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1.0 INTRODUCTION
For a field of social science to have usefulness, it must have a conceptual framework that
explains and predicts a set of empirical phenomena not explained or predicted by conceptual
frameworks already in existence in other fields (Shane 2000).
This study explored entrepreneurial oppòrtunities within franchising. On the surface,
franchising appears to create a system whose underpinnings are standardization,
replication, and compliance with detailed long-term contracts--a seemigly
unpromising environment in which to explore entrepreneurial opportunities. I argue
that heterogeneity and organizational complexity exist among franchising firms,
attributes overlooked in studies that characterized the phenomenon narrowly as a
uniform, dyadic relationship between franchisors and franchisees.
This study found that contractual provisions, franchisee obligations, and organizational
hierarchies varied among franchises, and that a relationship existed between the
presence of these attributes and differential performance among franchising firms. As a
contractual relationship between distinct entities, franchising is governed by a variety of
disclosure, trade, and intellectual property laws. Its contractual provisions and formal
disclosure documents defme a formal context in which franchising is conducted. In
addition to franchising's formal context, an operational realm also exists, one in which
daily operations of franchised businesses take place. This study revealed that
franchising's operational realm is not always contained within the defined limits of its
formal agreements, suggesting greater franchisee discretion may exist than revealed in
the agreement. As a result of organizational discontinuities in franchising's formal
context, and franchisee discretion within its operational context, diverse opportunities
for entrepreneurship exist within franchising beyond the birh of a franchisor's firm.
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Some researchers have called for additional theoretical development in franchising,
using more supple approaches that link strategies and performance. Consistent with
that approach, this study pursued four primary objectives:
1. To explore franchising's formal context, examining the nature and extent of
homogeneity in its disclosure and contractual provisions.
2. To examie relationships between firm characteristics, contractual provisions,
growth, and strategies among firms engaged in franchising.
3. To test the ability of characteristics and contractual provisions found in
franchising's formal context to predict measures of differential performance.
4. To examine relationships between franchising's formal context and its
operational realm, exploring the role of disclosure and contractual agreements
in franchise selection processes and daily operations offranchised businesses.
This study builds on previous research in franchising, revealing that entrepreneurial
opportuiuties exist within franchise systems beyond the inception of a franchisor's
original concept. It finds that organizational networks are formed within some
franchise firms, and that they are positively associated with the growth of those firms.
Support was also found for a view of franchising as a permanent organization form, not
merely a temporary expansion strategy. Further, this work revealed distinctions
between franchising's formal context and its operational realm.
Initially focused on franchising's formal context, this study examined relationships
among firm attributes, contractual provisions, and firm performance using three
measures of growth. Analysis revealed that some contractual provisions and firm
attributes increased the probability of opportunity exploitation and growth through
creation of new hierarchies and franchise networks within franchising firms. The
ability of contractual provisions and firm attributes, typically associated with
franchising's formal context, to explain comparative performance among franchising
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firms was then tested, using three measures of growth. Next, franchising's operational
realm was examined through in-person, semi-structured interviews with present and
former franchise owners, as well as representatives of a franchisor. In this portion of'
the study, the role of official disclosure documents and franchise agreements in both
franchise selection processes and daily operations of franchised businesses were
examined, in order to better understand differences between franchising' s formal and
informal contexts.
This chapter begins with a background to this research, including sections that
introduce contributions from entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, and
franchising research that helped to shape this study. Next, research justification is
presented, including franchising's economic impact, discussion of the research gap,
relative neglect ofthe methodology, and usefulness of this study. Methodologies used
in this study are presented next, followed by a brief summary and outline of this thesis.
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
This section provides background to this work, highlighting research that helped to
shape this study. It begins with an introduction, and then presents a selected group of
studies in entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, and franchising that have
particular relevance to this study. A more comprehensive review oftheoretical and
empirical literature is provided in a review of selected literature in the next chapter.
1.1.1 Background to the Research- Introduction
Firm performance and its social and economic impacts have justified longstanding
interest by practitioners and academics (Birch 1987); (Schumpeter 1934); (Storey
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1987). Firm performance has been called "the ultimate dependent variable" (Covin and
Slevin 1991, p. 9), and its relationship with entrepreneurial activity remains a fruitful
area for further research (Zahrà, Jennings et al. 1999). Determiants of firm
performance have been lined to marketing (Chaston 1997), strategy (Covin, Slevin et
al. 1994), individual leadership (Eggers, Leahy et al. 1996), training (Westhead and
Storey 1996), and entrepreneurship (Birley and Westhead 1990). Still a comparatively
young paradigm (Bygrave 1989), entrepreneurship theory could advance its body of
knowledge into economic and business mainstreams through systematic explorations of
entrepreneurial processes and firm performance (Clarkin and Rosa 2000).
Isolating determinants offirm performance, however, has proven complex and
problematic (Jennings and Beaver 1997). Firms are a nexus of relationships and
dynamic interactions among heterogeneous entities and individuals (Coase 1937).
Matrices of interactions between individuals and fiirms, with their internal and external
environments have been associated with entrepreneurial processes (Bouchikhi 1993);
(Kao 1991), and are believed to significantly differentiate the more from the less
successful (Solymossy 2000). One way to isolate determinants of performance is to
reduce the levels of environmental complexity, holding constant some contextual
factors that may affect firm performance.
An approach employed by Birley and Westhead identified eight different types of small
firm growth strategies, characterized by their internal and external attributes (Birley and
Westhead 1990). The authors concluded that firms within the small business sector
changed over time, and that assumptions of homogeneity in their strategies were not
supported when subjected to empirical analysis. Following a similar theme, Ucbasaran
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et aL built on previous work in entrepreneurial behaviours (e.g., (Gartner 1988);
(Gartner 1990); (Lumpkin and Dess 1996)), proposing a system of entrepreneurial types
categorized by organizational form (Ucbasaran, Westhead et aL 2000). The authors'
approach recognized that research in entrepreneurial behaviour should consider
contextual issues, and that entrepreneurial processes were more likely to be found in
some contexts than others. A means to implement this approach was suggested by
Gartner, who argued that before differentiating entrepreneurial types, the degree of
homogeneity within each organizational context should be examined (Gartner 1985).
Another approach was employed by Kodithuwakku and Rosa, who suggested that
environmental complexity may be reduced by examining entrepreneurial processes in
highly unpromising environments (Kodithuwakku and Rosa 1999). In a seemingly
uniform social and economic environment, with an apparent lack of opportunities and
resources, entrepreneurship emerged as a major determiant of success among farmers
in their study. i The authors found that entrepreneurial behaviour was more apparent in
this constrained, relatively homogeneous context, concluding that greater environmental
constraints improved the possibility of observing entrepreneurial processes.
Kodithuwakku and Rosa posited "Just as the value of water is most apparent in a desert,
so by analogy, it could be argued that the best way of observing the value of
entrepreneurship is when opportunties and resources are at their most meagre" (p. 12).
1 Kodithuwakku and Rosa (1999) examined why some Sri Lankan farmers were more successful than
others in the same village, given the same allocation and availability of resources. Ten years prior to the
field study, a group of families each received two and one-half acres of cleared land and a small monetary
grant. In fieldwork, they found considerable economic and social differentiation among the pioneers,
despite the parity of their initial resources and the uniformly scarce resources available to the farmers.
Although entrepreneurship studies frequently use success as the dependent variable (e.g., (Birley and
Westhead 1993); (Gray 1998); (Monroe, Price et al. 1996)), the "quasi-experimental" context of this
study made it somewhat unique.
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Both of the previously cited approaches sought to better observe entrepreneurial
processes by reducing environmental complexity and contextual heterogeneity in their
samples. The authors recognized a need for entrepreneurship research to go beyond
simple descriptions of the phenomenon and the birth of small firms, considering both
entrepreneurial contexts and processes (Low and MacMilan 1988). Additionally, these
approaches recognized the mediating effects of context on opportunity recognition and
exploitation, considered central tenets of entrepreneurship (Stevenson and Gumpert
1985). One aim of this study is to extend application of these previously described
approaches by exploring opportunities for entrepreneurship within the apparently
homogeneous and constrained context of franchising.
Although a high degree ofuniforllty is widely assumed among franchising firms, its
nature and extent has not been systematically examined. It follows that if
Kodithuwakku and Rosa's approach is to be developed beyond an agricultural setting,
another highly unprollsing, uniformly constrained context should be explored.
Franchising potentially meets these criteria. Built on replication, standardization, and
conforllty, franchising appears to create another highly unprollsing context for
entrepreneurialopportuiuties. Innovation, adaptation, and other behaviours commonly
associated with entrepreneurship are considered inherently ilegitimate in highly
formalized and structured organizations (Kirzner 1979), such as those found in
franchising. To detelle if franchising qualifies as a uniformly unprollsing
environment in which to examine entrepreneurial processes, the first section of this
study systematically examined franchising's formal context
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Dant and N asr observed that a number of earlier studies of franchising viewed it as a
simple dyadic relationship between franchisors and franchisees (Dant and Nasr 1998).
Studies that focus exclusively on the contracting relationship of the parties or the
principal and agent relationship created by a franchise are examples of this approach.
Recent empirical studies have revealed, however, that organizational complexities are
prevalent among firms engaged in franchising, including multi-unit ownership by
franchisees and various forms of master franchising. In their study of the restaurant
industry, Kalnins and Lafontaine found that only 11 percent of franchisees in their
sample were single unit owners (Kalnins and Lafontaine 1996). In his field
examination of five fast food chains, Bradach found that chain organizations rely
heavily on multi-unit franchisees as "building blocks of their organizations" (Bradach
1995, p. 80). These and other empirical fmdings suggest that narrowly-focused studies
may ignore complexities that exist in franchising, reducing their explanatory
effectiveness.
Organizational complexity and a broader approach to theoretical development are
potentially useful in understanding differential performance among firms in franchising.
Positing that organizational differences among franchising firms had an impact on
performance, Kaufmami and Kim found that firms engaged in various forms of master
franchising grew faster than those that did not (Kaufmann and Kim 1995). These area
developers and master franchisees introduced organzational layers between franchised
outlet owners and franchisors, creating a hierarchical structure beyond that of a simple,
dyadic governance system (Larson 1992). Hierarchies within firms create institutional
settings where exploitation of opportunities may exist, both in terms of establishing new
organizations and in pursuing new opportunities on behalf of their existing organization
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(Shane 2000). In order to take this approach one step futher, this study exallned the
prevalence of various forms of franchise networks, including area development, master
franchising and passive ownership, and measured their relationship to franchise system
growth.
On an aggregate basis, the success rate of firms engaged in franchising have been
compared with non-franchised businesses (e.g., (Bates 1996); (Stanworth, Purdy et al.
1998)). Other comparisons have focused on franchising as a method of expansion,
noting that economies of scale that accrued to franchised outlets provided competitive
advantages (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). Although franchise failure has been a popular
topic of debate among researchers (c.f. (Bates 1995); (Castrogiovanni, Justis et al.
1993)), and franchising has been found not to be a panacea for marginal small
businesses (Pilling 1991), factors that contribute to differential performance among
franchises remain a largely unexplored topic.2 Corlsistent with previous
entrepreneurship studies (e.g., (Davidsson 1989); (Zahra 1996)), this study focused on
firm growth as a measure of relative performance, operationalized as a changes in the
number of outlets within a given franchise system. Arguably, this approach and
measurement is consistent with venturing, the birth of new businesses within existing
organizations, a widely accepted measure of entrepreneurship employed in corporate
entrepreneurship literature (Guth and Ginsberg 1990).
2 Castrogiovanni et aI., found problems with methodology and generalizability of an earlier attempt to
differentiate fi'anchising finns by Camey and Gedajlovic, which found five fi'anchisor types: (1) rapid
growers; (2) expensive conservatives; (3) converters; (4) mature franchisors; and (5) unsuccessfuls
(Castrogiovanni, Bennet et al. 1995)
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This study of franchising was conducted in the United States. A contractual relationship
between legally distinct entities (Stanworth and Kaufrann 1996), franc hi sing in the
U.S. operates in a highly regimented and formal context, defined by detailed disclosure
requirements and contractual provisions. Arguably, U.S. franchise regulations are
among the most comprehensive in the world, providing a robust setting for
examinations offranchising's formal context. Frignani referred to disclosure
requirements in the United States as "particularly dense and complex" (Frignani 1995,
p. 10). Despite lengthy and regimented disclosure requirements, the extent to which
these items explain differential performance among franchising firms has not yet been
explored.
Although lengthy disclosure requirements and contractual provisions provided a robust
source of information, franchising's formal context presents only a partial view of the
phenomenon. Research conducted by the University of Westminster found differences
among franchisees in their ability to control their operations, and differences between
their perceived discretionary power and that specified in their agreements (Stanworth
1995). In other words, a large number offranchisees reported higher levels of
autonomy and independence than were actually afforded by the term of their
agreement. This finding led Stanworth to argue "the formal contract was often a poor
guide to the world of operational reality" (p. 161). Consistent with Stanworth's
approach, this study used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to
explore both formal and operational contexts offranchising in order to provide a more
complete view of the phenomenon.
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1.1.2 Background to the Research- Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship has been widely recognized as an engine that fuels most econolles
(Gorman, Hanlon et al. 1997). In broad terms, entrepreneurial processes and their
ability to impact firm performance have been influenced by three factors: the external
and internal environment, opportunity recognition, and opportunity exploitation.
Although recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities is considered a subjective
process, the opportunities themselves are an objective phenomena (Shane 2000).
Environmental factors have been found to mediate entrepreneurial processes
(Kaufmann and Dant 1998). Restrictions on fmancing, capital scarcity (Evans and
Leighton 1989), and liquidity constraints (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998) are most
often cited as indicators of environmental constraint on entrepreneurship. An
environment that fosters opportunity detection is an essential and necessary prerequisite
to entrepreneurship, because without it no entrepreneurial processes wil emerge
(Stevenson and Jarilo 1990). Organizational context has also been found to affect
entrepreneurial environments3 (Kao 1991), exerting influence on a firm' s ability to
inovate (Mone, McKinley et al. 1998). Environmental factors affect an
entrepreneur's ability to continually search out new opportunities that other firms
cannot or choose not to pursue (Hudson and McArthur 1994). Irrespective of size, high
performing firms were found to adopt more flexible organization structures, especially
in environments characterized by intense and dynamic competitive pressures
3 Kao (1991) defies the organizational context as "the immediate setting in which creative and
entrepreneurial work takes place...organizational strcture and systems, the definition of work rules, and
group culture affect significantly the nature of the creative or entrepreneurial environment. Such factors
may limit or facilitate creativity and entrepreneurship, and become an increasing factor to contend with as
the organization evolves" (Kao 1991).
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(Khandwalla, 1977 in (Covin and Slevin 1989)). These organic organizations were
more adaptable, had more open communications, more consensual decision-making,
and were more loosely controlled (Chell, Haworth et aL. 1991).
Khandwalla found that, in general, high performing firms adopted more mechanistic
organization structures only in environments with minimal competitive pressure (Covin
and Slevin 1989). Mechanistic organizations worked well when tasks were
straightforward, competitive environments were stable, when the goal was to produce
the same product repeatedly, and when human "machines" merely complied with the
rules as designed (Morgan 1997). These organizations tended to be highly centralized
and formal, with high levels of vertical interaction and specialization (Lumpkin and
Dess 1996). They were characterized as "much more traditional, more tightly
controlled, and more hierarchical in (their) approach" (Chell, Haworth et aL. 1991, p.
60). Mechanistic firms are believed to be ill suited for rapidly changing, highly
competitive, and dynamic markets.
Second, an ability to recognize opportunities has been considered a prerequisite for
entrepreneurship (Churchil 1997). Entrepreneurial opportunities are ones that create
profit potential through creation of new businesses, or that significantly improve the
position of an existing business (Hills, Lumpkin et al. 1997). Opportunity recognition
has been an important factor when firms operate in highly competitive and dynamic
market environments (Wright, Robbie et aL. 1997), for both new venture creation
(Cooper, Folta et al. 1995), and to enhance the position of existing businesses (Hils,
Lumpkin et al. 1997). Kirzner suggested that opportunity recognition is a central role
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of an entrepreneur, defmed as knowing or recognizing things that others did not
(Kirzner 1979).
An ability to exploit opportunities is the third factor in entrepreneurship (Shane 2000).
Opportunities are typically exploited in small firms through quick decision-making,
simple administrative structures, and flexible operations (Baldwin 1995). These
attributes enable rapid adaptation to changing market demands (Jennings and Beaver
1997). Miller concluded that rapid exploitation of opportunities for both small and
large firms was the only effective means of coping with adversity in hostile
environments (Miler 1983). Hostile environments were characterized by unstable
industry settings, intense competition, and comparative lack of exploitable opportunities
(Covin and Slevin 1989).
Thompson posited that strategic organizations are àble to embrace inovation and
entrepreneurship, finding and exploiting manageable opportunities (Thompson 1998).
He concluded that visionary leadership at all management levels and organizational
flexibility were essential aspects of entrepreneurial firms. Traditional organizational
models structured with rigid hierarchies and clearly defmed boundaries were found to
be poorly suited for today's entrepreneurial corporations (Dess, Lumpkin et al. 1999).
Increasingly, large firms engaged in highly competitive markets have attempted to
emulate apparent successes by small fIrms through adoption of more flexible
organization structures (Kanter 1996).
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1.1.3 Background to the Research- Corporate Entrepreneurship
Once considered an oxymoron, entrepreneurship in various organiational contexts has
received increased attention for its role as a determinant of firm survival, success,
profitability, and growth (e.g., (Birkinshaw 1997); (Burgelman 1983); (Drucker 1985;
Guth and Ginsberg 1990); (Miller 1983); (Pinchot ILL 1985); (Zahra 1996)). Stevenson
and Jarillo argued that pursuing opportunity, whether through specific company
structures or not, constitutes the core of both individual and corporate entrepreneurship
(Stevenson and Jarillo 1990).
Thirty years ago, Peterson and Berger (1971) found that entrepreneurial processes could
help firms to create new revenue streams through new business development (Zahra,
Nielsen et al. 1999). Entrepreneurial processes, through development and deployment
of unique resources were deemed necessary for organizational survival, profitability,
growth (Penrose 1968), and strategic renewal (Zalta 1996). Recently, opportunities
for entrepreneurship within corporate organizations have become a subject of
discussion among both practitioners and acadellcians (Sharma and Chrisman 1999).
Guth and Ginsberg posited that corporate entrepreneurship encompasses two types of
phenomena and the processes surrounding them: (1) venturing, the birth of new
businesses within existing organizations; and (2) strategic renewal by the
transformation of organizations through renewal of the key ideas (Guth and Ginsberg
1990, p. 5). Empirical evidence suggests that corporate entrepreneurship improved
company performance by increasing a firm's pro activeness and wilingness to assume
risks, and by subsequent development of new products, processes, and services
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996); (Zahra, Nielsen et al. 1999). Increasing creativity and
John E. Clarkin 18
innovation has not only been considered a determnant of increased performance, but
has become a minimum requirement for many corporations simply to remain
competitive (Herbert and BrazeaI1999). Over the past decade, there has been growing
awareness ofthe impact of governance and ownership systems on corporate
entrepreneurship (Zahra 1996). It is widely accepted that organizational structure,
processes, and systems found among firms are associated with relative performance
(Covin and Slevin 1989); (Eisenhardt 1989); (Slevin and Covin 1997).
Covin & Slevin argued that firmperformance is a fuction of both organizational and
individual-level behaviours (Covin and Slevin 1991). The authors argued that a firm-
behaviour perspective of entrepreneurship has a number of advantages: First,
entrepreneurial effectiveness can be measured in terms of firm performance. Second,
behaviours rather than attributes give meaning to entrepreneurial processes-- an
organization's actions make it entrepreneuriaL. Third, development of entrepreneurial
process knowledge hinges on accurately differentiating between more or less
entrepreneurial firms. Fourth, firm-level entrepreneurial behaviour is affected by and
managed through organizational structures, strategies, systems, and cultures (p.8).
Covin and Slevin's conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behaviour is
presented in Figure A2 in Appendix A.
Because management values, economic realities, and strategic considerations all result
in varying degrees of entrepreneurship withi organizations (Herbert and Brazeal
1999), it became possible to array firms on a continuum of conservative-
entrepreneurial (Covin and Slevin 1991). From the strategic management literature
emerged methods, practices, and styles that categorized and distinguished firrn-level
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entrepreneurial processes, called Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) (Lumpkin and Dess
1996). The authors argued that a firm's level of autonomy, inovativeness, risk taking,
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness served as indicators of its EO. They
concluded that relationships existed between a firm's EO and firm performance. EO
defmitions and references to other work in Entrepreneurial Orientation are presented in
Appendix B, Table B20.
1.1.4 Background to the Research- Franchise Systems
On the surface, franchising appears to create a uniformly regimented and theoretically
unpromising environment for entrepreneurship, especially when contrasted with non-
franchised businesses. Some have suggested, however, that franchising provides a
unique and fertile setting for research in entrepreneurship (Kaufmann and Dant 1998),
creating an organizational context that can either promote or constrain entrepreneurial
processes (Falbe, Dandridge et aL. 1998).
Franchising's environment presents a somewhat unique setting for entrepreneurship
research, in that success within its context depends on cooperation by two distinct
entities: franchisors and franchisees (Shane and Hoy 1996). Through cooperation,
franchised outlets achieve economies of scale in marketing and production normally
found only in large firms (Elango and Fried 1997). Unlike studies of 
non-franc hi sed
small businesses, where data scarcity and poor reliability are prevalent (Birley and
Westhead 1990), detailed financial and operational data on franchises may be available
to researchers. The contractual nature of a franchise and disclosure regulations found in
some countries provides a rich source of legal and financial information, although this
information is typically not made available to the public. This fertile setting for
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information is especially apparent in the United States, where federal and state laws
require detailed disclosure of material facts related to each franchise (Emerson 1998);
(Government 1986).
On one hand, franchising promotes entrepreneurial processes by delimiting fmancial
constraints on growth (Spinelli and Birley 1996). From a franchisor's perspective,
franchisees provide an efficient source of expansion capital (Caves and Murphy 1976);
(Dant 1995). Franchising overcomes informational barriers by providing franchisees
with management training, site selection assistance, and pricing guidance, as well as
information on other aspects of business ownership (Curran and Stanworth 1983).
Franchising also provides an alternative to employment for current or previous self-
employed individuals (Stanworth and Kaufmann 1996).
Conversely, franchising's organizational context hàs also been found to constrain
entrepreneurial processes. Unlike other businesses, franchised firms exist in an
environment characterized by performance monitoring and control mechanisms,
detailed contractual specifications, and fmancial reporting systems (MoITison 1997).
For individuals and firms within franchise systems, the path to success is through
efficient implementation of a proven system devised by others, rather than through
independent entrepreneurial behaviours. Detailed covenants of behaviour are prevalent
in franchising, leading some to conclude that franchisees more closely resemble
employees than independent entrepreneurs (Baucus, Baucus et aL. 1993). Kanouse
suggested that from a legal perspective, a "control spectrum" existed, as depicted in
Figure 1.1 below (Kanouse 1990).
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Figure 1.1: Kanouse's Control Spectrum
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Source: (Kanouse 1990)
Kanouse's spectrum positions franchising at a point where a governing firm has less
control than found in corporate-owned outlets, but more control than through
distributorships or licensing arrangements. Stanworth's study revealed, however, that
franchisors and franchisees differ in their views of responsibility and control over
operations of franchised outlets. A summary of this study is presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Views of Control Over Franchise Outlet Operations
Percent in agreement
Mainly or totally decision of: Franchiseeln=215) Franchisor (n=15)
Additions/Deletions Franchisor 55.3 93.3
of products or services
Pricing Franchisor 62.8 80.0
Hrs. of operation Franchisee 78.1 66.6
Staff employment Franchisee 93.5 60.0
Staff wages Franchisee 8804 93.3
Quality of service Franchisee 7404 46.7
Bookkeeping Franchisee 85.1 73.3
Local Advertising Franchisee 91.6 33.3
Source: Stanworth,1. (1995) The Franchise Relationship: Entrepreneurship or Dependence? (p. 167)
As Table 1.1 ilustrates, large discrepancies existed between franchisors and franchisees
in responsibilities for control decisions in franchised outlets. Franchisors, responsible
for crafting franchise agreements, consider control over pricing and product offerings to
be largely their responsibility. This view, however, was not widely held by franchisees.
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In the United States and several other jurisdictions, both franchisors and franchisees are
embedded in laws and regulatory requirements that establish legal limits within which
franchising must be conducted (Hudson and McArhur 1994). Franchise laws and
regulations restrict levels of flexibility by both parties (Lewis 1990). Contractual
provisions may also limit both parties' ability to evaluate the comparative value of other
opportunities (Kirzner 1979). Non-compete clauses, prevalent in franchising, impose
limitations both during and after the period covered by a franchise agreement. In his
study of industrial relationships, Blois observed that preclusions from other
opportunities may be perceived as a golden cage or a prison, depending on alternatives
at any given time (Blois 1998).
Researchers from a variety of disciplines have studied franchising, including those in
economics (e.g., (Kirchhoff1991); (Willamson 1975)), law (e.g., (Brown 1985);
(Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995)), strategic management (e.g., (Jarillo 1988); (Thorell
1986)) and entrepreneurship (e.g., (Birley, Leleux et aL. 1997); (Shane and Spell 1998);
(Stanworth, Purdy et aL. 1997)). Franchising has also been studied from more focused
perspectives, as a method of contracting (e.g., (Hart 1987); (Lafontaine and Slade
1998)), or marketing (e.g., (Morgan and Stoltman 1997); (Thompson 1971)).
Stanworth and Curran suggested that a major reason for restricted focus in these and
other studies is that franchising does not appear to fit comfortably within the limits of
any singlè academic discipline (Stanworth and Curran 1999). Although insightful,
narrow perspectives have often revealed conflicting observations, leading Koiranen to
conclude that franchising's complexity could best be understood by investigating its
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paradoxicalness (Koiranen, Hyrsky et al. 1997).4 This paradoxical view offranchising
was shared by several researchers, as summarized in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Paradoxes in Franchising
Independence/ Autonomy Interdependence Dant et aI., 1992; Stanworth,
1993"
Innovation Replication English & Hoy, 1995"
Responsibility Limited Decision-Making Hoy,1994"
Authority
Creativity Conformity English & Hoy, 1995;
Stanworth et aI., 1996"
Support Supervision Ring; 1995"
Conformity Lower Failure Rates Price, 1997 
Cooperative Entrepreneurship Conflict (c.£, Shane & Hoy, 1996;
Spinell & Birley, 1996)
"Source: Paradoxes and Reaction Pairs in Franchising (Koiranen, Hyrsky et aI. 1997).
1.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH
One aim of this study is to further the current base of knowledge about entrepreneurship
within franchising. This topic is relevant for several reasons. First, franchising's global
economic and social impact justifies further examination of entrepreneurship's role
within this context. Second, despite its economic I'pact, relatively litte is known
about entrepreneurship within franchising beyond a franchisor's creation of a concept.
Third, studies of franchising have focused on failure rates and agency theory, with few
if any attempts to lin entrepreneurial processes with performance. Finally, results of
this study add valuable data to the literature on franchising. Its fmdings have relevance
to academics, practitioners, and policy makers. Each ofthese areas of justification is
addressed inthe following sections.
4 An example ofthe paradoxical views offranchising is found in Price's expansive monograph: "how can
franchisors stress conformity, rather than innovation, and also simultaneously expect fewer failures than
independent businesses?" (Price 1997, p. 506).
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1.2.1 Franchising's Economic Impact
Franchising's socio-economic impact makes it worthy of study within the discipline of
entrepreneurship. Consistent with other entrepreneurship studies, franchising' s impact
is often measured in economic terms (Trutko, Trutko et al. 1993), including job creation
and sales turnover. Job creation has been widely used to measure the economic impact
of entrepreneurial processes (e.g., (Birch and McCracken 1987); (Stevenson and Jarillo
1990)). Consistent with this approach, Hoffman and Preble observed that creation of
new business units and jobs is central to franchising's mission (Hoffman and Preble
1993), and further research appeared justified, given its exponential growth and its role
as a source of job creation (Morrison 1995). Franchising's job creation is exemplified
by one ofthe best-known franchises, McDonald's, who has employed more than 16
millon people during its 40-year history (Bradach 1998).
Although measurements offranchising's economic impact sometimes differ depending
on the source ofthe data, its impact is considerable. Mendelsohn found that 1.5 millon
Europeans are employed by 4,000 franchisors in 170,000 franchised outlets;
employment numbers exceed 2.5 millon if those firms that supply franchised outlets
are also considered (Mendelsohn 1999). Another measure of economic impact is sales
turnover. France's 600 franchisors recorded nearly $25 billion in 1998 sales5, while
annual gross turnover for business format franchises in the DK reached an aggregate
£7.4 billion (Mendelsohn 1999). A report by the D.S. and Foreign Commercial Service,
as summarized in Table 1.3, notes the number of 
systems, number of units, number of
employees and sales turnover recorded in the European franchise market.
5 Source: Arthur Andersen, LLP, 1999 Franchise Survey of 40 countries, available at:
http://\\ww.arthurandersen ,com/Fram esalt. asp? IFranchiseServices! index. asp.
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Table 1.: The European Franchise Market - 1997
Country Franchises Franchise Units Employees Sales in $ bilion
Germany 530 22,000 230,000 1304
Italy 436 21,390 49,658 11.0
France 470 25,750 355,000 804
Netherlands 345 1l,91O 100,000 804
Great Britain 474 22,570 222,700 8.1
Spain 288 13,161 69,000 6.2
Sweden 230 9,150 71,000 5.2
Belgium 170 3,500 28,500 2.8
Norway 125 3,500 N/A 2.7
Hungary 220 5,000 45,000 204
Austria 210 3,000 40,000 1.
Denmark 98 2,000 40,000
.917
Portugal 220 2,000 35,000 .917
Czech & Slovenia 40 80 760 .76
Yugoslavia 18 620 2,810 .513
Total Europe 3,874 148,761 1,289,928 78,607
Source: European Franchise Federation, published by U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and
U.S. Department of State, 1998, National Trade Data Bank Market Report, 08-01-98.
In the United States, sales through franchised outlets approached $1 trillon (Bradach
1998), and were expected to account for 50% of all retail sales by the year 2000 (Dant
1995). By most measures of economic impact, franchising is worthy of further study.
Franchising's expansion in Europe and other global markets has enabled international
franchising to develop at an unprecedented rate (Preble and Hoffman 1995),
representing an important export for the United States. Shane found that between 1971
and 1985, U.S. franchisors added foreign outlets by 17% per year, almost twice as fast
as they added domestic outlets (Shane 1996). Payment of franchise fees to U.S.
franchisors by overseas franchise operations is a significant source of income for U.S.
franchisors, exceeding $569 millon in 1999 (Mann, Brokenbaugh et al. 2000). Table
lA presents geographic sources of franchise fee revenues from 1996 through 1999.
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Table 104: Franchise Fees Receipts to US. Franchisors (in $ milions)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Canada 36 29 41 35
Europe 170 192 230 253
Latin Americaa 38 44 53 56
Africa 9 12 12 14
Middle East 24 34 38 43
Asia and Pacific 131 148 123 147
Other 11 17 9 22
Total $ 419 $ 475 $ 506 $ 569
Source: US. Department of Commerce, Us. International Services: Cross-Border Trade in 1999 and
Sales Through Affliates in 1998 (2000).
a Includes other Western Hemisphere Countries not listed elsewhere
As indicated in Table 1.4, Europe represents a substantial and growing market for u.s.
franchisors. On a percentage basis, however, growth in receipts from Europe from
1998 to 1999 grew at 10 percent, while total receipts increased by 12.4 percent.
Within Europe, the impact and growth rates ofU.S. franchisors differs among countries,
as revealed in the comparative franchise fee receip~s in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Franchise Fees Receipts from Europe to US. Franchisors (in $ milions)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Belgium - Luxem bourg 2 2 3 3
France 10 18 15 15
Germany 81 76 80 89
Italy 3 3 20 22
Netherlands 3 5 6 8
Norway 2 3 5 6
Spain 4 5 5 10
Sweden . 4 4 6 7
Switzerland 2 2 2 1
United Kingdom 34 42 48 53
Other 23 31 40 39
Europe Total $170 $192 $230 $ 253
Source: US. Department of Commerce, Us. International Services: Cross-Border Trade in 1999 and
Sales Through Affiliates in 1998 (2000).
According to U.S. Department of Commerce data, Germany represents the largest
source of franchise fee revenues for U.S. franchisors, followed by the United Kingdom.
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In addition to its global economic impact in terms of job creation and revenue
generation, franchising's ubiquity also suggests that the phenomenon is material and
worthy of analysis (Harrigan 1998). Franchising's effects often reach beyond those
readily apparent. 6
L.2.2Research Gap
In spite of its present and potential economic impact, franchising has received limited
attention in recent literature (Falbe, Dandridge et aL 1998). One reason may be that
some researchers view franchising as a programmed, non-entrepreneurial mode of entry
(Phan, Butler et aL 1996). Another may be that entrepreneurs are often associated with
innovation (Filion 1998), an instrument by which entrepreneurial firms exploit change
to create wealth (Drucker 1985). While inovation has been considered the most
important characteristic associated with success (Baldwin 1995), some consider
franchising to be the antitheses of innovation, resp(imsible for homogenization of
commercial cultures and a lack of variety in many retail sectors (Kaufmann and Dant
1998).
Although entrepreneurship research on franchising exists, contributions from recent
literature have been heavily weighted towards franchisors as sole contributors of
entrepreneurial value. Despite more than 225 articles published by Society of
Franchising, and more than 80 articles published by entrepreneurship researchers,
franchisees have been one of the least studied of entrepreneurial types (Phan, Butler et
6 An example offranchising's impact was provided by Bradach, who observed that McDonald's had
recently surpassed the U.S. Army is the "institution that trains the greatest number of American youth-
nearly 700,000 teenagers annually" (Bradach 1998, p. 4).
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aL 1996). Studies that measured growth (e.g., (Shane 1996)), innovation (e.g.,
(Kaufmann and Dant 1998)), and entrepreneurial behaviour (e.g., (Baucus, Baucus et aL
1996)) have all focused on entrepreneurial activities by franchisors. Potential
entrepreneurial behaviours by franchisees may be overlooked, as franchisors have
stated they prefer managers to entrepreneurs, in order to protect their business system
from unauthorized change (Falbe, Dandridge et aL 1998). Price's expansive
monograph The Franchise Paradox, viewed entrepreneurial activity by franchisees as a
paradox (Price 1997). In contrast to studies of franchisors, litte research has been
devoted to entrepreneurial opportunities within franchise systems, presumably because
of its apparently unpromising environment for entrepreneurial experimentation by
franchisees.
Recently, however, Bercovitz observed that variations in contractual arrangements
between franchisors and franchisees remained largely unexplained (Bercovitz 1999).
She found substantial diversity in some pecuniary and non-pecuniary contract
provisions, influenced by levels and types of hazards present in a contract (p. 26).
Although her study suggested that possibilities of opportunty exploitation may vary
among franchising firms, relationships between contractual provisions and success or
performance of franchising firms remains largely unexplored.
Shane and Boy posited that creation of a franchise network is an entrepreneurial act
(Shane and Boy 1996). Although entrepreneurship research has generally accepted
franchisors as entrepreneurs (Falbe, Dandridge et aL 1998); (Shane and Boy 1996),
exclusion of franchisees would require an extremely narrow definition of the field (Boy
1994). Whether franchisees should be regarded as entrepreneurs is an emerging area of
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interest (Fenwick and Strombom 1998), especially when entrepreneurship is considered
to involve more than merely starting a business (Westhead and Wright 1998). There is
little empirical evidence, however, on the nature and extent to which franchise networks
exist within franchising.
Increasingly complex and dynamic global business environments require that firms
quickly and effectively adapt to competitive pressures (Slevin and Covin 1995), and
explaining how and why organizations change has been a central and enduring quest of
scholars (Van de Ven and Poole 1995). With few exceptions, global competition, rapid
technological progress, and many other factors have heightened the need for
organizations to become more entrepreneurial in order to survive and prosper through
inovative and pro active behavior (De ss, Lumpkin et al. 1999). Making a corporation
more entrepreneurial is now a minimum requirement in many industries simply to stay
in the competitive game (Herbert and Brazeal 1999). In contrast to entrepreneurial
firms, both small and large, Bucklin concluded that franchising "thrives upon resistance
to change" (Bucklin 1971). Zahra suggested that additional research is needed if the
association of governance and ownership systems with corporate entrepreneurship is to
be better understood (Zahra 1996). Concepts developed within corporate
entrepreneurship's constructs have not been applied in hybrid governance systems such
as franchising.
In summary, although entrepreneurship has been widely accepted as a determinant of
success in small firms, and a positive and strengthening linage between corporate
entrepreneurial behavior and financial performance has been established (Covin and
Miles 1999), entrepreneurship's relationship with firm performance within franchising
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has yet to be systematically explored. One aim of this study is to take a first step
toward identifying aspects in the formal and operational contexts offranchising where
entrepreneurial opportunties may exist.
1.2.3 Relative Neglect of Methodology
In their synthesis of recent literature, Elango and Fried (1997) concluded that past
research often presented an incomplete view of franchising, tied too closely to theories
of agency and power, and often ignored franchisee's perspective (Elango and Fried
1997). With roots in legal, marketing and economics disciplines, franchise research has
usually focused on agency and fisk reduction theories, transaction cost analysis, and
ownership redirection (Price 1997). Morrison proposed that future studies should
investigate a broader theoretical framework, incorporating the role of entrepreneurship
(Morrison 1995). Recognizing the limitations of past research, a broader theoretical
framework was introduced by Stanworth and Curran, who offered a sociological model
of franchising, which provides a skeletal structure for studies of franchising at societal,
organizational and individual levels (Stanworth and Curran 1999). Empirical studies
employing constructs outlined in Stanworth and Curran's study are not evident at this
time ofthis work.
Reporting on two major research projects conducted in Britain, Stanworth found
substantive disparities between the one-sided relationship that exists between
franchisors and franchisees in their formal or contractual level, and the "operational
realm" in which daily activities take place (Stanworth 1995, p. 165). Franchisees
reported relatively high levels of independence, despite comprehensively prescriptive
contractual provisions. Drawing further distinctions between formal and operational
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levels, more than 80 percent of franchisee respondents reported that their franchisor
"never mentioned the contract to them in their everyday relations" (p. 165). Stanworth
concluded that examinations of franchisor- franchisee relations exclusively at the formal
level is misleading, as franchisors need the goodwill of franchisees. Although
franchised businesses are frequently contrasted with non- franchised businesses,
Stanworth noted substantial variety between franchises in levels of autonomy enjoyed
by franchisees. Further examinations of differences between franchises, considering
both formal and operational realms, are not evident in recent studies of franchising.
1.2.4 Usefulness of Applications of Findings
Findings ofthis study have applicability for academics, practitioners, and policy
makers. This work contributes to continued development of entrepreneurship research
by examining a previously understudied and substantive group of firms. It extends
research performed in small firms and studies in corporate entrepreneurship to
franchising's hybrid governance structure.
Practitioners and potential franchisees may also benefit from this study and its typology
to better evaluate franchise opportunities. Potential franchisees may benefit from this
work's analysis offranchising, encouraging a more critical look among firms engaged
franchising, using indicators of potential entrepreneurial opportunities. Because
recruiting franchisees is an important par of franchising, franchisors may be more
forthcomig, and loosen constraints in their systems to allow for increased latitude on
the part of franchisees, encouraging innovation and wealth creation within their
systems. Entrepreneurial activity by franchisees implies a partnership in adapting to a
changing environment. As the global environment becomes more competitive, a need
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for entrepreneurial activity within franchising is likely to increase dramatically (Falbe,
Dandridge et al. 1998).
Policy makers in both the United States and Europe may benefit from insights provided
by this study as it pertains to disclosure. The current system of disclosure in the U.S. is
expensive to produce and administer. It may prove ineffectual as a disclosure
instrument if it does not provide information for prospective franchisees of growth and
potential success of franchises. In the U.S., improvements to the existing system of
disclosure may reduce the incidence of litigation and disputes in franchising, reducing
the need for additional franchise legislation. In Europe and other parts of the world,
where franchise disclosure issues are being debated, this work provides insights on
mechanisms of disclosure in the U.S.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
The exploratory nature ofthe first paii oftlus study justified use of a field study to
examine official documents governing franchise relationships. Primary data were
collected from 55 franchise systems over a period of fourteen months in the United
States, specifically in the cities of Charles ton and Columbia, South Carolina. The U.S.
provided a fertile setting for this initial portion of the study because of its uniform,
federal disclosure laws. Access to documents not normally available to the public was
provided with permission from the Secretary of State's Office in Columbia, South
Carolina.
In addition to primary data collected from franchise documents, facts derived from
official records and surveys were also examined. Datasets were constructed from facts
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gathered through Entrepreneur Magazine, FRADATA, and Bond's Franchise Guide.
These larger datasets provided an opportunity to employ quantitative methods of
analysis including correlation, factor analysis, and multiple regression analysis. Data
used to construct these datasets have been shown to be both consistent (Mehta, Luza et
aL. 1999) and reliable (Shane 1998).
In order to gain further insights in franchising's operational realm, this study includes
sell-structured interviews with four present franchise owners, including one area
developer franchisee, and two former franchise owners. Additionally, interviews with
the general counsel and chief financial officer of a fast growing franchise were
conducted to gain insights from a franchisor's perspective.
1.4 SUMMARY
Arguably, entrepreneurship is best understood as a'process within a context (Low and
MacMilan 1988), the constituents of which are entrepreneurs, engaged in a persistent
search for opportunities, and the efforts to marshal the resources needed to exploit them
(Hil and McGowan 1996); (Timmons 1994). The context in which individuals and
firms exist affects their ability to identifY, recognize, and exploit opportunities.
Entrepreneurial behaviour has been shown to have a positive and significant effect on
firm performance in small firms through examining individual and firm behaviours.
Corporate entrepreneurship studies have demonstrated that in large firms,
entrepreneurial behaviours by firms and individuals within it also is associated with
improved performance.
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As a hybrid, contractual governance structure, firms and individuals engaged in
franchising may be thought to exist in two distinct contexts: a formal context defmed by
contractual provisions and detàil disclosures, and an operational realm in which
everyday operations are conducted. Considering franchising's formal context,
comparatively little is known about factors that differentiate firms and their
contributions to firm performance. Specifically, the presence or absence of franchise
networks and their influence on firm performance has not been systematically
examined. In its operational realm, additional work is needed to better understand the
role of disclosure and the effects of contractual provisions on both a franchise selection
process and daily operations of a franchised business.
This study initially employed a case study approach to explore franchising's formal
context through direct examination of franchise disclosure and contractual documents.
Next, quantitative methods were used to examie datasets operationalized from
secondary sources, including correlation analysis, factor analysis, and multiple
regression. Finally, semi-structured interviews were used to extract the subtleties and
perceptions found in franchising's operational realm.
1.5 OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS
This work follows the basic framework of a five-chapter dissertation format, adapted to
present analysis in three separate chapters, and a separate chapter for defmitions and
hypotheses development. Chapter 2 begins with an inter-disciplinary review ofthe
recent literature, with an emphasis on entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship
contributions. Following the literature review, a chapter is devoted to defmitions and a
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unit of analysis discussion to provide clarity. Research questions and hypotheses
emerging from the literature are presented in this chapter.
Next, the methodologies used in this study are presented in chapter four, which includes
descriptions of the datasets. Analysis of the data follows in chapters five, six, and
seven. The first analysis chapter describes exploratory case studies of official
documents, while the second tests the hypotheses using secondary data derived from
both offcial documents and survey instruments. The third analysis chapter presents
semi-structured interviews. Finally, the eighth chapter contains discussion,
conclusions, implications, and suggestions for further research.
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2.0 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND FRANCHISING:
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The overall aims of this study are to explore entrepreneurial opportunities within
franchising. Consistent with other concepts in the social sciences, entrepreneurship
studies often require a multidimensional approach, as certain theo,ries have more
relevance in some contexts than in others. Increasingly, empirical research in
franchising has revealed complexities that justify employment of a multi-disciplinary
approach.
In franchising, a formal context is created by the contractual nature of franchise
relationships, governed by detailed disclosure requirements and regulatory oversight not
typically found in other business environments. Although comprehensive, franchise
,
agreements cannot cover all possible contingencies, and may have only a partial effect
on the daily operations of a franchised business. Examination of the operational context
is required to provide a more complete view of the phenomenon. This study, therefore,
examined both the formal and operational contexts of franchising, including
perspectives from the United States and other countries. This chapter reviews relevant
theoretical and empirical literature, focused on entrepreneurial processes in general, and
those applicable to franchising in particular.
Various theories have been employed in studies of entrepreneurship phenomena, in part
because the paradigm had not yet developed "distinctive methods and theories of its
own" (Bygrave 1989, p. 7). Research in economics (e.g., (Schumpeter 1934); (von
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Mises 1949)); social anthropology (e.g., (Rosa and Bowes 1990); (Caulkins 1988)),
psychology (e.g., (Chell, Haworth et al. 1991); (Shaver and Scott 1991)), sociology
(e.g., (Reynolds 1991)); strategic management (e.g., (Zahra 1993); (Barney 1991)) and
other disciplines have shaped the theoretical underpinnings of entrepreneurship
research. Although these contributions have provided valuable insights, they were
found to have limitations when used exclusively in studies of entrepreneurship.
In similar fashion, exclusive use of some theories has presented a less than complete
view offranchising, despite an apparent uniformity offranchising's context. Price
argued that franchise research, often rooted in legal, marketing, and economics theories,
had "shown a preoccupation with agency theory, transaction cost analysis, ownership
redirection, and risk reduction theory" (Price 1997, p. 533). He concluded that, in and
of themselves, these theories provided incomplete rationales, failing to explain the
dynamics found in empirical studies offranchising¡' Noting limitations in these
theoretical approaches, Stanworth and Curan observed that franchising "does not
comfortably fit within the limits of any single academic discipline or area of
management practice" (Stanworth and Curran 1999, p. 324). They argued that views of
franchising as merely a contractual form of business or as a form of marketing were too
narrowly focused. The authors advocated a more encompassing approach, linking
organizational characteristics and strategies to behavior patterns of individual actors.
Considering that franchising extends into a variety of academic disciplines, a multi-
disciplinary design was adopted for this literature review. Because this study includes
analysis of the formal context offranchising, as defined by its disclosure and
contractual provisions, the first section begins with :f'anchise research from a
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contracting perspective. Although narrow in its focus, a contracting perspective
provides insights into contractual relationships between franchisors and franchisees.
Contributions from organizational theory follow, which includes views of cooperative
relationships such as networks and strategic alliances. Next, contributions from
economics, and psychology disciplines are presented. As a contractual form of
business, franchising is subject to both general business and specific laws, which is
influenced by the regulatory environment in which it operates. Therefore, an overview
of the legal environments in which franchising operates is provided, with particular
emphasis on regulations in Europe and the United States. The second section of this
chapter reviews theoretical and empirical studies found in entrepreneurship literature.
Because opportunities for entrepreneurship in franchising must also consider its
organization structure, this study includes a review of the corporate entrepreneurship
literature.
2.2 CONTRACTING
Shane and Hoy argued that previous research in franchising viewed it in narrow terms,
simply as a contractual form of business between firms (Shane and Hoy 1996). Klein
concluded that underlying econollC forces found in franchise contracts may also be
found in most distribution arrangements, which makes franchising a "good laboratory in
which to study contractual arrangements" (Klein 1995, p. 36). Studies focused on
contracting have considered ranges of formal and informal methods used to regulate
exchanges, not just legal documents prepared by lawyers and signed by the parties
(Hudson and McArthur 1994). Contracting research has provided insights relevant to
franchising's formal context, as well as aspects of trust between parties in contractual
business relationships.
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2.2.1 Contracting- Review of Selected Theoretical and Empirical Literature
Firms enter into contractual business relationships for various reasons, one of which is
to gain a competitive advantage (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996). Within franchising's
context, competitive advantage is created when a franchisor's tested system, branded
concept, and economies of scale are combined with a franchisee's local market
knowledge and entrepreneurial talents (Stanworth, Purdy et al. 1998) in a unique form
of cooperative entrepreneurship (Shane and Hoy 1996). At the epicenter of
franchising's formal relationship are detailed disclosure and contractual agreements,
making a contracting perspective an integral part of this and other studies of
franchising.
In franchising, contracting is performed when two legally distinct entities, franchisors
and franchisees, execute a franchise agreement(Castrogiovanni and Justis 1998).
Through these agreements, franchisors grant permi~sion to use their trademark and
business system, typically in exchange for an up-front fee and continuing share of a
franchisee's profits (Bradach 1997); (Shane 1996). Viewed strictly from a contracting
perspective, franchise agreements have provisions similar to those found in other forms
of contracting. For example, because a franchisee's right to operate a business is
limited to the term of an agreement, Mendelsohn considered franchise agreements as a
form of limited contract (Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995). In cases where franchisees are
required to purchase goods exclusively from a franchisor, a franchise agreement is a
form of tying contract (Meese 1996). When aspects of remuneration are considered,
fÌ'anchise agreements are considered efficient contracts, because incentives are created
for the parties through assignment of rights or authority over decisions and shares of
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profit (Mathewson and Winter 1994). Barzel suggested that franchise agreements also
resembled shared tenancy contracts, "halfway between fixed-rent and wage contract(s)"
(BarzeI1989, p. 37). Shared tenancy aspects of franchise agreements establish a
franchisee's claim to residual profits, and were found to create entrepreneurial
incentives for franchisees (Birley, Leleux et al. 1997); (MichaeI1993); (Spinell and
Birley 1996).
Although long-term relationships exist between the parties, a franchise agreement is
considered neither a discrete market or futures contract, nor an employment contract
(Brickley and Dark 1987). Considering franchising's dynamics, Leblebici and Shalley
viewed franchise agreements as "long-term, incomplete, relational contracts" (Leblebici
and Shalley 1996, p. 409). Franchise agreements are long-term because their duration
may extend to 30 years7, with provisions that are seldom re-negotiated within a
contracted period (Lafontaine and Shaw 1999). T~èy are considered incomplete
contracts because a franchisor, ex ante, cannot predict all relevant situations likely to
occur during an agreement's term, and cannot cover all possible contingencies (Phan,
Butler et al. 1996). Despite inclusion of discrete obligations, such as specific purchase
requirements, franchise agreements are generally viewed as relational contracts, more
complex than those that only specify market transactions (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996).
As such, studies of other relational contracts have considered elements such as
flexibility, and assignment of rights and duties within agreements, aspects considered to
have particular relevance to franchising (Leblebici and Shalley 1996).
7 A McDonald's restaurant fi'anchise agreement, for example, has a 20-year duration (Kaufinann and
Lafontaine 1994).
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Franchise agreements seldom contain provisions for collaborative or joint decision-
making, with unilateral authority typically retained by franchisors (Price 1997). Unlike
other contractual agreements, franchise agreements are seldom negotiated, presented to
prospective franchisees "on a take-it-or-leave-it basis," sometimes with "callous
disregard for fair play and even fundamental rights" (Brown 1985, p. 1-6). Franchise
agreements contain terms and conditions that obligate both franchisors and franchisees.
As such, they have been viewed as "mutual business plans," fortifying prollses made
by each party (Lewis 1990, pp. 92-3). Falbe and Dandridge offered another view,
arguing that franchise agreements are designed by franchisors specifically to ensure
franchisees adherence to their terms (Falbe and Dandridge 1992). Martinez and Jarilo
also considered franchise agreements as an integral part of a franchisor's coordination
and monitoring mechanism8 (Martinez and Jarilo 1989). Contractual provisions that
include a right to monitor a franchisee's business has often been justified by a
franchisor's need for trademark protection (Selden 1998).
i
In addition to considering an agreement's provisions and terms, contracting studies have
also exallned trust, cooperation, and control mechanisms in contractual relationships.
Within the context ofjoint business e,ndeavors, trust was defmed as one entity's
expectation of ethically justifiable behavior on the part of the other entity (Wicks,
Berman et aL. 1999). Tsai found that trustworthiness was positively associated with
facilitating resource exchanges and combinations, creating value for a firm, and
encouraging innovation (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Ring posited that trust between
contracting parties enabled use of less formal norms and sanctions, which facilitated
8 Martinez and Jarilo defined coordination mechanism as "any administrative tool for achieving
integration among different units within an organization" (Martinez and Jarilo 1989, p. 490).
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ongoing cooperative relationships between organizations (Ring 1996). Written
contracts with specific terms and safeguards, argued Hudson, were necessary only when
there was no prior relationship; or when there was no reason for one party to trust the
other (Hudson and McArthur 1994). In their empirical study, Frankel etal. found that
manufacturers, merchandisers, and service providers in their sample did not believe that
formal agreements or contracts were necessary in order to achieve effective alliance
relationships (Frankel, Whipple et aL. 1996). Das argued that control was used in
contracting relationships only when adequate trust was not present, and that disparate
levels of trust and control were reliable indicators of the parties' degree of confidence of
cooperation (Das and Teng 1998).
Despite its use as an indicator of cooperation, trust has not been considered a requisite
for cooperation,9 since enlightened self-interest and legal mechanisms allow strangers
to work together for a common purpose (Fukuyama 1995). Although not a prerequisite,
1
trust is considered to be essential (Gentry 1996) or at least an important element in the
success of inter-firm relationships (Jeffries and Reed 2000) and contracting longevity
(Hudson and McArhur 1994). The most critical time for trust formation between
parties, whether among individuals or organizations (Jones and George 1998), was
found to be at the initial stage of their relationship (McKnight, Cummings et aL. 1998).
9 Fukuyama (1995) stated, "...people who do not trust one another wil end up cooperating only under a
system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and enforced,
sometimes by coercive means. This legal apparatus, serving as a substitute for trust, entails what
economists call "transaction costs" (Fukuyama 1995, pp. 27-8).
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2.2.2 Contracting Literature- Interpretive Summary
Despite their prollnent role in franchise relationships, relatively little is known about
franchise agreements beyond fees and royalty rates (e.g., (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1993);
(Lafontaine and Shaw 1999)). Two recent studies, however, have advanced the
knowledge base in franchise contracting, highlighting a need for further work in this
area.
Leblebici and Shalley examined allocations of contractual rights, establishing four
categories of variables in their exploratory examination of30 franchise contract
attributeslO (Leblebici and Shalley 1996). Although franchise agreements are generally
considered relational, their sample revealed that discrete rights and obligations were
more prevalent in formation and termination provisions. The authors concluded that
because franchise contracts bring together future expectations of both parties,
"franchisors can improve their prediction of new vlnture success by evaluating the
contractual arrangements specified for their firms" (p. 416).
Additionally, Bercovitz observed that variations among franchise agreements remained
largely unexplained (Bercovitz 1999). In her study of exchange hazards, she found that
contractual arrangements between franchisors and franchisees contained significant
variations in contract duration, territorial restrictions, and termiation clauses. While it
is generally assumed that contractual provisions in franchise agreements are designed to
control free riding by franchisees, her study noted that "essentially no empirical work
10 Leblebici and Shalley grouped their variables into four major categories: (1) characteristics of 
the
franchise, (2) the contract characteristics in tenus of allocation of rights and obligations, (3) the
governance structure of the contract with respect to monitoring, control, and dispute resolution, and (4)
contract performance in terms of the number oflegal disputes that may exist between the franchisor, and
the franchisees and the growth of the franchise operations (Leblebici and Shalley 1996, p. 411).
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(exists) exploring how the adoption of specific contract terms can alleviate this hazard"
(p. 1). Bercovitz's study filled a gap in the literature by investigating both non-
pecuniary and payment-related contract terms in franchising, and uncovered differences
in franchise agreements beyond franchise fees and royalties.
Although a contracting perspective is integral to understanding franchise relationships,
the legal environments in which this form of contracting takes pláce must also be
considered. For example, franchise agreements may contain conditional terms,
restrictions, and provisions, such as those that grant exclusive territories or exclude
competition among suppliers. As such, franchise agreements are not only subject to
laws that regulate business contracting in general, but also, in certain jurisdictions, to
laws specifically drafted to regulate franchising. Differences in legal environments may
shape the provisions of some franchise agreements, and therefore, must be considered
in studies of franchising.
Viewed from a contracting perspective, detailed and restrictive provisions typically
found in franchise agreements suggest that little or no trust exists between franchisors
and franchisees. Lutz suggested, however, that franchisees' freedom of action llght be
more dependent on a franchisor's ability to monitor performance than on specific
contractual provisions (Lutz 1995). Although trust between parties in franchising
remains largely unexplored, Falbe and Dandridge argued that an environment of trust
and co-operation would benefit both franchisors and franchisees (Falbe and Dandridge
1992). Low levels of trust among firms engaged in cooperative relationships are not,
however, unique to franchising. Mudambi and Helper found that ofthe 675 D.S. firms
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in their survey, only a small number had relationships where high levels of trust existed
(Mudambi and Helper 1998).
In summary, a contracting perspective provides some valuable insights, but may present
somewhat of a myopic view when used exclusively to examine complex franchising
relationships. Despite widespread belief that franchise contracts create a uniform and
highly regimented environment, there appears to be mounting empirical evidence to the
contrary.
2.3 NETWORKS, ALLIANCES, AND COOPERATIVE INTERORGANIZATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS
Cooperative relationships exist as form of governance for transactions between
economic actors, different from traditional supplier relationships or licensing
arrangements (Ring 1996). Cooperative relationshìps are defined as voluntary formal
,
or informal contractual arrangements where mutual collaboration results in risks and
rewards. These and other cooperative strategies among firms are of growing interest in
entrepreneurship research (Brush and Chaganti 1996). Low and MacMillan observed
that entrepreneurial opportunities were created both within and among organizations as
a result of ongoing relationship networks and exchanges that take place within them
(Low and MacMilan 1988).
Franchising has been called "the most ubiquitous and fastest growing form of
cooperative arrangements among entrepreneurs" (Gassenheimer, Baucus et al. 1996, p.
67); "arguably one ofthe most important organizational innovations of the last half
century" (Lafontaine and Masten 1995, p. 1). Despite studies of various forms of
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licensing, strategic allances, joint ventures, and other quasi-integrated organizations,
there has been a scarcity of research on franchising as a form of strategic alliance
(Harrigan 1998).
2.3.1 CIOR, Strategic Networks and Allances- Review of Selected Theoretical and
Empirical Literature
Ring and Van de Ven included strategic allances, partnerships, coalitions, joint
ventures, franchises, research consortia, and other various forms of networked
organiations under the heading of cooperative interorganizational relationships (CL OR)
(Ring and Van de Yen 1994). Their propositions offered reasons why CIORs formed,
why some succeeded, and why others failed. They posited that CIORs would emerge
when sufficiently favorable business conditions and motivations existed, causing two or
more firms to explore exchange through a cooperative relational contract. A simple set
of heuristics would then guide the parties through initial and recurrent sequences of
,
negotiations, leading to commitments to action. The authors suggested that CIORs may
be formed from pre-existing friendships, institutional mandates, resource dependencies,
or brokered deals by venture capitalists or investment bankers.
In practice, most CIORs emerge incrementally among strangers, beginning with small,
informal deals that involve little risk and do not rely on trust. Citing work by Aldrich
(1979) and Powell (1990), Rig and Van de Yen posited that one reason for failure
among organizational relationships is that they are poorly matched with environmental
conditions, an explanation more appropriate for those engaged in discrete contractual
relationships than those in relational forms of exchange (Ring and Van de Yen 1994).
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The authors concluded that endogenous forces arise over time within a relationship,
which might help to explain a CIOR's survival or failure.
One form of cooperative interorganiational relationship (CIOR) is a strategic network.
Jarilo defined strategic networks as "long-term, purposeful arrangements among
distinct but related for-profit organizations that allow those firms to gain or sustain
competitive advantage vis-à-vis their competitors outside the network" (Jarilo 1988, p.
32). Entrepreneurs typically developed network relationships with individuals and
entities such as suppliers, customers, accountants, and bankers (Hil and McGowan
1996), serving as vehicles to acquire external resources (Winborg and Landstrom
1997). An effective network was found to reduce requirements for specific contract
terms and conditions, using trust, reciprocity, and obligation in their stead (Hudson and
McArthur 1994).
Jarilo posited that strategic networks are preferred to integrated firms when four
conditions are present. First, when widely differing optimal scales exist. That is, when
a large firm may best carry out some activities, while other activities are best performed
by small firms. Second, when some activities of a firm require a specific culture or
mentality that substantially differs from other activities within the firm. Third, when
innovations within a large firm come primarily through motivations of small units
within the firm. Finally, firms benefit from strategic networks when different activities
within a firm contribute widely different rates of profitability (Jarilo 1993).
Several aspects of Jarilo's network perspective were found to be relevant to
franchising. Viewed fiom a network perspective, franchisees have considered
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themselves as partners with franchisors in a strategic relationship (Spinell 1997).
Although networks have been viewed as examples of interdependence among firms
(Wicks, Berman et al. 1999), a network perspective suggests that levels of operational
independence may exist for franchisees, whose decisions can influence performance at
a franchised outlet (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996); (Phan, Butler et al. 1996); (Stanworth
and Gibb 1984). On the other hand, clear distinctions between parties, a requirement in
Jarilo's definition, are not always evident in franchises. Continuing franchisor control
over a franchisee's business operations poses a question of whether a franchisor-
franchisee 'network' should be considered as one business or many (Adams, Jones et al.
1997).
Another type of cooperative interorganiational relationship (CIOR) is a strategic
alliance. Strategic allances are cooperative arrangements between firms that typically
involve exchanges, such as sharing or co-development of products or technologies
,
(Gulati 1998). Exchanges may take place either across or within industries at a firm-to-
firm level (Brush and Chaganti 1996). Similar to other forms of business partnerships,
strategic alliances establish relationships considered analogous to marriages (DeRose
1994). Shared objectives and satisfactory levels of cooperation have been considered
vital to success in strategic alliances (Das and Teng 1998).
Although some similarities exist, several aspects of franchising raise questions about
the validity of a strategic alliance perspective in studies of franchising. Brown observed
that there was gross disparity in bargaining power, fmancial strength, access to relevant
information, and economic exposure to loss between the parties in a franchise (Brown
and Dev 1997). In some instances, these disparities were used to create value for
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franchisors at the expense ofless-informed franchisees (Birley, Leleux et aL 1997).
Despite this power imbalance, franchisors have not been considered to stand in a
fiduciary relationship 11 with franchisees (Price 1997), a view supported by virtually all
U.S. courts that have issued opinions on this subject(Emerson 1998).
In addition to an imbalance of power, evidence of incongruous goals between
franchisors and franchisees has also been presented (Phan, Butler' et aL 1996); (Spinell
and Birley 1996). Because royalties are most often tied to sales, franchisor's are
concerned with volume and turnover, not retail unit profit (Cohen 1971). Differences in
this basis of compensation may cause some franchisors to encourage growth beyond
profit-maximizing levels (Baucus, Baucus et aL 1996). A manifestation of goal
incongruity is realized when a franchisor sets the hours of operation for a franchised
unit without regard for whether or not it is profitable for a franchisee to be open.
Arguably, the shared objectives found in other strat'egic alliances may not always be
found in franchising.
2.3.2 Cooperative Interorganizational Relationship- Interpretive Summary
Simlarities have been found between franchising and various forms of cooperative
interorganizational relationships (CIORs), including networks, and strategic alliances.
Following Ring and Van de Ven's criteria, franchise agreements appear similar to
CIORs initiated among strangers. Unlike these cooperative relationships, however,
i i The fiduciary status places on the fiduciary a trustee's duty to serve the beneficiary with undivided
loyalty and not "profit at the expense of the other." However, a significant part ofthe transactions
(discussions, negotiations, or otherwise) between franchisor and a potential franchisee are ofa
commercial nature, with each party having some access to information in some bargaining power. So
long as each party can recognize and take actions favoring its own best interests, judicial or legislative
imposition of a fiduciary status is inappropriate. For this reason, virtually all courts issuing opinions on
the subject have refused to characterize the franchise relationship as a fiduciary one (Emerson 1998).
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franchises usually involve substantial monetary investments, and have considerable exit
costs for franchisees. Whether or not a franchise relationship involves little or no risk is
currently a subject of considerable debate (c.£ (Bates 1995); (Castrogiovanni, Justis et
aL. 1993)).
Franchising also appears different from the two general types of networks introduced by
Dyer and Singh: those formed by de-centralized large firms, and networks made up of a
large number of companies who came together in a natural way, normally within the
same geographic environment (Molina 1998). Further, Thorell argued that in order to
serve as an engine of growth, strategic planning among network members was
necessary (Thorelli 1986). Lillted information is presently available on how franchise
participants conduct strategic planning (Parsa 1999), and no empirical evidence
supports a prellse that franchisees engage in strategic planning. Shortcomings
notwithstanding, a network perspective may prove useful in studies that lin value
i
chains of franchisors, franchisees, and suppliers. An example of a franchise value chain
is provided in Appendix A, Figure AI.
Unlike other strategic alliances, long-term franchise agreements are assumed to prevent
either party from responding or adapting to change. This attribute may explain a
scarcity of research on franchising as a form of strategic allance. In contrast to
franchise relationships, strategic alliances are generally dynamic "evolutionary
products" with new exogenous and endogenous ties developed in the network over time
(Gulati 1998). Another reason for an absence of research in this area may be that a
legal and econollc distinction between firms engaged in the relationship is inherent in
defmitions of a strategic alliance. Although legally separate, economic distinctions
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between franchisors and franchisees are often blurred, a topic addressed in more detail
in the next section of this chapter. As noted earlier in this section, continued franchisor
control in franchise relationships makes this form of alliance different from others,
which may reduce the effectiveness of comparative studies between franchised and
non- franchised alliances.
In summary, although some aspects of cooperative interorganizational relationships
(CIORs) have direct relevance, franchise relationships appear to have distinctive and
unique properties and characteristics that must also be considered, limiting the
effectiveness this perspective's exclusive use.
2.4 ECONOMICS
Econollsts were among the first to consider an entrepreneur's role as one separate from
that of a capitalist. Viewed from this perspective, entrepreneurs "are the change agents
,
of capitalism" (Thurow 1999, p. 83), whether through creative destruction ofthe status
quo (Schumpeter 1934) or entrepreneurial discovery (von Mises 1949). Change
through inovation and bearing of risk were central themes in econollsts' views of
entrepreneurship.
2.4.1 Economics- Review of Selected Theoretical and Empirical Literature
Most econollsts and many non-economists alike have accepted Schumpeter's
identification of entrepreneurship with innovation (Stevenson and Jarilo 1990). Cahil
observed that the terms innovation and entrepreneurialism were frequently used
interchangeably (Cahil1998). Although Baumol also considered a "firm-organizing
entrepreneur" as legitimate, it was an "innovating entrepreneur" who was responsible
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for economic growth and progress in productivity, accomplished through
transformation of "inventions and ideas into economically viable entities" (Baumol
1993, p. 198). Innovation has consistently been associated with firm success (Baldwin
1995), and an ability to sustain competitive advantage has been dependant upon a firm's
ability to develop capabilities for innovation (Lado, Boyd et al. 1997). Arguably,
discovery of opportunities became a core issue of entrepreneurship (Kirzner 1997), in
part because, as Slllor posited, "For the entrepreneur, opportunity is based in
innovation," (Smilor 1997, p. 343).
In organiational contexts, economic theories revolve around concepts that view
humans as fundamentally rational beings who seek to maximize utilities, and that
organizations are formed to enhance effciency (Freeman 1999). Organizations, argued
Scott and Rosa, were a means to an end, mechanisms that translated the entrepreneurial
vision through action, control and mobilization of resources to extract value and
i
accumulate capital (Scott and Rosa). Consistent with these tenets, entrepreneurship has
been associated with an individual's commitment to capital accumulation, business
growth, and assumptions of risks in a pursuit of opportunties in the market (Scase
1997), acting either as individuals or through organizations.
Of particular relevance to franchising, three constructs in the economics literature have
provided valuable insights and models: (1) resource scarcity or capital acquisition
model; (2) agency theory; and (3) transaction costs econollcs. According to resource
scarcity theory, businesses that grow by vertical integration face higher capital
constraints than businesses that expand via franchising. Through payment of up- front
fees, franchisees fund a franchisor's business expansion, thereby providing an efficient
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source of capital (e.g., (Caves and Murphy 1976); (Dant 1995)). Capital provided by
franchisees may be used to expand a franchisor's trademark through more locations,
increase marketing power within a system, and/or increase overall econolles of scale
ofa system (Birley, Leleux et al. 1997).
Based on 200 years of econollc research, agency theory assumes humans as rational
actors who seek to maximize their individual utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 in
(Davis, Schoorman et al. 1997). Agency problems arise when division of lab or requires
that a principal delegate decision-making authority to an agent (Jones and Butler 1992).
Agency theory explains how best to organie relationships in contexts where one party
determines work that another party undertakes (Eisenhardt 1989). Within franchising's
context, agency theory has been applied to studies of situations where monitoring is
difficult or expensive, or when motives of the parties differed. Agency theory predicts
that companies wil favor franchising over compant ownership where high monitoring
costs are present (Brickley and Dark 1987).
Viewed from an agency theory perspective, residual claims to profits more closely align
incentives offranchisors and franchisees, compared to those of corporate managers
(Eisenhardt 1989). Managers of company-owned outlets neither bear full costs nor
receive full benefits fiom their efforts, because their individual compensation and
fmancial performance of their outlet are not always directly linked (Kehoe 1996). In
contrast, compensated on residual claims, franchisees bear most of the costs of shirking
(Stanworth and Curran 1999).
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In addition to capital scarcity and agency theory, transactions cost economics also
provides insights relevant to franchising. Transactions cost economics is fundamentally
about how econollc activities are bundled in organizations (Freeman 1999). Viewed
from this perspective, firms exist because they reduce negotiation and enforcement
costs associated with exchanges (Coase 1937). Transactions cost econollcs is built on
traditional econollc theory, which views relationships among independent businesses
as short-term exchanges, terminated at the conclusion of a transaction (Brown and Dev
1997). It specifies conditions under which firms should manage economic exchanges
within their organizational boundaries, and when exchanges should be outsourced.
Transaction cost economics adopts John R. Commons's (1934) proposition that a
transaction is the basic unit of analysis (Wiliamson 1991). Exchange issues considered
relevant to transactions cost include costs of a governance mechanism, and threat of
Opportuiusm in exchanges (Barney 1999).
Bello concluded that transactions cost analysis was the dominant theoretical framework
employed to model variations in governance structures (Bello, Dant et aL. 1997). A
variety of organizational forms between market and vertically integrated hierarchies are
explained by the underlying attributes of transactions, namely asset specificity,
uncertainty, and frequency (Leblebici and Shalley 1996). Although transactions cost
proved useful in predicting when and why a franchisor may decide to vertically
integrate (Willamson 1991), it was considered less useful in analyses of ongoing,
contractual relationships of independent contractors, and in specific studies of firms that
operate somewhere between market and hierarchical poles (Lassar and Kerr 1996).
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Ongoing cooperation between entities in business exchanges typically involves
elements of interdependence. A threat of opportunism arises when one party in an
exchange requires a disproportionate investment in transaction-specific assets by the
other party (Wiliamson 1975); (Willamson and Winter 1993), a condition found in
many franchise systems. In franchising, threats of opportunism are addressed in
detailed contractual terms, specified in disclosure documents and franchise agreements.
Economists have demonstrated that franchise contracts can reduce free riding by
franchisees (Meese 1996). Coase, Wiliamson, and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
concluded, however, that there are transaction costs associated with writing contracts
(Hart 1987, p. 140). In this regard, formal rules and regulations serve as a legal
substitute for trust, with costs of litigation, negotiation, and enforcement acting as a tax
on economic activity (Fukuyama 1995).
In empirical studies of franchising, agency theory ~as received qualified support, while
support for resource scarcity theory was mixed. Shane, in his study of 157 franchise
systems, found support for agency theory, but rejected predictions based on resource
constraint theory (Shane 1998). Agency theory was also supported in Kehoe's study,
which found strong support for use of franchising in the hotel industry to overcome
principal-agent problems (Kehoe 1996). Support for resource scarcity was mixed
because although franchisees may be viewed as an efficient source of capital, they may
demand a higher return on their capital than passive investors. Franchisees are typically
unable to suffciently diversify their risk among several outlets in a chain (Norton,
1995; Rubin, 1990) in (Combs and Ketchen 1999).
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2.4.2 Economics- Interpretive Summary
A summary of different views offered by four of the economics schools of thought is
provided in Table 2.1.
Neoclassical
Table 2.1 Swnmary of Views from Economics "Schools of Thought" 
Firm is an input combiner
Humans are motivated by self-interest.
Critical resources are immobile, intangible, and self-compounding.
Demand is heterogeneous and dynamic.
Information is imperfect.
Firms are content with superior financial performance.
The firm is not a black box.
Market equilibrium is pernicious abstraction. Markets are in constant turoiL.
Firm is an inovation seeker.
Markets are dynamic processes of discovery that mobilize disbursed and imperfect
information.
The firm is motivated by desire for supranormal profits as vehicle for promoting
discovery and realizing opportunities in constantly changing
(disequilibrium) marketplace.
Assuming market efficiency, persistent profit opportunities are precluded. Profits
exist only to the extent of uncertainty and disequilibrium.
Entrepreneurs see mismatches (imperfection) between offerings and demand; their
arbitrage results in profits.
Finn is avoider of transaction costs resulting from market exchange. Such costs
include all the negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement costs.
Asset specificity, uncertainty, and bounded rationality are critical concepts
constraining the fi's achievement.
Focus is on deployment and combination of resources to meet heterogeneous and
dynamic demand rather than on 3ivoidance of negative aspects of market
exchange.
Resource Based Finn is a seeker of unique or otherwise costly-to copy inputs.
The appropriate unit of analysis is the firm, not industry.
The management (internal efficiency) of the firm is a salient factor.
Firm behavior is a deliberate choice more than a foregone conclusion from external
factors.
Healthy earnings can result from less-than-inovative leaps of the Schumpeterian
tye.
Focuses on deployment and combination of resources to meet heterogeneous and
dynamic demand rather than on other considerations, such as avoidance of
negative aspects of market exchange.
The resource-based theory's focus is on short-or mediwn-term behavior.
Source: Deligonul, Z. Seyda and Cavusgil, S. Tamer, Does the Comparative Advantage TheOlY of
Competition Really Replace theNeoclassical Theory of Perfect Competition? (Deligonul and
Cavusgil 1997).
Austrian
Transaction
Costs
Despite some empirical support, agency theory, when used exclusively to study
organizations, ignored "a good bit of the complexity" and presented "only a partial view
of the world" (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 71). When applied to studies offranchising, agency
theory alone provided insufficient insights into the ubiquity of company-owned and
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franchised units within the same chain (e.g., (Bradach 1997); (Bradach 1998); (FFCA
1999)), or a prevalence of multi-unit ownership by franchisees (e.g., (Bates 1997);
(FFCA 1999); (Kalnins and Lafontaine 1996)). Agency theory, focused on incentives,
monitoring and geographic dispersion, provided inconsistent predictive power into a
firm's decision whether to franchise or vertically integrate. Supermarkets, for example,
have highly dispersed retail outlets and almost never franchise (Maness 1996). 12
Recognizing these and other limitations to agency theory, Elango' and Fried concluded
that past franchise research was tied too closely to theories of agency and power
(Elango and Fried 1997).
The literature oftransaction-cost economics has focused primarily on a firm's boundary
activities, ignoring to some extent a firm's internal functioning (Gibbons 1999).
Transaction cost economics adopts an approach in which a transaction is made the basic
unit of analysis (Wiliamson 1991). It suggests tha! only costs of a governance
mechanism and threats of opportunism in an exchange are relevant (Barney 1999).
Long-term relational aspects associated with a franchise may limit transaction cost's
effectiveness in franchising studies. Additionally, Demsetz concluded that aspects of
opportunsm, moral hazard, and shirking were diffcult to derive exclusively from
transactions cost considerations (Demsetz 1987, p. 167). These aspects are important to
franchising, since franchisees potentially shirk on product quality, because gains accrue
solely to the shirker while costs are borne by all members of a franchise system (Shane
1996).
12 Michael concluded that diffsed residual claims associated with franchising lowered quality standards
in the outlet, a characteristic inherent in franchising (Michael 2000). He found that quality was
negatively associated with the percentage of franchised outlets in chains of hotels and restaurants.
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In summary, Bhide posited a more critical limitation of exclusive use of economics
theory in studies of business, arguing "Mainstream economics has little to tell us about
how and why some firms survive and grow and others do not" (Bhide 2000, p. 242).
2.5 LEGAL
Franchising is a form of business that touches many different areas of domestic and
international law (anonymous 1999). A complete review of all applicable legal
literature relevant to franchising is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, this section
reviews studies that provide insights on the legal landscape in which franchising
operates, focused on North America and Europe.
2.5.1 Legal- Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature
As presented earlier in this chapter, franchising is considered a contractual form of
,
business between two legally distinct entities, although ongoing controls and financial
interdependence have called into question whether franchise participants are one
business or many (Adams, Jones et al. 1997). In a franchise relationship, franchisors
typically maintain unilateral control (Selden 1998), to a degree that some may consider
franchisees an extension of a franchisor in the marketplace (Morgan and Stoltman
1997). Considering aspects of control and interdependence, Rubin argued that the
definition of a franchisee as a separate entity is a legal not an economic distinction
(Rubin, 1978 in (Castrogiovann and Justis 1998). Legal distinctions between
franchisors and franchisees are often tested when liability issues are litigated (Morgan
and Stoltman 1997). Although a consensus view in the literature is not evident,
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franchisees have generally been considered legally independent of but economically
dependent upon the business system of a franchisor (Kuratko and Hodgetts 1995).
Similar to other forms of contractual business, franchising is subject to a broad range of
common and civil laws.
Table 2.2: Franchise Legislation from Selected Countries
Country Applicable Legislation Requirements
United States Federal- Franchise "Rule 0" Required disclósure
Additional State Lawsl4 Required registration
Canada No Federal Law Required disclosure
Only Alberta has specific Civil remedies for breach
franchise law Obligation of "fair dealing"
France Loi Doubin covers all forms of Required disclosure of "sincere 
business where license or information"
trademark is involved.
Mexico Industrial Property Law Required disclosure
Required registration with Mexican
Institute of Industrial Property
Brazil Franchising Law of 1994 Required disclosure
Standard franchise agreement
Spain Retail Trade Act of 1996 Required registration
Required disclosure
Australia Franchising Code of Conduct Required disclosure
1998
Indonesia Government Regulation on Required disclosure
Franchising 1997 Required registration
Required priority to small and medium
sized entrepreneurs
Russia Civil Code. Required registration
Romania Ordinance Pre and Post contractual requirements
Required disclosure
Source: Konigsberg, Alex S., 1999, Around the World with Franchise Legislation
(Konigsberg 1999)
Despite its worldwide growth, and the law's role in governing franchise business
relationships, Mendelsohn posited, "there is no such thing in England, or indeed
13 U.S. Federal Trade Commission Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising
and Business Opportunity Ventures, Title 16 "Commercial Practices," Chapter 1, Subchapter D- "Trade
Regulation Rules."
14 States requiring franchise company registration: California, Hawaii, Ilinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin (anonymous 1999). Thirteen of the state laws treat the sale of a franchise in a
fashion similar to the sale of a security. State laws provide important legal rights to franchise purchasers,
including the right to bring private lawsuits for violations of state disclosure requirements (anonymous
2000).
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anywhere else, as franchise law" (Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995, p. xiii). A number of
countries have enacted legislation with requirements relevant to franchising, a selected
sample of which is provided in Table 2.2.
Franchising's worldwide growth has prompted a number of countries to consider
legislation in order to regulate different aspects of a franchise relationship. is Poland,
for example, has been viewed as a market "ripe for franchising," with rapidly
expanding media and advertising sectors, several successful franchise systems already
in operation, and identified prospects in retail, services and fast-food industries (Service
1998). Although Poland currently has no laws that govern franchising, a need for
legislation has been predicted as franchising becomes an important element of their
economy (Minsker 2000). Some countries with specific franchise laws are considering
expansion of their regulatory legislation. Although Canada has no federal laws
regulating franchising, the Province of Ontario has -recently drafted Bil 93, following
,
D.S. Federal Trade Commission legislation and existing franchise disclosure laws in
Alberta. 
16
Homogenization of preferences among consumers separated by national boundaries has
helped to promote expansive growth of franchising (Levitt 1983 in (Teegen 2000). At
15 Beales II and Muris explained one reason why a need for specific legislation exists beyond
enforcement of the contract as written. They posit that successful franchisors have established and
valuable trademarks, representing standards of quality among consumers in the marketplace. Although
franchisees must expend their resources to maintain the value of the trademark, they have an incentive to
avoid expenditures, realizing the full benefit but incuring only part of the cost. Even if explicit tenus are
written into the franchise agreement, reduced quality by franchisees may be diffcult to detect, such as
decreased employee monitoring or training, which leads to poor service. To prevail in litigation,
franchisors must convince external observers, often before ajury that is likely to favor 'the little guy' in
disputes with the 'bigger' franchisor (Beales II and Muris 1995, pp. 159-60).
16 The Alberta Franchises Act applies only to those franchises which are both operated in Alberta and
where the prospective franchisee is an Alberta resident or is an entity with a permanent establishment in
Alberta (Cohen 1999).
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the vanguard of this trend are U.S. franchisors (Hoffman and Preble 1993). Shane
found that from 1971 to 1985, U.S. franchisors added foreign outlets at a rate of 17%
per year, almost twice as fast as they added domestic outlets (Shane 1996), while
another study revealed that 400 U.S. franchisors increased their number of overseas
units by more than 70 percent during the 1980s (Preble and Hoffman 1995). It follows,
then, that the regulatory landscape in North America and abroad are of considerable
interest to U.S.-based franchisors.
The European Union represents the largest market for franchising outside the U.S., and
for many franchisors, the UK serves as the gateway to the rest of Europe17 (Tuttle and
Marcheso 2000). U.S. franchisors considering entry into the UK marketplace find no
disclosure laws, no registration requirements, and no laws focused on terllnation or
renewal, a legal climate described as "a breath of fresh air" (Nelson and Marcheso
1998, p. 1). Canada's legal climate is also of particular interest because 25% of the
i
country's 1,300 operating franchise systems are U.S.-based, making it one of 
the largest
single foreign markets for U.S. franchisors (anonymous 2001).
Table 2.3: Franchise Fees Receipts to u.s. Franchisors (in $ millons)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Canada 36 29 41 35
Europe 170 192 230 253
Latin America" 38 44 53 56
Africa 9 12 12 14
Middle East 24 34 38 43
Asia and Pacific 131 148 123 147
Other 11 17 9 22
Total $ 419 $ 475 $ 506 $ 569
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Us. International Services: Cross-Border Trade in 1999 and
Sales Through Afliates in 1998 (2000).
" Includes other Western Hemisphere Countries not listed elsewhere
17 As of November 1999, there were 570 systems with 30,000 franchised units operating in the UK,
which recorded $11. bilion in turnover (Turtle and Marcheso 2000).
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Fees from overseas royalties and payments to U.S. franchisors totaled $569 nullon in
1999, up from $419 nullion in 1996 (Mann, Brokenbaugh et al. 2000). Franchising is
clearly a substantial export for the United States. Table 2.3 summarizes the
international receipts of franchise fees to U.S. franchisors.
Although its worldwide potential was considered exponential (anonymous 1999),
franchising's growth may be influenced by differing regulatory climates. In broad
terms, laws relevant to franchising include those that address aspects of intellectual
property and those that govern franchisor-franchisee relationships, both pre-purchase
and during the term of a franchise agreement. Intellectual property refers to
trademarks, registered designs, and copyrights that form part of an intangible asset base
of a companylS (Blackett 1998). Intangible assets were found to represent a substantial
potion ofthe total assets in most franchise systems (Spinelli and Birley 1996),
achieving their highest values when brand name, trademarked logo, and operational
,
know-how are combined (Smith 1997). Because of substantial investments in
marketing and operational development by franchisors, laws that protect trademarks
and brand names are considered important in franchising (Johnson 2000); (Morgan and
Stoltman 1997).
2.5.1.1 Intellectual Propert Protection
A company's name, trademarks, trade names, service marks, brands, and brand names
are forms of intellectual property typically found in franchising. Since legal
18 Blackett (1998) observed that the earliest trademarks recognized by statute law in England were
hallmarks used by the cutlers of Sheffield, drawn up during the reign of Elizabeth I, and codified under
the Cutler's Company Act of 1623. The first trademark registered under the British Trade Marks Act of
1987 was the red triangle of Bass pale ale (B1ackett 1998, pp. 6-7).
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terllnology sometimes differs among jurisdictions, definitions for various forms of
intellectual property as they are used in Europe and the U.S.are provided in Table 2.4.
Table 204: Intellectual Property Definitions
Trademark Name, sign, or symbol used "Any word, name, symbol or device or any
to distinguish products or combination thereof, adopted and used by a 
services of individual or manufacturer or merchant to identifY its goods and
enterprise from those of distinguish them from those manufactured or sold
others: by others." 15 US.C. § 1l2ib
Trade Name Name used to distinguish "Any name used by a person to identifY his or her
individual or enterprise business or vocation." 15 US.C § 1127b
offering goods or services. a
Service Mark Trademark used specifically Type of trademark which identifies source of
to distinguish service as services (Celedonia 1999).
opposed to goods:
Brand Trademark or combination of trademarks, which through promotion and use has
acquired significance over and above its functional role of distinguishing the goods
or service:
Brand Name Most common form of trademark, central component of brand: a Source: Blackett, Tom, Trademarks 1998, page 7-8
b Source: United States Code
Although a number of European countries maintain individual trademark protection
laws, the Office for Internal Harmonization in the Internal Market, opened on April 1,
1996, provided a single trademark registration that covers all 15 EU member countries
,
(Kaufman and Hines 1997). The system, known as the Community Trademark or
CTM, is open to all Paris Convention countries, including the US., which provides a
cost-effective means of registering trademarks in the European Union.
In the European Union and in most other countries, trademark rights arise from formal
registration of the mark, while in the U.S., trademark rights arise from the mark's use in
the marketplace (Celedonia 1999). Trademark protection in the US. is afforded under
common law, selected state laws, and by federal statutes in Title 15 of the US. Code,
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The Trademark Act of 1946 (anonymous 1998). Known as the "Lanham Act,,,19 this
law descended from earlier generations of trademark law, and was designed to
encourage registration and protect marks from unfair competition (anonymous 1996).
Until the Canadian government enacted fundamental reform of its trademark laws in
1993, substantial differences existed between trademark laws in the U.S. and those in
Canada (Burshtein 1998).
2.5.1.2 Pre-Contract Relationship
Whether on a state, provincial, or federal level, jurisdictions that have enacted specific
franchise legislation frequently have included requirements for franchisors to disclose
aspects of their company to prospective franchisees before execution of a franchise
agreement. The Canadian Province of Alberta adopted laws in 1971 requiring
franchisors to furnish disclosure documents to prospective franchisees at least 14 days
before agreement signing (Konigsberg 1999). Alberta's franchise legislation was
updated with the enactment of the Franchises Act, Chapter F -17.1 of the Statutes of
Alberta, in 1995, a summary of which is presented in Appendix B, Table BL.
The first country outside of the U.S. and Alberta to adopt legislation directly relevant to
franchising was France. In 1989, the French government enacted Lož Doubžn, a
disclosure requirement that applies to all agreements involving a trademark or license
(Konigsberg 2001). Disclosure Document requirements for Lož Doubžn are provided in
Table 2.6:
19 Introduced by Texas congressman Fritz Lanham, signed into law on July 5, 1946 by President Harry S.
Truinan. In January 1996, President Clinton signed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which
strengthened the Lanam Act and harmonized U.S. trademark laws with those ofinany other nations
(anonymous 1996).
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Table 2.6: Disclosure Document Requirements Loi Doubin
1. General Information a. Date business founded
About the Franchisor b. Stage of development
c. Address of franchisor's head offce
d. Franchisor's legal form of business 
e. Nature offranchisor's activities
f Name(s) of management 
g. Business experience of management 
2. Registrations Relevant registration numbers, dates of registration of trademarks. 
3. Bank Information Names and addresses of five principal banking locations.
4. Goods and Services General and local market forecast of possible futue growth and
development.
5. Financial Statements Anual statements from last two fiscal years.
6. Franchise Network List of all franchisees; number of franchisees bound by similar
agreement; all franchisees who ceased to be members of network in
preceding year.
7. Other a. Term of agreement and conditions for renewal
b. Provisions for termination and assignment
c. Scope of exclusivity granted to franchisee
d. Estimate of amount and nature of expenses and capital
investment
8. Language Implied obligation to provide French language version of franchise 
agreement.
Source: Konigsberg Franchise Legislation in France (Konigsberg 2001)
Although specific disclosure requirements also exiat in Mexico, Brazil, Spain,
Indonesia, South Korea, and a host of other countries, the United States arguably has
the most extensive federal disclosure laws specifically designed to govern franchising
(Emerson 1998).
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission's Trade Regulation Rule, known as "The
Franchise Rule" includes specific requirements for pre-purchase disclosures of material
facts for U.S. franchises. 20 In broad terms, pre-purchase disclosure laws were designed
to help prospective franchisees make more informed decisions about their investment
20 The actual title of 
"The Franchise Rule" is "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures" 16 CFR Part 436.
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(Cohen 1998), which, according to the FTC, The Franchise Rule was intended to d021
(anonymous 1994). The FTC's disclosure statement is provided in Table 2.7 below:
Table 2.7: U.S. Federal Trade Commission Franchise Disclosure Statement
Disclosure Statement
Pursuant to 16 CFR 436.1 et seq., a Trade Regulation Rule of the Federal Trade Commission regarding
Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, the
following information is set forth on (name offranchisor) for your examination:
1. Identifying information as to franchisor.
2. Business experience offranchisor's directors and executive officers.
3. Business experience of the franchisor.
4. Litigation history.
5. Bankruptcy history.
6. Description of franchise. 
7. Initial fuds required to be paid by a franchisee.
8. Recuring funds required to be paid by a franchisee.
9. Affiliated persons the franchisee is required or advised to do business with by the franchisor.
10. Obligations to purchase.
11. Revenues received by the franchisor in consideration of purchases by a franchisee.
12. Financing arrangements.
13. Restriction of sales.
14. Personal participation required of the franchisee in the operation of the franchise.
15. Tennination, cancellation, and renewal of the franchise.
16. Statistical information concerning the number of franchises (and company-owned outlets).
17. Site selection.
18. Training programs.
19. Public figure involvement in the franchise.
20. Financial information concerning the franchisor.
Source: Code of Federal Regul¥tions, 16CFR436
2.5.1.3 Competitive Practices
In addition to legislation that protects intellectual property and provides for pre-
purchase disclosure, laws that govern competitive practices also have relevance to
franchising. The centerpiece of franchise law applicable to competitive practices in
Europe is EU Commission Regulation 4087-88, which essentially created an exemption
from the EU competition laws contained in Section 85 (Minsker 2000). In Europe,
agreements between franchisors and franchisees have been viewed as vertical
agreements, similar to contracts between suppliers and customers concerning marketing
21 Since taking effect in 1978, the FTC has obtained judgments of more then $4 milion in civil penalties,
and $41 millon in consumer redress through enforcement of the Franchise Rule (anonymous 1994).
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of goods or services. Vertical agreements do not usually give rise to competitive
practices concerns unless (l) one of the parties in an agreement has significant market
power, or (2) a large network of similar agreements exists (anonymous 1999). A
supplier who contractually attempts to control a distributor's conduct, either through
resale price maintenance, or selective distribution within a territory or category of
customer is employing vertical restraints, which restrict or distort competition (Howe
1996). The 1958 Treaty of Rome, the foundation of competition laws in Europe,
expressly prohibits practices such as vertical restraints.
Two articles of the Treaty have been considered most relevant to business law, Article
85 that prohibits unfair forms of competition, and Article 86, which prohibits abuse of a
dominant position22 (Davidowand MacKernan 1997). The market power of a
franchisor, the network of franchise agreements, and restrictions and obligations
typically found in franchising were found to contravene Article 85.1 of the Treaty of
Rome (Abell1998). Since February 1, 1989, franchises have operated under
Regulation 4087/88; the so-called Franchise Block Exemption, an exemption to Article
85, renewed by the ED Commission at the end of 1999. Although some countries
supplement ED Commission laws with a patchwork of civil laws governing general
business practices (Krondstrom 1998), and laws may differ among individual countries
22 Article 85(1) of the Treaty condemns all agreements to restrain or distort competition. Article 85(2)
declares void all agreements contrary to 85(1). Article 85(3) gives the European Commission power to
exempt agreements which it finds are not seriously anti-competitive or further technical or economic
progress while benefitting consumers. A wide variety of arrangements and schemes have been found to
violate Article 85. These include cartels, price fixing, resale price maintenance, exclusive distribution
systems which impose barriers on trade between members states, ilegal tying, market sharing
agreements, price discrimination, loyalty rebates and a host of other exclusionary practices (Davidow and
MacKernan 1997)
John E. Clarkin 68
(Nelson and Marcheso 1998), EU countries have relied primarily on Commission rules
to govern competitive practices in franchising.
Cuningham observed that the EU Commission has tolerated the otherwise anti-
competitive practices of franchising, provided their restrictions fell within certain
permitted parameters (Cunningham 1998). An example of the restrictions considered
acceptable (white list) and unacceptable (black list) is listed below in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: White list and Black list of Terms in Franchise Agreements
White List
Stipulated limits for a specified geographical area of a subfranchise unit (previously expressly prohibited)
Active sales outside of the agreed area may be prohibited
Franchisor can prohibit the franchisee from sellng competing products
Non-competition clauses of up to one year
Clauses stating a minimum product assortment are allowed
Franchisor may prescribe certain training or education
Black list
Franchisor denies a franchisee the right to purchase similar products (for example one soft drink brand
rather than another)
Contract forbids the use of "common knowledge" or know-how
Control or command of franchisee prices in the contract (Franchisor may recommend a certain retail
price).
,
Franchisor prohibits "passive sales".
Source: Krondstrom 1998 Franchising- Sweden
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) through its generic statute,
the Federal Trade Commission Act, enforces a variety of federal antitrust and consumer
protection laws. Established by Congress in 1914, the FTC is an independent agency
charged with enforcing provisions of the Act, among which are those that prohibit
unfair or deceptive acts or practices23 (anonymous 2000). The FTC's mission is to
ensure that U.S. markets function competitively and efficiently, free of undue
restrictions and unfair or deceptive acts (anonymous 2000). Among the competitive
23 Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Commission has detennined that a representation, omission, or
practice is deceptive if: (1) it is likely to mislead conswners acting reasonably under the circumstances;
and (2) it is material, that is, likely to affect consumers' conduct or decisions with respect to the product
at issue (anonymous 2000).
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practice laws enforced by the FTC are the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the Clayton
Act of 1914, which was later amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, and the
Federal Trade Commssion Act. Antitrust legislation in the U.S. describes unlawful
practices in general terms, relying on the cours to decide which are illegal based on
individual facts and circumstances (anonymous 2000). A table summarizing the
similarities and differences between EU and U.S. competitive practice laws is presented
in Appendix B, Table B2.
In addition to competitive practices, legal systems are also used to resolve disputes
between franchisors and franchisees. Typical of other dyads and networks, franchises
are typically embedded in constitutions, legislation, and regulations, creating exogenous
safeguards that define limits within which contracting must be conducted (Hudson and
McArhur 1994). Despite popular acclaim, franchise relationships have often become
adversarial (Emerson 1998), with a comparatively high rate of litigious activity (Shane
and Hoy 1996). Using a random sample of75 companies from a pool of 1,031
franchising companies, Bygrave & Spinelli found that 91 % offranchisors in their
sample were involved in litigation with their franchisees (Bygrave and Spinelli 1992).
Although franchise agreements often require arbitration or mediation as forms of
dispute resolution, litigation between franchisors and franchisees is prevalent in
franchising, especially in the United States.
2.5.2 Legal- Interpretive Summary
In summary, legal environments appear to be evolving both in countries where
franchising is in its infancy, and in countries where it is already well established.
Already considered to have the most extensive franchise laws (Emerson 1998), the
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United States has recently held hearings in the House of Representatives' Judiciary
Committee on the Small Business Franchise Act24 (Coble 1998), which proposed
additional federal regulations specific to franchising. Legislators and practitioners
appear polarized in their positions on this issue, as are some prominent academic
researchers (c.£ (Bates 1999) and (Adler 1999); (LaFalce 1999) and (Cohen 1999);
(Kezios 1999) and (Wieczorek 1999)). Among provisions of the Act are imposition of
fiduciary duties on franchisors for advertising funds, limits on the ability of franchisors
to open outlets near existing ones, and terms that prohibit franchisors from restricting
choices regarding sources of supply (AlIen 1999).
The effects of legislation on franchising's expansion has yet to be determined through
empirical analysis. In some respects, franchisors may avoid markets where extensive
legislation exists, favoring those markets with little or no regulatory requirements.
Spain's 40 percent annual growth rate offranchising (Gamir and Mendez 2000), one of
the few countries in Europe with specific franchise legislation, suggests that the legal
environment in which franchising operates, in and of itself, is not a reliable predictor of
franchise expansion.
In summary, legal environments in which franchising is conducted shape intellectual
property, disclosure, and other provisions found in franchise agreements and disclosure
documents such as the UFOC. Because of its extensive federal regulatory
requirements, especially those related to disclosure, the United States provides fertile
ground for studies of franchising.
24 H.R. 4841, 105th Congress, Congressional Record E2162 (1998) (Coble - Small Business Franchise
Act of 1998) was introduced on October 14, 1998.
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2.6 PSYCHOLOGY
Industrial and organizational psychology has provided supplemental or complimentary
research related to individuals and their role in a venture's success (Sexton 1987).
According to Stevenson and Jarilo, the psychological/sociological approach to studies
of entrepreneurship began with McClelland (1961), and Collins and Moore (1964), in
the early 1960s (Stevenson and Jarilo 1990). These studies focused on entrepreneurs
as individuals, with the idea that individual backgrounds, environments, goals, values,
and motivations were the real objects of analysis. According to the authors, causes of
entrepreneurial action were of primary interest to these early psychology researchers.
2.6.1 Psychology- Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature
Among contributions in the psychology literature are studies of individual traits and
behaviours, including examinations of entrepreneurial intentions (Bird 1988), self-
efficacy (Whyte, Saks et al. 1997), and the effects of self-efficacy on intentions (Boyd
and Vozikis 1994). Self-confidence (Krueger and Dickson 1994), and overconfidence
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999) have also been examined, as well as a study on the
reluctance of some individuals to enter into business (Galbraith and Latham 1996),
personality patterns (Miner 1996), emotionality (Jehn 1997), propensity to take risks
(Brockhaus 1980), and the influence of biology on psychology (Weaver 1996). Filion
observed that behaviourists typically ascribe characteristics of creativity, persistence,
locus of control and leadership to entrepreneurs (Filion 1998).
Empirical studies that examined linkages between individual traits and the success of
their firms have produced conficting results. An empirical study by Blanchflower and
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Oswald set out to fmd the impact of psychological traits on entrepreneurship, as
measured by self-employment25 (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). Using an
econometric analysis ofthe Nàtional Child Development Study (NCDS) of 11,407
individuals born in Great Britain, the authors found that 1,279 were self-employed.
Because the NCDS study recorded outcomes of psychological tests performed on these
individuals as children, Blanchflower and Oswald examined correlations between traits
and self-employment. 26 They found that a quantitatively small but clear correlation
between those anxious for acceptance when they were children and those who were less
likely to start their own business. The authors concluded, ."psychology apparently does
not play a key role in determining who becomes an entrepreneur" (p. 13).
On the other hand, Kauranen found that personality traits of entrepreneurs were
interrelated with firm success, and were particularly apparent in small firms, where the
role of an entrepreneur is central to the operation oifhe business (Kauranen 1997). In
studies of individuals within organizations, Eggers found a strong correlation between a
CEO's behavior and a firm's fmancial performance (Eggers, Leahy et aL. 1996).
Leadership traits and an ability to communicate a vision were also found to have a
positive effect on firm performance among those in Baum et aL. 's sample of 183 CEOs
(Baum, Locke et aL. 1998).
25 Blanchflower and Oswald considered self-employment as the simplest form of entrepreneurship
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1998).26 The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is a "longitudinal birh cohort study that takes as its
subjects all those living in Great Britain who were born between March 3 and March 9, 1958. These
children were surveyed at birh and at ages 7, 11, 16,23, and 33. At the first three follow-ups,
information was obtained from parents, teachers, and doctors. At the most recent sweep, conducted in
1991 when all subjects were age 33.." (Blanch flower and Oswald 1998, p. 5). Details of the survey are
summarized in Elias, Peter, and Blanchflower, David G., The Occupations, Earnings and Work Histories
of Young Adults: Who Gets the Good Jobs? Research Paper no. 68. London: Department of
Employment, 1989.
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Gartner suggested that behaviors should be the focus of study as opposed to traits or
characteristics (Gartner 1988). He concluded that research focused on psychological
traits of entrepreneurs (e.g., (Carland, Hoy et al. 1984); (Chell, Haworth et al. 1991);
(Kets de Vries 1985); (Shaver and Scott 1991)) had proven "unfruitful" (Gartner 1988,
p.47). Gartner advocated a shift in focus toward "what the entrepreneur does and not
who the entrepreneur is" (Gartner 1988, p. 57). Individual entrepreneurial behavior
(e.g., (Mitton 1997)), and links between individual behavior and firm performance (e.g.,
(Jennings and Beaver 1997)) have been examined under psychology constructs. Other
behaviors studied included time commitment to work and family (Parasuraman, Purohit
et al. 1996) and time allocation (Cooper, Ramachandran et al. 1996).
Although insightful, studies of individual behavior in small firms has proven
problematic, in part because small business researoh frequently fails to distinguish
entrepreneurial behaviour from that of small business owner-managers (Deeks 1976);
(Jennings and Beaver 1997). Recognizing the heterogeneity of both individual
behaviors and the small business sectors in which they operate, some researchers have
advocated studies of individual behavior in a variety of settings, such as business start-
up and multiple business ownership circumstances (Westhead and Wright 1998).
Individual traits and behaviors within franchise organizations have included studies of
franchisee personality (Schell and McGills 1995); the psychological climate within
franchising (Strutton, Pelton et al. 1995); and franchisee behaviour (Dant 1995);
(Felstead 1991); (Stanworth and Curran 1999). In addition, studies of cooperation and
trust within franchise systems (e.g., (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996); (Ring 1996)),
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opportunistic behavior (e.g., (Withane 1991); (Das and Teng 1998)), and level of
franchisee satisfaction (e.g., (Koiranen, Hyrskyet al. 1997); (MoITison 1997)) have all
contributed to the knowledge base of individual behavior in franchise systems.
2.6.2 Psychology- Interpretive Summary
Mitchell concluded that apparently no typical entrepreneur exists, citing failure of
characteristics-and demo graphics-based research in psychology and sociology to
discover cause-effect linkages between personality types or backgrounds and success
(Mitchell1997). Storey's empirical findings suggested that although there was
considerable speculation, it was difficult to draw a clear pattern of the inipact of an
individual's personal characteristics on whether or not they survive in business (Storey
1994). Studies that focus on an individual's cognitive processes or training may present
only a partial view, because although discovering opportunities is important, it
represents an incomplete view of complete entrepreneurial processes.
As Kets de Vries argued "Many people have ideas, but very few have the stamia to
turn their ideas into action, .. . and as some aspiring entrepreneurs have discovered the
hard way, a vision without action is nothing more than an hallucination" (Kets de Vries
1996, p. 24).
Psychology researchers have employed different definitions of an entrepreneur, which
has made comparative studies diffcult. Table B3 in Appendix B presents various
definitions and characteristics from empirical studies that examied traits,
characteristics, and behaviours with author(s) defmitions of entrepreneurs if one was
provided. Chell summed up limitations of behaviour approaches, stating that the
paradox for this field of study has been that although entrepreneurship appeared to be
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directly related to individual behaviors, much of human behavior was too complex to
count (Chell).
2.7 MARKETING
Mendelsohn and Bynoe (1995) concluded that "franchising, at its core...is a method of
marketing goods and services" (Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995, p. xiii). Proponents of
franchising have viewed it as a dynamic method of combining advantages of both large
and small businesses to benefit the small businessperson (Vaughn 1979). Franchising
has also been called the most important type of contractually linked vertical marketing
system (Parsa 1999). The International Franchise Association (IF A) stated that John
Naisbitt, author of Megatrends, said, "Franchising is the single most successful
marketing concept ever. ,,27
Conversely, critics offranchising viewed it as representative of homogenization in our
commercial culture, "singularly responsible for the lack of variety in a number of retail
sectors" (Kaufìann and Dant 1998, p. 6). Further, Cohen argued that there is a "basic
flaw built into the structure of this form of marketing," (p. 175) citing the prevalence of
destructive conflicts between franchisors and franchisees (Cohen 1971). He concluded
that conficts result because franchisors are able to make decisions and set policies that
do not maximize franchisee's profits.
27 Source: (anonymous), IFA's Franchise Opportunities Guide, Summer 1995 Edition.
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2.7.1 Marketing- Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature
In narrowly focused terms, franchising represents an important method of distribution, a
"quasi-integrated alternative to markets and hierarchies" (Kaufrnann, Gordon et al.
2000, p. 217). On a continuum ranging from individually negotiated transactions at
current market conditions to one where movement of goods is an automatic part of a
long-range marketing plan, franchising as a mode of distribution may be said to occupy
the middle ground (Bucklin 1971, p. 33).
Viewed as categories within a context of marketing channels, Thompson proposed four
forms of vertical organization structures, a summary of which is presented in Table
2.11.
Table 2.11: Vertical Organization Structures Within Marketing Channels
Free and Open Supplier merely sells product to Duplication of effort, ineffcient scheduling, high
(Conventional) buyer. selling costs, no economies of scale
Ownership Combined successive stages of Maximized control, operating economies through
Integration production and distribution corporate directives.
under single ownership
Administered Channel member influences Pertains to line or classification of merchandise, 
System behavior of vertically adjacent rather than complete store operation.
firms by exerting leadership or
economic muscle within
channeL.
Contractual Independent firms at different Contractual integration occurs where various stages
Agreements distributive levels, integrated of production and distribution are independently
programs on contractual basis owned, but relationships between vertically
to obtain systemic economies adjacent finns are covered in a contractual
and an increased market arrangement such as those found in franchise,
impact. voluntary, and cooperative forms of organization.
Donald N. Thompson Contractual Marketing Systems: An Overview in Contractual Marketing Systems
Thompson, Donald N., Heath Lexington, Lexington, MA 1971
Thompson argued that in each type of contractual system and in every vertical channel,
conflicting and cooperating objectives may be found, although contractual system
members typically have more harmonious interests than conflicting ones (Thompson
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1971). He posited that cooperation or confict in a contractual channel varied with the
life cycle of a system. For example, franchisees are usually anxious to cooperate with
their franchisor initially, accepting the value of services in their franchise package.
This may change as a franchisee gains experience, particularly if a franchisor's services
are intangible. Thompson posited that "If a franchisee obtains only an initial expertise
accompanied by the use of a trademark, he may begrudge the franchisor attempts to
exercise control" (p. 23). He concluded that a root cause of conflict within contractual
marketing systems such as franchising is role incongruency.
The role of power in channel relationships has received a great deal of attention from
marketing researchers (Keh and Park 1998), studies that appear to have relevance to
franchising. Gaski found that 56 percent of articles in four primary outlets for
distribution channel research addressed the topic of interorganizational power (Gaski
1996). He noted that power, as it pertains to mark~ting channels, was defmed as "the
ability to control the decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member in
a given channel" (p. 64). A franchisor's control of strategic marketing activities
suggests that studies of power in marketing channels have applicability to franchising.
In addition to marketing channels, theories that relate to brand power, consumer value,
awareness, and purchasing patterns have also had applicability in studies of franchising.
Brand power may extend beyond the intrinsic qualities of a product or service in the
minds of consumers. For example, McCracken took an anthropological approach to
brands, arguing that brands have value because they add value, and they add value by
adding meaning (McCracken 1993). His study of 11 Canadians showed that cultural
meanings existed in beer brands. Based on his exploratory research, he concluded, "the
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chief cultural meaning carried by beer is masculinity" (p. 137). Lane posited that
regard for a brand arises from consumers' perceptions of quality, the user's satisfaction,
and prestige (Lane 1998). She argued that appeal and familiarity with brands go hand-
in-hand; with consumers choosing those brands they know and like. Each year,
marketers spend millions of dollars creating and developing brand images, considered
crucial for their firm's long-term success (Bhat and Reddy 1998).
Although initially required to build brand awareness, marketing was considered most
important during the middle of a product or company's life cycle, when identities had
been established, but consumers are stil concerned about quality (Treynor 1999).
Brand names are a source of differentiation in environments where physical
differentiation among products is difficult, and consumers are wiling to pay a premium
for them (Kohli and Thakor 1997). In situations where consumers are aware of a
number of brands that fit their criteria, they are unlikely to expend much effort in
seeking out information on unfamiliar brands28 (Macdonald and Sharp 1996).
Using a brand's power to influence consumer buying patterns through an efficient
distribution channel, franchising combines economies of scale and local production.
Franchising was considered to be an important means of leveraging brand equity, a
critical and inimitable resource in a fIrm's quest for competitive advantage and value
creation (Harrigan 1998). Brand equity is a term used in finance to describe the
28 Macdonald and Sharp noted, "A further way brand awareness may affect choice within the
consideration set is by influencing perceived quality. In a consumer choice study by Hoyer and Brown
(1990) over 70% of consumers selected a known brand of peanut butter from among a choice of three,
even though another brand was 'objectively' better quality (as determined by blind taste tests), and even
though they had neither bought or used the brand before. This result is even more surprising considering
the subjects were given the opportunity to taste all of the brands" (Macdonald and Sharp 1996, p. 3).
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prellum a consumer would pay for a branded product or service, compared to an
identical unbranded version ofthe same product! service29 (BieI1993). Empirical
support for brand equity may be found in Wu's comparative study of90 franchised and
65 independent hotels, in which he found that room rates in franchised motels were 21
percent higher than that charged by independent motels (Wu 1998). This finding
supported his hypothesis that franchises were able to extract price prellums from
consumers.
2.7.2 Marketing- Interpretive Summary
Kim attributed an overall lack of attention in the marketing literature to the presence of
different contexts in marketing channels, arguing, "no single framework or model
relating to behavioural phenomena can apply across all channel systems" (Kim and
Frazier 1996, p. 19). More specifically, Wren and Simpson observed that little attention
had been devoted to understanding how control and coordination is achieved in
marketing channels, particularly those involving small frrms (Wren and Simpson 1998).
Citing an earlier work by Romano and Ratnatunga (1995), Siu and Kirby noted "an
absence of a structured literature base which designated relevant linkages and
established the nature and weight of marketing on small enterprise research" (Siu and
Kirby 1998, p. 40). Recent attention is found, however, in the work of Stewart and
McAuley, who developed a taxonomy of strategies used by Canadian and UK SMEs in
the manufacturing sector (Stewar and McAuley 2000). Marketing perspectives
nonetheless provide valuable insights to this and other studies of franchising in several
ways.
29 "Brand equity can be considered the additional cash flow achieved by associating a brand with the
underlying product or service" (Biel 1993, p. 69).
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First, a view of franchise relationships as relational marketing channels introduced
dynamics such as dependence; flexibility, expectations and trust beyond contractual and
economieperspectives. For example, Johnson found that close interfirm relationships
encouraged strategic integration, building strong, enduring partnerships that turn the
negative view of dependence into a positive, strategic asset (Johnson 1999). She
concluded, however, that measures of flexibility and relationship quality constructs,
although important, did not perform well in her study of 160 industrial machinery
companies, suggesting that future research was needed.
Second, a marketing perspective introduced concepts of brand awareness and equity,
integral parts of franchising. This perspective contributes to an understanding of
franchising's past successes at penetrating new markets, and insights on
franchisors'expansion plans in new markets. It is atlso helpful in understanding how
advertising and franchise fee structures are developed and justified within franchising,
extending those offered by the economics literature or simple accounting measures.
Since both consumers and potential franchisees are likely to be influenced by franchise
marketing, this perspective may also provide insights on why potential franchisees are
attracted to certain franchise concepts.
Third, marketing literature contributed to this study by recognizing the importance of
integration with other paradigms, such as strategic management and entrepreneurship
(e.g., (Parsa 1999); (Stewart and McAuley 2000)). Lastly, contributions from
marketing have highlighted a need to consider the context in which theoretical gestalts
are applied. For example, Anderson and McAuley found through their study of rural
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entrepreneurs that "marketing theory cannot be applied universally without taking
account of context" (Anderson and McAuley 1999, p. 176).
2.8 ENTREPRENEURSHIP
In formulating theoretical foundations for this study, entrepreneurship provided a
number of potentially useful models. This section of the literature review is divided
into two parts: the first covers the broad topic of entrepreneurship, the second focused
on corporate entrepreneurship, the study of entrepreneurship within organizations.
When the birth of firms is used as a measure of entrepreneurship (e.g., (Blanchflower
and Oswald 1998); (Gartner, Mitchell et aL. 1989); (Reynolds 1991)) a quantifiable
indicator of the phenomenon is available. Reliability of this indicator, however, had
been questioned in a number of recent studies. For example, Jennings and Beaver
observed that entrepreneurial activity was not an essential prerequisite for small
business formation30 (Jennings and Beaver 1997). Although small business' dynamic
environment has provided fertile ground for entrepreneurship studies, a growing trend is
to make clear distinctions between the concepts of small business and that of
entrepreneurship (Ruse and Landstrom 1997). Further, in their study of portfolio and
habitual entrepreneurs, Westhead and Wright argued that entrepreneurship involved
more than the act of starting a business (Westhead and Wright 1998). In many
contexts, distinguishing entrepreneurial behaviour from others has proven problematic,
and futher development of theoretical foundations in entrepreneurship have been
30 Blatt summarized the relationship between small business formation and entrepreneurship:
"Not every small business is entrepreneurial and not every entrepreneur runs in small business. Some
small businesses are run by entrepreneurs and some entrepreneurs runs small businesses; they are not
usually exclusive nor mutually inclusive categories" (Blatt, 1988 in (Dana 1992).
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complicated by an apparent lack of consensus on a definition for the term (Bull and
Wilard 1993).
2.8.1 Entrepreneurship- Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature
Entrepreneurship has been viewed not as a singular monolithic consideration, but rather
as a concept that covered a broad range of activities (Herbert and BrazeaI1999). It is a
process, not a single act (Block and MacMilan 1993). Therefore, it follows that the
nature of entrepreneurship involves more than simply forming a business. Using the
number of new businesses created may not be "a reliable indicator of the development
of entrepreneurship" (Westhead and Wright 1998, p. 174).
Churchil observed that entrepreneurship is widely recognized as creating value- albeit
initiated through starting a new venture (Churchil 1997). He posited that value is
actually created as an enterprise grows, creates jobs, and satisfies the needs of
additional customers, while making money for stakeholders in the process. According
to Churchil, a growing company continues to create value if it introduces new products
or services, creates additional jobs, and pays more taxes, thereby renewing itself.
Entrepreneurship is viewed, therefore, as a continuing process of opportunity
recognition and realization (Stevenson and Jarilo 1990).
Considered in isolation, studies that exclusively focus on entrepreneurial processes may
only present a partial view of the phenomenon. Kao argued that entrepreneurship
resulted from interrelationships of a person, a task, and an organizational context,
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requiring a more holistic view as opposed to a single frame ofreference31 (Kao 1991).
An individual's industry-specific knowledge and reputation, for example, have their
greatest value when applied in similar contexts, and are likely to influence opportunity
selection and recognition (Hart, Stevenson et al. 1995). In order to further progress
within the entrepreneurship discipline, Low and MacMilan advocated theory driven
research that is both contextual and process driven (Low and MacMillan 1988).
One process, deemed central to entrepreneurship, is that of creating successful
organizational relationships (Shane and Hoy 1996). Within franchising' s organizational
context, the role of a franchisor as entrepreneur is generally accepted in the literature
(Falbe, Dandridge et al. 1998); (Spinelli 1997). Ray Kroc, for example, is widely
recognized as an entrepreneur, despite the fact that he did not invent McDonald's
operation, but merely discovered it (Block and MacMillan 1993). Excluding
franchisees from entrepreneurship would require an extremely narrow defmition of the
field (Hoy 1994), although their role is much less defined than that ofa franchisor.
Studies that measured growth (e.g., (Shane 1996)), inovation (e.g., (Kaufmann and
Dant 1998)), and entrepreneurial behavior (e.g., (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996)) have all
described entrepreneurial activities of franchisors. Price viewed entrepreneurial activity
by franchisees as a paradox, illegitimate in franchising's context of replication and
standardization (Price 1997).
31 Kao defined organizational context as "the Iimnediate setting in which creative and entrepreneurial
work takes place. Such issues as organizational structure and systems, the definition of work rules, and
group culture affect significantly the nature of the creative or entrepreneurial environment. Such factors
may limit or facilitate creativity and entrepreneurship, and become an increasing factor to contend with as
the organization evolves" (Kao 1991, p. 6).
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In order to protect their business systems from unauthorized changes, franchisors have
stated that they prefer managers to entrepreneurs as franchisees (Falbe, Dandridge et al.
1998). Barrow cited a Bank of America official who said: "the best franchisee, as far as
many franchisors are concerned, is someone who is smart enough to understand and
operate the system, but not smart enough to try to improve on it" (Barrow 1989, p. 170).
Opportunities for entrepreneurial behaviours by franchisees may exist in some systems,
however, because agreements cannot cover all possible contingencies, and a
franchisor's ability to impose strategic direction over franchisees is limited, as long as
franchisees comply with contractual provisions (Phan, Butler et al. 1996).
Arguably, the most contentious issue in franchising research centers on franchise
failures (e.g., (Bates 1997); (Lafontaine and Shaw 1998); (Shane 1997); (Stanworth,
Purdyet al. 1997)). Fueling debates are wide discrepancies in reported failure rates
reported by popular, industry, and academic sources. Failure rates of approximately 4
percent had been reported in both the popular press (Hoy 1994) and by franchise
associations (Stanworth, Purdy et al. 1998), conclusions substantiated by some
academic research (e.g., (Castrogiovann, Justis et al. 1993)). Although not citing a
specific rate, Barrow concluded that franchise failure rates were much lower than for
the small business sector as a whole (Barrow 1989). The annual British Franchise
Associationiational Westminster Bank survey estimated franchisee failure and
turnover combined were around 10 percent per annum (Stanworth, Purdy et al. 1998),
while Storey cited a study of survival factors amongst franchisees that found results
similar to those for small-business owners in general (Storey 1994).
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Studies by Bates, however, found failure rates for young franchises that exceeded those
of non-franc hi sed businesses (Bates 1995); (Bates 1996). In a later study, using a
sample of 82,202 franchise firms, Bates concluded that some franchisees were less
likely to survive than independents (Bates 1997). Using longitudinal data, Shane found
that 75 percent of new franchises in a sample of 157 companies were found to fail
within 12 years (Shane 1997). Confruung that survival rates differed among
franchises, Shane later found that within his sample, new franchise systems were
especially prone to failure (Shane 1998).
Explanations for failures within franchising include some of the same reasons for
failure of non- franchised businesses, including failure to achieve employment of others
and failure to achieve high levels of turnover (Storey 1994). Unlike non-franchised
businesses, some franchisees were unable to grow through increases in same store sales
(Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996), often prohibited fron'l adding products or services
designed to increase sales by provisions in their franchise agreement. Often promoted
as a business panacea (Stanworth, Purdy et al. 1998), disputable failure rates caused
some to label franchising as a trap for the trusting (Brown, 1969 in (Stanworth, Purdy et
al. 1997). According to Chrisman et aI., attributes that increase likelihood of a
venture's success may simultaneously decrease its probability of surviva¡32 (Chrisman,
Bauerschmidt et al. 1998). Although insÌghtful, use offailure rates as measures of
relative success have proven problematic, at least in part because of inconsistencies in
32 Chrisman et al. argued that strategic management theory suggests that a business unit's performance is
related to the environment of the industry in which it competes, the resources it controls, the strategy used
to align resources with opportunities, and the organizational structure, processes, and systems it employs
to implement its strategy. Survival, on the other hand, depends on the organization's ability to secure
tangible resources (such as capital, credit, land, facilities, etc.) with which to do business (Chrisman,
Bauerschmidt et al. 1998).
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defmition and measurement (DeCastro, Alvarez et aL. 1997); (Stanworth, Purdyet aL.
1998); (Watson and Everett 1996).
In addition to studies of success and failure, entrepreneurship research has contributed
to an understanding of value creation and extraction in franchise systems. In his study
offranchisees, Phan speculated that some franchisees were probably acting
entrepreneurially, and therefore, should create value33 (Phan, Butler et aL. 1996). He
argued "unanticipated contractual contingencies become the focal points for
entrepreneurial value creation by the franchisee" (p. 382). Opportunities for value
creation are considered important, as Birley et aL. concluded, "prospective wealth
creation is a major motivation for both franchisor and franchisee" (Birley, Leleux et aL.
1997, p. 1). Further support for wealth maximization as a general motivation for
franchisees was offered by (MichaeI1993), (Spinelli and Birley 1996), and (Wiliams
1998).
Kaufmann and Lafontaine, who studied McDonald's franchisees, provided a specific,
albeit atypical example of a wealth extraction process in franchising (Kaufmann and
Lafontaine 1994). Although the authors acknowledged that their study wasnot ofa
typical franchise, they found substantial ex post and ex ante rents were available to
McDonald's franchisees. They determined that franchisees earned ex post rents when
they achieved a minimum of$900,OOO in annual sales34, while ex ante rents were
33 Phan assumed that the entrepreneurial phenomenon was apparent whenever opportunities were pursued
that required resources beyond those controlled (Stevenson and Jarillo i 990).34 Sales measured in 1982 dollars. Examination of sales data from 5,400 McDonald's restaurants
revealed that as of December 1982, 76 percent had attained sales of over $900,000 (p. 422). Calculation
of economic rent in the study included the opportunity costs of interest and fi'anchisee labor. The
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available to franchisees leaving the system, in part because McDonald's acceptance rate
of new franchisees was about 7.5 percent (p. 418).
Phan (1996) observed that despite 225 published articles under the Society of
Franchising, franchisees have been one of the least studied of entrepreneurial types
(Phan, Butler et al. 1996). Kaufmann and Dant (1998) argued that franchising
"provides a unique and fertile setting for research in entrepreneurship: franchisor as
entrepreneur, franchisee as entrepreneur, and the franchise relationship as an
entrepreneurial partnership" (Kaufmann and Dant 1998, p. 14). Despite previous work
by entrepreneurship researchers, a number of questions about franchising remain
largely unanswered: Do franchisees create new combinations, causing discontinuity?
(Boy 1994). Are there opportuiuties within the franchising system for franchisees to
conduct entrepreneurial processes that create wealth? (Spinell 1997). Can the
assumption that franchisees are creating value because they act entrepreneurially be
borne out by empirical data? (Phan, Butler et al. 1996, p. 399). A summary of
theoretical and empirical studies related to franchising is provided in Appendix B,
Table B4.
2.8.2 Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE)- Review of Theoretical and Empirical
Literature
Entrepreneurial processes within corporate organizations have recently become a topic
of discussion among both practitioners and academics (Sharma and Chrisman 1999).
What makes a firm entrepreneurial? Lumpkin and Dess argued that an entrepreneurial
opportunity cost of labor assumed that franchisees worked longer hours than managers of company-
owned stores (Kaufinann and Lafontaine 1994).
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firm is one that effectively combines autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking,
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). The most
common examples of corporate entrepreneurship (CE) are found where an established
organization enters a new business; an individual or individuals within a corporate
context champion a new product; and when an organization embraces an
entrepreneurial philosophy in its operations35 (Covin and Miles 1999). Once considered
an oxymoron (Stevenson and Jarilo 1990), CE has been legitimatised by growth in the
field offrrm-level entrepreneurship research (Zahra, Jennngs et al. 1999). CE has been
linked to profitability, survival, and growth (Zahra 1996), the pursuit of competitive
advantage (Covin and Miles 1999), improved firm performance36 (Peters and Waterman
Jr. 1982), value creation (Vozikis, Bruton et al. 1999), and organizational adaptation
and renewal in firms (Falbe, Dandridge et al. 1998).
CE largely encompasses two types of phenomena ånd the processes that surround them:
(1) Strategic Renewal- organizational transformation through renewal of key ideas on
which they are built; and (2) Venturing- the birth of new businesses within existing
organizations (Guth and Ginsberg 1990). Global competition, delayered management
structures, and rapid technological innovation have served as catalysts for
organizational transformation, as corporations strived to become entrepreneurial (Dess,
35 Herbert & Brazeal contrasted the concept of corporate entrepreneurship with that of an individuaL.
"The classic conceptions of entrepreneurship is that of the individual, independent entrepreneur who
assumes financial and other risks in order to exploit a new idea or product possibility; and that the risks of
failure uniquely devolve upon the entrepreneur. In cOlporate entrepreneurship, however, individualor
group entrepreneurship is fostered within a preexisting organizational setting; the organization provides
support for the development and exploitation of one or more innovations which are deemed strategically
andfinancially consistent with the supporting organization's mission. Thus, executives attempting to
implant entrepreneurial activities, support for them, and rewards for them typically and by definition are
interested in corporate entrepreneurship (Herbert and Brazeal 1999).
36 Dess observed that the literature generally supports the notion that corporate entrepreneurship is related
to performance, but that the relationship may not immediately be apparent (Dess, Lumpkin et al. 1999).
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Lumpkin et aL. 1999), and overcome the powerful force ofhomeostasis found in many
large organizations (Barrett and Weinstein 1998). In response to increased pressure,
corporate executives have sought ways to eliminate the organizational barriers to
inovation, and unleash creative talents in their people (Herbert and Brazeal 1999).
Chung concluded that the nature, speed, direction, and variety of entrepreneurial ideas
and initiatives were significantly affected by organizational context (Chung and
Gibbons 1997). Traditional organizational models, built around rigid hierarchies, were
considered poorly suited for today's entrepreneurial firms (Dess, Lumpkin et aL. 1999).
Covin argued that innovation is at the center of the nomological network that
encompasses the construct of corporate entrepreneurship (CE) (Covin and Miles 1999).
"Innovating companies" posited Kanter, "provide the freedom to act which arouses the
desire to act" (Kanter 1996, p. 142).
Corporate venturing, the second aspect of CE, has been well documented in the
literature (e.g., (Block and MacMilan 1993); (Burgelman 1983)). A new venture is the
result of a process of new business creation and organization, for the purpose of profit
and growth, which produces and markets products or services to satisfy unmet market
demands37 (Gartner 1985). Biggadike defmed a corporate venture as "a business
marketing a product or service that the present company has not previously marketed
and that requires the parent company to obtain new equipment or new people or new
knowledge" (Biggadike 1979, p. 104). Corporate venturing is internal generation of
new businesses (Block and MacMillan 1993), or more specifically, creation of new
37 Chrisman observed that new ventures can take several forms: joint ventures between two or more
established firms; a corporate venture initiated as a self-contained organizational unit; or as an
independent venture initiated and controlled by one or more individuals (Chrisman, Bauerschmidt et al.
1998).
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businesses by members offirms that already exist (Venkataraman in (Greene, Brush et
al. 1999); (Zahra 1996). Table 2.12 provides a summary of corporate entrepreneurship
definitions.
Table 2.12: Corporate Entrepreneurship Definitions
Author and Date Definition
(Burgelman 1983) Corporate entrepreneurship refers to the process whereby the finns
engage in diversification through internal development, requiring
new resource combinations to extend the firm's activities in
previously unrelated areas. (p. 1349)
(Chung and Gibbons 1997) Corporate entrepreneurship is an organizational process for
transforming individual ideas into collective actions through
management of uncertainties. (p. 14)
(Covin and Slevin 1991) Corporate entrepreneurship involves extending the firm's domain of
competence and corresponding opportunity set through internally
generated new resource combinations. (p. 7, quoting Burgelran,
1984, p. 154)
(Guth and Ginsberg 1990) Corporate entrepreneurship encompasses two types of phenomena 
and the processes surrounding them: (1) the birth of new businesses
within existing organizations, i.e., internal innovation or venturing;
and (2) the transformation of organizations through renewal ofthe
key ideas on which they are built, i.e. strategic renewaL. (p.5)
(Jennings and Beaver 1997) Corporate entrepreneurship is the extent to which new products
and/or new markets are developed. An organization is
entrepreneurial if it develops a higher than average number of new
products and/or new markets (p. 489)
(Scheidl 1998) Corporate entrepreneurship involves the notion of birth of new 
businesses within ongoifg businesses, and... the transformation of
stagnant, ongoing businesses in need of revival or transformation.
(p.2)
Spann, Adams, & Wortman Corporate entreprenew'ship is the establishment of a separate
(1988) corporate organization (often in the form of a profit center, strategic
business unit, division, or subsidiary) too introduce a new product,
server or create a new market, or utilize a new technology. (p. 149)
Vesper (1984) Corporate entrepreneurship involves employee initiative from
below in the organization to undertake something new. An
innovation which is created by subordinates without being asked,
expected, or perhaps even given permission by higher management
to do so. (p. 295)
Zahra (1993) Corporate entrepreneurship' is a process of organizational renewal
two distinct of related dimensions: innovation and venturing, and
strategic renewal (p. 321)
Zahra (1995, 1996) Corporate entrepreneurship- the sum off a company's innovation,
renewal, and venturing efforts.38 (1995, p. 227; 196, p. 1715)
38 Innovation involves creating an introducing products, production processes, and organizational
systems. Renewal means revitalizing the company's operations by changing the scope of its business, its
competitive approaches or both. It also means building or acquiring new capabilities and then creatively
leveraging them to add value for shareholders. Venturing means that the finn wil enter new businesses
by expanding operations in existing or new markets.
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Sharma and Chrisman further refmed the concept, differentiating between external and
internal corporate venturing, the former creating semi-autonomous or autonomous
entities, while the latter created entities that reside within an existing organizational
domain (Sharma and Chrisman 1999). Venturing, therefore, involves not only
creatively entering new markets, but also creating new opportunities within existing
markets (Vozikis, Bruton et al. 1999). Both entering new markets and creating new
opportunities within existing markets are considered entrepreneurial activities, because
they help businesses to create new revenue streams (Zahra, Nielsen et al. i 999).
Although a number of defmitions for CE are evident in the recent literature, Stevenson
and Jarilo observed that the "crux" of corporate entrepreneurship is that opportunities
for a firm must be pursued by individuals within it (Stevenson and Jarilo 1990).
Guth and Ginsberg concluded that despite growing interest in CE, "there appears to be
nothing near a consensus on what it is" (Guth and Ginsberg 1990, p. 6). Covin and
Miles observed that despite general agreement in the literature that firms per se can be
entrepreneurial, there is no consensus on what attributes must be present to label a firm
entrepreneurial (Covin and Miles 1999). In his review of the literature, Sharma
observed that although authors generally agreed on unique features of CE, they often
used different terms to express themselves (Sharma and Chrisman 1999). Table B17 in
Appendix B presents definitions used in previous studies of corporate entrepreneurship.
Organizational characteristics that foster corporate entrepreneurship are presented in
summary form in Table 2. i 3 below.
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Table 2.13: Organizational Characteristics that Foster Corporate Entrepreneurship
Characteristic Study Conclusions
Appropriate Use of Fry; 1987; Sathe, 1985; Block & Omati, In order to be effective, reward
Rewards 1987; Scanlan, 1981; Souder, 1981; system must consider goals,
Kanter, 1985 feedback, emphasis on
individual responsibility, and
rewards based on results.
Management Support Hisrich & Peters, 1986; Sykes, 1986; Managers must be wiling to
Souder, 1981; Sykes & Block, 1989; facilitate entrepreneurial
MacMilan, Block, & Narasima, 1986; projects.
Quinn,1985
Resource Availability Sathe, 1985; Von Hippel, 1977; Souder, Employees must perceive
1981; Sykes, 1986; Hisrich & Peters, availability of resources for
1986; Katz & Garter, 1989 inovative activities.
Organizati onal Souder, 1981; Sathe, 1985; Hisrich & Identified in various ways, but
Structure Peters, 1986; Sykes, 1986; Burgelran, always an essential factor
1983; Schuler, 1986; Bird, 1988; Sykes
& Block, 1989
Risk Taking MacMilan, Block, & Narasimha, 1986; Employees and management
Sathe, 1985; Sykes, 1986; Burgelran, must be wiling to take a risk
1983, 1984; Quinn, 1985; ElIis & Taylor, and have tolerance for failure
1988; Kanter, 1988; Bird, 1988; Sykes & should it occur.
Block, 1989 
Source: An Interactive Model of the Coiporate Entrepreneurship Process, (Hornsby, Naftiger et al.
1993).
2.8.3 Entrepreneurship- Interpretive Summary
Despite an apparent lack of definitional consensus, theoretical foundations of corporate
entrepreneurship (CE) may provide a useful prototype for this study of entrepreneurial
opportunities within franchise systems. First, Zahra et al. called the empirical evidence
"compelling" that CE improves firm performance39 (Zahra, Nielsen et al. 1999). In a
previous study, they posited that corporate governance can significantly impact CE, and
called for additional research on their association (Zahra 1996). Firm performance has
39 An example was cited by Covin and Miles of a 1995 Zahra and Covin study of three separate samples
and a total of 108 firms where a positive and strengthening relationship between CE behavior and
subsequent financial performance was revealed (Covin and Miles 1999).
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been considered as the ultimate dependent variable40 (Covin and Slevin 1991), a
measure ofa firm's ability to create value for its customers in a sustainable and
econollcally efficient manner (Barney 1991); (Chrisman, Bauerschmidt et al. 1998).
Second, CE views entrepreneurship as a process, one that includes both venturing and
inovative entrepreneurial processes within an organizational context. CE also
considers that contributions to firm performance may be made by individuals or teams
of individuals within organizations. This view is consistent with Miler's argument that
what is most important is not who a critical actor is, "but the process of
entrepreneurship and the organizational factors which foster and impede it" (Miler
1983, p. 770). Increasingly, corporate governance mechanisms have come under
scrutiny for their ability to foster or constrain entrepreneurship (Blair 1995).
Lastly, relationships between performance and ent:iepreneurship remain a fruitful area
for research (Zahra, Jennings et al. 1999). Bhide concluded, "Entrepreneurs who start
and build new businesses are more celebrated than studied" (Bhide 2000, p. 3).
Stevenson acknowledged a need to establish lins between entrepreneurship and
corporate management, ifthe formers' large body of research is to benefit the latter
(Stevenson and Jarillo 1990). Within franchising's context, Price concluded that
measuring performance, like most aspects of franchise studies, is under-researched
(Price 1997, p. 473). This could be due, at least in part, to a lack of a suitable model for
analyzing entrepreneurial processes within franchising's hybrid organizational form
(MichaeI1993).
40 Schwartz and Teach concluded that there was no general agreement on which performance measures
were right to study (Schwartz and Teach 2000).
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Despite CE's potential application, models developed in non-franchised businesses may
require modification for studies of franchising firms. Corporate governance models
assume that individuals are employees. In franchising, recipients of directives are not
at-wil employees but franchisees, equity owners with a significant stake in a legally
distinct component of a networked business (Selden 1998). Additionally, the formal
context offranchising depicts an organizational form that meets Weber's six
characteristics of a bureaucracy,41 making it a theoretically unpromising environment
for entrepreneurial processes. Kantner argued that in these enviromnents, benefits
derived from entrepreneurial processes would be severely limited, and only take place
when companies: (1) mandated change from the top; (2) set up formal tests of ideas
initiated at the top; (3) bring in outsiders free from the constraints facing employees; or
(4) are unable to maintain complete control, which allows a few "holes in the system"
(Kanter 1996, p. 84). Unlike non-franchised businesses with organic organizational
structures, contractual provisions in franchising are likely to prevent substantive
changes in organizations for the term of an agreement.
Dess et aL. suggested that making bureaucratic organizations more flexible and efficient
through corporate entrepreneurship, and the use of CE as a means for strategic renewal
is one of the most promising areas for future research (Dess, Lumpkin et aL. 1999).
Covin and Miles posed this challenge to management researchers:
41 There is consensus among social scientists that six characteristics of 
bureaucracy, all part of Weber's
original description, are roughly as follows: (l) A hierarchical chain of command; (2) Specialization by
function; (3) Uniform policies covering rights and duties; (4) Standardized procedures for each job; (5) A
career based on promotions for technical competence; and (6) Impersonal relations (Pinchot 1994, pp. 22-
3).
John E. Clarkin 95
The principal challenge to management researchers is to identitY the entrepreneurial processes
that lead to various forms of corporate entrepreneurship, and then to theoretically predict and
empirically veritY the forms of this phenomenon that produce the best results for firms in
various business and industry contexts (Covin and Miles 1999, p. 65).
Sharma argued that in order to advance theory from abstract concepts to concrete
solutions, classifications of groups or populations of organizations that share large
numbers of characteristics and differ sharply from other groups is desirable (Sharma
and Chrisman 1999).
2.9 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW
This review of selected literature acknowledged contributions made by studies of
contracting. Organization theory, economics, legal, psychology and marketing
disciplines were also covered. Additionally, because of its relevance to this study, a
more comprehensive review of the entrepreneurship literature was presented, with a
separate section devoted to a review of the contributions made by corporate
entrepreneurship researchers. Although valuable ih furthering an understanding of
franchising, some common themes emerged from the literature that highlighted a need
for additional work in this area.
First, as previously described, franchìsing resembled a shared tenancy contract,
"halfway between fixed-rent and wage contract(s)" (BarzeI1989, p. 37) with aspects of
both relational and discrete contracts. As an organizational form, franchising has been
considered a hybrid (Shane 1996), requiring a governance structure with control
systems that allow both coordination and adaptation (Spinelli and Birley 1996). Central
features of franchise organizations are a simultaneous presence of both firm- and
market-like characteristics (Noiion 1988). From an econollcs perspective, franchise
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firms operate near the middle of a continuum between markets and hierarchies (Brown
1998), with medium levels of adaptation, incentives, and controls (Wiliamson, Winter
et al. 1991) as ilustrated in Table 2.14 below.
Table 2.14: Economic Organizations Comparison
Unilateral Coordinated Incentives Administrative
Adaptation Adaptation Control
Market High Low High Low
Hybrid Medium Medium Medium Mediwn
Hierarchy Low High Low High
Source: Wiliamson (1991), "Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural
alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36: 269-296.
Viewed from a marketing perspective, franchising as a mode of distribution is said to
occupy the middle ground between the planned end of an integrated system and the
day-to-day pole of the independent system (Bucklin 1971). Entrepreneurship
researchers have viewed franchising as "somewhat of a half-way house, lying
somewhere between entrepreneurship and employment" (Barrow 1989, p. 166), or
"exactly mid-way between solo independent entrepreneurs and large corporate
i
managers (Knight, 1984 in (Price 1997). Although useful when contrasting franchises
with non- franchised firms, these narrowly-defined approaches may have limited use in
comparing firms engaged in franchising when used exclusively. One explanation
offered by Stanworth and Curran, "franchising does not fit comfortably within any
single academic discipline" (Stanworth and Curran 1999, p. 324).
Theoretical paradigms used in previous research often encountered difficulties in
explaining some prevalent phenomena found in empirical studies offranchising. For
example, the widespread presence of multi-unit ownership by franchisees and various
forms of master franchising (Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994); (Kaufmann and Dant
1998) indicate organizational complexity within what is sometimes considered a
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simple, dyadic relationship between franchisors and franchisees. As increasing
numbers of large firms strive to emulate small firms by nimbly adapting to survive in
changing markets, (Kanter 1997), Price's paradox of how conforllty and fewer failures
in franchising remains largely unexplained (Price 1997).
Additionally, despite franchising's ubiquity and global econollc impact, except for
studies by Bates (Bates 1996), Shane (Shane 1995)(Shane 1995), (Shane 1997) and
Stanworth (Stanworth and Kaufmann 1996), comparatively little is known about factors
that differentiate successful franchises from unsuccessful ones. Further, as Bradach
described, firms engaged in franchising often used a combination of franchised and
company-owned stores to expand their chains (Bradach 1997). This plural form
phenomenon also remains largely unexplained, as does differential performance among
firms engaged in franchising.
Stanworth and Curran recognized that franchising extends into "a multiplicity of fields
such as law, marketing, econollcs, entrepreneurship, human resource management,
psychology, sociology, and organizational theory" (Stanworth and Curran 1999, p.
324). The authors formed propositions that spanned macro, organizational, and
individual levels, offering 15 general propositions as guidelines for hypothesis
generation and testing. Employing a typology based on the work ofStanworth and
Curran, this study addresses franchising at organizational and individual levels. The
next chapter describes development of hypotheses that emerged from this literature
review, and a discussion of units of analysis used in this study.
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. 3.0 DEFINITIONS, UNITS OF ANALYSIS, AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
"How much more agreeable it would be to reduce everything to a handful of aspects and
explain it by a handful of causes" (Landes 1969, p. 554).
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter reviewed recent literature with relevance to franchising.
Contributions have been made from a number of different countries and academic
disciplines, including econollcs, marketing, and entrepreneurship, focused primarily
on franchising' s formal context. Albeit to a lesser extent, academics, legal
practitioners, and consultants have also studied franchising's operational realm.
Emerging from the literature were several points that helped to shape this study.
First, clarity and consistency in terminology is important in studies of franchising.
Failure rates in franchising, a topic frequently studied by researchers from various
disciplines, have historically had problems of defmition and measurement (Stanworth,
Purdy et al. 1998). As a contractual form of business between legally distinct entities,
franchising may also become entangled in tortuous and complex legal definitions
(Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995). The British Franchise Association, International
Franchise Association, and the Code of Ethics of the European Franchise Association
have each adopted different definitions of afranchise.42 While the U.S. Department of
Commerce definedjianchising as a form oflicensing (Kostecka 1988), academic
studies have also viewed it as a form of marketing or distribution (Vaughn 1979), or to
describe the collective groups of frrms who engage in the use of a franchise as part of
42 Adams concluded, however, that each essentially describes, "a contractual relationship between the
parties under which one party (the franchisor) licenses the other part (the fi'anchisee) to carry on
business under a name, etc. owned or associated with the franchisor" (Adams, Jones et aL. 1997, p. 22).
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their business strategy (e.g., (Bates 1996)). To improve clarity and consistency, a
section providing definitions used in this study is provided.
Second, franchising involves organizational complexity and diversity that must be
considered in its units of analysis. On the surface, franchising's components appear to
fit together in a simple, straightforward manner. As depicted in Figure 3.1 below, and
posited by Vaughn: "The parent company is termed the franchisor; the receiver of the
privilege the franchisee; and the right or privilege itself, the fi'anchise,,43 (Vaughn 1979,
pp. 1-2).
Figure 3.1: Basic Franchise System
I FRANC HISOR I I FRANCHISEE I
11 FRANCHISE 11
Empirical studies offranchising have revealed, however, that what appears to be a
conceptually simple, dyadic business relationship is actually more complex, with
additional organization layers and product or service variations. Multi-unit ownership
by franchisees, area developers, and co-branding in retail outlets are a few examples of
organizational complexity found within franchising.
43 The wordfi'anchise is derived from the old French word,franchir, meaning, "to free from slavery"
(Emerson 1998).
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A third point to emerge from the literature is that beyond the role of a franchisor,
comparatively little is known about entrepreneurial opportunities and processes within
the context of franchising. Franchising is built on replication, standardization,
uniformity, and compliance, in contrast to the attributes of innovation and adaptation
most commonly associated with entrepreneurship. Franchisors maintain unilateral
authority through detailed agreements and operations manuals that govern activities and
behaviours by franchisees. It would appear that discretion, innovation, and other
behaviours typically associated with entrepreneurship are inherently illegitimate in
franchising, consistent with Kirzner's view of highly structured organizations (Kirzner
1997).
Lastly, entrepreneurship studies of franchising that examined growth (e.g., (Shane
1996)), inovation (e.g., (Kaufmann and Dant 1998)), and entrepreneurial behaviour
(e.g., (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996)) have predominantly focused on activities of
franchisors. In contrast, little research has been devoted to entrepreneurial activities
within franchising, presumably because of its seemingly unprollsing environment for
experimentation and adaptation. In their literature review, Phan et al. observed that
despite more than 80 articles published by entrepreneurship researchers, the franchisee
has been one of the least studied entrepreneurial types (Phan, Butler et al. 1996).
The aims of this chapter are to address measurement and defmition problems, clarify
levels and units of analysis, and to develop research questions and hypotheses used in
this study of franchising. This chapter begins by defining terminology used in this
study. Next, a review offranchising's organizational and product/service variations is
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presented. Research questions and hypotheses are presented next, followed by a
summary of the chapter.
3.2 DEFINITIONS
Stanworth and Curran argued, "theoretical discussion of a phenomenon first requires a
clear definition of that phenomenon" (Stanworth and Curran 1999, p. 324). Many
definitions used in entrepreneurship research have been considered incomplete, unable
to withstand the scrutiny of other researchers (Gartner 1988). A goal ofthis section is
not to debate defmitions used in previous studies, but rather to provide clarity and
consistency in the terminology used in this study.
This study viewed entrepreneurship as a phenomenon extending beyond the birth of a
new firm (Westhead and Wright 1998). Consistent with Shane's approach, this study
considered entrepreneurship to include sources of opportunities, processes of discovery,
evaluation and opportunity exploitation, and the individuals and firms that exploit them
(Shane 2000). Shane's approach followed constructs developed by Low and
MacMilan, who argued that entrepreneurship is a context and process driven
phenomenon (Low and MacMillan 1988). Because franchising exists within an
organizational context, this study also included corporate entrepreneurship paradigms of
organizational innovation and venturing (Guth and Ginsberg 1990).
3.2.1 Franchise
In broad terms, ajìanchise is any arrangement in which the owner of a trademark, trade
name, copyright, or other proprietary product or process allows another to use it in the
selling of goods or services (Kuratko and Hodgetts 1995). In the context ofthis study, a
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franchise is a legal, contractual license between two distinct entities, whose relational
parameters are established by terms and conditions in a UFOC and franchise agreement.
3.2.2 Franchisor
Afranchisor is an individual or company that has developed some product or service
(Caves and Murhy 1976), and contractually licenses its use for a period of time to
another entity through a franchise agreement. Afranchisor is legal owner ofthe
product, service, trademark, or other form of intellectual property being licensed. A
franchisor may be an individual, a group of individuals, or distinct corporate entity.
3.2.3 Franchisee
A franchisee is a recipient of a contractual license (franchise) granted by a franchisor.
The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is formally governed by a franchise
agreement. A license grants a franchisee the rights to market designated products or
services in a specified location, in accordance with provisions set forth in a franchise
agreement. In exchange for these rights, franchisees pay a certain sum of money to
franchisors to operate the business, rights limited to the term of the agreement, or to a
lesser period if an agreement is termiated (Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995). A franchisee
may be an individual, a group of individuals, or distinct corporate entity.
3.2.4 Master Franchisor and Master Franchisee
There are many definitions of master franchising (Kaufmann and Kim 1995). Justis and
Judd defined a master franchisor as "an independent business person who has
contracted with the franchisor to sell franchises to franchisees in a specific geographic
area or territory" (Justis and Judd 1986, p. 17). As a recipient of specific marketing
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rights for a specified term in exchange for a fee, a signatory of a master franchise
agreement is considered a master fianchisee. The signatory may be an individual,
group of individuals, or distinct corporate entity, and functions at an intermediate level
in a franchise organizational structure between franchisor and franchisee. This
relationship is depicted in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Master Franchisee
Franchisor
Franchisee
Franchisee
Master Franchisee
For purposes of this study, a distinction between master fianchisor and master
franchisee will be based on whether this entity is viewed from a franchisor's or
franchisee's perspective. Although legally a franchisee, master franchisees may assume
roles in marketing and quality control that are normally viewed as responsibilities of a
franchisor. Their duties, responsibilities, and activities are likely to differ substantially
from those of owner-operators of individual franchised outlets, more closely resembling
that ofa franchisor. To those owner-operators offranchised outlets, master franchisees
are not peers, but rather individuals holding a position of authority in a hierarchy.
John E. Clarkin 10'4
3.2.5 Area Director/Developer Franchisee
Siuular to master franchisees, area directors/developers introduce an organizational
layer in franchise systems, serving a role between franchisees and either a franchisor or
master franchisor. Unlike master franchisors, area directors do not have a right to offer
franchises, but rather serve as marketing or sales representatives of a franchisor or
master franchisor.44 Area directors/developers are franchisees, signatories to area
development agreements with a franchisor or master franchisor. Their duties, however,
include quality inspections and technical support for unit franchisees, duties and
responsibilities typically associated with franchisors.
3.2.6 Franchise Agreement
Afranchise agreement is a contract between two legally distinct entities, a franchisor
and a franchisee (Castrogiovanni and Justis 1998). In the United States, franchise
agreements are used in combination with disclosure documents, such as the Uniform
Franchise Offering Circulars (UFOC), as well as exhibits, addendums, and attachments.
In contrast to franchise agreements, UFOC and other disclosure documents associated
with franchising are required to be written in "plain English.,,45
3.2.7 Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC)
Created by the North American Securities Administration Association (NASAA), a
Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFO C) provides a systematic framework of
categories for disclosure of material facts about a franchise. It includes a regimented
44 Although Kaufinann and Kiin (1995) included sub-franchising and area development as "types" of
master franchising arrangements, distinctions are made in this study to improve clarity.45 A "plain English" requirement for business contracts meansthat a reasonable person would be able to
understand the terms and conditions as set forth in the document.
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system of numbering and labeling, with guidelines and examples published by the
NASAA. These guidelines and requirements not only specify categories and
numbering schemes, but also stipulate whether material information about a franchise is
to be presented in narrative or tabular format. A partial copy of guidelines and
requirements is provided in Appendix O.
3.2.8 Franchising
Franchising describes use of a franchise as a mechanism by which one firm purchases a
right to use a brand name and operating system of another (Shane and Hoy 1996).46
Franchising is an organizational form based on a legal agreement between a parent
organization (the franchisor) and a local outlet (the franchisee) to sell a product or
service using a process and brand name developed and owned by the franchisor (Shane
1996). In this study, a firm that is presently offering franchises for sale or has
operational franchised outlets is considered to be ehgaged in franchising.
3.2.9 Trade Name and Business Format Franchising
Franchising has often been divided into two broad categories, trade name and business
format. Trade name franc hi sing is an arrangement where the franchisee purchases the
right to operate under the name of the franchisor that acts as a source of centralized
purchasing for the franchisee and promotes the trade name (Litz and Stewart 1997). In
contrast, business format franchising is an ongoing relationship that not only includes
product, service, and trademark, but also the entire concept of the business (Elango and
46 Although many definitions offranchising exist, Mendelsohn observed that they usually contain five
basic features: (I) Branding in one form or another; (2) A system; (3) The grant of a right to use the
branding and system; (4) The payment of some form of direct or indirect consideration by the franchisee
to the franchisor; and (5) The investment in, and ownership of, the franchised business by the franchisee
(Mendelsohn and Bynoe 1995).
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Fried 1997). Compared to business format franchising, trade name arrangements
usually leave significantly more residual power in the hands of the individual franchisee
(Litz and Stewart 1997). Both trade name and business format franchising are
distinguishable from most other forms of business by the "symbiotic relationship of
inter-dependence existing between two legally distinct econonuc entities" (Stanworth
and Kaufmann 1996, p. 57). In both trade name and business format franchising,
franchisees are legally independent but econollcally dependent to varying degrees on
an integrated business system of a franchisor (Kuratko and Hodgetts 1995).
3.2.10 Franchise System
The termfranchise system has been used to describe the specific governance structure
(Blair 1995) or organizational context (Falbe, Dandridge et al. 1998) created by a
franchise. In this study, the termfranchise system wil be used to describe the
organization created by a firm engaged in offering franchises, which includes multiple-
concept offerings, various forms of master franchising, and includes both fi'anchised
and company-owned outlets.
3.2.11 Franchise Concept
Franchise concept is a term commonly found in franchise disclosure documents to
differentiate among different programs or business types offered under the same
agreement. Concept is used among practitioners to describe or categorize the specific
type of business being licensed by a franchise. A distinction between a franchisor and a
franchise concept is important, as many franchisors license more than one concept. For
example, Tricon Global Restaurants, a franchisor, offers fi'anchises in Pizza Hut, KFC,
and Taco Bell concepts, each utilizing different franchise agreements.
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3.2.12 Franchised Outlet
A franchised outlet is a single establishment or territory governed by a franchise
(Curran and Stanworth 1983). For this study, a franchised outlet may include both co-
branded and single concept outlets.
3.2.13 Earnings Claim
In the context offranchising in the United States, the Federal Trade Commission
defines an earnings claim as any representation of "actual or potential sales, costs,
income or profit.,,47 The UFOC Guidelines defme it as information "from which a
specific level or range of actual or potential sales, costs, income or profit from
franchised or non-franchised units may be easily ascertained" (Wieczorek 1999, p. 16).
Currently, franchisors are not required to make an earnings claim, but should they elect
to do so, it must be disclosed in Item 19 ofthe UFC)C.48
3.2.14 Exclusive Territory
An exclusive territory is a specified boundary within which a franchised business
operates. A franchise provision that grants exclusive territory prohibits granting of
another identical franchise within a specified geographic boundary. This exclusivity
mayor may not be associated with a sales quota, and has been considered an important
element in franchise growth (Bradach 1995).49
47 Source: U.S. Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule, 16 CFR Section 436. 
1 (a)(24)(b ).48 Price found that 26 percent of 
the franchises in her sample made these voluntary earnings disclosures
(Price 2000).49 Bradach (1995) found that existing franchisees dominated new franchisees as a source of growth within
a given franchise system. He concluded that "The most important constraint on growth with existing
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3.2.15 Passive Ownership
A provision found in franchise agreements and disclosure documents that defmes
ownership requirements. Franchises that permit passive ownership do not require a
commitment by prospective franchisees to management of a franchised outlet.
3.2.16 Franchise Fee
An up-front payment made by a franchisee to a franchisor in exchange for rights to
operate a franchised business. A franchisor typically provides a franchisee with the
right to use intellectual property as contained in a franchise in return for a lump sum
fi'anchisefee payment and an annual royalty fee (Shane 1996).
3.2.17 Royalty
Ongoing fee paid by a franchisee to a franchisor, usually based on a percentage of gross
sàles or revenues. 
50
3.3 FRANCHISE UNIT OF ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
In simle franchise systems, as depicted in Figure 3.3 below, each franchisee is an
owner-manager of one franchised outlet. In this configuration, there is little difference
between the success, failure, or performance of any given franchisee and a
franchisees occurred when a franchisee owned an exclusive territory and did not want to develop it
aggressively" (Bradach 1995, p. 75).
50 Lafontaine reported in a 1992 study that 123 of 
the 127 responding franchisors charged some form of
royalties, of which 112 were based on a percentage of sales or revenues (Lafontaine and Slade 1998).
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Figure 3.3: Simple Franchise System
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franchisee's outlet. Empirical studies offranchising have found, however, that few
franchise organizations resemble this simple system.
Variations in organizational complexity among franchising firms introduce variables
that must be considered in studies of franchising at an individual or firm level of
analysis. Among the types of organizational complexity prevalent in franchising are
passive ownership, multi-unit ownership by franchisees, various forms of master
franchising, and combined use of both franchised of company-owned outlets.
3.3.1 Passive Ownership
Passive ownership is a contractual provision where the owner of a franchised outlet
need not manage the daily operations of the outlet. In franchises where passive
ownership of outlets is allowed, financial buyers may purchase one or more franchised
outlets based on the investment's ability to provide econollc returns. Franchised
outlets with passive ownership introduce organiational complexity that must be
considered because of separation between ownership and management of the franchise.
In other words, a franchisee and manager of a franchised outlet are likely to be different
individuals under a passive ownership arrangement. Passive owners are likely to differ
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in their motivations and relationships with their franchisor from that of owner-manager
franchisees.
3.3.2 Multi-Outlet Ownership
Bradach opined that a common assumption in the literature is a view of franchise
systems as an agglomeration of single unit franchisees (Bradach 1995). Kaufmann
posited that modern franchising "is replete with multi-unit operators" (Kaufiann and
Kim 1995, p. 50), and although the termj-anchisee conjures an image ofa franchised
outlet's owner-manager (Caves and Murphy 1976), empirical evidence suggests
otherwise. Empirical support for the prevalence of multi-unit ownership was provided
by Kalnins & Lafontaine, who found that single-unit owners made up less than 11 % of
the total units in their sample of3,400 restaurants in Texas (Kalnins and Lafontaine
1996). Similarly, Bates discovered that 84 percent of recently-started restaurant
franchise units in his sample were owned by multiestablishment corporations (Bates
1997).5I
Although some franchisee-owned chains may consist of one or two outlets, others have
evolved into organizations of considerable size, structure, and complexity. One
franchisee, NPC International, owns 785 Pizza Hut restaurants, with annual turnover in
excess of$455 nul1ion, while another franchisee, Ameriking, owns 379 Burger King
restaurants, with $395.9 milion in turnover, 17,069 employees, and operations in 12
SI One explanation for the multi-unit phenomenon is that reduced training and administrative costs make
existing franchisees a "relatively inexpensive source of growth for chain organizations" (p. 61) (Bradach
1998). Another view is that because most franchise agreements contain non-compete clauses (Lafontaine
and Slade 1998), the purchase of an additional outlet is one of a limited number of available choices for
existing franchisees to expand their business interests.
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U.S. states.52 Ranked in terms of number of units, franchisee-owned chains account for
63 ofthe largest 150 restaurant chains in the United States, with 10,142 ofthe 45,779
total units in the rankings.53 The Franchise Finance Corporation of America (FFCA),
one of the largest providers of financing to franchised businesses, concluded that the
operational proficiency and management sophistication required to operate a large chain
of restaurants by a franchisee is closer to that of a franchisor than an owner-manager
franchisee (FFCA 2000).
3.3.3 Master Franchising
In addition to multiple outlet ownership by franchisees, some franchises employ various
forms of master franchising in their organizations. Kaufmann and Kim called master
franchising "one of the most important additions to the franchising landscape"
(Kaufmann and Kim 1995, p. 50). The authors observed that master franchising is a
form of "umbrella licensing agreement," (p. 50) which provides granting of an
exclusive territory, and introduces an additional level of control between franchisors
and franchisees. They found that 57 percent of franchises in their sample engaged in
some combination of sub-franc hi sing, area development, and/or master franchising.
Area development agreements typically grant a right to an area developer to establish a
pre-specified number of units in an exclusive territory, over a prescribed period of time
52 NPC International is a publicly-traded fim on NASDAQ (NPCI). Ameriking, Inc. is a privately held
company. Financial data on the company obtained at
http://wv\.\V.hoovers.com/co/capsule/8/0216351328.OO.htmJ.53 While Pizza Hut had 22 operators in the largest chains, Subway had only one in the ranking, and
despite its number one ranking in tenns of domestic sales, no McDonald's operators made the FFCA's
Top 150 list. The FFCA found that no correlation existed between the percentage of 
units franchised and
the prevalence oflarge fi'anchisee operators, and that "corporate philosophy is more of a factor in
determining how large franchisees become" (FFCA 2000, p. 75).
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(Kalnins and Lafontaine 1996). Area director or area development agreements, master
franchise agreements, and sub- franchise agreements introduce organizational layers
between the franchisor and franchisee, adding organizational complexity beyond that of
the simple dyad depicted in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
3.3.4 Plural Organization
The third example of organizational complexity in franchising is found in those firms
that use combinations of franchised and company-owned outlets within the same
system. Many firms that engage in franchising also operate company-owned outlets, in
what Bradach termed "the plural form" of organization (Bradach 1997). Using an
ethnographic case study approach, he found that a plural organizational form facilitated
innovation in the five restaurant chains studied. Bradach concluded that most restaurant
chains operate as plural forms, and suggested that plurality kept their control processes
fresh. For the firms in his sample, plural organizations enabled management to better
focus on opportunities and adaptation.
Multi-unit ownership by franchisees, master franchising, and the prevalence of both
franchised and company-owned outlets suggest that studies of franchise organizations
must consider organizational variations, as depicted in the representative franchise
organization in Figure 3.4 below:
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Figure 3.4: Representative Franchise Organization
FRANCHISOR
r----------______~ __________________....
i Area Director or Master F ranch isee Corporate Manager
Franchisee 2
Organizational complexities are sometimes overlooked in empirical studies of
franchising, especially those using questionnaire and survey instruments. A survey of
franchisees, for example, is likely to include owner-managers of a single outlet, owners
of multiple outlets, and passive owners, representing differing levels of involvement in
the daily operations of a franchised business. A franchisee, especially those with multi-
unit ownership, may also be a corporation or parnership made up of several
individuals, each with potentially different responsibilities and opinions.
In her study of job satisfaction among restaurant and non-food retail franchises,
Morrison used a population of franchisees that included those with partial ownership
interests in the franchised outlet (MoITison 1997). More than one-third of the sample
included owners of multiple franchises, and measured franchisor relations and
franc hi see performance. This study did not differentiate between those franchisees with
multi-unit ownership and those with single unit responsibilities, despite probable
differences in their jobs, fiancial risks, organizational commitment, and franchisor
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relations. Morrison's study also did not consider whether area developers or master
franchisees were part of the franchise organizations in her sample, organizational layers
that may influence relations among franchisors and franchisees.
3.3.5 Franchise Concept Variations
In addition to organizational variations, some frrms offer several different franchises
within a single franchise system. The term concept is frequently used in franchise
documents and among practitioners to describe an individual product and/or service
franchise offerings. Some franchisors offer more than one concept franchise, using the
same branded products or services in different configurations. The Coffee Beanery, for
example, offers a kiosk or cart concept in addition to its traditional retail store franchise.
Quizno's, a quick service sandwich shop, offers a smaller, limited service Quizno's
Express franchise for airports, schools, and mall locations, in addition to its original
concept offering. These different concept offerings may have different franchise fees,
start-up costs and different contractual provisions. Although offered by the same
franchisor, different franchise concepts mayor may not be offered under the same
franchise agreement.
In addition to different concept offerings under the same brand, some franchisors offer
franchises incorporating different concepts and brands. One franchisor, Tricon Global
Restaurants, for example, offers franchises in Pizza Hut, KFC, and Taco Bell concepts.
Another franchisor, Dwyer Group, offers seven different franchise concepts: (1)
Rainbow International; (2) Mr. Appliance; (3) Mr. Rooter; (4) Aire Serv; (5) Mr.
Electric; (6) Glass Doctor; and (7) Dream Maker. Each of Tricon and Dwyer Group's
franchise concepts are offered by a single fì'anchisor through different UFOCs and
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franchise agreements. Tricon and Dwyer are not unique in this approach, as seventy-
seven ofthe largest 150 restaurant chains in the D.S. operate in this multi-concept
environment (FFCA 2000).
Multiple concept offerings by franchisors introduce product and/or service variations
among franchised outlets in the same franchise system. One example of multi-concept
offerings is known as co-branding, where more than one franchise concept is delivered
within the same outlet (Young, Hoggatt et aL. 1999). Another form of co-branding
different concepts is found in franchised restaurants that operate within retail
convenience stores, or video rental franchises that also offer coffee or pizza from
another franchise. A thid variation of co-branding multiple concepts is when offerings
by the same franchisor are combined in a single outlet, as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 Example of Co-Branded Outlet
The outlet depicted in Figure 3.5 offers Allied Domecq PLC's Dunkin Donuts, Togo's,
and Baskin Robbins Ice Cream concepts in a single facility. 
54 According to this
54 Dunkin' Donuts, Baskin Robbins, and Togo's are separate corporations operating as Allied Domecq
Quick Service Restaurants (AD-QSR), an unincorporated division of Allied Doinecq PLC.
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franchisor, multi-concept strategies are designed to optimize capital and labor
utilization within a single facility.
Viewed from an organizational standpoint, franchise organizations that employ multi-
concept offerings and/or co-branded outlets introduce potential inconsistencies in the
unit of analysis, as ilustrated in Figure 3.6 below. In this example, Franchisee #3 is
licensed by the franchisor to distribute both Concept A and Concept B, and may employ
co-branding in Outlet #1 and Outlet #3, while operating Outlet #2 as a single concept
outlet.
Figure 3.6: Multi-Concept Franchise System
Franchisor
Multi-concept product offerings and co-branded outlets are not the only product or
service variations found among firms engaged in franchising. Some firms operate as
franchisor for one or more concepts, while simultaneously licensed as a franchisee for
other concepts. RTM Restaurant Group, forexample, is franchisor of 133 Lee's
Famous Chicken outlets, and is a franchisee with 710 Arby's and 350 Del Taco
restaurants. Whether R TM is considered as franchisor or franchisee is dependent upon
the specific concept being studied. A single corporate entity may also act as franchisor
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of one or more concepts and master franchisee for one or more additional concepts.
This type of single entity franchisor/franchisee organization is portrayed in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Simultaneous Franchisor/ Franchisee
3.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
"The literature makes it clear that opportunities do not drop from the sky" (Low and
MacMilan 1988, p. 155). Low and MacMilan posited that opportunities are created
within and among existing organizations, and that the same relationships needed to
identify opportunties are also necessary to obtain the resources required to exploit
them. The authors recommended that future research in entrepreneurship should focus
on contextual and process oriented studies using different levels of analysis to "provide
a much richer understanding ofthe entrepreneurial phenomenon" (p. 157). Following
the broad framework outlined by Low and MacMilan, this work explores the context of
franchising for potential entrepreneurial opportunities. This section begins by first
developing the research questions and specific hypotheses for this study.
3.4.1 Exploration of the Formal Context of Franchising
As described in the literature review, recent research in franchising has often been
guided by agency theory, transaction cost analysis, ownership redirection, and risk
reduction theories (Price 1997). In their synthesis of the literature, Elango and Fried
concluded that these studies, although helpful, focused primarily on franchisors, and
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often ignored opportunities within franchise organizations (emphasis added) (Elango
and Fried 1997). Although potential for entrepreneurial opportunities within
franchising has been posited (Phan, Butler et al. 1996), the nature of or extent to which
these opportunities exist remains largely unexplored.
On the surface, franchising appears to create a highly regimented, uniform, and
theoretically unprollsing environment for entrepreneurship, especially when compared
to non- franchised businesses. Institutional constraints created through legislative and
regulatory agencies establish strict legal boundaries within which franchise contracting
must be conducted (Hudson and McArthur 1994). Franchisors impose a variety of
product or service controls, contractual specifications, financial reporting requirements,
and regularly monitor activities at a franchised outlet (MoITison 1997). Franchisors
retain unilateral authority and often seek to curtail franchisee autonomy in the best
interests of the overall system (Hoy 1994), and some are ruthless with those who
deviate from prescribed methods (Price 1997). Built on replication, standardization,
uniformity, and conforllty with detailed procedures, it would appear that inovation
and other behaviours commonly associated with entrepreneurship are inerently
ilegitimate in highly structured organizations such as those found in franchising
(Kirzner 1979). Unlike owners of non-franc hi sed businesses, a franchisee's path to
success appears to be one of efficient implementation of a proven concept, as opposed
to entrepreneurial behaviour.
On the other hand, there are several reasons why franchising potentially presents an
ideal context in which to study entrepreneurship. First, actors are never completely
constrained by formal rules ofa system within which they operate (Bouchikhi 1993).
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Franchisees, therefore, are potentially entrepreneurial "because a franchisor's ability to
imposed a strategic direction on a franchisee is limited" (Phan, Butler et al. 1996, p.
380). Viewed from an organizational perspective, Shane and Boy introduced the notion
of a franchise as an entrepreneurial venture, positing the creation of a franchise network
was an entrepreneurial act (Shane and Hoy 1996). Although franchising's context
appears to constrain entrepreneurial behaviours, Kaufmann and Dant observed that to
varying extents, all environments constrain entrepreneurship, and franchisees may have
varying degrees of latitude in delivering a franchise system concept at their particular
location (Kaufmann and Dant 1998). Empirical studies have supported a view that
individuals within franchising may exert considerable influence over sales volume and
profits (Fenwick and Strombom 1998). A given franchise system or concept, therefore,
provides an organizational context that can either promote or constrain entrepreneurial
attributes (Falbe, Dandridge et al. 1998).
Second, studies of entrepreneurship within organizational contexts, once considered an
oxymoron, have received increased attention. Known to be a source of competitive
advantage in small firms, an ability to innovate and rapidly respond to dynamic market
conditions has also contributed to success in large firms (Kanter 1997). Corporate
entrepreneurship theory posits that the primary characteristics of entrepreneurship
typically associated with an individual, such as growth, innovation, and flexibility, are
also considered to be desirable traits for corporations (Stevenson and Jarillo 1990).55
Constructs and typologies, such as those developed by Covin and Slevin (Covin and
Slevin 1989); (Covin and Slevin 1991) and Lumpkin and Dess (Lumpkin and Dess
55 The crux of corporate entrepreneurship, according to Stevenson, is that opportunity for the firm must
be pursued by individuals within the firm (emphasis added).
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1996) have proven useful in both clarifying entrepreneurship's role within
organizations, and in differentiating firms by their comparative entrepreneurial
behaviours.
Although studies have. found that corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is a determinant of
survival, success, profitability, and growth in corporate hierarchies (Zahra 1996),
comparatively little is known about entrepreneurship's role in hybrid organizations,
such as franchising. Despite more than 225 articles published by Society of
Franchising, and more than 80 articles published by entrepreneurship researchers, the
franchisee remains one of the least studied of entrepreneurial types (Phan, Butler et al.
1996). This lack of attention is presumably because offranchising's apparently
unpromising environment for entrepreneurial experimentation.
Lastly, franchising's formalized organizational stn!icture creates a regimented and
comparatively homogeneous context in which to examine opportunities and processes.
The context in which franchised businesses operate is well defined by uniform
disclosure requirements and legal provisions contained in detailed, long-term contracts.
Franchise agreements define the organization structure, governance system, and work
rules for each system, which significantly affect the entrepreneurial environment in
which each system operates (Kao 1991). By comparison, non-franchised businesses,
especially SMEs, typically adopt an informal structure, allowing them to rapidly adapt
to changing market conditions, consumer preferences, and competitive pressures.
Zahra concluded that entrepreneurial activities were likely to thrive in contexts
characterized by dynamism and uncertainty (Zahra 1996). Entrepreneurs operating
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within franchising's context must resolve constant, yet evolving tension between the
strategic imperatives of standardization and adaptation (Kaufmann and Eroglu 1998).
Researchers are likely to fmd a plethora of entrepreneurial opportunities and behaviours
in non- franchised contexts. Once found, separating entrepreneurial behaviours and its
effects from other determinants has proven difficult, however, and attribution of success
and/or failure has been "complex, dynamic and problematic" (Jennings and Beaver
1997, p. 67). Franchising creates an apparent homogeneous context, especially when
contrasted with the SME sector, which is known to be far from homogeneous in many
respects (McMahon and Stanger 1995). In comparison to non-franchised businesses,
franchising's context appears to reduce enviromnental complexity, to one prescribed,
controlled, and delimited by contractual terms of a franchise agreement.
A highly regimented, seemingly uniform, and unpromising environment such as that
found in franchising seems an unlikely context for studies of entrepreneurship.
Kodithuwakku and Rosa argued, however, that environmental complexity was reduced
in highly unprollsing contexts (Kodithuwakku and Rosa 1999). The authors chose an
apparently uniform social and economic environment in a Sri Lankan vilage, with a
perceptible lack of opportunities and resources. Their research revealed that
entrepreneurship was a major determinant of success on the part of some farmers in
their sample. 
56 They argued that because entrepreneurial behaviour was more readily
56 Kodithuwakku and Rosa (1999) examined why some Sri Lankan farmers were more successful than
others in the same vilage, given the same allocation and availability of resources. Ten years prior to the
field study, a group of families each received two and one-half acres of cleared land and a small monetary
grant. In fieldwork, they found "considerable economic and social differentiation" among the pioneers,
despite the parity of their initial resources and the uniformly scarce resources available to the farmers.
Although entrepreneurship studies frequently use success as the dependent variable (e.g., (Birley and
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apparent in this constrained and relatively homogeneous context, it may be inferred that
the greater the environmental constraints, the greater the possibility of observing
entrepreneurial processes.
Before Kodithuwakku and Rosa's theme is extended into the apparently uniform and
unpromising environment of franchising, a logical first step is to explore the formal
context of franchising, as defined by its contractual provisions, for indicators of
uniformity. This leads to the first set of research questions:
Ql a: To what extent is the formal context of fi'anchising homogeneous?
Ql b: How do contractual provisions difer amongfranchisingfirms?
3.4.2 Differential Performance among Franchising Firms
Viewed from an Austrian econollcs perspective, continuous inovation is a driver of
higher performance in firms. It is characterized by,factors such as flexibility and
interfirm heterogeneity (Deligonul and Cavusgil 1997). An organizational view
suggests that organic structures and an entrepreneurial strategic posture contribute to
high performance in firms (Covin and Slevin 1989). Although there is widespread
acceptance that superior performance is associated with quick decision-making, simple
administrative structures, and flexible operations, innovation has consistently been
found to be associated with success (Baldwin 1995).57 Lado et aL. argued that once
achieved, a firm's ability to sustain competitive advantage depends on the extent to
Westhead 1993); (Gray 1998); (Monroe, Price et al. 1996)), the "quasi-experimental" context of this
study made it somewhat unique.57 Consistent with the recent literature, Mone et al. defined inovation broadly as any action that either
puts the organization into new strategic domains or significantly alters the way the organization attempts
to serve existing customers or constituents (Mone, McKinley et al. 1998).
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which it develops capabilities for innovation (Lado, Boyd et al. 1997). "For the
entrepreneur, opportunity is based in innovation" (Smilor, p. 343).
In contrast, franchising is considered by some as the antitheses of innovation,
representative of increasing homogenization in commercial cultures, singularly
responsible for a lack of variety in several retail sectors, and an instrument of
destruction for budding retail entrepreneurs (Kaufmann and Dant 1998). From an
organizational perspective, franchising's Tayloristic organization form operates with
mechanized efficiency (Morgan 1997), in stark contrast to organic structures found in
entrepreneurial firms. Morgan observed that many franchising systems centralize their
product or service design and development, while decentralizing implementation in a
highly controlled fashion:
"They use scientific methods to determine the work to be performed, produce manuals that set
standards and codifY performance in minute detail, have well-developed recruitment and
training plans, and comprehensive systems of job evaluation often provide the recipe for
success" (Morgan 1997, p. 28).58
To attain consistency in product or service at outlets within their chain, franchisors
curtail franchisee independence and autonomy, under the premise that it represents the
best interests of the overall system (Hoy 1994).
58 Morgan noted that McDonald's and other firms in the fast-food industry provided the best examples of
the mechanized approach. McDonald's has built a solid reputation for excellent performance in the fast-
food industry by mechanizing all its franchise outlets all over the world, so that each can produce a
uniform product, serving a mass market in a perfectly regular and consistent way, with all the precision
that "hamburger science" can provide. McDonald's actually has its own "Hamburger U" for teaching
this science to its managers, and has a detailed operating manual to guide franchises in the daily
operations of the McDonald's system. The finn is exemplary in its adoption of Tayloristic principles and
recruits a non unionized labor force, often made up of high school and college students and part-time
workers, that will be happy to fit the organization as designed. The "machine" works perfectly most of
the time. The company also has a dynamic and innovative character, but this is for the most part confined
to its central staff who do the thinking (i.e., the policy developmentand design work) for the corporation
as a whole (Morgan 1997, pp. 27-8).
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Further research on franchising using entrepreneurship constructs appeared justified;
especially given franchising's econollc impact and its role as a source of job creation
(MoITison 1995). Although entrepreneurship has been studied for a variety of reasons,
Covin and Slevin argued, "the overriding reason for the current interest in the topic is
the widespread belief that entrepreneurial activity stimulates general econollc
development as well as the economic performance of individual firms" (Covin and
Slevin 1991, p. 9). As such, entrepreneurship has often been viewed as a means of
creating value (Stevenson, Roberts et aL. 1985). While some consider entrepreneurship
synonymous with starting a new venture (e.g., (Gartner 1985)), Churchil posited that
value is really created as an enterprise grows, creates more jobs, and meets the needs of
more customers (Churchil 1997).59 Both the creation of new business units and jobs is
central to franchising's mission (Hoffman and Preble 1993), making growth among
firms within franchising a relevant topic within entrepreneurship. Venturing, the
creation of new units within an organization, proviUes an accepted measure of the
phenomenon.
A substantial research gap exists in studies of franchising firms. Although aggregate
growth rates have been the topic of several academic studies (e.g., (Lafontaine and
Shaw 1998); (Stanworth, Purdy et aL. 1997)), few studies have examined differential
growth among individual franchising firms. In their review of recent literature, Elango
and Fried noted that actual operations of franchising systems have rarely been directly
examined (Elango and Fried 1997). Within this context, little is known about
59 De Rose cautioned that value is often vaguely defined, and frequently used as a substitute for cost or
price. He defined value as "the satisfaction of customer requirements at the lowest total cost of
acquisition, ownership, and use" (DeRose 1994, p. 12).
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characteristics that differentiate growing franchises from others. Therefore, the broad
question is: What characteristics and contractual provisions are associated with growing
firms operating within the context offranchising? To address this broad research
question, several hypotheses were developed.
The existence of franchising has been explained through capital acquisition models
(e.g., (Caves and Murphy 1976); (Dant 1995)), ones that view franchisees as an
efficient source of capitaL. Franchisees are responsible for purchasing equipment,
inventory, real estate, and other costs associated with the initial start-up oftheIr outlet.
Start-up costs include an up-front franchise fee payment to the franchisor. Although
lending institutions have generally supported franchisee borrowing (Stern and
Stanworth 1993), franchisors may be in a better position to negotiate more favorable
terms with lenders on behalf oftheIr franchisees.
Franchises that offer financial assistance may be better able to attract franchisees as
compared to those who do not. Access to capital is likely to become more important for
those franchises with higher initial start-up costs and fees. Therefore,
Hypothesis la: Financial assistance wil be positvely associated with growth.
Hypothesis 1 b: Financial assistance provisions wil be positively associated
with inital start-up costs.
Shane and Boy posited that the act of creating a franchise network was an
entrepreneurial act (Shane and Boy 1996). Networks are created within franchising
when franchisees begin as owners of single outlets, and subsequently purchase rights
for additional outlets. The prevalence of multi-unit ownership within franchising has
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been revealed in previous empirical studies (e.g., (Kalnins and Lafontaine 1996);
(Kaufiann and Dant 1996)). Bradach concluded that multi-unit ownership by
franchisees provided franchisors with a more manageable, concentrated base (Bradach
1995). He argued that "the more concentrated the base of franchisees, the easier it is to
decide on and implement proposed adaptations" (p. 79).
In addition to multi-unit ownership by franchisees, other forms of franchise networks
are created through various types of master franchising. In their sample of 169
franchisors, Kaufmann and Kim found that 57 percent engaged in some form master
franchising, area development, and/or sub-franchising arrangements (Kaufmann and
Kim 1995). Using Compound Average Growth Rate (CAGR)6o as a measure of outlet
growth, the authors found that firms engaged in various forms of master franchising
grew faster than those that did not. Although a third form of franchise network may be
created through passive ownership of franchised otitlets, there are no previous studies in
which it was explored.
Franchisors periodically revise their franchise agreements. In addition to updating their
fmancial statements and number of operational outlets, changes in contractual
provisions may also be implemented. A franchise that presently includes master
franchising, area development, and/or sub-franchising arrangements mayor may not
have offered those provisions since the firm's inception. If franchise network
60 Kaufinann and Kim calculated growth rates as: CAGR= (current number of outlets )1/11 - 1. The authors
culled out franchise systems in existence for less than five years because of instability with the CAGR
modeL.
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provisions enable faster growth, arguably they are more likely to be associated with a
firm's projected growth than its past performance. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2a: Area development provisions wil be positvely associated with
growth.
Hypothesis 2b: Sub-franchising wil be positively associated with growth.
Hypothesis 2e: Passive ownership wil be positvely associated with growth.
In their conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behaviour, Covin and Slevin
considered external variables, strategic variables, and internal variables, all of which
combined to make up entrepreneurial posture, as depicted in Appendix A, Figure A2
(Covin and Slevin 1991). External variables included dynamism and hostility of the
environment, while internal variables such as top management values and
organizational culture were also considered. The strategic variables included a firm's
strategy and business practices. Covin and Slevin 'Posited that entrepreneurial posture is
highest among firms with growth strategies, and that entrepreneurial posture was
positively associated with firm performance (p. 13).
On one hand, franchising enables a firm to achieve rapid expansion, consistent with a
growth strategy. Shane found that the more a firm emphasized franchising, the faster
the firm would grow (Shane 1996). Conversely, an ownership redirection thesis views
franchising as simply a short-term or early stage development feature (Dant, Paswan et
al. 1996). Ownership redirection posits that once franchisors gain fmancial and human
capital, they will prefer to adopt more conventional growth strategies, such as opening
company-owned outlets in order to meet their needs of future growth. Norton referred
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to simultaneous company and franchised outlet ownership as "a curious feature" of
franchised organizations (Norton 1988, p. 199). Therefore,
Hypothesis 3a: Growth strategies wil be positively associated with firms
offering area development agreements.
Hypothesis 3b: Growth strategies wil be positively associated with firms
offering subjT'anchising agreements.
Hypothesis 3c: Growth strategies wil be positively associated with firms that
permit passive ownership.
Hypothesis 3d: The ratio of franchised outlets to total outlets wil be positvely
associated with growth.
Hypothesis 3e: The ratio of fianchised outlets to total outlets wil be negatively
associated with the number of years a firm has been franchising.
Franchising as a method of growth is predicated 011 an assumption that value has been
created by a franchisor through careful operation, testing and documentation of a
commercially viable idea (Spinelli 1997). Spinell argued that the essence offranchisee
due diligence is to verify the ability of: (1) the franchise to create wealth through the
franchisor's business format; and (2) the ability of the format to be transferred for local
execution. In his study of Canadian franchisors and franchisees, Knight found that both
groups advocated government regulations to improve disclosure (Knight 1986). In the
United States, the UFOC Item 19, Earnings Claims provides an official vehicle for this
aspect of due diligence.
In franchising, disclosure of earnings has been called "The Issue That Wouldn't Die"
(Kolton 1999, p. 48). Unlike other Items in a UFOC, disclosure of earnings, actual or
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potential sales, or costs for both franchised and non-franchised units is voluntary under
Federal Trade Commission guidelines. It is unlawful for franchisors to provide any
earnings claim information to prospective franchisees unless formally disclosed in
UFOC Item 19 (Wieczorek 1999). Debates over mandatory earnings claims disclosure
have continued since the guidelines were enacted in 1986.
Kolton observed that those in favor of mandatory earnings claims question how a
potential franchisee can make an informed decision about an important investment
without some indication of potential returns on that investment (Kolton 1999). Those
opposed to mandatory claims cite the difficulty of creating reliable earnings numbers
from a system of disparate financial statements, and the liability for franchisors should
franchisee performance differ from that disclosed. Despite continuing debates over
earnings claims disclosure among practitioners, lawmakers, and those engaged in
franchising, the topic has received little attention in the academic literature.
A notable exception was a recent study by Price, who found a negative relationship
between a franchise system's size, in terms of 
number of units, and disclosure of
earnings (Price 2000). In her analysis of278 UFOC documents, only 73 (26 percent)
provided voluntary earnings claim information. She found support for her hypothesis;
franchisors that disclose earnings information face greater investment risk, and
therefore must find ways to mitigate their risk through higher fees from franchisees.
Although not examined in her study, franchisors may also mitigate investment risk
through longer-term franchise agreements
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Given the imortance of earnings claim information to prospective franchisees, it
follows that those franchise systems who voluntarily disclose earnings may have an
edge in attracting potential franchisees over those franchises that choose not to disclose.
Franchisors with above average earnings or sales at their outlets are more likely to
voluntarily disclose earnings information than those with below average performance.
It follows that they are likely to have a system with favorable wealth creation potential
at a franchisee leveL. Earnings claim disclosure should also be important in those
systems with higher reliance on franchising as a means of growth. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4a: Earnings claim disclosures wil be positively associated with
growth.
Hypothesis 4b: Earnings claim disclosure wil be positvely associated with
franchise fees.
Hypothesis 4c: Earnings claim disclosure wil be positively associated with
longer-term agreements.
Hypothesis 4d: Earnings claim disclosures wil be positively associated with the
ratio of franchised outlets to total outlets.
3.4.3 The Operational Realm of Franchising
Previous sections of this chapter focused entirely on franchising's formal context, as
defined by its official disclosure and legal agreements between franchisor and
franchisee. Stanworth observed:
"...at the formal level, relations between the franchisor and franchisee might be described as
dependently one-sided since the contract is drawn up on a virually non-negotiable basis by the
franchisor and put to the franchisee on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis" (Stanworth 1995, p. 165).
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He suggested that an operational realm in franchisor- franchisee relations existed, one
not necessarily revealed by an analysis of contractual provisions exclusively. His study
found that despite explicit contractual obligations that circumscribed autonomy,
franchisees reported relatively high levels of 
independence in daily operations of their
businesses. Stanworth concluded that considerations based solely on the formal context
of franchising are llsleading, presenting only a partial view of the phenomenon.
Franchising's formal context is generally defmed by legal requirements, contractual
provisions, and franchisor authority retained in franchise agreements, as depicted in
Figure 3.8. Its formal context appears to create boundaries of conduct, within which all
business must be conducted at franchised outlets.
Figure 3.8: Boundaries Created by Formal Context ofFranchising
Other Contractual
Provisions Restrictions(i.e. Product)
Franchisor Retained
Authority Mandatory Obligations
(i.e. Fees, Reporting)
Legal Requirements
(i.e. Trademark)
Shane and Hoy observed that entrepreneurship scholars know relatively little about how
entrepreneurs successfully manage cooperative relationships involving organizational
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routines, such as those found in franchising (Shane and Hoy 1996). They observed that
franchising's high rate of litigation and low survival rates may be indicators that
practitioners have little knowledge in this area as well. Despite franchising's ubiquity
and economic impact, actual operations of a franchising system have rarely been
directly examined (Elango and Fried 1997).
One approach is to explore the extent to which contractual provisions and firm
characteristics explain performance among franchising firms. Therefore, the following
research question is posited:
Q2. To what extent is firm peiformance explained by contractual provisions and
characteristics offirms engaged infranchising?
Stanworth found that more than 80 percent of his franchisee respondents claimed that
franchisors made no mention of contractual provisions to them in their daily relations
(StanwOlih 1995). In the United States, meeting federal disclosure requirements and
drafting detailed agreements is an expensive and time-consuming process, one in which
costs are likely passed on to franchisees and ultimately consumers. Franchise
legislation in a number of other jurisdictions, such as Alberta and Ontario Canada has
been patterned after U.S. disclosure laws, in an effort to inform and protect potential
franchisees from franchisor abuse. Despite its prominent position in debates concerning
franchisor-franchisee relations, the role of official disclosure and contractual documents
in a franchise selection process and daily operations of franchised businesses remains
largely unexplored. Little is known about how contractual provisions are formulated
and enforced by franchisors.
John E. Clarkin 133
Falbe et al. opined that it is important for both researchers and practitioners to better
understand the extent and role of entrepreneurial activity within franchise systems
(Falbe, Dandridge et al. 1998). Since disclosure documents and contractual provisions
are likely to play a substantial albeit partial role in entrepreneurial activity within
franchising, the following research questions are proposed:
Q3a: What is the role of the UFOC andfianchise agreement in the selection
process and daily operations offranchised businesses?
Q3b: How are franchise disclosure documents and contractual provisions
formulated and enforced?
3.5 SUMMARY
This chapter provided defmitions for terms used in this study. Research questions about
the nature and extent of homogeneity within franchising's formal context that emerged
from the literature were reviewed. Next, variations and organizational complexity
among franchising firms was discussed. In the following section, several hypotheses
were developed, designed to test the relationships between franchise firm characteristics
and contractual provisions with measures offirm performance.
Evidence emerged from the literature that both a formal context and an operational
realm exist in franchising. The extent to which characteristics and contractual
provisions explains differential performance among franchising firms had not
previously been examined. Finally, research questions that explore the link between the
formal context and the operational realm were formulated. The next chapter reviews
methods used in this study to address these research questions and test hypotheses
previously discussed.
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4.0 METHODS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Franchising has often been compared to other forms of governance structures (e.g.,
(Harrigan 1998); (Michael 1996); (Norton 1988)). Failure rates among franchising
firms have also been contrasted with those of 
non-franc hi sed businesses (e.g., (Barrow
1989); (Bates 1996)). In these and other comparative studies, firms engaged in
franchising appear as a monolithic group of businesses, existing in an environment as
homogeneous and uniform as the products and services they provide.
Although it "does not comfortably fit within the limits of any single academic discipline
or area of management practice" (Stanworth and Curran 1999, p. 323), aspects of
franchising are fertile ground for entrepreneurship research (Kaufmann and Dant 1998).
A logical emphasis for entrepreneurship research within this context is one focused on
growth, since entrepreneurship has long been associated with growth among both small
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and large firms (e.g., (Drucker 1985); (Kanter 1996); (Penrose 1968); (Schumpeter
1934)). Review of the literature revealed that entrepreneurship research has focused on
aspects of franchising at an organizational level, including studies where franchising
was viewed as a means of delimiting organizational and financial constraints of firm
growth (e.g., (Spinell and Birley 1996)), and at an individual level, including
franchising's role as a route to self-employment (e.g., (Kaufmann and Stanworth
1995)). At a firm level, studies in corporate entrepreneurship (CE) have lined
entrepreneurship to firm performance within large firm organization structures (e.g.,
(Block and MacMilan 1993); (Zahra and Garvis 2000))), although CE's paradigms
have not been tested in hybrid organizational forms, such as those found in franchising.
Comparatively little is known about the role of entrepreneurship within franchising at a
firm level, beyond that of a franchisor and the birth of an original concept.
The aim of this work is to contribute to the body of knowledge in entrepreneurship by
exploring its role within franchising's context. To achieve this aim, a three-part study
was undertaken. First, the nature and extent ofuniforllty within franchising's formal
context were explored. To probe franchising's formal context, I employed a content
analysis strategy to explore lengthy and detailed disclosure documents and contracts
that govern franchising in the United States.61 The franchise, as defined in its Uniform
Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) and franchise agreement, served as the unit of
analysis for the first part of this study.
61 Although franchising is considered a contractual relationship, Bercovitz observed that variations in
these contracts remains an aspect offranchising that is largely unexplored (Bercovitz 1999).
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Next, I tested hypotheses that emerged from the literature employing quantitative
analysis. Secondary sources of data, based on UFOC analysis and a franchisor survey
conducted by a publisher of franchise data were used to construct datasets for this
portion ofthe study. Consistent with studies in corporate entrepreneurship, the premise
guiding this section was that if opportunities for entrepreneurship were evident within
franchising's formal context, they were more likely to be found in growing franchises.
This section sought to identify factors and characteristics associated with growing firms
within franchising' s formal context.
Stanworth and Curran identified a need to "establish more definitely the separateness
and distinctiveness of the franchised business form" (Stanworth and Curran 1999, p.
340). Arguably, the first two sections ofthis study provided a logical step toward
addressing this need, by more closely examining contractual provisions, firm
characteristics, and performance among franchising firms. Its objectives were to better
understand the degree of homogeneity within franchising's context; and to examine
similarities and differences among those frrms that operate within it. Primary and
secondary data were employed in the first sections of this study, although the focus of
the first two sections of the study was delimited to that of the formal context of
franchising.
Detailed and specific provisions in disclosure and contractual agreements, as described
in the previous sections, characterize the formal context offranchising. The role of
these documents in a franchise purchase decision and daily operations of franchised
outlets, however, is largely unknown. To explore operational aspects offranchising, I
performed semi-structured interviews with six franchisees, four current and two former
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franchise owners. To provide additional insights on legal and financial considerations
of franchising, I conducted interviews with the general counsel and chief fmancial
officer of a fast-growing franchisor. Stanworth posited that exploration of both formal
and operational realms offranchising was required to obtain a complete picture of the
phenomenon (Stanworth 1995). He observed that studies of franchising relations that
focus solely at the formal level may be misleading, as the "operational realm...is not
necessarily revealed by an contractual relations" (p. 165).
The United States provided fertile ground for this study, because of its uniform and
comprehensive disclosure and regulatory requirements for franchising firms. There
were, however, several limitations to this approach. First, there is no present
requirement for franchisors to file UFOC and franchise agreements with any federal
regulatory agency. Although franchisors are required to send a UFOC and franchise
agreement to qualified prospective franchisees, these documents are generally not
available to the public. Only eleven U.S. states require franchisors to register and file
UFOC and franchise documents before offering franchises in those states, and
nationally established franchises are often exempted from filing requirements.62
Second, although data derived from these lengthy documents is robust and reliable,
obtaining a representative sample is problematic. In addition to those franchises
exempted from filing requirements, regional franchises without any operating outlets in
a given state are not likely to have their documents filed in that state. In other words, a
regional restaurant franchise with a significant presence in the northeast U.S. is not
62 The eleven states that require registration are: California, Ilinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minesota, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.
John E. Clai'kin 138
likely to have a UFOC and franchise agreement on file in California. Exempted
franchises are likely to include larger and more mature systems, introducing bias into a
sample derived using this method.
Based on these considerations, I decided to supplement an initial sample of 55 UFOC
and franchise agreements with datasets constructed from reliable sources of secondary
data. Although the secondary data was less robust than that ofUFOC and franchise
agreements, the datasets provided information on a large number of franchises, enabling
use of various quantitative analysis technques. Use ofthese publicly available datasets
also had the potential to improve the external validity of 
this portion of the study.
Because a single, comprehensive dataset of franchises did not exist at the time of this
study, three different datasets were employed. Each source provided different insights
from a diverse sample of franchises.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, justification for the methodologies
employed in this study is presented. To improve clarity and structure, and because
multiple methodologies are employed in this study, each of 
the three issues are
discussed separately, followed by a summary. Next, the three phases ofthe empirical
work are presented. Each section is structured with separate headings for dataset
description, data collection and sample, and measures used in the study. The chapter
concludes with a summary.
4.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METHODOLOGIES
This section justifies in more detail the methodologies employed in the three main
aspects of the analysis. Although use of multiple methods added complexity to this
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study, I considered this approach applicable, given the state of franchising research at
the time of this study. It is also consistent with an approach advocated by Easterby-
Smith et aI., who posited, "one should attempt to mix methods to some extent, because
it provides more perspectives on the phenomenon being studied" (Easterby-Sllth,
Thorpe et aI. 1991, p. 31). To improve clarity and structure, the examination ofUFOC
and franchise agreements, exploration of secondary datasets, and interviews with
franchisees are each presented separately.
4.3 PRIMARY DATA: EXAMINATION OF 55 UFOC AND FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
Stanworth and Dant argued that entrepreneurial activities by franchisees were often
constrained by contractual provisions (Stanworth 1995). Despite its prominent role in
governing a franchise, comparatively little is known about the similarities and
differences in contractual provisions among franchises. Bercovitz noted that traditional
agency models have focused on payment terms, ignoring the non-pecuniary contractual
features offranchising (Bercovitz 1999). To advance the field of knowledge in this
area, I examined how provisions found in disclosure documents and franchise
agreements differed among franchising firms. I focused on the franchise, as defmed by
its franchise agreement and disclosure documents, as the unit of analysis for this portion
of the study.
Subjective interpretation of contractual terms and conditions was necessary to research
this issue, requiring a strategy of data collection that would facilitate comparative
analysis. To accomplish this task, I chose a content analysis strategy to guide data
collection for this portion of the study. Marshall and Rossman observed that content
analysis allowed derivation of objective and quantitative descriptions from these types
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of communication instruments, which facilitated subsequent pattern identification
(Marshall and Rossman 1989). The authors posited that content analysis is useful for
"producing descriptive information" or "cross-validating research findings," in an
"unobtrusive and nonreactive" manner, allowing a researcher to determie "where the
emphasis lies after the data have been gathered" (p. 99-100). This approach was
consistent with heuristic theory building and exploration, the objectives of this first
portion of the study.
Although franchise disclosure requirements in the United States provided documents
with robust content, obtaining a representative sample ofthèse documents was
problematic. Routinely exceeding 150 pages, UFOC and franchise agreements are
expensive for franchisors to produce and distribute. These documents contain a
franchisor's financial statements, lists of existing franchisees with addresses and phone
numbers, and in some cases earnings offranchised'outlets,63 information not intended
for public distribution. While franchisors with growing sales and strong growth may
willingly respond to surveys or requests for documents, those with a less than
impressive record may be less inclined to have their performance published. At the
time of this study, there was no singular, all-inclusive repository for franchise
documents, and no federal requirement for all franchisors to file their documents with
any federal agency.
63 Earnings Claims (UFOC Item 19) are voluntary under present U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
regulations. The FTC estimates that 20% offranchisors provide this disclosure offranchised outlet
earnings.
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To obtain franchise documents, I collected an initial sample of 13 UFOC and franchise
agreements from clients of the University of South Carolina Small Business
Development Center (SBDC) in Charleston, South Carolina.64 Researchers have
solicited these documents through contacting members of the International Franchise
Association (IF A) or by using the list offranchisors in Entrepreneur Magazine's
Franchise 500CI. Although these sources may have yielded additional documents for
this study, I found that a larger sample ofUFOC and franchise agreements were
available for viewing at the South Carolina Secretary of State's Office in Columbia,
South Carolina. I requested and subsequently received perllssion to exallne franchise
documents at the Secretary of State's Office.
The United States provided fertile ground to study franchising's formal context. One
reason is that the US. Federal Trade Commission requires franchisors to disclose
material facts, detailed information about their frarlchise offering, and outline specific
duties created by the franchise in Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars (UFOC).65
Another is that the U.S. has the "most developed franchise sector of all advanced
industrial societies with many large and long-established franchises" (Stanworth and
Curran 1999, p. 331). In contrast, the European Union (EU) has very few franchise-
specific laws beyond the civil, commercial, and social laws that typically govern
64 The author was employed as a Business 
Consultant at the SBDC in Charleston, South Carolina during
this period, and had consulted with clients who agreed to provide these documents. Clients had obtained
these documents from franchisors, and had used them in their evaluations of franchise opportunities
between June 1999 and September 2000.65 The UFOC serves as the single document that complies with both U.S. federal and state requirements
governing franchise disclosure. Used by the vast majority of franchisors, the UFOC has become the
national industry standard in franchising (FTC 16 CFR 436 p. 57296).
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business relationships,66 although France and Spain require franchisors to disclose
material information to prospective franchisees.67 Franchisors in Europe are generally
expected to follow guidelines implemented in the European Code ofEthics,68 which
contain broad provisions of fair behaviour for franchise practitioners.
The franchise, as defmed in its UFOC and applicable franchise agreement, attachments,
and exhibits define the legal governance structure for franchise relationships in the
United States. These documents have previously served as a unit of analysis for
comparisons of successful and unsuccessful franchisors (Shane 1995), and I considered
them an appropriate unit of analysis for this portion of the study.
4.3.1 UFOC Dataset Description
Designed by the North American Securities Administration Association (NASAA), the
UFOC provides a systematic and uniform framework for disclosure of information
about individual franchises, in a structure of pre-assigned categorical Items.
Franchisors are required to follow NASAA guidelines, which provide examples of both
descriptive summaries and table outlines. The guidelines not only specify organization
of information within a document, but also whether information about the franchise
66 The European Commission passed two regulations defining the vertical restraints tyically used in
franchising: (EC) No. 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty of Rome, and (EEC)No. 4087/1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty. Available at http://\\lww.etI-
n.-an chise. com/legislation .htm.
67 In 1989, the French govermnent adopted legislation that requires mandatory disclosure for franchises
and all agreements that involve a license to use a trademark or logo. "Loi Doubin" was found to lack the
clarity and detail of disclosure requirements found in North America (Konigsberg 2001).
68 The Code of Ethics was first elaborated in 1972 by the European Franchise Federation. The Code
includes definitions; guiding principles (which include obligations of both franchisor and franchisee);
recruitment, advertising, and disclosure; franchisee selection; and guidelines for the franchise agreement.
Available at http://www.eff-n.anchise.com. A copy is provided in Appendix 1, Table 22.
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must be presented in paragraph form as a descriptive summary or in tabular form. 69
Table 4-1 lists the specified UFOC Items and framework.
Table 4-1: UFOC Items and Format
FRAMEWORK FORMAT
Item Description
1 Franchisor, Predecessors, Affliates Summary
2 Business Experience Summary
3 Litigation Summary
4 BankruptcylU Summary
5 Initial Franchise Fee Summary
6 Other Fees Tabular
7 Initial Investment Tabular
8 Restrictions on Sources of Products Summary
9 Franchisee's Obligations Tabular
10 Financing Summary
11 Franchisor Obligations Summary
12 Territory Summary
13 Trademarks Summary
14 Patents, Copyrights & Proprietary Summary
15 Obligation to Participate Summary
16 Restrictions on What May be Sold Summary
17 Renewal, Termination, Transfer, Dispute Resolution Tabular
18 Public Figures 11 Summary
19 Earnings Claims Summary
20 List of Outlets Tabular
21 Financial Statements Summary
22 Contracts IL Summary
23 Receipt'-' , Summary! I
4.3.2 UFOC Collection and Sample
To explore uniformity, I looked for similarities and differences among franchises. I
examined an initial sample of thirteen UFOC and franchise agreements at the
University of South Carolina's Small Business Development Center in Charleston,
69 A complete set ofUFOC Guidelines and reporting requirements is available from the NASAA at
http://nasaa.org/nasaa/corpfin/UFOC.doc.
70 Persons identified in Item 1 or Item 2 who have been involved as a debtor in proceedings under U.S.
Bankruptcy Code are required to be disclosed in this Item.
71 Franchisors must disclose if any public figures are used in marketing or promoting the franchise.
72 Lists all agreements contained in offering circular and franchise agreement, such as sublease,
applicable state riders to agreement, and addendums.
73 Receipt pages contain franchisor and prospective franchisee copies that acknowledge receipt ofUFOC,
fÌ"anchise agreement, and all applicable Exhibits. Receipts pages must be signed and dated by both
franchisor and franchisee. These pages assure that disclosure documents were provided to prospective
franchisee ten business days before signing agreement or ten days before any payment is made.
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South Carolina. I then collected data from an additional 42 documents at the Office of
the Secretary of State, in Columbia, South Carolina. Although the State of South
Carolina does not legally require franchisors to file a UFOC and franchise agreement,
more than 750 documents were on file at this office at the time of this study.74 The
Secretary of State's office staff fied documents in the order in which they were
received, using a sequential numbering system. I selected individual franchise
documents from the available collection at random during September 2000.
Data collection from sources in South Carolina had both advantages and limitations.
On one hand, documents examined from any given franchise were likely to be similar
to those found elsewhere in the U.S. In other words, federal requirements to provide
UFOC and franchise agreements apply to all 50 U.S. states. Although several states
had enacted specific laws to regulate franchise disclosure or conduct, South Carolina
had no specific franchise legislation at the time of 
this study.75 Generalizability of this
portion ofthe study is limited, as this sample is not assumed to be representative of the
population of franchises. In other words, this portion of the study sought to discover if
and how franchise documents varied, not how typical the variations are.
The exploratory nature oftlus portion of the study required that I design a method of
data collection and categorization for variables. Using MS Access, Word, and Excel
application software, a tabular system was devised to capture relevant data while
maintaining integrity of the variables within cases. Transfer from the database to
74 At the time of 
this study, 755 franchise and business opportunity disclosure documents and legal
agreements were on file at the Secretary of State's Office.75 The 12 U.S. states that require registration are Hawai, Ilinois, Indiana, Marland, Minnesota, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virgiiua, Washington, and Califonua
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spreadsheet format was done to facilitate conversion into SPSS for further analysis. Of
the 23 Items contained in each UFOC, data were gathered from 16 Items that appeared
relevant to this study. 
76
As described in Section 4.2.1, I initially examined a preliminary sample of 13 UFOC
and franchise agreements. These agreements were gathered and examined at the
University of South Carolina Small Business Development Center in Charleston, South
Carolina. Franchises in this sample represented a variety of industries, including auto
repair, hair salons, and quick service restaurants. A summary of 
the industries
represented is contained in Table 4-2.
'.
Table 4-2: Industry Representation of Preliminary UFOC Sample
Quizno's Corporation Sandwich
Case Handyman Services Home repair
The Pet Pantry Pet food delivery
Piggly Wiggly Grocery
Entrepreneur's Source Business Services
Tilden Associates Auto Repair
Décor and You Designers Home furnishings
Golf Augusta Retail sporting goods
World Inspection Network Home inspection service
Great Clips Hair salon
Little Scientists Children's training
Party Land Specialty retail
Entrepreneur's Source (Area Director) Business Services!
To facilitate case comparisons, I designed a method of standardizing the data
requirements. Numerical values such as fees and dates were transcribed directly, while
contractual obligations and specifications were operationalized as dichotomous or
categorical variables.
76 Business experience of franchisor's officers and directors, pending litigation, previous bankruptcies,
trademarks and patents, public figures used in advertising, franchisor's financial statements, number of
contracts included in the circular, and the acknowledgement of the receipt of the circular were not
included in the data.
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4.3.3 UFOC Measures: Preliminary Sample
The 16 UFOC Items examined in the preliminary sample of 13 documents provided
data sufficient for measuring more than 100 variables for each franchise.77 For this
sample, I entered data as a text summary of applicable terms under each Item into an
MS Word table. An example of the measurement system extracted from Item 9 is
provided in Table 4-3 below, while a copy of all the data collected in this preliminary
sample is contained in Appendix D.
Table 4-3: Item 9- Financial Reporting Requirements
Financial UFOC 1 Weekly; must provide direct on-line access to franchisor; monthly
Reporting income; annual income statement and balance sheet; audit
UFOC2 Franchisor may poll computer for sales, cost, and other fmancial or
marketing data; monthly reports; audit
UFOC3 Monthly sales reports; audit
UFOC4 Weekly, may be audited without notice
UFOC5 Quarterly financial statements; audit
UFOC6 Quarterly financial statements; audit
UFOC7 Anual fmancial statements; weekly register reports
UFOC8 Submit all fiancials as specified
UFOC9 Must submit gross revenue~ and sales tax reports monthly, must verifY
and sign each fmancial report
UFOC Access during normal working hours, funish tax return, may require
10 use of modem.
UFOC Weekly marketing report; bi-weekly financial report with payment of
i i fees; tax returns as requested
UFOC Weekly signed fiancial statements; must keep records for three years
12 after agreement termination
UFOC Signed weekly sales report; quarterly P&L; annual P&L and balance
13 sheet; all daily records; tax returns
Several points emerged from the initial exploration of this sample. First, deterllning
differences in provisions among franchises were further complicated by differences in
phraseology, posing potential codification and comparative analysis problems. For
77 Item 9, Franchisee Responsibilities, contained 23 sub-items, each sub-item had several variables within
it. Item 20, List of Outlets, contained eleven sub-categories, including the number of franchises that left
the system, and the number of units transferred for each of the previous three years. The number of
projected new unit openings in the next 12 months was also included in this Item.
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example, in Item 8, Restrictions on Sources of Products or Services, a variety of
qualification terms were used to describe a number of related and unrelated restrictions.
The phrase must buy solely through approved suppliers, as found in UFOC 2, is similar
but not identical to the requirement in UFOC 8 to use spectfzed suppliers only, any
others must be approved. A sample of differences found among franchises are
ilustrated in Table 4-4 below:
Table 4-4: Preliminary Sample UFOC Item 8
Product UFOC 1 Required to buy only approved products
Specifications UFOC2 Must buy solely through approved suppliers
UFOC3 Must buy product from franchisor or designee
UFOC4 No restrictions on product purchases
UFOC5 No product purchases required other than marketing materials
UFOC6 No product purchases required other than marketing materials
UFOC7 All fixtures, furnishings, software, equipment, and materials specified.
No requirements to purchase operating materials
UFOC8 Specified suppliers only, any others must be approved
UFOC9 Must purchase any logo-bearing equipment from franchisor
UFOC 10 Must comply with specifications
UFOC 11 Must purchase only design~ted supplies, equipment, fixtures
UFOC 12 Must purchase copyrighted materials from franchisor; other supplies
from approved list of vendors
UFOC 13 Not currently required to purchase any goods, services, supplies or
fixtures
To reduce coding errors and to facilitate comparative analysis, a system of
measurement using dichotomous and categorical variables was designed.
Second, in order to remain within limits imposed on this study, a need for data
reduction became apparent. A focus on Item 9, Franchisee Responsibilties, appeared
to offer several advantages. Item 9, with its 25 sub-categories, provided a consistent
fi'amework within which to gather data for comparative analysis. Specified by U.S.
federal law, this framework is consistent among franchises. Within this framework
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were statements relevant to a study of contractual provisions that may constrain or
allow entrepreneurial processes. For example, requirements for pre-openig,
restrictions on products and services offered, financial reporting specifications, and
monitoring and control requirements are some of the provisions contained within the
sub-categories ofItem 9. Table 4-5 displays the sub-categories ofItem 9.
Table 4-5: Item 9 Sub-Categories
Category Category Description
a. Site Selection and Acquisition! Lease
b. Pre-Opening Purchases/Leases
c. Site Development and Other Pre-Opening
Requirements
d. Initial and Ongoing Training
e. Opening
f. Fees
g. Compliance with Standards and Policies/
Operating Manual
h. Trademarks and Proprietary Information
i. Restrictions on Products/ Services Offered
j. Warranty and Customer Service Requirements
k. Territorial Development and Sales Quota.
1. Ongoing Product/ Service Purchases
m. Maintenance, Appearance and Remodelling
Requirements
n. Insurance i
o. Advertising
p. Indemnification
q. Owner's Participation! Management/ Staffing
r. Records and Reports
s. Inspections and Audits
1. Transfer
u. Renewal
v. Post- Termination Obligations
w. Non-Competitiôn Covenants
x. Dispute Resolution
y. Other
Third, consistent among franchises in the sample, the contents of several UFOC items
contained references to accompanying franchise agreements, exhibits, and addendums.
In one franchise, for example, seventeen provisions covered renewal, termination,
transfer, and dispute resolution. Sixteen of those provisions contained references to
various sections ofthe franchise agreement. In the same fì'anchise, of the 25
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Franchisee Responsibilities provisions contained in Item 9, twenty-four referred to
sections of the franchise agreement and its addendums. The DFOC and franchise
agreement, together with its exhibits, addendums, and attachments, appears be
substantively as well as physically bound together. As such, these documents were
analyzed collectively. A copy ofItem 9 from a franchise is included in Table B21 in
Appendix B.
4.3.4 UFOC Measures
As previously stated, I designed a system of dichotomous and categorical codification
to facilitate comparative analysis. The following describes how variables for this
dataset were constructed. Where fmancial measures were employed, measurements
were performed in D.S. dollars. Contractual provisions related to product and supplier
requirements were operationalized as five dichotomous variables: (l) Sell Only
Approved Product; (2) Required Minimum Purcha~e; (3) Franchisor must Approve
Product Line; (4) Franchisees are Limited to Approved Line of products or services; (5)
Franchisee must use Approved Suppliers Only. In similar fashion, variables related to
operations of franchised outlets were constructed into whether or not the franchisor Set
Hours of Operation, whether an Exclusive Territory was granted with purchase of a
franchise, and whether a franchisor set a pre-determined Sales Quota.
Several dichotomous variables were constructed to measure aspects of franchise
marketing and advertising. Advertising Required identified franchises in which
franchisees were required to make mandatory contributions to an advertising fund.
Advertising Percentage differentiated those franchises whose franchisee contributions
were based on a percentage of gross revenues from those using alternative methods.
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Opening Advertising identified franchises that required franchisees to pay fees for
advertising the initial opening of their business. When specified, the required Opening
Advertising Amount was also measured. Advertising Approval identified franchises that
require franchisor approval for advertising that franchisees may wish to conduct in their
markets.
Owner Full Time identified those franchises in which a franchise owner is required to
devote full time efforts to the operation of an outlet. Similarly, Designate Manager
identified those franchises in which a franchisee may designate a manager to operate
the business. In cases where designated managers were perlltted, Approve Manager
identified franchises in which managers must be approved by their respective
franchisors.
Provisions that govern outlet monitoring were measured using three dichotomous
variables. Quality Audit identified those franchises in which a franchisor reserves the
right to perform formal audits of its franchised outlets. Inspect Business and Interview
Customer identified those franchises in which a franchisor retains the right to inspect
and/or interview customers of a franchised business as a part of its ongoing monitoring
program.
Transfer Allowed differentiated those franchises that contractually specified that
transfers were perlltted within the term of an agreement. Franchises that used a Fixed
Fee as a basis for calculating Transfer Fee were differentiated from those that
employed alternative methods of calculation. Similarly, franchises that disclosed
Renewal Terms and Renewal Amounts were measured. Dispute resolution was
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measured as a categorical variable, indicating whether mediation, arbitration, or no
specific means of dispute resolution was specified.
Other Business differentiated those franchises in which ownership of another business
was specifically allowed during the term of a franchise agreement. Some contract
provisions extended restrictions beyond the term of a franchise agreement. Non-
Compete identified those franchises in which a provision specified that a franchisee
may not enter into a competing business after the term of a franchise agreement. For
those franchises with specific non-compete clauses, Non-Compete Years measures the
duration of post-agreement non-competition.
4.4 SECONDARY DATA: EXAMINATION OF THREE SECONDARY DATA SOURCES
Guided by hypotheses that emerged from the literature review and results of the
previous section, I collected additional data from rtliable secondary sources, enabling
use of more extensive quantitative methods for the second portion of this study.
Consistent with studies in corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., (Covin and Miles 1999);
(Zahra 1996)), if opportunities for entrepreneurial processes exist within the context of
franchising, they may be more evident in growing franchises. With little guidance from
the recent literature, I probed these datasets for characteristics that differentiate growing
franchises from others.
The dearth of official data relevant to franchising has been noted in the academic
literature (e.g., (Lafontaine 1995); (Mehta, Luza et al. 1999)) and in D.S. government
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reports (e.g., (Stana 2001)).78 A singular, comprehensive, and official source of data on
franchising did not exist at the time ofthis work. Given the absence of a single
comprehensive source of datá on franchising, I collected data from three sources used
previously in acadellc studies of franchising. Piling et aL. employed use of multiple
datasets in their study of competition among franchised and company-owned units
(Pilling, Henson et aL. 1995). They concluded that "while increasing the difficulties of
comparing results" the approach "significantly increases the insights provided by the
research" (p. 185). Therefore, to test the hypotheses, I collected data from three
secondary sources: (1) FRANDATA's franchise system Snapshots; (2)Entrepreneur
Magazine's Franchise 500(j rankings, as published in its 1997, 1998, 1999,2000, and
2001 editions; and (3) Source Book Publication's Bond's Franchising Guide. Each is
described below.
4.4.1 FRANDATA Dataset Description
FRADATA Corporation is a leading supplier of information to and about the
franchising industry. Founded in 1989, FRADATA maintains a proprietary database
of franchise information, compiled from independently verified data gathered from
individual UFOC documents.79 The company maintains an active customer base of
over 2,500 franchise concepts - including each ofthe 100 largest companies involved in
franchising. Jambulingham and Nevin concluded, "Extensive research indicated that
78 Since the US. Department of 
Commerce canceled it publication Franchising in the Economy in 1988,
there is no census-type data available from which to calculate growth or survival of 
franchise systems(Lafontaine and Shaw 1998).79 The company posits that its dataset represents the largest private collection of current and archived
UFOCs in the world. FRAAT A has relationships with a variety of regulatory and industry agencies,
including the US. Small Business Administration (SBA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), International Franchise Association (IF A),
American Franchisee Association (AF A), and the National Franchise Council (NFC).
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FRADATA's database was the most complete available" (Jambulingham and Nevin
1999, p. 376).
FRADATA Corporation distributed its database information through custollzed
research reports, and through its four franchise websites:
http://v,ivv'\.FranchiscRescarch.com , http://vv\,vw.FranchiscRcgistrv.com ,
http://wwvv'.FranchiseDocs.com, and http://www.FranchisePlanet.com. The company
posited that its FranchisePlanet.com's research section was the single largest source of
objective data available about the U. S. franchise industry. Access to more than 1,200
franchise companies was provided through FranchisePlanet's Snapshots lin.
4.4.2 FRANDATA: Collection and Sample
I collected a random sample of 598 franchise Snapshots from FRADATA through its
FranchisePlanet website at http://vv\,vw.fi-anchiseplAnet.com during May and June 2000.
To provide a permanent record of data gathered on each franchise, I downloaded each
FrachisePlanet Snapshot from the website, and stored them on disc as individual HTML
files before I entered data into MS Excel spreadsheet, and subsequently transferred the
accumulated data to SPSS v. 10 for analysis.
Each Snapshot contained a variety of information about each franchise, as summarized
in Table 4-6:
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Table 4-6: FRANDATA Snapshot Dataset Variables
Contact Name, Address, Telephone Number
Description Franchise description
Legal Agreements Agreements to be signed as conditions of franchise purchase
Programs Offered Other concepts offered by this franchisor
Business Types Other business types offered by franchisor
System Size Number offranchised and company-owned outlets
Initial Payments Franchise Fee, payment terms, multiple franchise purchase discounts
Initial Investment Average minimum and maximum cost estimates, with and without real estate
Royalties Amount and basis of royalty calculation
Advertising Advertising expenditues required
Exclusive Territory If offered, parameters of territorial exclusivity
Term/ Renewal Initial and renewal term of franchise agreement
Transfer Franchise transfer requirements
Financing Type of fiancing (if offered) by franchisor
An example ofa FranchisePlanet Snapshot obtained through FRANDATA's website
from McDonald's Corporation is provided in Appendix E, Table EL.
4.4.3 FRANDATA Measures
Using the difference between the current year (2001) and the year in which the business
i
was formed, Age was calculated. In siuular fashion, Experience was measured, using
the current year and the year in which the firm commenced franchising. I considered
that firms may use the period of time between start of operations and the start of
franchising to refme their concept. Therefore, Rejinement Period was created by
measuring the number of years between a firm's first year of operation and the year
which the firm began franchising. Number of Franchises and Number of Company
Units were measured directly for each franchise, and Size was calculated as the sum of
franchises and company units. Percent Franchised was calculated by dividing Number
of Franchises by Size.
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Purchase of a franchise may require execution of additional agreements in addition to
the franchise agreement. Number of Agreements measured the total number of
agreements required to be sigíied as a condition of the franchise purchase.80 In addition
to its original concept, Other Programs measured the number of other programs offered
by a franchisor.8I Similarly, in addition to its standard program, franchisors may offer a
variety of business types, measured by Business Types.82
In some concepts, franchise fees vary. Initial franchise fees may be provided in a range,
Fee Low and Fee High measured low and high ranges of franchise fees, expressed in
U.S. dollars. Terms was measured as a dichotomous variable, differentiating those
franchisors who offered payment terms from those who did not.
4.4.4 Entrepreneur Magazine Franchise SOO(í: Dataset Description
Entrepreneur Magazine began its system of raning franchises in 1980 with its first
Franchise 500(í issue. Its ranking system lists only North American franchisors, which
must submit UFOC or Alberta Canada disclosure documents before inclusion, and
employs an independent CP A firm to audit financial data. Rankings are based on a
weighted system established by the magazine. Although details of the system are not
disclosed, weighted more heavily are a franchisor's fmancial strength and stability, the
system's growth rate, and the size of a franchise system. Also considered in the ranking
are the number of years in business, length of time franchising, start-up costs, amount
80 Confidentiality agreements, lease agreements, and promissory notes are examples of additional
agreements.
81 A fi'anchisor may offer other programs to become a franchisee in the system. An area development
agreement is an example of a program listed in this category.
82 An 
example is Pretzel Time's franchise, which offers a cart/iosk franchise and a co-branded fi'anchise
in addition to its standard offering.
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of litigation, percentage of terminations, and whether or not the franchisor provides
financing for franchisees.
The magazine considers variables used in their rankings to be "objective, quantifiable
measures of a franchise operation" (p. 174-175), in part, because subjective elements
such as satisfaction or management style are not considered (anonymous 2001). In
addition to 500 ranked systems, the 2000 edition of the Entrepre~eur's Franchise 500CI
listed 98 non-ranked franchises. 83
Data from Entrepreneur Magazine has been employed in previous academic studies of
franchising. Castrogiovanni et aL. validated the data, and felt "confident that both the
UFOC data obtained to estimate failure rates and the additional Entrepreneur data used
in this study are accurate" (Castrogiovanni, Justis et aL. 1993, p. 107). Shane also used
Entrepreneur's dataset to study franchisor mortality (Shane and Foo 1998).84
Lafontaine concluded that Entrepreneur's dataset was "the most detailed longitudinal
data set on individual franchisors" (p. 15), although she cautioned that it should not be
considered representative of the population offranchisors (Lafontaine 1995).
I chose this dataset for several reasons. First, with an estimated 2.2 million readers,
Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500CI ranking system is widely known by franchise
researchers, practitioners, and potential franchisees. Second, because responding
franchises often included their Franchise 500CI ranking in their marketing materials,
83 Non-ranked franchise systems included both those companies whose information was verified but fell
below the criteria for the 500th system, and those companies who submitted unverifiable data. Hotels and
motels, because of much higher typical start-up costs were also excluded from the rankings.
84 In an earlier study, Shane cited previous work by Lafontaine (1992) 
and Michael (1993) that concluded
the dáta provided by Entrepreneur was "unbiased" (Shane 1996, p. 222).
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response bias may be lower than would typically be expected of independent surveys.
Exit from Entrepreneur Magazine's listing was used as a measure of failure in Shane's
study. Third, reliability of data in this dataset may be better than that of other surveys,
in part because franchisors are required by the magazine to provide documentation to
substantiate their claims. Before publication, data is audited by the magazine.
4.4.5 Entrepreneur Magazine Franchise 500CI: Collection and Sample
Access to Entrepreneur's Magazine's data was available through either the printed
publication, or through the magazine's website at
h1¿:j/www.entre¡;ne1!r.cOln!1i-anchise zone. I collected data from the January 2000
edition of Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500CI between September 2000 and
January 2001. I included both ranked and unranked franchises, for a total of598
franchises in this sample.
I transcribed data from the Entrepreneur Magazme's 21 sI Annual Franchise 500CI
Table 4-7: Entrepreneur MagazinE! Dataset Variables
Name
Franchise Description
Franchise 500'" Rank
Year Began Operations
Year Began Franchising
Number of Franchises 1997
Number of Franchises 1998
Number of Franchises 1999
Number of Company Owned 1997
Number of Company Owned 1998
Number of Company Owned 1999
Franchise Fee (Low)
Franchise Fee (High)
Average Start-up Costs (Low)
Average Start-up Costs (High)
Royalty
Franchisor Financing Available
edition, published in January 2000, into an MS Excel spreadsheet, and subsequently
transferred the data to SPSS for analysis. Variables provided by the magazine and
collected for tlus portion of the study are presented in Table 4-7.
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4.4.6 Entrepreneur Magazine Franchise SOO(ß: Measures
Variables from this dataset were constructed as follows: Age was calculated as the
difference between the year the franchisor began operations and the current year (2001).
Experience was calculated in similar fashion, using the year in which the firm began
franchising. Consistent with the measurement system used in the previous dataset, I
considered that firms may use the period of time between start of operations and the
start of franchising to refme their concept. Therefore, REFINE was created by
measuring the number of years between a firm's first year of operation and the year
which the firm began franchising. As described earlier in this section, Entrepreneur
Magazine considered franchise system size to be one of its most important criteria.
Because the magazine did not specify whether company-owned units were included in
their measurement, I considered Size to be the sum of franchised and company-owned
umts, calculated for each of the three years provided. To deternune if company-owned
units had any effects on the other variables, Franchise Percentage was calculated, using
the quotient of franchised units divided by the total number of units in each of the three
years.
Franchise Fee and Average Start-up Costs were measured in D.S. dollars, as provided
by the magazine. Royalty, as provided by the magazine, was listed as either (l) a
percentage; (2) a range of percentages; (3) a fixed rate per period of time; or (4) the
term "varies". Since a clear majority of franchises in this sample calculated royalty
based on a percentage or percentage range, those with fixed rates per period and those
listed as "varies" were excluded. Where a range of percentages was listed, the mean
value was entered. Ten different types offmancing were coded in the magazine's
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listing.85 Financing was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether
any form of fmancial assistance was provided by franchisors.
4.4.7 Source Book Publications: Dataset Description
Data were also gathered from Source Book Publications of Oak Brook, California,
publisher of the Bond's Franchise Guide. The company posted information from 1,201
franchises on its website, http:í/v",\x,'\.worldfranchising.com. Source Book obtained
information from franchisors using a survey instrument. Mehta et aI., in their
comparison of franchise data sources, concluded that Source Book Publication's Bond's
Franchise Guide was a reliable source of information for studies offranchising, and
comparable to other widely used sources of franchise information (Mehta, Luza et aI.
1999).
Source Book's survey collected data in the broad categories of:
(l) Franchisor Background, including when established, total units and projected
new units;
(2) Financial Requirements, including investment and fees
(3) Terms of Contract, including passive ownership and area development
agreements
(4) Franchisor Support and Training Provided, including fmancial assistance; and
(5) Franchisor's Specific Expansion Plans, categorized by D.S., Canada, and
overseas.
Although considered reliable, this dataset included only those franchises headquartered
in North America, and cannot be considered as representative of the population offirms
engaged in franchising. A copy of the Source Book Publication's questionnaire used in
their survey is included in Appendix F.
85 The ten types of financing categories established by the magazine are: in-house financing; 3rd party
financing; accounts receivable financing; equipment financing; franchise fee financing; inventory
financing; leasehold improvements financing; payroll financing; start-up cost financing; and working
capital financing.
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4.4.8 Source Book Publications: Collection and Sample
I collected data from Source Book Publication's website between December 2000 and
February 2001. Data were collected from all 1,201 franchises listed on the website. I
downloaded individual web pages relevant to each franchise, saved them as HTML
files, and later entered the variables into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Subsequently, I
transferred the data from Microsoft Excel to SPSS for analysis.
4.4.9 Source Book Publications: Measures
Variables were constructed as follows: Since only those franchises headquartered in
North America were included in this dataset, HQ was measured using a dichotomous
variable to differentiate between Canadian- and U.S.-headquartered franchises. US,
Canada, and Int'l represented the number of outlets located in each market. SIZE was
calculated for each franchise, as the sum of its U.Sl, Canadian, and International outlets.
Franchises and Company Owned measured the total number of franchised and
company-owned outlets respectively. P ERFRAN was calculated by dividing the
number of Franchises by SIZE.
Franchisors provided the year in which their firm was Established, and the year in
which they Began Franchising. Since the time between when a firm was founded and
when it began franchising may be used to refine the concept, REFINE was calculated as
the number of years elapsed from when a firm was Established and when it Began
Franchising. From these two dates, A GE and EXP were calculated, using difference
between the present year (2001) and the year Established and Began Franchising
respectively. TERM represented the length of a franchise agreement expressed in years.
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Franchisors were asked to provide the number of units they project to open in the
upcomig twelve months. PNU measured the number of projected new units for each
franchise.
Several variables related to financial aspects of a franchise were measured. ILOWand
IHIGH represented low average and high average investment costs associated with each
franchise, while FFEE measured initial franchise fees in thousands ofD.S. dollars.
ROYAL and ADV measured royalties and advertising fees, respectively.86 EC was
operationalized as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a franchise made an
earnings claim. FA was measured as an ordinal variable, indicating whether (0) no
financial assistance; (1) indirect fmancial assistance; (2) direct financial assistance; or
(3) both indirect and direct financial assistance were provided by franchisors.
Variables related to operations of a franchise wereialso measured. SF and ET were
measured as dichotomous variables, indicating whether sub- franchising, and expansion
within assigned territories were permitted under a franchise agreement respectively.
PO was operationalized as a categorical variable, indicating whether passive ownership
of a franchised outlet was prohibited, discouraged, or allowed by a franchisor. AD
served as a dichotomous indicator of whether area director agreements were offered by
a franchisor.
86 TIiese variables were expressed as a percentage of gross sales. Those fi'anchises who used fixed
royalty payments were excluded.
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Source Book Publications' survey asked franchisors to indicate their plans for growth in
the U.S., Canadian, and overseas markets. Three categorical variables were established
to measure growth intentions in these markets, expressed as (0) 
no expansion planned;
(I) limited expansion in this market; (2) expansion in all areas of this market. A
summary of the variables measured in this dataset are provided in Table 4-8 below.
Table 4-8: Source Book Publications Dataset Variables
HQ Location of Headquarters Dichotomous
US Number of Outlets in U.S. NominalCanada Number of Outlets in Canada NominalIntl Number of Outlets outside NA NominalSIZE Total Number of Outlets NominalEstablished Year in Which Firm Established NominalBegan Franchised Year in Which Firm Began Franchising NominalAGE Number of Years Since Firm Established NominalEXP Number of Years ofFranchising Experience NominalREFIN Number of years in Operation Before Franchising Commenced NominalFranchises Total Number ofFranchised Outlets NominalComp.-Own Total Number of Company-Owned Outlets NominalPERFRAN Percentage of Outlets Franchised NominalPNU Projected New Openings in Next 12 Months NominalILOW Average Investment- Low Average NominalIHIGH Average Investment- High Average NominalFFEE Franchise Fee NominalROYAL Royalty Fees . Nominal,ADV Advertising Fees NominalEC Earnings Claim Disclosed DichotomousTERM Term of Franchise Agreement in Years Nominal
PO Passive Ownership OrdinalAD Area Director Agreements Offered DichotomousSF Sub-Franchising Permitted DichotomousET Expansion in Territory Permitted DichotomousFA Financial Assistance for Franchisees OrdinalEXPUS Expansion Intentions in U.S. OrdinalEXPCAN Expansion Intentions in Canada OrdinalEXPOS Expansion Intentions Overseas i Ordinal
4.4.10 Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses of the Datasets
Although each dataset provided information on franchise characteristics, such as
number of outlets, year in which operations began, and amount of fees, each provided
unique information relevant to this study. FRADATA's dataset included the number
of different concepts, programs, and business types offered by each franchisor. The
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dataset also included the number of agreements required to be signed as a condition for
purchase of a franchise, and whether or not an exclusive territory was offered in
conjuction with the purchase. Entrepreneur Magazine's dataset included the number of
franchised and company-owned outlets operated for the previous three years, providing
a longitudinal measure of growth. This dataset has been widely used in studies of
franchising by academics and practitioners. Source Book's dataset provided
information on the geographic location of each franchisor's outlets, categorized by
U.S., Canadian, and international markets. It also included organizational details, such
as whether passive ownership, sub- franchising, or area development agreements were
offered. The dataset contained details of the franchise agreement not found in other
datasets, such as the term of the agreement in years, and whether or not an earnings
claim was provided in the agreement. In addition, because this dataset was developed
from data collected through a survey of franchisors, it provided information on
projected openings as well as the extent and geographic focus of each franchisor's
expansion strategy.
While providing valuable insights, FRADATA and Entrepreneur Magazine's datasets
were limited to data disclosed in a UFOC and franchise agreement. Although
FRANDATA's dataset was derived from a random sample, there is no information on
the population of 1,300 franchises from which it was drawn, and access to the data is
not possible since the website was removed from service. Data gathered from
Entrepreneur Magazine was also limited, and firms included in the ranking have been
found not to be representative of the population of franchises in previous studies (e.g.,
(Lafontaine 1995); (Shane 1997)). The Source Book dataset was developed from the
population of 1,201 franchises, and contained information not found in other datasets.
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Information obtained from this respected source of franchise data also provided a means
of examining franchisor strategies and intentions in addition to characteristics and past
performance.
4.5 PRIMARY DATA: SEMi-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
The first two portions of this study focused on franchising's formal context, delimited
by its contractual provisions and legal disclosure requirements. Stanworth argued that
"consideration offranchisor-franchisee relations solely based at the formal level is
misleading" (p. 165), and that "the formal contract was often a poor guide to the 
world
of operational reality" (Stanworth 1995). He cited an example based on work
conducted at the University of Westminster in which franchisees reported high levels of
independence despite the apparent controls imposed by a franchise contract.
To further examine the operational realm and differences between the formal and
informal contexts of franchising, I chose a sell-structured personal interview format.
Interviews with six franchise owners and two representatives of a franchisor were
conducted. This method was chosen because the exploratory nature of the research
problem could best be addressed through in-depth examination and analysis, consistent
with the use of qualitative methods (Yin 1989). Personal interviews and other
qualitative research methods "have become increasingly important modes of inquiry for
the social sciences" (Marshall and Rossman 1989, p. 9), and were considered the best
method when dealing with complex research topics (de Vaus 1996). Although the
interview methods employed may limit external validity of subsequent analysis, they
are consistent with work whose aim is to provide additional perspectives for theory
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building. At the time of this study, work is stil being conducted on propositions toward
a general theory offranchising (e.g., (Stanworth and Curran 1999)).
4.5.1 Franchisee Interview- Dataset Description
I conducted semi-structured personal interviews with four present and two former
franchisees. These interviews were recorded on audiotape, with the permission of
interviewees. Transcripts are provided in Appendices G through L.
4.5.2 Franchisee Interviews- Collection and Sample
The ubiquity of franchising assured that an ample supply offranchisees existed in most
U.S. metropolitan areas. To remain within the overall 
limits of this study while
providing insights from a cross-section of franchisees, I chose to limit this section to
interviews with six franchise owners. Franchise owners were chosen from an available
base in Charleston, South Carolina based on several factors.
First, I selected franchisees from diverse industries, including fast food, business
services, and retaiL. Although I did not intend to get a sample representative of the
population of franchisees, the industries selected are ones where franchising has
realized considerable success. Second, I chose franchisees with varied levels of
experience. The sample included relative newcomers to franchising as well as veterans.
It also included two former franchisees, one who recently left the system, and a
franchisee whose franchisor ceased operations. Thid, specific franchises were chosen
because of their growth rates. An area developer from Quizno's, a quick service
restaurant franchise, was included in the sample. Quizno's has grown from 400 outlets
to in excess of 1,300 outlets in one year's time, and has risen from #46 to #6 in
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Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500(í ranking, and is presently ranked #8 in the
"Top 30 Fastest-Growing Franchises" by the magazine. A franchisee from General
Nutrition Centers (GNC) was also selected. Established in 1935, GNC currently ranks
#9 in the Franchise 500(í, and #17 in the "Top 30 Fastest Growing Franchises."
Franchisees and former franchisees in this sample were chosen to provide a diverse
sample, while remaining within the required scope of this study.. Sell-structured
personal interviews were conducted, during which franchisees were asked open-ended
questions.
4.5.3 Franchisee Interview- Measures
Interviewees were asked open-ended questions, designed to provide insights along three
main themes: First, to better understand the role of a UFOC and other formal aspects of
franchising in actual operations of a business. Interviewees were asked about the role
of UFO Cs and franchise agreements in their franchise selection process. The second
theme is that offranchisor and franchisee relations, and the role of 
UFO Cs and
franchise agreements in governing the actual operations of their franchised outlet.
Finally, interviewees were asked about how change and adaptation is implemented
within their business. They were asked about how they responded to dynallcs in their
markets, specifically how adaptation to changing customer behaviours and competitive
pressures were accomplished. The open-ended questions and clarifying statements
were designed to extract subtleties and perceptions expressed by the interviewees. I
summarized their responses in text format for presentation.
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4.5.4 Franchisor Interviews
Sell-structured interviews with the general counsel and chief fmancial officer of a
rapidly growing franchise were also conducted. This franchisor was chosen based on
its rapid growth, and their willingness to participate in this study. This franchise system
is owned by two former franchisees, who purchased the original 18 restaurants from the
founder. Interviews were conducted in person by the author, at Quizno's corporate
headquarters in Denver, Colorado, recorded on audiotape with the permssion of 
the
interviewees. Transcripts are provided in Appendices M and N.
4.6 SUMMARY
The aim ofthis chapter was to describe methods used to collect data for the three
analysis sections of this study. The first section followed a content analysis strategy to
gather data for comparative analysis from 55 UFOC and franchise agreements. I
considered this method suitable, considering the exploratory nature of this section, and
the detailed contracts and disclosure documents being analyzed. Next, hypotheses that
emerged from the literature were tested, using three datasets created from secondary
data. I considered the absence of a single, comprehensive source of data on franchising
and availability of different perspectives from the three datasets in this section.
Although use of multiple datasets introduced complexity, it provided additional
insights. Lastly, because examinations offranchising's formal aspects provided a
limited view of the phenomenon, semi-structured interviews were conducted with
individuals currently and previously involved in franchising. Interviewees represented
both current and former franchisees from a variety of industries, using a method
designed to provide levels of comparability and meaningful insights into franchising's
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operational realm. Interviews with two franchisor representatives were also performed.
Analysis of the data collected follows.
John E. Clarkin 169
5.0 ANALYSIS OF UFOC AND FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
When contrasted with other organizational forms, franchising appears to create a
uniform and highly regimented context, a theoretically unpromising environment for
entrepreneurship. The extent and nature of uniformity in franchising's context remains
largely unexplored. As presented earlier in this work, assumptions of uniforllty may
be based, at least in part, on legal agreements and disclosure documents that
characterize the formal environment in which franchise relationships exist. One way of
testing these assumptions is through systematic examination of Uniform Franchise
Offering Circulars (UFO C) and franchise agreements, the official documents that defme
and govern franchise relationships in the U.S. 87
5.2 UNIFORMITY IN FRANcmSE DOCUMENTS
In the European Union (EU), very little franchise-specific legislation exists beyond the
civil, commercial, and social laws that govern most business relationships in each
country.88 Although France and Spain have laws that govern disclosure to prospective
franchisees,89 franchisors in Europe are generally expected to follow guidelines of fair
behaviour for franchise practitioners implemented in the European Code of 
Ethics. 
90
87 UFOC and franchise agreements may also contain attached Exhibits, Addendums, and riders which are
also part of the franchise and are included in this analysis.88 The European Commission passed two regulations defining the vertical restraints tyically used in
franchising: (EC) No. 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) ofthe Treaty of Rome, and (EEC)No. 4087/1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty. Available at http://v,ww.efI-
fran chise. com/legislation.htm.
89 In 1989, the French government adopted legislation that requires mandatory disclosure for franchises
and all agreements that involve a license to use a trademark or logo. "Loi Doubin" was found to lack the
c1aríty and detail of disclosure requirements found in North America (Konigsberg 2001).
90 The Code of Ethics was first elaborated in 1972 by the European Franchise Federation. The Code
includes definitions; guiding principles (which include obligations of both franchisor and franchisee);
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In contrast, franchisors in the United States are required by both federal and, in some
cases, state laws to make detailed disclosures of material facts about the company
offering the franchise, about the franchise being offered, and about specific duties in the
relationship created by a franchise.91 Together with its respective franchise agreement,
the UFOC serves as the single document that complies with both U.S. federal and state
requirements governing franchise disclosure.92 Used by a vast majority offranchisors,
UFOCs have become a national industry standard in franchising (Commission 1986),
are sanctioned by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and were therefore
selected for use in this study. A copy of the FTC Franchise Rule that defines the use
and disclosure requirements is provided in Appendix C.
Devised by the North American Securities Administration Association (NASAA), the
UFOC provides a systematic framework of disclosure, including categorical numbering
and labeling.93 Guidelines and requirements are highly specific, including detailed
examples and pre-designated specifications for content and presentation of information.
For example, NASAA guidelines specify whether information must be presented in
paragraph form as a descriptive summary, or in tabular form, according to pre-designed
recruitment, advertising, and disclosure; franchisee selection; and guidelines for the franchise agreement.
Available at http://vvwv,:.eff-fi'anchise.com.
91 As previously described, U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) regulation 16 CFR Part 436, known as
the Franchise Rule, requires franchisors to disclose these facts in a prescribed and consistent manner,
following either the FTC's Franchise Rule's disclosure layout or Uniform Franchise Offering Circular
(UFOC) guidelines.92 Amended Franchise Rule- 12/30/93, FTC Matter No. R511 003, Federal Register.
93 "Disclose" means to state all material facts in an accurate and unambiguous manner. Disclose clearly,
concisely and in a narrative form that is understandable by a person unfamiliar with the franchise
business. For clear and concise disclosure avoid legal antiques and repetitive phrases. When possible, use
active, not passive voice. Limit the length and complexity of disclosure through careful organization of
information in the disclosure. Avoid technical language and unnecessary detaiL. Make the format and
chronological order consistent within each Item (anonymous 2000).
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specifications. A complete set ofUFOC requirements is available
http://nasaa.org/nasaaícorpfìn/UFOC.doc. A copy of requirements for UFOC Items 1
and 2, and a cover page are provided in Appendix 0 to ilustrate the level of detail
associated with NASAA's requirements. A copy ofNASAA's requirements for Items 9
and 17 are also provided in Appendix 0 because of their relevance to franchisee
obligations and restrictions, aspects germane to this study. As summarized in Table
5.1, UFOCs follow a uniformly prescribed framework ofItems and disclosure topics
designed to present material facts about a franchise offering and facilitate comparisons
among franchises.
Table 5.1 UFOC Item Framework and Fonnat
FRAMEWORK FORMAT
Item Description
1 Franchisor, Predecessors, Affliates Summary
2 Business Experience Summary
3 Litigation Summary
4 Bankruptcl4 Summary
5 Initial Franchise Fee Summary
6 Other Fees Tabular
7 Initial Investment , Tabular
8 Restrictions on Sources of Products Summary
9 Franchisee's Obligations Tabular
10 Financing Summary
11 Franchisor Obligations Summary
12 Territory Summary
13 Trademarks Summary
14 Patents, Copyrights & Proprietary Summary
15 Obligation to Participate Summary
16 Restrictions on What May be Sold Summary
17 Renewal, Termination, Transfer, Dispute Resolution Tabular
18 Public Figures~) Summary
19 Earnings Claims Summary
20 List of Outlets Tabular
21 Financial Statements Summary
22 Contracts~Ò Summary
23 ReceiptY7
i Summary
94 Persons identified in Item 1 or Item 2 who have been involved as a debtor in proceedings under U.S.
Bankruptcy Code are required to be disclosed in this Item.
95 Franchisors must disclose if any public figures are used in marketing or promoting the franchise.
96 Lists all agreements contained in offering circular and franchise agreement, such as sublease,
applicable state riders to agreement, and addendums.
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This section begins by describing the results of an exploratory examination of 
UFO Cs
and franchise agreements conducted in two phases. First, complete documentation
packages associated with a franchise purchase were examined for uniformity in
structure, format and contents. Included were UFOCs, franchise agreements, and all
exhibits, addendums, attachments, riders, and appendices. Given the extent of coverage
and quantity of documentation, the fist analysis was limited in scope to just thirteen
franchises. For the second phase of 
this analysis, a subset of the variables examined in
the first phase was selected for a more focused exploration of franchisee responsibilities
and restrictions. Documentation from a total of 55 franchises were examined in this
second phase.
An analysis of uniformity in the UFOC framework and format is first described,
followed by analysis of the sample's contents. Ne!)t, the respective franchise
agreements are analyzed. An analysis of the entrepreneurial constraints found in both
UFOC and franchise agreements follows, specifically focused on franchisee obligations
and other areas of opportunity for entrepreneurship within the system. This section
concludes with a summary of the results.
5.2.1 Uniformity in Framework and Format: Analysis of 13 UFOC Documents
Consistent with published guidelines, all UFOC documents in this sample complied
with NASAA requirements for franchise disclosure. UFOC Items were numbered and
97 Receipt pages contain franchisor and prospective franchisee copies that acknowledge receipt ofUFOC,
franchise agreement, and all applicable Exhibits. Receipts pages must be signed and dated by both
franchisor andfi'anchisee. These pages assure that disclosure documents were provided to prospective
franchisee ten business days before signing agreement or ten days before any payment is made.
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categorized as required, and tables within UFOC Items 6, 7,9, 17, and 20 revealed
consistent frameworks of sub-categories. 98 For example, tables in Item 9, Franchisee
Obligations, contained an assigned categoricallabeling system similar to the overall
UFOC framework with alphabetical ordering. Obligation "a." was titled Site selection
and acquisiton/ lease in each UFOC, and obligation "d." was titled Inital and ongoing
training in each UFOC examined. Similar in structure, Item 17, Renewal, Termination,
Transfer and Dispute Resolution, contained ordered and alphabetized categories of
provisions, a through w. Consistent sub-category lettering and descriptive titles among
franchises were also found. In each UFOC, Item 20, List of Outlets, contained tabular
information about the numbers and locations of franchised and company outlets. In
summary, this exploratory investigation ofUFOC frameworks and formats revealed a
consistent and regimented structure of item and subordinate item ordering, and
consistent category and sub-category titles in each case examined.
5.2.2 Uniformity in Content: Analysis of 13 UFOC Documents
As described earlier, the first portion of this exploratory study broadly examined
contents of 13 UFOCs for uniformity in framework and contents. In this initial sample,
content data considered relevant to the overall study were collected from UFOC Items
1,5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20 and categorized into 46 variables.
In order to remain within the scale limits imposed on this study, data from Items 2,3,
4,13, 18,20,21,22, and 23 were not included in this analysis. Table 5.2 presents items
and variables examined in this initial portion of 
the study.
98 The guidelines state: "Disclose obligations in tabular form. The table should contain a response to
each category listed below. Do not change the names of the categories. Fit all obligations within thelisted categories."
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Table 5.2: Exploratory Examination of Contents in Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars (UFOC)
ITEM VARIABLE COMMENT1. Franchisor, Predecessors &
. Year corporation founded
Affiliates
. Year began franchising
2. Business Experience
3. Litigation
4. Bankruptcy
5. Initial Franchise Fee
. Franchise fee
6. Other Fees
. Royalty Includes fixed fees and those
. Renewal based on a percentage of sales
. Transfer or geographic area.
. Marketing
. Other mandatory fees
7. Initial Investment
. Initial investment-Low May include cost of real
. Initial Investment- High estate, expected rent payments
and leasehold improvements.8. Restrictions on Sources of
. Product Specifications
Products or Services
. Other Restrictions
9. Franchisee's Obligations
. 12 Variables 25 separate categories.
Includes references to UFOC
and franchise agreement.10. Financing
. Financing offered by franchisor
11. Franchisor Obligations
. Site Selection Lists obligations of services
. Advertising provided by franchisor.
. Training
. Other
12. Territory
. Territorial Exclusivity
13. Trademarks and Patents
14. Patents, Copyrights
. Intellectual Propert
15. Obligation to Participate in
. Level of participation Includes full-time, part-time or
Actual Operation if passive ownership is
permitted.
16. Restrictions of what . Franchisor products
franchisee may sell
. Other products
17. Renewal, Termination,
. Contract term (length)
Transfer & Dispute Resolution
. Renewal terms
. Agreement termination by
. franchisee
. Agreement termination by
franchisor
. Right of refusal
. Buy back provision
. Transfer fees
. Non-compete during agreement
. Non-compete after agreement
. Dispute resolution
18. Public Figures
19. Earnings Claims
. Earnings or sales claims Optional disclosure
20. List of outlets
21. Financial Statements of
Fran chi sor 
22. Contracts
23. Receipt
, i
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Although the framework and format ofUFOC documents were found to be consistent
and regimented, disclosures within the framework varied among franchises in this
sample. For example, following identical UFOC frameworks, one franchise provided
17 pages of documentation and 5 exhibits, another used 43 pages and 5 exhibits, while a
third franchise used 54 pages and 12 exhibits to meet the same requirements of
disclosure about their respective franchises. Another indicator that franchises varied in
the extent of disclosure was evident in Item 19, Earnings Claims. An earnings claim
includes any representations of 
"actual or potential sales, costs, income or profit," and
under U.S. Federal Trade Commssion (FTC) guidelines, disclosure of earnings is not
mandatory. Three franchises in this sample (23%) provided earnings information under
Item 19.99
The nature and extent of restrictions and franchise€ obligations imposed by each
agreement also varied among franchises in this sample, including product selection
criteria. For example, nine franchises (70%) had specific product purchasing
requirements, stipulating that franchisees purchase materials and supplies exclusively
from a franchisor or from a franchisor's designee. Three franchises defined their
franchised outlet's hours of operation, and one specified the number of employees that
each franchisee must hire. Six franchises required that an owner commit to on-site
management of their outlet, while only one permitted passive ownership. 100
99 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission noted that "approximately 20 percent of franchisors choose to
make earnings disclosures, and that prospects, in theory, can find franchise systems that voluntarily
disclose earnings information" (p. 57309) 16 CFR 436.
ioo Franchises that permit passive ownership have no requirement for an owner's direct participation in
the operation of the business.
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5.2.3 Summary: Uniformity in Framework, Format, and Contents of UFOC
Franchises in this initial sample exhibited a high degree of 
uniformity and
regimentation in their structure and format, conforming with NASAA's guidelines for
UFOC disclosure. The initial sample revealed, however, substantial variations among
franchises in the scope and extent of disclosure. Table 5.3 presents a summary of
descriptive findings, while Appendix D contains details of this initial exploratory study.
This exploratory sample of 13 UFOC documents, as presented in Table 5.3, represented
a diverse group of franchises. Firms varied in age from 3 to 85 years, and had between
3 and 83 years offranchising experience. The average franchise fee was $26,070.00,
but standard deviation of the sample (18.0) reflected the fact that one franchise did not
assess a franchise fee, while another franchise, The Entrepreneur's Source, charged fees
that ranged between $50,000 and $100,000.101 Royalty fees also varied among firms in
the sample, both in terms of 
magnitude and on their basis of calculation. For example,
ten franchises (76.9%) assessed royalty fees based on a percentage of gross sales, in
amounts that ranged between 2 % and 10 percent. Five of these franchises (50%) had
minimum royalty payments that ranged from $250 to $1,000 per week.
101101 In the case of Entrepreneur's Source, an average fee of$75,000 was used to calculate the mean
franchise fee.
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5.2.4 Uniformity in Franchise Agreements: Framework, Format, and Contents
As stated previously in this chapter, UFOCs, franchise agreements and various exhibits
and attachments comprise the official documents of a franchise. In contrast to the
regimentation found in UFOCs, franchise agreements are not required to follow a
prescribed format or structure. Agreements in this sample followed no apparent
numbering, labeling, or categorical framework.
Franchise agreements in this sample differed in length; one agreement consisted of 15
pages, while another spanned 35 pages. The number of addendums and exhibits also
differed, with as few as five and as many as 12 separate documents attached to the
UFOCs and franchise agreements in this sample. Categorical frameworks also differed;
Quizno's agreement contained 23 Sections, while contractual provisions in Pet Pantry's
agreement were divided among 11 Sections. Sections within franchise agreements did
not follow the same regimentation as found in UFQC documents; Training was listed as
a separate category, Section 7, in Quizno's franèhise agreement, while training
information was part of Section 5, Services to Franchisee in Pet Pantry's agreement.
To ilustrate the diversity found in franchise agreements, tables of contents from three
franchises were compared, as depicted in Table 5.4.
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Table 504: Franchise Agreement Tables of Contents 
Section Franchise Aj!reement 1 Franchise Aj!reement 2 Franchise Agreement 3
1 Purpose Introduction Parties
2 Grant of Franchise Grant and Tenn of Franchise Recitals
3 Franchised Location and Territory Definitions
Target Area
4 Initial Franchise Fee Site of Franchised Business Grant of Franchise 
5 Royalties Initial Franchise Fee Services to Franchisee
6 Development of Royalty Fee Payments by Franchisee
Franchised Location
7 Training Marketing and Advertising Obligations ofFranchisee
8 Operations Manual Telephone Numbers and Relationship of Parties 
Advertising ,
9 Development Assistance Computer maintenance Fee Transfer of Franchise 
10 Operating Assistance Training Termination of Franchise 
11 Franchisee's Operational Operating Requirements Miscellaneous ProvisionsCovenants
12 Advertising Operating Assistance
13 Quality Control Records and Financial Reports
14 Marks, Trade Names, Reviews
Proprietary Interests
15 Reports, Records and Insurance
Financial Statements
16 Transfer Books and Records
17 Tenn and Renewal Service Marks
18 Default and Tennination Default and Termination
19 Business Relationship Assignment
20 Restrictive Covenants Sale to Third Part
21 Disputes Death or Disability
22 Security Interests Covenant not to Compete
23 Miscellaneous Provisions Remedies and Indemnities
24 Contract Interpretation;
Modification
i,
Information provided in franchise agreements was presented exclusively in summary
format, although the amount of information and content varied among franchises. In
some cases, franchise agreements provided information not found in the UFOC, such as
information related to contract terms, specific requirements for the grant of a franchise,
and definitions ofthe legal relationship of the parties. Topics addressed in the UFOC,
such as fees, transfer, inspections, and training, were also included in various sections
oftheIr respective franchise agreements.
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5.2.5 Summary of Uniformity in Franchise Agreements
Overall, franchise agreements in this sample did not appear to follow the regimentation
and strict framework conventions found in UFOCs. The information contained in
franchise agreements was presented exclusively in summary format. Although
franchise agreements contained information also found in the attached UFOC, some
provisions contained disclosures and specific information not found elsewhere.
5.3 CONSTRAINTS WITHIN FRANCHISING
In the first phase ofthis study, exploratory examination of thirteen franchise documents
found uniformity in structure and format among UFOCs in this sample. It also revealed
differences in both the extent of disclosure and nature of restrictions imposed by
franchises. Concurrent examination of the sample's respective franchise agreements
revealed that (1) franchise agreements and their respective addendums and exhibits
contained relevant information not contained in the UFOC; and (2) franchise
agreements followed no prescribed structure or fonnat. The second phase ofthis
exploratory study examines the extent to which contractual provisions circumscribe
operations offranchised outlets by analyzing 55 UFOC and franchise agreements.
5.3.1 Introduction
The first phase of the study revealed that not all relevant disclosures were made
exclusively in a UFOC. Specific terms and details related to fees, for example, were
found only in franchise agreements. Therefore, examiation of both UFOCs and
franchise agreements for each franchise was necessary to complete this phase of 
the
study.
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Within a UFOC structure, Item 9, Franchisee Obligations provided a useful template
for systematic examination and analysis of a larger sample of both UFOC and franchise
agreements. Item 9 was seleoted because it not only provided a uniform structure of
sub-items, which included references to provisions in both the UFOC and franchise
agreement, but it also focused on franchisee responsibilities and restrictions, germane to
this work. In contrast to general franchisee obligations under the Guiding Principles of
the European Code of Ethics for Franchising,102 UFOC Item 9, Franchisee Obligations,
contains a detailed framework of responsibilities, restrictions, and obligations, with
specific references to applicable sections of both UFOC and franchise agreement. ID3
Of the 26 sub-items contained in Item 9, nine were chosen for their particular relevance
to this study, delimited also by limits imposed on this document. Data from Item 19,
Earnings Claims, were also gathered because of its importance to franchisees and
because relatively few franchises chose to make thls voluntary disclosure. Variables
were grouped according to subordinated categories within Item 9. In all, 24 categories
offranchisee obligations were listed in Item 9, in sub-item categories a throughy in
consistent order, and with uniform category titles. An example of the framework of
Item 9 is contained in Table 5.5.
102 The Principles state that the obligations of 
the individual franchisee are: (1) devote its best endeavours
to the growth of the franchise business and to the maintenance of the common identity and reputation of
the franchise network; (2) supply the Franchisor with verifiable operating data to facilitate the
determinatìon of performance and the financial statements necessary for effective management guidance,
and allow the Franchisor, and/or its agents, to have access to the indivìdual Franchisee's premises and
records at the Franchisor's request and at reasonable times; and (3) not to disclose to third parties the
know-how provided by the Franchisor, neither during nor after tennination of the agreement (anonymous2001).
103 One franchise noted that Item 9 was designed to "help you (franchisee) find more detailed information
about your obligations in these agreements and in other items of this offering cìrcular."
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Table 5.5: UFOC Item 9 "Franchisee Obligations" Sub-Item Categories
Category Category Description Included in Study
a. Site Selection and Acquisition/ Lease
b. Pre-Opening Purchases/Leases
c. Site Development and Other Pre-Opening
Requirements
d. Initial and Ongoing Training
e. Opening
f Fees
g. Compliance with Standards and Policies/
Operating Manual
h. Trademarks and Proprietary Information
i. Restrictions on Products/ Services Offered Yesj. Warranty and Customer Service Requirements
k. Territorial Development and Sales Quota Yes
1. Ongoing Product/ Service Purchases
m. Maintenance, Appearance and Remodeling
Requirements
n. Insurance
o. Advertising Yes
p. Indemnification
q. Owner's Participation! Management/ Staffng Yes
r. Records and Reports
s. Inspections and Audits Yes
1. Transfer Yes
u. Renewal Yes
v. Post- Termination Obligations Yes
w. Non-Competition Covemants Yes
x. Dispute Resolution i Yes
y. Other
i
This section begins by examining the relationships among variables within each of the
nine sub-items and Item 19. Next, correlation analysis of all variables is presented.
5.3.2 Sub-Item i: Restrictions on Products or Services Offered
An ability to adapt products and services for dynamic markets is often cited as a source
of competitive advantage for small businesses. Adaptation is also used as an indicator
of inovation and other entrepreneurial processes (Jennings and Beaver 1997).
Analysis in this section considered the potential for innovative processes and adaptation
through initiating change at a local leveL. These processes are likely to be suppressed
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when circumscribed by contractual restrictions on products or services offered by a
franchised outlet.
Variables considered in this category were derived from Restrictions on Products/
Services Offered, Sub-item "i" ofUFOC Item 9. A majority of franchises restricted
products offered at a franchised outlet to only those approved by franchisors (78.2%).
Product purchases were confined exclusively to approved suppliers in 70.9% of
sampled franchises. A requirement for franchisees to sell only approved products was
significantly associated with both franchisor approval for products or services offered at
outlets, and a restriction to sell only an approved line. The extent and scope of
franchisor control over franchised outlets' product offerings revealed in this section is
consistent with Morgan's predictions of product uniforllty among franchised outlets
(Morgan and Stoltman 1997).
Table 5.6: Frequencies and Correlations of Restrictions on Products/ Services Offered
Variable Frequencies 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Sell Only Yes 43 78.2% Corr. 1.000
Approved Product ~ 12 21.8
2 Required Min. Yes 7 12.7 Corr. .202 1.000
Purchase ~ 48 87.3 -
3 Franchisor Yes 40 72.7% Corr. .566** .111 1.000Approve Line ~ 15 27.3
4 Limited to Yes 45 81.8 Corr. .664** .039 .664** 1.000Approved Line N; 10 18.2
5 Accepted Yes 39 70.9 Corr. .243 .124 0417** 0425** 1.000Suppliers Only N; 16 29.1
6 Franchisor Sets Yes 10 18.2 Corr. .135 .244
-.029
-.100
-.009 1.000Hrs. of Operation ~ 45 81.8
** Significant aP'.OI n=55
Although most did not, a minority of franchises (18.2%) prescribed hours of operation
for franchised outlets in their agreements. A franchisor's right to set hours of operation
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was not significantly correlated to any other variables in this category. A summary 
of
frequencies and correlations from sub-item i is presented in Table 5.6.
5.3.2.1 Discussion
Maintaining consistency in product and service offerings at a franchised outlet is not
only a requirement for meeting customer expectations, but also ensures protection of a
franchisor's trademark. Despite widely held assumptions ofunirormity, not all
franchises in this sample exerted control over all products or services offered at a
franchised outlet. Although a majority (78.2%) restricted products offered to only those
approved by their franchisor, the remainder had no such requirement. I04 Similarly, a
requirement for franchised outlets to offer a limited line of products or seek franchisor
approval for product offerings was not uniformly imposed in all franchises. This data
suggests that opportunities for custollzation and adaptation to meet local market
demands exists in some franchises. This is consistent with Phan's speculation that
,franchisees are potentially entrepreneurial because of gaps in their formal agreements
(Phan, Butler et aL. 1996).
Arguably, franchises that mandated miimum purchase requirements and stipulated
hours of operation exerted more control over operations offranchised outlets than those
that do not. These requirements have little relationship to trademark protection or
quality control, but may be indicative of franchises driven by incremental sales
revenues, possibly at the expense offranchisee profits (Birley, Leleux et aL. 1997).
104 Some franchises use specialized equipment in addition to product specifications to control production.
Tastee Freeze, for example, required that franchisees lease a unique and essential pump to regulate the
flow of its soft-serve ice cream (Love 1995).
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5.3.3 Sub-item k: Territorial Development and Sales Quota
Territorial exclusivity not only defmes a potential market for a franchised outlet, but
also protects an outlet from encroachment by either franchised or company-owned
outlets within the same chain. Territorial encroachment is a highly contested issue in
franchising (Vincent 1998). When used in conjunction with territorial exclusivity,
establishment of a sales quota ensures franchisors of a miimum revenue stream of
royalties from a given territory.
More than two-thirds (67.3%) of franchises inthis sample defined exclusive territories
for franchisees, either based on geographic or demographic boundaries, and more than
half (54.1 %) of them specified sales quotas. Unexpectedly, a provision for territorial
exclusivity was not highly correlated with a requirement to meet a specified sales quota.
Overall, a majority of franchises (72.7%) in this sample did not stipulate a sales quota
in their UFOC or franchise agreement.
Granting of territorial exclusivity, whether by demographic or geographic means, can
be important to a franchisee. A summary of the frequencies derived from sub-item "k."
is presented in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Territorial Exclusivity and Sales Quota (Sub-Item k.)
Variable Frequencies 1 2
1 Exclusive Territory Yes 37 67.3% Corr. 1.000
~ 18 32.7
2 Sales Quota ~ 15 27.3% Corr. .253 1.000
No 40 72.7
i, i I
5.3.3.1 Discussion
Territorial exclusivity affords a level of assurance that direct competition is not likely to
come from an additional franchised or company-owned outlet of the same concept
within a specified market area. Establishment of a protected geographical area that is
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fair to both franchisees and franchisors is difficult, given rural, metropolitan, and
suburban settings (Spinelli 1994). Territorial encroachment is one of the most
commonly litigated issues between franchisees and franchisors (Vincent 1998).105
Granting an exclusive territory prohibits franchisors from selling additional outlets in a
given market area, which may adversely affect their ability to grow revenues.
Mathewson argued that territorial exclusivity is profitable when franchisee efforts are
critical to a venture's success (Mathewson and Winter 1994).
The results from this sample suggest that a majority of franchisors is wiling to grant
territorial exclusivity without a requirement for franchisees to meet a sales quota.
Although the results are not significant, frequencies suggest that a quid-pro-quo
relationship between a franchisor's grant of an exclusive territory and a franchisee's
requirement to meet a sales quota is not apparent in this sample.
5.3.4 Sub-item 0: Advertising
Success of a branded product or service depends on an ability to effectively market and
advertise it (Aaker and Bie11993) (Bhat and Reddy 1998) (Ha 1998). A majority of
franchises in this sample (74.5%) required franchisees to make payment into an
advertising fund. Two-thirds of the franchises in this sample based their fees on a
percentage of sales or income. In addition to ongoing advertising payments, a minority
of franchises in this sample (23.6%) required franchisees to set aside additional funds to
promote opening of their outlet. More than one third (36.4%) of franchises required
that locally developed advertising be approved by the franchisor, an aspect significantly
105 Vincent defined territorial encroachment as "... when a franchisor approves a new location, whether
company-owned or franchised, which is close enough to an existing location so that the new location
draws away some customers from the existing location, resulting in a reduction of sales for the older
location" (Vincent 1998, p. 30).
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correlated to both mandatory advertising and opening advertising requirements. Table
5.8 presents frequencies and correlations found in sub-item o.
Table 5.8: Advertising Frequencies and Correlations (Sub-item 0.)
Variable Frequencies 1 2 3
1 Mandatory ~ 41 74.5% Corr. 1.000Advertising No 14 25.5
2 Opening ~ 13 23.6% Corr. .129 1.000Advertising No 42 7604
3 Franchisor Approve Yes 20 3604% Corr. .355** .380** 1.000I-Advertising No 35 63.6
, , l "I I
5.3.4.1 Discussion
Large-scale advertising campaigns exert significant influence over consumer product
choices (Bucklin 1971). Franchising relies upon advertising to build brand recognition,
often used by consumers to determine that a seller's prices are justified by the product's
level of quality (Norton). In the D.S. restaurant industry, for example, most brands
spent between 2.5% and 5% of sales on mediaI06 (FFCA 2000). A majority (74.5%) of
franchises in this sample required franchisees to contribute toward a brand's advertising
expenses.
Less than one-fourh (23.6%) of franchises in this sample required that franchisees pay
for grand opening expenses, presumably because franchisor-sponsored advertising has
minimized liability ofnewness typical of 
non-franc hi sed start-up businesses. There
also appears to be appreciable discretion in local marketing, since nearly two-thirds
(63.6%) of franchises do not require franchisor approval for local advertising.
5.3.5 Sub-item q: Owner's Participation/ Management/ Staffing
In the context of agency theory, ownership of a local outlet by 
a franchisee theoretically
reduces problems of shirking (Meese 1996). A prevalence of multiple outlet ownership
106 In 1998, McDonald's spent $570.9 milion in total measured media advertising (FFCA 2000).
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by franchisees was found in previous empirical studies (Kalnins and Lafontaine 1996);
(Kaufmann and Dant 1996), which appears to confict with this theoretical approach.
Systems that support ownership of multiple outlets may be more likely to attract
prospective franchisees with aspirations of growth and increased responsibility.
In this sample, nearly two-thids of franchises (63.6%) required that owners provide on-
site supervision, while nearly half (49.1 %) required both that owners be on-site and
devote full time to operations of their franchised outlet. Although 65.5% of franchises
allowed franchisees to designate a manager, 60% required franchisor approval for a
manager. These findings are summarized in Table 5.9
Table 5.9: Owner's participation, Management and Staffng (sub-item q)
Variable Frequencies 1 2 3 4
1 Owner Required Yes 35 63.6% Con. 1.000-On-Site No 20 3604
2 Owner Must Devote Yes 27 49.1% Con. .742** 1.000Full-Time ~ 28 50.9
3 Owner May Yes 36 65.5% Con. .087 .102 1.000i-Designate Manager No 19 34.5
,
4 Franchisor Must Yes 33 60.0% Con. .000
-.015 .890** 1.000Approve Manager I- 22 40.0No
! I I, i l
5.3.5.1 Discussion
For franchisors, a franchise relationship induces self-direction by owner-manager
franchisees in circumstances where central control would be difficult (Stanworth and
Curran 1999). However, only half (49.1 %) ofthe franchises in this sample required
that owners devote full-time to running their business, while more than one-third
(36.4%) did not require an owner's presence on-site. Owners of franchises who are not
required to devote full-time efforts or to be on-site wil have more opportunities to
engage in other business endeavours than those in other systems.
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An ability to hire and designate a manager is provided in two-thids of the franchises in
this sample. A majority (60%) of franchises requires franchisor approval of an
appointed manager, a provision that may be indicative of higher levels of control by
some franchisors in franchised outlet operations.
5.3.6 Sub-item s: Inspections and Audits
Although some form of quality control by franchisors is required to guard against
claims of trademark abandonment, the extent and manner in which inspections and
audits are conducted may be a measure offranchisor control (Dant and Nasr 1998);
(Kaufmann and Eroglu 1998). Unexpectedly, 21.8% of franchises in this sample had no
specified provision for franchisors to inspect franchised outlets in their UFOC and
franchise agreement. Further, 30.9% of franchises did not specify a quality audit.
Although in a minority (12.7%), a small group of franchisors formally reserved the
right to interview an outlet's customers as a part of their inspection process. Table 5.10
presents a summary of frequencies and correlations among variables related to
inspections and audits.
Table 5.10: Inspections and Audits (sub-item s)
Variable Frequencies 1 2 3
1 Inspect Business . Yes 43 78.2% Corr. 1.000
No 12 21.8
2 Qual ity Audit Yes 38 69.1% Corr. .790** 1.000
No 17 30.9
3 Right to Interview Yes 7 12.7% Corr. .202 .255 1.000Customers No 48 87.3
! i I
, ! l I
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5.3.6.1 Discussion
Random inspections of franchised outlets by franchisors provide assurances that
franchisees follow established procedures and standards (Blair 1995). Knight found
that as franchisees became more experienced, they began to question their franchisor's
standards and policies, as they increasingly believed that success of their outlets was
due to their own efforts (Knight 1986). Arguably, the right to interview a franchisee's
customers provides franchisors may be considered an increment~llevel of monitoring
over routine inspections and quality audits.
5.3.7 Sub-items t and u: Transfer and Renewal
One measure offranchisee autonomy cited by Spinelli was a franchisee's ability to
transfer ownership or to renew their agreement (Spinelli and Birley 1996). A majority
offranchises in this sample (61.8%) based transfer fees on a percentage of franchise
fees in effect at the time of transfer. For those 21 franchises that specified fixed transfer
,fees, amounts ranged from $500 to $7,500 with a mean of$4,119. Terms for renewal
were provided by 52.7% offranchises. Fees ranged between $500 and $15,000, with a
mean renewal fee of$3,647. Findings in this section are summarized in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11: Transfer and Renewal (sub-items t and u)
Variable Frequencies 1 2 3
1 Transfer Allowed Yes 43 78.2% Corr. 1.000
No 12 21.8
2 Fixed Transfer Fee Yes 21 38.2% Corr.
-.038 1.000
No 34 61.8
3 Renewal Tenus Yes 29 52.7% Corr. .382**
-.080 1.000Disclosed No 26 47.3
i i !
, ! !
I i N i Minimum i Maximum Mean Std. Error Std.
DeviationFixed Fee 21 500.00 7500.00 4119.0476 374.6503 1716.8631Amount
Renewal 17 500.00 15000.00 3647.0588 861.187 3552.1327Amount
! I I!
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5.3.7.1 Discussion
Franchisors may exert substantial control over franchisees in aspects other than product
specifications. For example, Ray Kroc, founder of 
Mc Don aId's, refused to grant
additional franchises to his most successful franchisees primarily because they sold
Pepsi Cola as opposed to Coca Cola, contrary to McDonald's policy (Love 1995).
Franchisors retain unilateral rights to grant transfers or renewals ,of franchise
agreements during and at the expiration of their term respectively. The wide range of
fees associated with transfer and renewal indicates that some franchisors may exert
fmancial penalties in this aspect of franchising, perhaps in an effort to influence
franchisee behavior.
Considering financial commitments by franchisees to their outlet(s) and the long term
of most franchise agreements, Emerson concluded that legal issues surrounding
,termination, renewal, and transfer of franchises were among the most controversial in
franchise law (Emerson 1998). A failure to disclose renewal terms, as was found in
nearly half (47.3%) of franchises in this sample, may help explain part ofthis legal
controversy. Spinell concluded, "A franchise prospect should be wary of an agreement
of an agreement that does not address renewal" (Spinelli 1994, p.368).
5.3.8 Sub-item v: Post Termination Obligations
Obligations and restrictions within UFOCs and franchise agreements may extend
beyond an agreement's term (Spinelli Jr. and Bygrave 1995). A substantial majority
(94.5%) of franchises in this sample had non-compete clauses that prohibited
involvement in competing businesses after an agreement's expiration. Periods of 
non-
compete varied between one and five years (mean 2.086; s.d. .138). Five of 
the
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franchises in this sample (9.1%) required that managers and/or employees offranchised
outlets also sign post-termination non-compete contracts. 107
5.3.8.1 Discussion
Non-compete clauses, found in most franchise contracts, make it difficult for
franchisees to put human capital accumulated within a chain to good use upon
termination (p.36) (Lafontaine and Slade 1998). Non-compete clauses potentially
restrict competition, and may deprive individuals an ability to earn a living after
contract termiation. U.S. courts have ruled that non-compete clauses may be enforced
only ifthey are: (1) necessary to protect a legitimate business interest; (2) reasonably
limited to time and territory; (3) not unduly restrictive of the person's ability to earn a
living; (4) reasonable from a public policy standpoint; and (5) supported by valuable
consideration (anonymous 1999). Non-compete clauses may be viewed as an indicator
of franchisor control that extends beyond an agreement's term.
5.3.9 Sub-item x: Dispute Resolution
Disputes within franchising are prevalent, reported in both acadellc literature (Spinell
Jr. and Bygrave 1995) and popular press (Harris and France 1997). Procedures for
dispute resolution are important considerations for all parties in a franchise (Leblebici
and Shalley 1996). Nearly three-quarters of franchises in this sample specified
arbitration, mediation, or either method of dispute resolution in their agreements. Of
those that specified a method of dispute resolution, 78.9% stipulated arbitration, as
indicated in Table 5.12.
107 The five franchises that required managers and/or employees to sign post-tennination non-compete
agreements are: (l) Blimpie; (2) Le Print Express; (3) Pizzaria Regina; (4) Worldsites; and (5)
Medihealth Solutions.
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Table 5.12: Dispute Resolution
Sub-item x. Frequency
Mediation 8 14.5%
Arbitration 30 54.5
Either 3 5.5
None 14 25.5
Total 55 100%
5.3.9.1 Discussion
Ideally, governance structures should give all participants incentives to work together
efficiently, and minimize costs of coordination and dispute resolution (Blair 1995).
There is a trend in the U.S. toward increased litigation between parties engaged in
franchising (Spinelli Jr. and Bygrave 1995), despite a prevalence of mediation and
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements. In addition to a prescribed method of
dispute resolution, franchisors may employ a judicial forum selection clause, which
requires any franchisee litigation to be brought in a franchisor's choice of jurisdiction
(Dunham, Darrin Jr. et al. 1998). Inclusion of forum selection clauses in franchise
agreements is increasing (Zimmerman 1998).
Baucus et al. concluded that franchisors are likely to become involved in fewer disputes
in situations where franchisees have latitude (Baucus, Baucus et al. 1996). More than
one fourth (25.5%) of franchises in this sample had not specified a method of dispute
resolution. There is at this point, however, no indication that those franchises that do
not specify a prescribed dispute resolution method have fewer disputes, or offer greater
latitude to their franchisees.
5.3.10 Item 19: Earnings Claim
As explained in the Methodology Section, disclosure of potential earnings, sales, or
income is voluntary under current D.S. law, but is a recurring topic in policy debates.
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An earnings claim is defined as information". . . from which a specific level or range of
actual or potential sales, costs, income or profit from franchised or non- franchised units
may be easily ascertained" (anonymous 1998). Because of 
long standing debates, it has
been called "the issue that wouldn't die" (Kolton 1999, p. 48). Although the D.S.
Federal Trade Commission estimated that 20% of franchises voluntarily disclosed
earnings, (Wieczorek 1999) only 12.7% of franchises in this sample made earnings
disclosures.
5.3.10.1 Discussion
In Knight's study of 148 franchisors and 105 franchisees, both sides agreed that
government disclosure regulations were required to control "con artists and frauds"
operating within franchising (Knight 1986, p. 14). Bates and Bradford cited one study
of 282 restaurant franchises where 92 percent of them were earning less than profit
projections used by franchisors in their promotional literature (Bates and Bradford
11995). As a voluntary item, earnings claim disclosure may be indicative of a more
forthcoming or better performig franchise, when compared to those who elect not to
provide this information to prospective franchisees.
5.3.11 Correlation of variables
Some variables within sub-items were found to be significantly correlated, such as an
owner on-site requirement and obligations for an owner to devote full-time to operation
ofa franchise in sub-item q, and disclosure of renewal terms and permission to transfer
a franchise agreement in sub-item t. In order to obtain a more complete look at overall
terms of aUFOC and fi:anchise agreement, all variables were entered into a correlation
matrix. A correlation table is presented in Appendix B, Table B5.
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Analysis revealed that several variables in one sub-item were significantly correlated
with variables from other sub-items. For example, a requirement to limit products or
services offered at a franchise outlet to only approved products was significantly
correlated to the granting of exclusive territories (.374), and a right of a franchisor to
approve managers selected by a franchisee (.577). A franchisor's right to approve a
product line was also correlated to a right to inspect a franchised outlet (.368). This
implies that some franchise agreements are more restrictive than others, and that
restrictions found in one sub-item may be indicative that restrictions exist in other sub-
items as welL.
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6.0 FRANCHISING'S FORMAL CONTEXT AND DIFFERENTIAL
PERFORMANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA
6.1 INTRODUCTION
As described in the Introduction Chapter, the overall purpose ofthis study is to explore
entrepreneurial opportunities within franchising's context. Stanworth observed that
franchising's context was comprised of a formal constituent, characterized by
contractual agreements and official documents, and an informal one, in which the day-
to-day operations of business were conducted (Stanworth 1995). Consistent with
Stanworth's approach, this portion of the study builds on the previous section, and
continues an examination of franchising' s formal context.
The previous section began with an exploration and analysis offi:fy-five Uniform
Franchise Offering Circulars (UFO C) and franchise agreements. Widely held
assumptions of uniformity among firms engaged in franchising were not supported in
that analysis, as differences in contractual provisions and organizational complexities
were revealed. To the extent that franchising's formal constituent shapes firm
behaviour, discontinuities and heterogeneity among firms may be surrogates of
potential entrepreneurial opportunities. Further exploration appeared justified.
This section employs contributions from the corporate entrepreneurship literature to test
previously developed hypotheses using secondary data sources.
Figure 6.1: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Firm
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A key goal of this section is to further explore relationships between entrepreneurial
opportunities and firm performance, measured by growth in number of outlets, as
depicted in Figure 6.1.
One approach to explore entrepreneurial opportunities within franchising's context is to
examine characteristics that differentiate growing franchises from others. Growth has
been widely accepted as an indicator of entrepreneurship (Drucker 1985); (Penrose
1968); (Schumpeter 1934). Growth has been associated with entrepreneurship in small
firms (Birley and Westhead 1990); (Carland, Hoy et al. 1984); (Davidsson 1989);
(Storey 1987) as well as in large firms (Covin and Miles 1999); (Kanter 1996); (Slevin
and Covin 1997). Consistent with corporate venturing (Block and MacMilan 1993);
(Guth and Ginsberg 1990), growth among franchising firms is substantially dependent
upon creation of new business units. It follows, then, that growth should also serve as
an indicator of entrepreneurial opportunities within hybrid organization structures, such
as those found in franchising.
Although the Methods Chapter described three datasets used in this portion of the study,
this chapter begins with a brief summary of the FRAD AT A, Entrepreneur Magazine,
and Bond's Source Book Publications datasets. Each dataset provided different
information relevant to this study. FRADATA provided extensive information on
fees, agreement offerings, and other details not found in other datasets, while Source
Book listed each franchise's projected new openings for the next twelve months. In
addition, their survey gathered information from franchisors on the extent and
geographic location of their expansion plans. Widely used by academics and
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practitioners, Entrepreneur Magazine's dataset provides a lin to previous studies of
franchising.
Next, descriptive statistics are presented, including a crosstabs analysis that illustrated
relationships among variables in the three datasets. To begin testing hypotheses
developed in a previous chapter, four measures of franchise growth were
operationalized. Correlation and ANOVA analyses follows, testing hypotheses
developed in the previous chapter. To determine the extent to which variables obtained
from franchising's formal context explain growth, factor analysis and multiple
regression analysis are performed. This chapter concludes with a 
'summary of the
analyses.
6.2 DATASET DESCRIPTION SUMMARIES
Although detailed descriptions of secondary datastrts used in this study are provided in
the Methods Chapter, a brief summary ofFRADATA, Entrepreneur Magazine's
Franchise 500(R 2000 Edition, and Source Book Publications datasets is presented in this
chapter. Piling et al. used multiple datasets in their study of competition among
franchising firms (Pillng, Henson et al. 1995). The authors argued that although testing
hypotheses in separate databases made comparisons of results more difficult, it
"significantly increases the insights provided by the research" (p. 185) In the absence of
a singular, official source of franchise data,108 multiple datasets were employed in this
portion ofthe study.
108 The U.S. Department of 
Commerce ceased publication of its Franchising in the Economy in 1988.
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6.2.1 Dataset Description Summary- FRANDATA
Data used in this portion of the study were collected as a random sample of 592
franchises from FRADATA Corporation's database. I09 FRANDATA maintains an
active customer base of over 2,500 franchise concepts - including each of the 100
largest companies involved in franchising. Jambulingham and Nevin concluded,
"Extensive research indicated that FRADATA's database was the most complete
available" (p. 376) (Jambulingham and Nevin 1999). FRADATA distributed
information through custollzed research reports, and through its four websites:
FranchiseResearch.com, FranchiseRegistry.com, FranchiseDocs.com, and
FranchisePlanet.com. Data for this study were gathered through the
FranchisePlanet.com website, promoted by FRADAT A as the single largest source of
objective data available about the U.S. franchise industry. A copy ofa FRADATA
Snapshots web page, the source of information for this dataset, is included in Appendix
E, Table EL.
6.2.2 Dataset Description Summary- Entrepreneur Magazine Franchise SOOQi
Since 1980, Entrepreneur Magazine has published its Franchise 500(l ranking of
franchises, providing quantifiable and comparative measures of franchise opportunities.
This dataset has been considered as a reliable source of franchise information (Shane
1996). Only franchises who provide Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars (UFOCs)
or Alberta Disclosure documents, and whose responses are verified by the magazine are
109 FRANDATA Corporation is a leading supplier of 
information to and about the franchising industry.
Founded in 1989, FRANDATA developed and maintains a proprietary database, compiled from
independently verified data gathered from individual UFOC documents. According to the company, the
dataset represents the largest private collection of current and archived UFOCs in the
world. FRANDATA has relationships with a variety of regulatory and industry agencies, including the
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), International Franchise Association (IF A), American
Franchisee Association (AF A), and the National Franchise Council (NFC).
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included in Entrepreneur's rankings. An independent accounting firm audits all
financial data provided by franchisors before publication (p. 196). i IO
In its 2001 edition, Entrepreneur Magazine explained that its rankings do not endorse,
advertise, or recommend any particular franchise, but rather serve as "aresearch
tooL.to compare franchise operations" (anonymous 2001, P. 174). According to the
magazine, its Franchise 500(I is "the best and most comprehensive rating of franchises
in the world," using a system "polished and perfected," with a "formula that accurately
identifies today's top franchise opportunities" (p. 174).
In addition to its use by potential franchisees, Entrepreneur's Franchise 500(I dataset
has also been used in academic research. With the demise of the U.S. Department of
Commerce's Franchising in the Economy in 1988, statistical data on franchising has not
been available from official government sources.l1 Castrogiovanni et aL. used
i
Entrepreneur's data to test the representativeness of their sample in a study of
franchisor types (Castrogiovanni, Bennet et aL. 1995). Shane also used this data to
examine survival and growth of new franchisors (Shane 1996). Exit from
Entrepreneur's listing served as his dependent variable in a later study of franchisor
failure (Shane and Foo 1998). Lafontaine and Shaw compared exit from
Entrepreneur's listing to exit from the trade publication "Franchise Anual,"
concluding that exit from Entrepreneur's listing accurately reflected exit from
i 10 Entrepreneur Magazine noted that research for the 2000 Franchise 500QY was compiled by Maria
Anton Conley, Lee Houston, and Liza Dembiec, with assistance from Bowen Park and Megan Reily;
financial analysis was performed by David R. Juedes, CPA (anonymous 2001, P. 175).
III Trade associations, such as the International Franchise Association (IFA) and the American
Franchisee Association (AF A), have also become involved in data collection and dissemination on
fi'anchising.
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franchising (Lafontaine and Shaw 1998). Despite limitations noted by Lafontaine, lI
the Entrepreneur Franchise 500Q! is considered a reliable source of quantitative
information on franchising (Shane 1996).
6.2.3 Dataset Description Summary- Source Book Publications
Data for this portion of the study were also gathered from Source Book Publications of
Oak Brook, California, publisher of Bond's Franchise Guide. m 'In their comparison of
three sources of franchise data, Mehta et aL. concluded that Source Book Publication's
Bond's Franchise Guide was a reliable source of information for studies of franchising
(Mehta, Luza et aL. 1999). The publisher conducted a survey of franchisors for its
Guide, and published individual responses on their website, at
li:í/www.worldfi.anchisIng.com. Source Book's survey collected data in broad
categories, as described in Table 6.1:
Table 6.1: Categories of Data in S(jurce Book Dataset
Franchisor Background Age, Experience, Total number of 
units, 
Number of projected new units
Financial Requirements Average investment costs, Fees
Contract Provisions Area development, Passive ownership,
Sub
Franchisor Support Financial Assistance, Training
Expansion Plans Expansion intentions in U.S., Canadian,
and overseas markets
A copy of Source Book's questionnaire used in their survey is included in Appendix F.
i 12 LafontaIne noted that although the Entrepreneur Magazine dataset provided "the most detailed
longitudinal data set on individual fianchisors," (p. 15) based on a comparison with the U.S. Department
of Commerce's Franchising in the Economy survey, Entrepreneur's data set was not representative of 
the
population of firms engaged in franchising (Lafontaine 1995).II The data, questionnaire, and other information is available at http:hvww.worldfJ'anchisinl!.com .
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6.3 DIFFERENCES AMONG THREE FRANCHISE DATA SOURCES
This section provides descriptive analyses for FRANDAT A, Entrepreneur Magazine,
and Source Book Publications datasets, followed by an ANOVA comparison ofthese
widely used sources of franchise data. In addition to basic information such as size,
fees, and number of years in operation, each source of data gathered different facts from
franchising companies relevant to this study. For example, FRADATA collected the
number of different programs and business types offered by franchisors. Entrepreneur
Magazine's dataset contained larger, more mature systems, and served as a basis of
comparison with previous studies offranchising. Source Book's dataset, derived from
the publisher's survey of franchisors, not only provided historic measures of growth,
but also revealed the number of new outlets projected in the upcoming twelve months
and geographic focus of each franchisor's growth strategy. Collectively, these datasets
revealed intricacies and complexities among firms engaged in franchising greater than
those often presented in the literature.
6.3.1 Descriptive Analysis: FRANDATA
In aggregate, firms in FRADATA's sample represented 157,518 franchised and
28,771 company-owned outlets, averaging 266.08 franchised and 48.6 company-owned
outlets per firm. i 14 Subway, the largest firm in the sample, had 11,541 franchised
outlets, while Radio Shack had the largest number of company-owned stores with 5,014
outlets. Only 36.3 percent of firms in this sample used franchised outlets exclusively in
114 As presented in Section 3.3.3 and depicted in Figure 3.3, some firms engaged in franchising
simultaneously operate a number of outlets using corporate managers. Company-owned outlets may be
used for test marketing of new products or services and/or training. A franchisor may assume temporary
ownership of an outlet in cases of franchise default or termination, or it may be a permanent part of a
company's strategy and financial asset base. Since there was no practical method of differentiating
among strategies, and because company-owned outlets contribute to economies of scale and scope in
similar fashion to franchised outlets, they were included in measures of franchise system size.
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their organizations, while a majority of firms (63.7%) simultaneously employed
combinations of franchised and company-owned outlets, using a "plural" form of
organization (Bradach 1997).
On average, firms in this sample had been in business for 21.36 years, had 5.92 years of
business experience before they began to offer franchises, and had been franchising for
more than 15 years. IIS There were also firms without franchising experience in this
sample, as 35 firms (5.9%) currently offered franchises to prospective franchisees, but
had not yet reported opening of their first franchised outlet.1I6 Exclusive territorial
rights were granted by 78.5 percent of the franchises in this sample, while 280 (47.3%)
offered financial assistance to franchisees. The majority of franchises in this sample
(70.3%) did not offer agreements that covered purchase of multiple outlets, and a
similar number (70.4%) did not offer area development agreements. Average franchise
fees for firms in this sample ranged between $21,598 and $27,141.
1
Contractual obligations associated with a franchise purchase varied among firms in this
sample. Franchise agreements in this sample had an average term of 10.8 years.
Analysis of the 1,969 franchises in FRADATA's database revealed that although a
large percentage had 10- year contract terms, more than half of these franchises had
terms covering shorter or longer periods of time, as presented in Table 6.2.
ll5 Based on year of incorporation, the five oldest franchises in this sample averaged 87.8 years in
business before they began franchising.
116 FRANDATA and other sources of secondary data utilize UFOC documents as their source of data.
Only updated annually, there is likely to be a substantial delay between the opening of an outlet and its
inclusion in a UFOC. Finns offering franchises were included in this dataset.
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N/A 34 1.73%0-4 90 4.57%5-9 474 24.07%10 937 47.59%11-15 141 7.16%16-20 266 13.51%
::20 27 1.7%TOTAL 1969 100.00%
Source: FRANDATA, obtained at http://w\-vv,i.FranchisePlanet.col1 .
In addition to franchise agreements and UFO Cs, franchisors in this sample required
prospective franchisees to sign an average of3.23 agreements as conditions of their
purchase. II7 BAB Systems, Inc., for example, required prospective franchisees to sign
17 separate agreements in order to purchase one of their Big Apple Bagels franchises,
including a BAB Operations Supply Agreement, a Fixed Price Purchase Option, a
Master Lease Agreement, and a Security Agreement.
Although in a minority, 15.2 percent offranchisors in this sample offered other
programs through which potential franchisees could become a part of their system, in
addition to their original concept. Baskin Robbins, for example, offered a separate
institutional program for schools and universities in addition to its original ice cream
store franchise. Institutional program :fianchisees operate smaller facilities and have
lower start-up costs than standard concept franchisees. CKE Enterprises, a fast-food
restaurant chain, offered Carl's Jr./ Hardee's dual-concept franchises, as well as Cad's
Jr./ Green BUllito franchise programs. These dual concept franchises are evident in the
117 Dollar Rent-a-Car, International House of 
Pancakes, Jiff Lube, and Sterling Vision each required as
many as 1 i agreements, while Howard Johnson's and Carvel each required 10 agreements to be signed as
conditions of purchase.
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co-branded outlets as described in Section 3.3.4. Distribution of other programs offered
by firms engaged in franchising is presented in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: FRANDATA-Number of Other Programs to Become Franchisee
Valid o
1
2
3
4
7
Total
Frequency
502
65
15
4
2
4
592
Percent
84.8
11.0
2.5
.7
.3
.7
100.0
Valid Percent
84.8
11.0
2.5
.7
.3
'.7
100.0
Cum. Percent
84.8
95.8
98.3
99.0
99.3
100.0
In addition to other programs, some franchises offered additional business types as
vehicles for prospective franchisees to enter their franchising system. Dunkin Donuts,
for example, offered a Combo Store business, a Conversion Program, and a
Cooperative Production Program in addition to their basic type of donut shop franchise.
Each franchise is offered under a separate franchise agreement. The distribution of
firms offering different business types is presented'in Table 6.3 below.
i
Table 6.3: FRANDAT A- Number of Additional Business types
Valid o
1
2
3
Total
Frequency
487
90
13
2
592
Percent
82.3
15.2
2.2
.3
100.0
Valid Percent
82.3
15.2
2.2
.3
100.0
Cum Percent
82.3
97.5
99.7
100.0
Although a majority of franchises in this sample offered only their core franchise, a
sizable minority (17.7 percent) offered additional business types, each under different
franchise agreements, with potentially different terms, conditions, and fees.
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Appendix B, Table B6 presents means and standard deviations for continuous variables,
and frequencies and percentages for dichotomous and categorical variables from this
FRADATA sample dataset.
6.3.2 Descriptive Analysis: Entrepreneur Magazine
The Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500(8 sample included 598 ranked and
unranked franchises. In aggregate, the sample represented firms' with 335,871 total
outlets: 289,287 franchised and 46,584 company-owned outlets. With 24,256
franchised outlets, Kumon Math and Reading Centers represented the largest franchise
in this sample. On average, firms in this sample had been in existence for 23.42 years,
had been franchising for more than 16 years, and had operated for more than seven
years before begining to franchise. Dividing the number of franchised outlets by the
total number of outlets in each franchise, a percentage of units franchised was
calculated. In aggregate, firms in this sample increased the percentage of total units
franchised from 87.47 percent in 1997, to 88.31 percent in 1998, to 88.88 in 1999.
Because franchise fees may vary with different programs or business types,
Entrepreneur's dataset presented franchise fees as a high and low average. i 18 Franchise
fees in this sample, ranged from an average low of$20,550 to an average high of
$26,070. Average start-up costs, which includes franchise fees ranged from $258,920
to $532,210. Of the 597franchises in this sample, 404 franchises (67.6%) included
some form offmancial assistance 
to prospective franchisees. A summary of the
lIS Franchise fees may differ among fi'anchises offered by the same franchisor. For example, fees may be
based on factors such as population or number of households in a franchisee's specific territory.
Franchisors may also charge different fees for area director franchises or those that involve other
programs or business types, as described in the previous section.
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descriptive statistics from Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500lI dataset is presented
in Table 6.4.
Table 604: Descriptive Statistics Entrepreneur Magazine Dataset Variables
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Freq. I Percent.
AGE 3 135 23042 16.29
EXP 3 75 16.10 10.94
OPB4F 0 129 7.32 12.60
F97 1 19720 418.69 1481.83
F98 1 19667 445.30 1538.91
F99 1 24256 483.76 1747.14
C97 0 5433 75.13 457.16
C98 0 5223 76.30 452.72
C99 0 5729 77.90 457.84
PERF97
.69 100.00 87047 20.3 1
PERF98
.88 100.00 88.31 19.26
PERF99
.90 100.00 88.88 18.28
FEEL"
.00 89.50 20.55 11.48
FEEH" .00 200.00 26.07 17.08
STARTLOa 1.00 30000.00 258.92 1556044
STARTHIa 1.80 45000.00 532.21 2692.92
FIN No=O 193 I 32.3Yes=l 404 167.6a In thousands ofU.S. dollars; Valid N=572
Descriptive statistics and correlations for Entrepreneur Magazine's dataset are provided
in Table B18 of Appendix B.
6.3.3 Descriptive Analysis: Source Book Publications
Source Book Publications provided information on 1,201 North American franchises
through their http://v\,'Vvw.l1Jorld(ianchising.comwebsite.This sample was comprised of
1,026 franchises (85.4%) headquartered in the United States, and 175 Canadian-based
franchises. In aggregate, franchised outlets in the U.S. accounted for 254,778 ofthe
total (71.5%), while 32,448 outlets were located in Canada (9.1%), and 68,981 (19.4%)
were international outlets. Table 6.5 depicts geographic distribution of outlets among
firms in this sample.
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Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics Source Book Publications Dataset Variables
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Percent.NUUSa 0 12627 212.14 749.19
NUMCAb 0 3555 27.04 139.19NUMa 0 12836 57044 567048
SIZEb 1 26588 303.95 1265.53
NFRAa 0 20531 260.85 1068.51
NCOMa 0 6057 43.10 300.77
HQa Canada 175 14.6%
U.S. 1026 8504%aN= 1201; "N= 1202
NUUS= Number ofU.S. outlets SIZE= Total number of outlets
NUCA= Number of Canadian outlets NFRA= Number offranchised outlets
NUIN= Number of international outlets NCOM= Number of company-owned outlets
HQ= Location of headquarters 
On average, franchises in this sample had 303.95 total outlets, 260.85 outlets franchised
(81.54 percent) and 43.1 company-owned outlets. Averagè age offranchisors, as
measured by the date a firm was established, was 23.13 years, while the number of
years since firms began franchising averaged 15.37 years. The average term of
franchise agreements in this sample was 10.88 years.
In pecuniary terms, franchises in this sample charged franchise fees that averaged
$21,900, and required a low and high mean initial investment of between $242,210 and
$500,130 respectively. Of those franchises that charged royalties based on a percentage
of sales, the average royalty was 5.38 percent. Nearly half of the franchises in this
sample (46.1 %) provided indirect financing support for prospective franchisees, while
almost one-thid (30.2%) offered franchisees no financial assistance.1I Earnings
claims information, voluntary under current D.S. Federal Trade Commission guidelines,
were provided by 26.3 percent of respondents in this sample, consistent with the ratio
119 A small minority (1.7%) offered both direct and indirect financial assistance.
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revealed in Price's study (Price 2000), but higher than a 20 percent estimate provided
by the D.S. Federal Trade Commission (Government 1997).
Also revealed though this survey were organizational differences among franchisors.
Passive ownership, where a franchise owner need not be an active participant in daily
operations of an outlet, were prohibited by only 25.1 percent of franchises in this
sample. A majority of franchises in this sample allowed or discouraged passive
ownership of their franchised outlets. Area development agreements were offered by
more than half of the franchises (51.8%), introducing a layer of supervision and support
between owners of franchised outlets and their franchisor.
While a majority of franchises prohibited their franchisees from sub- franchising, 22.1
percent offranchises permitted this practice within a franchisee's designated area. A
majority of franchises in this sample (83.1 %) pernitted expansion by existing
franchisees within their territory. 120 Although franchisors in this sample projected to
open an average of33.2 outlets in the upcoming 12 months, a high standard deviation
(96.88) indicated that projected growth was not uniformly distributed among franchises.
Descriptive statistics for Source Book Publication's dataset are summarized Appendix
B, Table B7. Complete descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table B 19
of Appendix B.
120 Collectively measuring subfranchising and area development Kaufinann and Kim found that 57
percent of the franchises in their sample engaged in these practices (Kaufinann and Kim 1995).
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6.3.4 Comparison of Datasets
As described in the Introduction section of this chapter, each dataset provided different
information relevant to this study. FRADATA provided extensive information on
fees, agreement offerings, and details not found in other datasets. Entrepreneur
Magazine's data had served as a basis of comparison in previous studies of franchising,
and Source Book Publications gathered anticipated growth information, listing
projected new openings and geographic expansion strategies.
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Before proceeding with theoretical development and hypothesis testing, the three
datasets used in this study were compared using ANOVA to determne if they could be
used independently. None ofthe datasets used in this study were posited as
representative of the population of franchises. This comparison was conducted to see
if findings developed in one of the datasets could be generalized to the other.
Therefore, a logical first step would be to examine the level of relative similarity among
the datasets (Trochim 2001).
The three datasets were compared using one-way ANOV A, based on five common
variables: total number of units (SIZE), number of years since incorporation (AGE),
average franchise fee (FEE), number offranchised outlets (#Franch), and number of
company-owned outlets (#Comp.). Table 6.6 below summarizes the findings.
Table 6.6: ANOV A Comparison of Three Datasets
Descriptives 95% Confidence
Interva~ for MeanDataset N Mean Std Dev Lower Upper
Homogeneity ANOV A
Of Variance
Sig Levene F Sig,Size 1 583 262043 675.62 207047 317.38
2 588 432.80 1225.31 333.56 532.05
3 1192 294.59 716.12 201.45 282.84
Total 2363 294.59 866.36 259.64 329.54 .000 18.179 10.146 .000Age 1 583 20.90 14.83 19.69 22.10
2 588 22.94 15.15 21.72 24.17
3 1192 22.69 15.18 21.83 23.55
Total 2363 22.31 15.10 21.70 22.92
.986 .014 30456 .032Fee 1 583 23560.69 11785.91 22601.99 24519.38
2 567 23213.87 11908.64 2223 1.56 24196.18
3 1102 21879.61 11938.93 21173.94 22585.28
Total 2252 22650.74 11911.20 22158.53 23142.96 .986 .014 4.659 .010#Franch. 1 583 217042 541.64 173.36 261.47
2 588 369.38 1039049 285.19 453.57
3 1191 209.24 622.22 173.87 244.61
Total 2362 251.2 735.35 221.45 280.79 .000 17.095 10.227 .000#Comp. 1 583 45.01 269040 23.09 66.93
2 588 63042 382.67 32043 94042
3 1191 32.85 217.21 20.50 45.20
Total 2362 43046 279.70 32.18 54.75 .001 70436 2.366 .094Dataset 1 = FRANDATA; Dataset 2= Entrepreneur Magazine; Dataset 3= Source Book Publications
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Levene's homogeneity of variance test revealed that equal variance assumptions could
not be made for size, number of franchises, and number of company-owned outlets.
Post hoc tests using Tamhane and Dunnett T3 multiple comparisons revealed that the
FRADATA and Source Book datasets did not differ in terms of size and number of
franchises. Although assumptions of equality in the number of company-owned outlets
could not be rejected, ANOV A analysis revealed differences among the three datasets.
This fmding is inconsistent with Mehta et aI., who found no significant differences
among variables between the Entrepreneur magazine and Source Book datasets in a
similar analysis (Mehta, Luza et aI. 1999). The implications of this fmding suggest that
generalizability ofthe fmdings using any given dataset are restricted to firms in that
sample.
6.3.5 Crosstabs Analysis of Contractual Provisions and Franchise Characteristics
Franchise agreements have been viewed as long-term relational contracts, with an
average term often years (Leblebici and Shalley 1996). Comparatively little is known
about these agreements and their relationship with firm characteristics or strategy,
despite their focal position in franchising. For example, longer-term agreements
potentially reduce franchisor income derived from renewal fees, although they
potentially add stability to a system by reducing franchisee turnover. Contractual terms
may also affect an ability to attract potential franchisees. Franchisees who choose
franchising as a lifestyle may be more attracted to franchises with longer-term
agreements. Younger, less-proven concepts may be compelled to offer shorter
agreements, while larger, more mature franchises may be able to command longer
terms, based on their market presence.
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Examination of 55 UFOC and franchise agreements conducted earlier in this study
revealed substantive differences in franchise agreement provisions. Contractual
provisions may serve as indicators of firm behaviour within franchising's context,
facilitating comparisons among firms. Comparative studies of firm behaviour formed a
basis for development of corporate entrepreneurship theory (Stevenson and Jarillo
1990). This section examines relationships between contract provisions and
characteristics of franchising firms. Relationships between these variables and
comparative growth among franchising firms follows.
To explore relationships between contractual provisions and franchise characteristics,
variables from FRAD AT A's dataset were operationalized as binary and ordinal
variables.
¡Table 6.7: Franchise Contractual Provisions and Characteristics (FRANDATA)
Provision Description Variable
DEV Development agreement offered binary
MULTI . Multi-unit agreement offered binary
EXCL Exclusive territory offered binary
NUM Number of agreements ordinal
TERM Agreement term ordinal
FIN Financing offered ordinal
BIZTYlE Number of business tyes offered ordinal
OTHER Number of other programs offered ordinal
Characteristic
YBF Years in operation before franchising ordinal
NFRA Number of franchised outlets ordinal
NCOM Number of company-owned outlets ordinal
FEEL Low average franchise fee ordinal
FEEH High average franchise fee ordinal
AGE Number of years since incorporation ordinal
EXP Number of years franchising ordinal
SIZE Number of outlets in system ordinal
PERF Percentage of total outlets franchised ordinal
CAGR Compound average growth rate , ordinal
This dataset provided several measure of franchise contractual provisions, including
term of an agreement, a provision for territorial exclusivity, and the number of
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agreements franchisees are required to sign as a condition of purchase. 12l Variables
were operationalized as depicted in Table 6.7.
Crosstabs analysis was performed using SPSS v10 for Windows. Significance level of
.05 was adopted, based on an asymptotic distribution assumption. Chi-square,
correlations, and Kendall's tau-b statistics were calculated. Tau-b was chosen as a
measure of nonparametric association, and served as an indicator of strength and
direction for the variables, taking ties into account. Table 6.8 presents significant
relationships revealed in this crosstabs analysis.
Table 6.8: Significant Relationships Between Contractual Provisions and Franchise Characteristics: FRADAT A
Contractual Provisions
DEV MULTI EXCL NUM TERM FIN BIZTYPE OTHERFranchise YBF
.017Characteristics NFRA
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000NCOM
.000
.000 .004
FEEL
.000 .018
.003 .003
FEEH
.010
.002 .003
.032AGE
.010
.000 .000 .000 .000
.000EXP
.029 .014 '.001 .000 .000 .001 .000SIZE
.004 .000 ' .000 .012 .000 .000 .000PERFRA
.000
.004
CAGR
! l l .012 ! i I
Chi-Square tests revealed several significant relationships between contractual
provisions and franchise characteristics. Only the term of a franchise agreement,
operationalized as an ordinal variable "TERM," was found to have a significant (.045)
although weak and negative (tau-b of -.077) relationship with franchise growth, as
measured by CAGR. TERM was also significantly associated with larger, more mature
franchise systems, and with those charging higher franchise fees. A complete crosstabs
analysis of this dataset is presented in Table B8 of Appendix B.
121 In addition to a franchise agreement, some franchisors require prospective franchisees to sign
additional agreements as a condition of franchise purchase. Some fì'anchises also offer other business
tyes and other programs as a means to become franchisees in their system.
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Selected contractual provisions were also contained in Source Book Publication's
dataset. Similar to FRADATA, franchisor financial assistance, area development
agreements, and term of franchise agreements were disclosed. Different contractual
provisions, such as permission to sub-franchise, passive ownership, franchise expansion
in territory, and voluntary disclosure of earnings claims were also provided in this
dataset. Source Book's dataset supplied several measures of franchise growth,
including number of projected new openings anticipated in the next twelve months and
geographic areas targeted for expansion. In siuular fashion to the previous analysis of
FRADATA's dataset, categorical variables were operationalized to enable a crosstabs
analysis. These variables are presented in Table 6.9 below.
Table 6.9: Franchise Contractual Provisions and Characteristics (Source Book)
Provision Description Variable
DEV Development agreement offered binary
SUB Sub- franchising permitted binary
PASS Passive Ownership pennitted binary
EXT Expansion in territory permitted binary
FIN Financing offered binary
EC Earnings claim provided binary
TERM Tenn of agreement ordinal
HQ US or Canadian headquarters binary
Characteristic
YBF Years in operation before franchising ordinal
NFRA Number of franchised outlets ordinal
NCOM Number of company-owned outlets ordinal
FFEE Average franchise fee ordinal
AGE Number of years since incorporation ordinal
ILOW Low average initial investment ordinal
IHIGH High average initial investment ordinal
EXP Experience in franchising ordinal
SIZE Number of total outlets ordinal
PERF Percentage of total outlets franchised ordinal
GROWTH Percentage growth projected ordinal
CAGR Compound average growth rate ordinal
PNU Projected new outlet openings ordinal
EXPUS Expansion plans for US market ordinal
EXPCAN Expansion plans for Canadian market ordinal
EXPINT Expansion plans for overseas markets! ordinal
Crosstabs analysis of this dataset using Tau-b measures of association revealed the
existence of similar relationships between contractual provisions and franchise firm
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characteristics as those found in FRADATA's dataset. Chi-Square analysis revealed
significant relationships existed between contractual provisions and characteristics of
firms in this dataset, as evident in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: Significant Relationships Between Contractual Provisions and Franchise Characteristics: Source Book
Contractual Provisions
DEV SUB PASS EXT FIN EC TERM HQFranchise YBF
.006Characteristics NFRA
.000
.000NCOM
.000
.007 .000
.000
FFEE .002 .002
.002
.000 .000AGE
.024
.000
ILOW .000 .015
.001 .000
.000 .000IHIGH .000
.004 .001
.000
EXP
.017 .027
.000 .000SIZE
.008 .032 .000
PERF .000 .001
.000 .029 .004 .019GROWTH
.031
.006
.000 .000CAGR
.002
.007
PNU
.003
.017
.000
.000EXPUS
.000 .047 .000
.000EXPCAN
.000
.005
.010 .000EXPINT .000 .000
.005 i
! .002 I I I, r I
Although the chi-square analysis indicated that relationships existed among variables,
correlation analysis was used to determine the strength and direction of those
relationships. Financing provisions were associated with larger firms, both in terms of
number of franchised outlets (NFRA= .100) and total number of outlets (SIZE= .073).
A negative relationship between franchise agreement term and CAGR (-.067) was also
consistent with that found in the FRADATA dataset. Significant associations
between TERM and NFRA (.096), NCOM (.145), AGE (.180), EXP (.173), and SIZE
(.113) were comparable to relationships revealed in the FRANDATA analysis.
Development agreement provisions were positively associated with number of
company-owned outlets. Significant relationships between DEV and NCOM (.129) and
PERF (- .111) were revealed, consistent with the FRAND AT A sample. A complete
crosstabs table from Source Book's dataset is presented in Appendix B, Table B9.
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This analysis of Source Book's dataset revealed relationships inconsistent with those
found in the previous analysis using FRADATA's dataset. For example, significant
associations between a provision to provide financing and the age and experience of a
firm were revealed in the FRADATA dataset. These relationships were not evident in
Source Book's dataset. In addition to an ANOVA comparison performed in section
6.3.4, this section provided further evidence of differences among secondary datasets
used in studies of franchising.
6.4 FRANCHISE GROWTH
Franchising's aggregate growth rates have been a topic of debate among academics and
practitioners (c.f. (anonymous 1999); (Lafontaine and Shaw 1998); (Stanworth, Purdy
et aL. 1997)). Franchising has been considered a powerful means to effect growth
(Birley, Leleux et aL. 1997), enabling firms to grow at a faster rate than through
exclusive use of internal resources. Franchising firms grow by a combination of: (l)
increasing same store turnover; and/or (2) opening additional outlets. Bradach
concluded that firms engaged in franchising rely heavily on adding new units, because
it is difficult to stimulate sales in existing units (Bradach 1998). Hoffman argued that
franchising represented the only business strategy in which the creation of new business
units is central to its llssion (Hoffman and Preble 1993).
Growth, as measured by a change in the number of outlets, has also been found to be a
key factor in the survival of firms engaged in franchising. Shane studied the 1983
cohort of new franchisors in the D.S., and found that fewer than one quarter were stil
franchising ten years later (Shane 1995). His work revealed "surviving new franchisors
have continuous growth in franchised outlets over the first ten years of system life"
(p.19). Growth in new outlets was one measure used to determine the value of a
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franchise122 (Baucus, Baucus et aL. 1993), and was used as a dependent variable in
Kaufmann and Kim's study of franchise system growth rates (Kaufmann and Kim
1995).
Although new unit development is important, it presents only a partial view of overall
growth among firms in franchising. For example, a study of restaurant chains, an
industry with a substantial franchise population, ilustrated comparative contributions of
same store sales and new unit development. Table 6.11 describes historic sources of
growth by the 100 largest U.S. restaurant chains. It illustrates the importance of new
unit development to overall growth in this industry, but also shows that its contribution
I h. . 123to tota growt vanes over time.
Table 6.11: Top 100 U.S. Restaurant Chains-Sources of Growth
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Avg. Unit Sales Increase 2.9% 0.7% 0.8% 1.% 3.2%New Unit Development 2.6% 4.5% 4.1% 3.3% 2.2%Total Growth 5.5% 5.2~ 4.9% 4.6% 504%Source: 2000 Chain Restaurant Industry Review & Outlook, Franchise Finance Corporation of America,
p. 23 (FFCA 2000).
Table 6.10 ilustrates that new unit development was responsible for 40 percent of
restaurant chains' total growth in 1999, down from 71.7 percent in 1998 and 83.8
percent in 1997 . Availability of data limited measures of growth in this study to
changes in the number of units.
122 Baucus et al. considered the age ofthe franchise, the market representation, and the growth oftotal
retail outlets compared to the investment made by the franchisee in base fees and royalties to detennine
the value of the franchise.
12 An example of 
relationships between number offranchised and company-owned outlets and sales
turnover is provided in Brinker International's annual report. A copy ofa relevant page from their report
is found in Appendix 1, Figure 3.
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To examine franchise growth in this study, four measures were used, reflecting different
aspects of the phenomenon. First, franchise growth in number of outlets using
compound annual growth rate was calculated. Next, franchise growth as measured by
the number of new outlets projected to be opened in the next twelve months was
measured. Next, franchise growth expressed as a percentage increase in the number of
exiting outlets was calculated. Finally, franchise growth strategy was operationalized.
Each is discussed in the following sections.
6.4.1 Franchise Growth: Compound Average Growth Rate
Kaufmann and Kim studied the effects of master franchising on system growth rates
using compound average growth rate (CAGR) (Kaufmann and Kim 1995). This
measure considers the average increase in number of outlets since the firm began
. 124operations.
Exallning firms that had been in existence for five or more years, CAGR was
calculated for franchises in the three datasets. The 1,169 franchises in Source Book
Publications dataset had a mean CAGR of26.82 percent, those in Entrepreneur
magazine's dataset averaged 32.94 percent, while FRADATA's sample yielded a
mean of31.09 percent growth. Results of this comparison are presented in Table 6.12
below.
Table 6.12: Comparison ofCAGR in Thee Datasets
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Source Book 1169 0.00 1.93 .2682 .2139
Entrepreneur 591 0.00 1.98 .3294 .2442
FRANDATA 569 0.00 2.27 .3109 .2423
, !
124 Kaufinann and Kiin calculated CAGR= (current number of outlets) 1/n -1; where n= age of the system
in years. The authors noted that CAGR is unstable for new systems, where n is very small (p. 58)
(Kaufinann and Kim 1995).
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Consistent with Lafontaine' s fmding (Lafontaine 1995), firms in Entrepreneur
magazine's dataset represented more mature franchises. Of the 598 firms in the dataset,
591 (98.8 percent) had been in operation for five or more years. Firms in Entrepreneur
magazine's dataset also had a 6.1 percent higher average CAGR than those included in
Source Book Publication's dataset. The magazine's dataset provided a longitudinal
look at firms, providing data on number of franchised and company-owned outlets for
the previous three-year period. In aggregate, firms in this sample increased their
average number offranchised and company-owned outlets by 5.6 percent and 7.7
percent in the 1997-98 and 1998-99 periods respectively, as presented in Table 6.13:
Table 6.13: Mean ofFranchised and Company-Owned Outlets &
Change in Mean of Outlets Among Firms in 2000 Franchise 500cI
1997 Avg. 1998 Avg. '97 to '98 1999 Avg. '98 to '99
Outlets Outlets Change Outlets Change
Franchised 418.69 445.30 604% 483.76 8.6%
Company-Owned 75.13 76.30 1.6% 77.90 2.1%
Total 493.82 521.60 5.6% i 561.66 I 7.7%!
6.4.2 Franchise Growth in Projected New Units
Of the three datasets used in this study, only Source Book Publications captured the
number of projected openings expected for each franchise. A required disclosure in
UFOCs, projected new openings may be a reliable measure of growth. 125 In aggregate
terms, respondents to Source Book's survey stated that they intended to add 37,380 new
outlets to their systems in the upcoming year. Franchises expected to open an average
of33.2 outlets, with a standard deviation of96.88.12 Sixteen franchises in the sample
had projected new openings in excess of 300 outlets; Coverall projected an additional
1,782 openings, while Jani-King expected to add 1,500 outlets in the upcomig year.
125 In the U.S., franchisors are required to offcially disclose the number of 
projected new openings
expected in the upcoming 12 months in Item 20 of the UFOC.126 N= i 126, Minimum= 0; Maximum = i 782.
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Subway and Peyron Tax Service each planned to add another 1,000 outlets to their
systems.
6.4.3 Franchise Growth Rate
Using the number of projected new openings and the existing number of outlets in each
franchise, a ratio of growth was calculated for each franchise. Franchises in this sample
had an aggregate installed base of 3 65,046 units. 127 Given a projected 37,380 new
units, franchisors projected an anual increase of 10.23 percent in the number of
franchised and company-owned outlets.
In similar fashion, projected growth rates were calculated for each franchise. When
calculated for individual firms, a mean growth rate was 58.57 percent was revealed,
although a high standard deviation (132.48) indicated wide dispersion of growth rates
among firms in this sample. Sixteen franchises thåt projected to add in excess of300
units each were removed from the sample, yielding a mean and standard deviation in
the number of projected new openings of 24.17 and 34.94 respectively for the 1110
remaining firms. Average growth percentage, recalculated for remaining firms, was
virually unchanged from the original sample at 58.87 percent.
Collectively, franchisors in this sample appeared optimistic in the number of outlets
they projected to open in the next year, especially when compared to their historic
growth rates. Excluding firms in existence for less than five years, historic growth as
measured by CAGR had a mean value of26.82 percent. Those firms would have to
127 Notable among those franchises that did not respond to this question was McDonald's, with 26,588
total units.
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attain an average 50.01 percent growth rate to achieve the number of 
new openings
projected.
To determie relationships between CAGR, number of projected new outlet openings,
and growth rates, a correlation analysis was performed on franchises in the Source
Book Sample. The results are presented in Table 6.14.
Table 6.14: Correlation of Measures of Growth
CAGR PNU GROWTH%
CAGR 1.0
PNU
.315** 1.0
GROWTH% .033 .074** 1.0
A weak and statistically insignificant relationship between past growth rates, as
measured by CAGR, and projected growth rates of franchises in this sample suggests
that past growth rates may be less than reliable indicators of projected future growth.
6.4.4 Franchise Growth: Strategy
Franchising's growth has been studied on a macro level by academics (e.g., (Lafontaine
and Shaw 1998) and practitioners (anonymous 1998). Growth has been considered
central to franchising's mission (Hoffman and Preble 1993), and a key factor for
survival for firms engaged in franchising (Shane 1995). Little is known, however,
about similarities and differences in growth strategies among franchising firms.
In this portion of the study, expansion plans of North American franchisors in Source
Book Publication's dataset are examined. Geographic expansion focused on three
areas: (1) United States; (2) Canada; and (3) Overseas. To determine the extent of
expansion within each area, franchisors were asked: (1) In which regions of the U.S. are
you actively seeking new fianchisees; (2) Are you actively seeking franchisees in
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Canada, and if so, which Provinces; and (3) Are you actively seeking franchisees
overseas, and if so, in which countries.
To reduce the number of variables to a manageable number, I coded individual
responses into ordinal variables, with categories for no expansion, limited expansion,
and unlimited expansion in each of three respective geographic areas. 128 Table 6.15
depicts the comparative extent and geographic focus of planned expansion.
No Expansion
Limited Expansion
Unlimited Expansion
Missing
Total
N= 1,202
Table 6.15: Franchisor Expansion Plans
U.S. Canada Overseas
6.2% 39.9% 56.6%
27.0% 8.3% 16.1%
64.0% 48.5% 25.0%
2.7% 3.3% 3.9%
100% 100% 100%
As displayed in Table 6.14, franchisors in this sample indicated a strong preference for
V.S. expansion, with 91 percent of respondents indícating plans to expand on a liuuted
,
or unlimited basis in this market. By comparison, less than half ( 41.1 percent) planned
expansion in overseas markets. This finding conflicts with Shane's earlier study, which
found more than 70 percent ofV.S. franchises planned overseas expansion (Shane
1996).
Source Book's dataset was comprised of both Canadian and V.S.-based franchise
systems. ANOV A analysis of age, size, and experience failed to produce significant
differences between V.S.- and Canadian-based franchises. To control for possible
differences in expansion plans, projected new openigs were compared using an
128 Those franchises who indicated an intent to expand were asked whether the expansion was directed
toward a specific region or to all regions within the area. The responses were operationalized into a scale
where 0= no expansion, 1= regional expansion, and 3= expansion to all regions within the area.
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independent samples T-Test. The results, presented below in Table 6.16, indicate
significant differences between D.S. and Canadian franchisors in terms ofthe number
of outlets they project to open in the upcoming twelve months.
Table 6.16: ANOVA Comparison ofU.S. and Canadian Franchises Projected New Outlets
N Mean Std. Dev. F Sig.
Canadian 166 19048 52.08
US. 960 35.57 102049 3.916 i .048, i
In addition to the number of projected new outlets, D.S. and Canadian-based franchises
differed in the extent and geographic focus of their expansion plans in the U.S. and
Canadian markets. As Table 6.17 depicts, differences in their overseas expansion plans,
however, could not be supported in this analysis.
Table 6.17: Comparison of Expansion Plans for U.S. and Canada Headquartered Franchises
Headquarters Chi-Square Test Symmetric
US. Canada Chi- df Exact Tau-b Pearson R Exact
Square Sig." Value Sig."Expand No 7 68
US. b 0.7% 44.2%
Limited 302 22 420.816 4 .000 .282 .398 .000
29.8% 14.3%
Unlimited 705 64
69.5% 41.6%
Expand No 475 4
Canada 48.1% 2.3%e
165.008 2 .000 -.251
-.266 .000Limited 55 45
5.6% 26.0%
Unlimited 458 124
4604% 71.7%
Expand No 576 104
Overse 58.9% 60.8%
as d Limited 155 31 1.852 2 .396 .024 .028 .355
15.8% 18.1%
Unlimited 252 36
25.6% 21.%
a Two-tailed.
bN valid cases= 1168
eN valid cases= 1161
d N valid cases= 1154
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Despite cultural similarities and geographic proximity, a substantial number of
Canadian-based franchises expressed no intent to expand into the U.S. market, while a
similar ratio ofU.S. franchises also expressed no expansion intentions into Canada.
Differences in expansion plans into overseas markets between D.S. and Canadian-based
franchises could be supported in this analysis. A closer examination ofU.S. and
overseas market expansion strategies follows.
6.5 ANOVA: FRANCHISE PROVISIONS AND EXPANSION STRATEGY
Five provisions in franchise agreements were operationalized into dichotomous
variables: (1) Financial assistance; (2) Area development agreements; (3) Passive
ownership; (4) Earnings claim, and (5) Sub- franchising. Franchise characteristics were
then examined using ANOVA, to discover similarities and differences based on the
presence or absence ofthese five contractual provisions. In addition, ANOV A
comparisons using expansion strategies in D.S. and overseas markets were also
examined.
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franchisors that did not, although these differences were not statistically significant.
Details of the ANOVA comparison are provided in Appendix B, Table BlO.
6.5.2 ANOV A Area Development
Area development agreements were offered by slightly more than half (53.34 percent)
of the franchises in this sample. Although differences were not statistically significant,
those who offered development agreements had, on average, fewer total units (96.24),
fewer franchised units (98.49), yet projected to open more new outlets in the upcollng
year (7.81). Significant differences between groups were also evident. Franchises in
which development agreements were offered had franchise agreements with longer
terms (1.58) and higher franchise fees (1.46) than those franchises that did not. Details
of this analysis are provided in Appendix B, Table B1 1.
6.5.3 ANOV A Passive Ownership
Less than one-third (32.5 percent) of franchises in this sample prohibited passive
ownership of franchised outlets. Comparison revealed a significant difference in
percentage of franchised outlets; those prohibiting passive ownership had a lower ratio
of franchised to total outlets (4.52) than those who did not. Although those prohibiting
passive ownership had substantially fewer outlets (186.31), fewer franchised outlets
(152.82), and projected fewer new outlet openings (3.26), the results were not
statistically significant. Details of this analysis is presented in Appendix B, Table B12.
6.5.4 ANOV A Earnings Claim
Unlike other UFOC required disclosures, franchisors that provide earnings claims do so
voluntarily. Of the franchises in this sample, a minority (26.3 percent) provided this
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disclosure. Franchises that disclosed earnigs had fewer outlets (82.16), represented
franchises with higher average investment requirements (249.76), and had lower
compound average growth rates (.05), although differences were not statistically
significant. Significant differences were revealed, however, in average growth
percentage, franchise fees, and franchise agreement term. On average, franchisors that
provided earnings claims projected slower growth (19.41), had higher franchise fees
(1.98), and had franchise agreements with longer terms (.85) than those that did not.
Details of this analysis is presented in Appendix B, Table B13.
6.5.5 ANOV A Sub-franchising
Less than one-fourth offranchisors in this sample peruutted sub-franchising. Although
not statistically significant, franchisors that permitted sub-franchising were smaller
(32.92), younger (1.08), and projected a greater number of new outlet openings (16.93).
Significant differences were revealed in percent otfranchised outlets, average
investment required, and franchise fees. Those franchises permitting sub- franchising
had a higher percentage offranchised to total outlets (7.90), lower average investment
requirements (389.41), and had lower franchise fees (2.41) than those who did not.
Details of this analysis is presented in Appendix B, Table B14.
6.5.6 ANOV A Firm Strategy in D.S. Market
To explore how franchises with unlimited expansion strategies, those expanding into all
regions within an area, and those with no expansion plans differed, ANOVA was
performed for U.S. and International areas. Seventeen measures offranchise
characteristics were measured, using D.S. expansion plans as the factor variable. One-
way ANOVA assumes that all variances are equal, and a Levene test was performed to
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verify homogeneity of variance among the variables. Table 6.18 depicts the
homogeneity of variance test and ANOVA comparison.
Table 6.18: Test of Homogeneity ofVariances and ANOVA (U.S. Expansion)
ANOVA
Levene dfl df2 Sig. F sig.
Number of US outlets 6.324 2 1165 0.0019 3.890 0.021
Number of international outlets 1.078 2 1165 0.3405 0.345 0.708
Age of Business 0.067 2 1165 0.9355 6.139 i................a:Bra
Experience 1. 73 2 1165 0.3099 4.603 i.. i 76
Total outlets 3.597 2 1165 0.0277 1.741
Number of franchised outlets 4.945 2 1165 0.0073 2.457 0.086
Number of company outlets 2.188 2 1165 0.1126 0.791 0.453
Projected new openings 9.683 2 1096 0.0001 7.182 0.001
Growth Percentage 4.147 2 1096 0.0161 2.790 0.062
Percent of units franchised 10.241 2 1165 0.0000 11.883 0.000
Average Investment Low 3.637 2 1137 0.0266 0.657 0.519
Average investment high 6.768 2 1128 0.0012 1.850 0.158
Franchise Fee 3.348 2 1141 0.0355 6.998 0.001
ROYALTY 0.960 2 1068 0.3831 0.968 0.108
Agreement term 0.801 2 1126 0.4493 8.042 9.Q99Years before franchising 1.919 2 1165 0.1473 2.264 104CAGR 6.378 2 1165 0.0018 6.729, 0.001, , , ! I
This analysis revealed several significant differences between franchises based on their
,
expansion strategy. The 75 franchises that indicated no expansion plans in the u.s.
market had been in operation an average of26.93 years, while those with a targeted
expansion averaged 25.14 years. A majority of franchises in this sample (65.8 percent)
planned unlimited expansion in the U.S., these firms averaged 22.07 years in operation.
These firms also differed significantly in their number of years of franchising
experience, with 18.39 years for those with no expansion plans, 16.05 years for those
firms with targeted expansion plans, and 14.78 years for those with unlimited expansion
plans. Franchise agreement terms also differed significantly among firms in this
sample. Those with no expansion plans had an average 8.78-year term, while those
with targeted plans averaged 11.37-years. Franchise agreement terms among firms with
unlimited expansion plans averaged i 0.59 years.
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Levene's test revealed that assumptions of equal variance could not be supported for ten
variables in this ANOVA comparison. Post hoc tests using Tamhane's T2, a
conservative pairwise comparison based on aT-test, were performed. Pairwise
comparisons are presented in Table B15 located in Appendix B. When firms with no
expansion intentions were contrasted with those who indicated unlimited expansion,
several significant differences emerged. Those with unlimited expansion strategies
were larger, with an average of238 more total outlets, 227 more D.S. outlets, and 57
more international outlets. They 
also had an average of nearly 210 more franchised
outlets, and 29 more company-owned outlets than those firms who planned no
expansion. Firms adopting an unlimited expansion strategy had lower average (5.4
percent) franchise fees, but franchise agreement terms that averaged 1.8 years longer.
On average, firms with unlimited expansion strategy in the D.S. market had compound
average growth rates that were 14.23 percent higher than those with no expansion
intentions.
This test revealed that significant differences did not exist between firms with targeted
and unlimited expansion strategies in terms of their size. Comparisons in the number of
existing outlets in the D.S., number of international outlets, number offranchised
outlets, number of company-owned outlets, and total number of outlets failed to
produce significant differences. Significant differences were revealed, however, in
other characteristics. Firms with unlimited expansion strategies were an average of3
years younger than those with targeted expansion, they projected an average of 21.28
more outlets to be opened in the upcoming year, and had a 7.77 percent higher ratio of
franchised to total units in their system. Firms that indicated an unlinuted expansion
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strategy in this market had an average of 14.36 percent higher CAGR than firms
adopting a targeted expansion approach.
6.5.7 ANOV A Firm Strategy in Overseas Market
In similar fashion to the comparison of strategy in the D.S. market, an ANOV A
comparison in overseas markets was performed. Overseas markets are likely to present
risks and uncertainties to North American franchisors not found in domestic markets.
Test of homogeneity of variance and ANOVA are presented in Table 6.19.
Table 6.19: Test of Homogeneity ofVariances and ANOVA (Overseas Expansion)
ANOVA
Levene dfl df2 Sig. F sig.
Number of US outlets 33.160 2 1151 0.0000 15.706 0.000
Number of international outlets 14.526 2 1151 0.0000 5.492 0.004
Age of Business 4.732 2 1151 0.0090 1.85 0.251
Experience 3.624 2 1150 0.0270 5.147 0.006
Total outlets 31.263 2 1151 0.0000 14.143 0.000
Number of franchised outlets 38.389 2 1151 0.0000 17.084 0.000
Number of company outlets 5.274 2 1151 0.0053 1.55 0.212
Projected new openings 33.852 2 1 lll 0.0000 18.873 0.000
,Growth Percentage 1.633 2 1111 0.1959 0.929 0.395
Percent of units franchised 35.269 2 1151 0.0000 17.476 0.000
Average Investment Low 2.727 2 1123 0.0658 1.47 0.318
Average investment high 4.002 2 1114 0.0185 1.681 0.187
Franchise Fee 2.501 2 1125 0.0825 3.627 ii 9/057ROYALTY 0.054 2 1056 0.9474 0.111 0.895
Agreement term 2.528 2 1109 0.0803 1.50 0.260
Years before franchising 0.526 2 1150 0.5912 0.184 0.832
CAGR 13.423 2 1151 0.0000 10.138 0.000! ! ! ! I
This analysis revealed significant differences among firms in their franchise fees. The
667 firms with no intentions to expand overseas charged an average franchise fee of
$21,274, while those with targeted overseas expansion averaged $23,768. The 282
firms with unlimited overseas expansion intentions charged an average $22,670 in
franchise fees.
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Only one significant difference emerged between those firms with targeted expansion
strategies and those with unlimited expansion in overseas markets. Firms that indicated
targeted expansion projected to open an average of 32.62 fewer outlets in the upcollng
twelve months than those with unlimited overseas expansion.
To exallne the relationship of expansion strategies to franchise characteristics and
contract provisions, a non-parametric correlation analysis was performed. Twenty-
seven variables were entered in this analysis. Three variables that expressed expansion
strategies, EXPUS, EXPCAN, EXPINT were significantly correlated at the .0000 leveL.
Although a number of significant correlations were revealed in this analysis, many 
of
the coefficients were small (less than .100). Significantly associated with expansion
strategies in the United States with correlation coefficients greater than .100 were U.S.-
John E. Clarkin 233
based franchisors (.282) with a higher numbers ofU.S. outlets (.208) and international
outlets (.184). Expanding franchises had higher numbers of projected new openings
(.228). Expanding franchises in this market were also those with lower investment
costs (-.145) and (-.123) for their respective average low and high investment.
Expanding franchises were associated with the provision for franchisee financing (.146)
and those who allowed passive ownership of their outlets (.128).
Similar to those franchises with expansion plans in the U.S., franchises expanding into
Canada also were associated with those having higher numbers of international outlets
(.288), and those with a higher number of projected new openings (.209). In contrast,
those expanding into Canada were associated with a larger number of Canadian outlets
(.426), were larger systems overall (.187), had a larger number of franchises (.207), and
a higher percentage of franchised outlets (.174). Franchises expanding overseas were
also associated with larger systems, with higher numbers ofU.S. (.160), Canadian
(.219) and international outlets (.491). They were also associated with larger franchises
in terms of total size (.199), the number offranchised outlets (.216), the number of
projected new openings (.218), and the percent of total outlets franchised (.117).
Franchises expanding overseas were also associated with the provision to offer area
directorships (.112) and to allow sub-franchising (.155).
Expansion intentions of responding franchises in this sample, 'for U.S. expansion (.170),
Canadian expansion (.160) and overseas expansion (.140) were also significantly
(.0000) associated with a franchise's overall compound average growth rate (CAGR).
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6.6 CORRELA nON ANALYSIS
In order to determine the strength and direction of relationships among variables in this
dataset, and to test hypotheses developed in section 3.4.2, correlation analysis using
SPSS v.10 for Windows was performed. Kendall's Tau-b was selected, to
accommodate the use of non-parametric variables found in this dataset.
A number of significant relationships were revealed. The number of international
outlets was positively and significantly associated with AGE (.132), EXP (.240), and
number of outlets as measured by SIZE (.362), and NFRA (.376). Longer term
franchise agreements were associated with larger and more experienced franchise
systems, as measured by NUS (.155), AGE (.137), and EXP(.146), and SIZE(.i08).
Longer agreements were also related to franchise systems with higher average
investment requirements, as measured by AILO (.293) and AIHI (.317). A higher
percentage offranchised units (PERF) was associàted larger, more experienced
systems, as measured by SIZE (.220), NUS (.141), NCAN (.164), NINT (.140), and
EXP (.182).
Although the provision to provide financing was significantly correlated to larger
systems, weak relationships were evident in SIZE (.069), NFRA (.093), NCOM (-.076),
as well as those related to the average low (-.088) and average high (-.076) investment
required. A stronger positive relationship was found between the provision to provide
financing and royalty fees (ROY= .134). AILO (-.186) and AIHI (-.205), were
significantly and negatively associated with ROY. Organizational variables, such as
passive ownership, sub-franchising, and area directorships had significant relationships
with several franchise characteristics. Area development provisions were associated
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with NCOM (.132), AILO (.194), AIHI (.198), and longer franchise agreements, as
measured by TERM (.174). Sub-franchising was also associated with AD (.266).
6.6.1 Hypotheses Test
Specific hypotheses that emerged from the literature review were developed in section
3.4.2, and are summarized in Table 6.26.
Correlation analysis revealed that a weak (.087) but positive and significant relationship
existed between fmancial assistance to franchisees and a firm's average growth, as
measured by CAGR. Also significant was a relationship between financing and the
number of projected new outlets (.134). No significant relationship between financing
and projected growth percentage of firms in this sample was found. Hypothesis i b was
not supported in this analysis, as a negative and significant relationship was revealed
between fmancing and average investment costs. A summary ofthese relationships is
presented in Table 6.20 below. 129
Table 6.20: Financial Assistance Correlations
FIN CAGR PNU GROWTH
FIN 1.0
CAGR .087** 1.0
PNU .134** .315** 1.0
GROWTH .030 .033 .074 1.0
,
The second hypothesis examined relationships between three measures of growth and
three measures offranchisee-owned networks: area development, sub-franchising, and
passive ownership. Significant and positive associations were revealed between
number of projected openings, percentage growth, and two network variables; area
129 For all correlation tables in this section: **= .001.
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development and passive ownership. A summary of correlation coefficients is
presented in Table 6.21.
Table 6.21: Franchise Network Correlations
AD SF PO CAGR PNU GROWTH
AD 1.0
SF .266** 1.0
PO
.066** .025 1.0
CAGR
.015 .026 .037 1.0
PNU
.082** .038 .076** .315** 1.0
GROWTH
.061 ** .038 .067** .033 ! .074** l 1.0!
Based on this analysis, Hypothesis 2a and 2c were supported using projected measures
of growth, but rejected when CAGR was employed as a measure of historic growth.
Correlation coefficients indicated, however, that relationships among these variables
were weak. Hypothesis 2b could not be supported using the three measures of growth
employed in this study.
The third hypothesis tested relationships between g'rowth strategies and franchise
networks. Franchise networks, as operationalized by area development, sub-
franchising, and passive ownership were positively and significantly associated with
franchisors that indicated more aggressive growth strategies overseas markets. In
addition to overseas market growth, passive ownership was also significantly correlated
with more aggressive growth strategies in the D.S. market. A summary of correlation
coefficients is presented in Table 6.22.
Table 6.22: Growth Strategy Correlations
AD SF PO EXPUS EXPCAN EXPINT
AD 1.0
SF .266** 1.0
PO .066** .025 1.0
EXPUS
-.022
-.014 .128** 1.0
EXPCAN .025 .097** .035 .245** 1.0
EXPINT .112** .155** .075** .281** ! .502** l 1.0l
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Based on this analysis, Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c were supported for overseas growth
strategies. Hypothesis 3b also received support for Canadian expansion, while 3c
received support for D.S. expansion.
Part of the third hypothesis tested relationships between percentage of units franchised
and the age and franchising experience of franchisors. A positive (.182) and significant
relationship between the numbers of years a firm has been franchising and its ratio of
franchised to total outlets was revealed. Similar relationships were revealed between
the ratio offranchised outlets and growth strategies in the D.S. (.070), Canadian (.174),
and overseas (.117) markets, as presented in Table 6.23.
Table 6.23: Franchised Outlet Ratio to Growth and Growth Strategies
EXP PERF CAGR PNU GROWTH EXPUS EXPCAN EXPINTEXP 1.0
PERF .182** 1.0
CAGR
-.219** .173** 1.0
PNU .022 .183** .315** 1.0
GROWTH
-0485**
-.113** .033 .074** 1.0 '
EXPUS
-.092** .070** .170** .228** .105** 1.0
EXPCAN .048 .174** .160** .209**
-.038 .245** 1.0EXPINT
.050** .017** .140** .218** i -.039 i .281** i .502** i 1.0i
The ratio of outlets franchised to total outlets was significantly associated with three
measures of growth, and growth strategies in U.S., Canadian, and overseas markets. Its
relationship with GROWTH, however, was negative. Hypothesis 3d, therefore,
received qualified support. Hypothesis 3e was supported, contrary to ownership
redirection theories of franchising.
The fourth hypotheses tested relationships between earnings claim disclosures and
measures of growth, franchisor investment risk, and ratio offranchised to total outlets.
No significant relationships were revealed between earnings claim disclosures and any
of the three measures of growth used in this study, as presented in Table 6.24.
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Table 6.24: Earings Claim Correlations
EC CAGR PNU GROW TERM FFEE AILO AIHI PERFEC 1.0
CAGR .007 1.0
PNU .025 .315** 1.0
GROW
-.041 .033 .074** 1.0
TERM .073** .007 .021
-.124** 1.0
FFEE .065**
-.009 .014
-.071 ** .187** 1.0
AILO .101 **
-.071** -.011
-.119** .293** 0429** 1.0
AIHI .085**
-.059** .018
-.147** .317** .368** .740** 1.0PERF
-.049** .173** .183**
-.113**
-.063** ! -.072** i -.152** ! -.140** ! 1.0i
Significant relationships were revealed, however, between earnings claims and
measures of investment risk such as agreement term, franchise fees, and average
investment.
Although a significant relationship between earnings claim disclosure and the ratio of
franchised outlets to total outlets was found, direction of the association was negative,
contrary to the hypothesized relationship. Hypothesis 4a, therefore, could not be
supported. Although hypotheses 4b and 4c were shpported, correlation coefficients
indicated weak relationships among these variables. Hypothesis 4d was not supported
in this analysis. A summary of the hypotheses tested in this section are presented in
Table 6.25. A complete correlation table is presented in Table B19 of Appendix B.
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Table 6.25: Summary of Hypotheses Tested
No. Variable Hypothesized Variable Relationship
Relationship
la. Financial + CAGR +
Assistance PNU +
%GROW
lb. Financial + Initial Start-up -
Assistance Costs
2a. Area Development + CAGR
PNU +
%GROW +
2b. Sub- Franchising + CAGR
PNU
%GROW
2c. Passive Ownership + CAGR
PNU +
%GROW +
3a. Area Development + Expand US
Expand Can. 
Expand Intl. +
3b. Sub-Franchising + Expand US
Expand Can. +
Expand Intl. +
3c. Passive Ownership + Expand US +
Expand Can.
Expand Intl. +
3d. Percent Franchised + CAGR +
Outlets iPNU +
%GROW -
3e. Percent Franchised - Franchising +
Outlets Experience
4a. Earnings Claim + CAGR
PNU
%GROW
4b. Earnings Claim + Franchise Fees +
4c. Earnings Claim + Agreement Term +
4d. Earnings Claim + Percent -
Franchised
Outlets
ii
6.7 FACTOR ANALYSIS
Correlation analysis revealed that a substantial number of significant relationships
existed among variables in this dataset. To reduce the number of variables to a
manageable size, factor analysis was conducted on the Source Book Publication's
dataset using SPSS V. 10 for Windows. Varimax orthogonal rotation was selected to
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aid in interpretation of the factors. Factors with eigenvalues greater than one were
extracted, using principal components method.
Eight factors were developed, (1) size; (2) investment; (3) age; (4) experience; (5)
organization layers; (6) ownership; (7) financial; and (8) royalty. These eight factors
explained a cumulative 69.966 percent of total variance, as presented in Table 6.26.
Table 6.26: Factor Analysis Extraction
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Rotation
Component Total % ofVar. Cum % Total % ofVar. Cum % Total % ofVar. Cum % 
1 4.962 22.555 22.555 4.962 22.555 22.555 4.758 21.627 21.6272 20412 10.964 33.519 20412 10.964 33.519 2.244 10.198 31.825
3 1.712 7.783 41.02 1.712 7.783 41.02 1.821 8.278 40.1034 1.534 6.973 48.275 1.534 6.973 48.275 1.539 6.994 47.097
5 1.73 6.239 54.514 1.73 6.239 54.514 1.99 6.357 5304556 1.218 5.535 60.049 1.218 5.535 60.049 1.332 6.055 59.510
7 1.24 5.111 65.160 1.124 5.111 65.160 1.99 50450 64.960
8 1.057 4.805 69.966 1.057 4.805 69.966 1.01 5.006 69.966
9 0.981 40460 740426
11 i I
" ! !
Factor analysis reduced the original 22 variables td eight factors, which were saved for
use in a regression analysis. A component matrix with correlation coefficients is
presented in Table 6.27 below.
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Table 6.27: Factor Analysis
SIZE INVEST AGE EXP OWNR NETW FIN TER
Headquarters 0.0056 0.1605
-0.2443
-0.3280 004148
-0.1103
-0.2529US outlets
-0.0941
-0.0559
-0.0367 0.1350 0.0888 0.0266
-0.0002Canadian outlets
-0.1365 0.1144 0.1541
-0.3047
-0.1446 -0.0574 0.1289
International outlets 
-0.1807
-0.1532
-0.0882 0.0171
-0.0697 0.0184
-0.0144Total outlets
-0.1439
-0.0851
-0.0418 0.0720 0.0117 0.0188 0.0023Franchised outlets
-0.1616 -0.0628
-0.0024 0.0757 0.0577 0.0140 0.0149Company outlets
-0.0408 -0.1436
-0.1746 0.0392
-0.1595 0.0312
-0.0444Percent franchised 0.0200
-0.3729 0.2798
-0.0395' 004014
-0.0133
-0.0467Age 0.3117 004455 0.0269 0.0697 -0.0204
-0.0117Experience 0.3756 0.1471
-0.0437 0.3090 -0.2834
-0.1260Years before franchising 0.0705 004244 0.0693
-0.1710 0.2102 0.0903Avg. Investment Low 0.1499 0.2409
-0.0866 0.0388 0.1074 0.2183Avg. investment high 0.2145 0.2536
-0.0566 0.0715 0.0627 0.1472Franchise Fee 0.1832 0.1518
-0.2977
-0.1735 0.1019 0.0640ROYALTY 0.1317 0.0035
-0.1340
-0.0694 0.0937Agreement term 0.2260 0.3079 0.1523 0.0763
-0.2042Earnings Claim 0.0050 0.1998 0.2201 0.1089 0.0593
-0.3777Passive Ownership
-0.0090 0.0937 0.0023 0.1369 0.2669Area Directorships
-0.0156 0.1081 0.2586
-0.1466Sub- Franchising
-0.0321
-0.2072 004248
-0.0197Expand in Territory
-0.0492 -0.0672 0.0909
Financial Assistance
-0.0501
-0.2068 0.1790
SIZE factor consisted of items that measured size of a franchise in terms of number of
outlets. In addition to total number of outlets in each system, the number ofD.S.,
Canadian, and international units were also considered. Both franchised and company-
owned outlets were included in this factor. INVEST included both high and low
average investment required to purchase a franchise, as well as the franchise fee and
term of agreement in years. AGE factor included not only number of years that a
business had been in operation, but also the number of years that a firm had been
franchising. EXP factor included the number of years that a firm had been in operation
before franchising, as well as a ratio of franchised outlets to total outlets in the system.
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OWNER factor considered location of headquarters and whether passive ownership of
franchises were perlltted. NETW included variables related to franchise networks,
including area directorships and sub- franchising provisions. FIN factor included
whether or not a franchisor provided fmancial assistance to franchisees, whether or not
an earnings claim was provided, and the amount of royalty assessed. TER indicated
whether expansion in territory was perlltted by a franchise agreement.
Factor scores were created and used as independent variables in multiple regression
analyses to test their explanatory power using three measures of franchise growth as
dependent variables: CAGR, projected new openings, and ratio of projected openings to
existing number of outlets. These measures of growth were developed in Section 6.4.
6.8 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FRANCHISE GROWTH
Multiple regression analysis was performed using 'SPSS v.1 O. Eight factors developed
in the previous section were entered as covariates. Natural logarithms for dependent
variables, CAGR (compound average growth rate), PNU (projected new openings) and
GROW (projected growth percentage) were computed. Entry of independent variables
into each regression model were performed using stepwise selection, with probability of
F to enter at :s .050 and probability to remove at :: .100. Collinearity diagnostics
revealed no strong intercorellations among independent variables were present, as
highest condition values indices did not exceed two. BD
130 Condition indices are the square roots of 
the ratios of the largest eigenvalueto each successive
eigenvalue. A condition index greater than 15 indicates a possible problem, and an index greater than 30
suggests a serious problem with collinearity.
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6.8.1 Regression Analysis: Compound Average Growth Rate
The first regression model using CAGR as a dependent variable revealed an adjusted R
Square of .500, as presented in the model summary in Table 6.28.
Table 6.28: Model Summary and ANOV A, CAGR Regression
Model R R Square Adjusted Std. EITor of
R Square Estimate
1 0.682 00465 00465 00472
2 0.694 00482 00480 00465
3 0.704 00496 00494 0.458
4a 0.708 0.502 0.500 00456
ANOV A Model 4
Sum of df Mean Square F Sig.
Squares
Regression 174.501 4 43.625 209.887 .000
Residual 173.141 833 .208
Total 347.642 837
a Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score AGE, REGR factor score ,
EXP, REGR factor score FIN, REGR factor score 
SIZE 
As presented in Table 6.28, effects of 
four of the eight factors were found to have a
significant effect on CAGR as a dependent variable: AGE, EXP, FIN, and SIZE.
iUnstandardized and standardized coefficients, t-values, and p-values are presented in
Table 6.29.
Table 6.29: Regression coefficients CAGR as Dependent Variable
Unstandardized Standardized
B Std EITor BETA t PConstant
-10493 0.016
-94.704 0.000
AGE
-00439 0.016
-0.684
-27.976 0.000
EXP
-0.083 0.016
-0.126
-5.134 0.000
FIN 0.077 0.016 0.120 4.919 0.000
SIZE 0.049 0.015 0.077 3.161, 0.002l i
AGE, comprised of both the number of years in operation and number of years a firm
had been engaged in franchising had a comparatively large and negative effect on
growth, as measured by CAGR. EXP also was found to have a negative beta, although
its influence on the dependent variable was considerably less than AGE.
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6.8.2 Regression Analysis: Projected New Outlets
In the same fashion as the previous section, factors were entered into a regression
analysis, this time using number of new outlets each franchise projected to open in the
upcollng twelve months as a dependent variable. The same model explained
substantially less variance in number of projected new outlets than in historic growth, as
measured by CAGR. The model summary and ANOV A are presented in Table 6.30.
Table 6.30: Model Summary and ANOVA, Ln PNU Regression
Model R R Square Adjusted Std. Error of
R Square Estimate
1 0493 .243 .242
.99100
, 2 .514 .264 .262
.97798
3 .525 .276 .274
.97028
4 .532 .283 .280
.96600
5" .536 .288 .283
.96375
ANOV A Model 5
Sum of df Mean Square F Sig.
Squares
Regression 311.56 5 62.231 67.000 .000
Residual 770.919 830 .929
Total 1082.076 835
"Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score SIZE, REGR factor score
FIN, REGR factor score OWNER, REGR factor score EXP, REGR
factor score NETW
As presented in Table 6.30, the model produced an adjusted R Square of .283.
Predictors also changed from those revealed in the analysis using CAGR as a measure
of growth. Although EXP, FIN, and SIZE were also included in this model, AGE did
not significantly affect the number of projected new openigs.
Table 6.31: Regression coefficients Ln PNU as Dependent Variable
Unstandardized Standardized
B Std Error BETA t PConstant 2.660
.033 790433 .000
SIZE 1.088
.069 0469 15.726
.000
FIN
.166
.034 .144 4.924
.000OWNR
.128
.033 .113 3.849
.000
EXP
.100
.034 .087 2.921
.004
NETW 7.387E-02
.066
.065 2.211,
.027! i
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Included in this model that were not present in the previous one were OWNER and
NETW, measures related to passive ownership and franchise networks. Coefficients
are presented in Table 6.31. As presented in Table 6.31, SIZE has a comparatively
large effect on the number of projected new outlets. Both FIN and OWNER also had
significant effects on the dependent variable, albeit to a lesser extent. EXP and NETW,
although significant, had small beta values.
6.8.3 Regression Analysis: Projected Growth Percentage
In similar fashion to the previous two regression analyses, this regression 
analysis used
the ratio of projected new outlets and current number of outlets to measure the projected
growth percentage of firms in the sample. A model summary and ANOV A are
presented in Table 6.32.
Table 6.32: Model Summary and ANOV A, GROWTH Percentage
Regression
Model R R Square AdjuSted Std. Error of
R Square Estimate
1 .531 .282 .281
.97296
2 .560 .313 .312
.95195
3 .578 .334 .332
.93799
4 .594 .352 .349
.92560
5 .604 .365 .361
.91715
6 .612 .375 .370 .91062
7" .617 .381 .376 .90668
ANOV A Model 7
Sum of df Mean Square F Sig.
Squares
Regression 406.185 7 58.026 70.586 .000
Residual 660.118 803 .822
Total 1066.303 810
a Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score EXP, REGR factor score
AGE, REGR factor score SIZE, REGR factor score INST, REGR
factor score OWNER, REGR factor score TER, REGR facor score
NETW.
This model produced an adjusted R Square of .376 with seven of the eight factors in the
modeL. Only FIN did not produce a significant effect on this dependent variable,
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although beta coefficients for NETW and TER were comparatively small, as
summarized in Table 6.33.
Table 6.33: Regression coefficients GROWTH percentage as Dependent Variable
Unstandardized Standardized
B Std Error BETA t PConstant 3.131
.032 97.747 .000
EXP
-.580
.033
-0493
-170421 .000
AGE
-.200
.032
-.174
-6.260
.000
SIZE
-.382
.066
-.166
-5.792 .000INST
-.164
.036
-.128 ' -4.578
.000OWNR
.130
.032 .1l4 4.105
.000
TER
.1l9
.033
.101 3.597 .000
NETW 9.058E-02
.032
.079 2.8281 .005! !
As presented in Table 6.33, EXP, AGE, and SIZE all had negative beta coeffcients,
indicating that larger, more experienced franchises had lower growth rates than
younger, smaller franchises.
6.9 SUMMARY
This portion of the study examined differences in contractual provisions and
characteristics of firms engaged in franchising. In the absence of a single,
comprehensive source of franchising data, three secondary datasets were employed.
This section focused on the formal constituent offranchising's context, using
contractual provisions, firm characteristics, and growth as its variables. In concert with
a corporate entrepreneurship theme, measures of venturing were operationalized, using
creation of franchised outlets as a basis for comparison.
Although the three datasets provided unique and valuable insights on contractual
provisions, ANOVA comparison revealed differences between FRADATA,
Entrepreneur Magazine, and Source Book datasets. This fmding is contrary to a
previous study that compared the latter two sources of franchise data. Crosstabs
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analysis ofFRADATA and Source Book datasets also revealed relationships between
contractual provisions, such as fmancing and length of a franchise agreement, and
franchise characteristics, such as age, size, and fees.
Because Source Book's dataset provided several indicators of future franchise growth,
such as the number of projected new openings, and expansion intentions in D.S. and
overseas markets, further analysis focused on this dataset exclusively. Correlation
analysis using 27 variables revealed numerous significant relationships among the
variables. In order to reduce the number of variables to a manageable number, a factor
analysis was performed.
Emerging from factor analysis were eight constructs, which served as independent
variables for a multiple regression analysis. Dependent variables were formed using
three measures of franchise growth: (1) compound1average growth rate (CAGR); (2)
Number of projected new outlets expected in the next twelve months; and (3) Growth
percentage as measured by a ratio of projected new outlets to the curent total outlets.
The explanatory power of the regression model varied among dependent variables.
Although an R-squared value of .500 was attained using CAGR as a dependent
variable, the model lost much of its predictive power with future measures of franchise
growth. It explained only 28.3 percent of 
the variance in the number of projected new
outlets, and 37.6 percent ofthe ratio of openings to total outlets. Discussion of 
these
and other fmdings is presented in the final chapter of this study.
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7.0 FRANCHISING'S OPERATIONAL CONTEXT: A CASE STUDY
OF FRANCHISEES AND FRANCHISOR
For while systematic data create the foundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal data that
enable us to do the building. Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness that
comes from anecdote. We uncover all kinds of relationships in our hard data, but it is only
through the use of this soft data that we are able to explain them. Henry Mintzberg (1979)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Previous sections of this work examined disclosure and contractual provisions
associated with franchising. Although franchisors are required by federal law to
comply with the format of disclosure, contents of these documents were found to differ
among franchising firms. Next, characteristics that differentiated growing franchises
from others were examined, using data obtained from secondary sources. Although
differences among franchises were revealed in these two previous sections, disclosure
and contractual provisions of franchising and the datasets derived from them represent
only a partial view of the phenomenon.
Using two in-depth and closely linked research projects conducted at the University of
Westminster, Stanworth examined relations between franchisors and franchisees
(Stanworth 1995). Contractual provisions were compared with data gathered through
surveys and interviews with franchisors and franchisees. Despite restrictive contractual
provisions that appeared "to closely circumscribe the franchisee' s freedom of action as
a businessman," relatively high levels of independence among franchisees were
discovered. Based on these seemingly conflicting fmdings, Stanworth concluded that:
. ..at the formal level, relations between the franchisor and franchisee might be described as
dependently one-sided since the contract is drawn up on a virually non-negotiable basis by the
franchisor and put to the franchisee on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis. But the findings also hint
strongly that consideration offranchisor-franchisee relations solely at the formal level is
misleading. ..(that suggests) an operational realm in franchisor-franchisee relations which is not
necessarily revealed by an analysis of contractual relations. (p. i 65)
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This portion of the study examines franchising's operational realm. In broad terms, it
examines the role of disclosure and contractual agreements in the franchise selection
process and daily operations offranchised businesses. To explore the subtleties,
perceptions, and dynamics within franchising's context, a case study approach was
chosen. Case study research was defmed by Yin as a method of empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 1989). As a research
strategy, it focuses on "understanding the dynamics present within single settings"
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534). Case study has been considered an ideal methodology when
a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed (Tells 1997). Case study results were also
found to facilitate an understanding of complex real-life situations (Soy 1996).
Eight individuals were chosen to participate in this portion of the study. Cases were
selected from a population ofD.S. franchises with1operations in the states of 
North and
South Carolina. In addition to four active franchise owners, two former franchisees
were also interviewed. One former franchisee left his system voluntarily, while the
other was part of a system in which the franchisor declared bankuptcy. In order to gain
additional perspective on the UFOC and its role in a franchised business, the chief
fmancial officer, and general counsel representing a fast growing franchise were also
interviewed. The number of cases chosen for analysis is consistent with Eisenhardt's
observation, that while there is no ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 10
cases usually works well (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 545).
Franchisees were chosen purposefully; representing diverse industries, male and female
ownership, and varied lengths of time in fral1chising. This selection process is
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consistent with Pettigrew's approach, which suggests that given the number of cases
that can usually be studied, it makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations
and polar types in which the process of interest is "transparently observable" (Pettigrew
(1988), quoted in (Eisenhardt 1989). This franchisor was chosen because of its success
and rapid growth in the competitive, quick service restaurant industry. Franchise owner
interviews took place in South Carolina, while interviews with the franchisor's
representatives took place at their corporate headquarters in Denver, Colorado.
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the method of data collection for this
section. Open-ended questions were primarily used to expand the depth of data
gathering, as recommended by Yin (Yin 1989). First, this approach enabled
interviewees to reveal individual perspectives on the daily operations of their franchised
businesses. Second, it afforded interviewees an opportunity to provide additional
insights on operational aspects of franchising. Given that the aims of this section are to
explore individual perceptions in a real life context, the advantages of additional
insights and perceptions appeared to outweigh the disadvantages of potential bias,
incomplete recollections, and potential reflexivity associated with this methodology
(Tells 1997). All interviews were conducted in person by the author, and recorded on
audio tape with the consent of all interviewees.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, within-case analysis is performed on six
present and former franchise owners. Next, a cross-case analysis is conducted to search
for patterns among interviewees in the sample. Following the franchise owner's
section, interviews with two franchisor representatives are presented. Lastly, a
summary of the fmdings is provided.
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7.2 WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS OF PRESENT AND FORMER FRANCHISEES
Tells observed that analysis of case studies is one of 
the least developed aspects of the
methodology (Tell is 1997). . Within-case analysis allows unique patterns of each case to
emerge before generalizing patterns (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540). This section follows an
explanation-building analytic strategy, one of the possible techniques presented by Yin
(Yin 1994). Line number references to transcripts are included where interviewees are
quoted. Complete transcripts of the interviews are provided in Appendices G through L.
7.2.1 Franchise Owner A
"...it was about 90 milion pages. I don't think we ever even read it"
Evelyn Perry, Muzak franchisee
Franchise A is a Muzak franchise, which provides 'music via satellite to commercial
customers, such as restaurants, offices, and grocery stores. This company began with a
patented process of transmitting background music over telephone lines in the 1920s. It
now boasts 250,000 subscribers and 80 nullion listeners, delivering its programming
through a network of 60 satelltes. The company changed hands from the Wrather
Corporation in 1957, to the TelePrompter Corporation in 1972, to Westinghouse
Corporation in 1981. Muzak LLC is presently headquartered in Fort Mill, South
Caro lina. 13 i
Evelyn is a Muzak franchisee, located in Charleston, South Carolina. She and her
husband purchased this franchise in 1984 from an existing franchise owner. Muzak
131 Information obtained from Muzak LLC website at http:íí\vww.muzak.com/corp/default.asp.
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franchises are geographically exclusive, and at the time of her purchase, "the only way
to get into the franchise community was to be the son or daughter of an existing owner,
or to buy one from somebody" p3 ). Although this franchisor could also convert one of
its company-owned territories into a franchised territory, it had not done so in the recent
past. Evelyn did not evaluate any other franchises before purchasing this franchise,
because her husband worked for Westinghouse (the parent company), and was familiar
with this franchisor and its technology. The couple believed that franchises other than
Muzak did not fit their vision. Although they were not specifically looking to own a
business, "we knew that we did not want to work for someone else forever" f 43).
When asked about her experience with the receipt and review of Muzak's UFOC and
franchise documents, Evelyn recalled that it "was about 90 nullon pages" f 52) and
confessed, "I don't thin we ever even read it" f 53). She stated that she had spoken
with other franchisees and learned there was no room in the franchise agreement to
negotiate, that it was "a take-it-or-leave-it contract"f55). Her husband had worked for
the parent corporation for more than two years before they purchased their franchise,
and had good friends in this business, some of whom were franchisees. When asked if
most of her information about this franchise came from other franchisees, she replied
"Absolutely" f 67). In her discussions with other Muzak franchisees, Evelyn found that
the franchisor provided quality products and services, made its delivery commitments,
and that overall, franchisees were enjoying their expected levels of sales and profits.
Next, the role of disclosure and contractual agreements in the daily operations of her
franchised business were discussed. Evelyn noted that a previous "batte with
corporate," revealed "we have no protection under those documents" and that "there is
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very little in the way of laws that protect franchisees at all" P3). She stated that the
Muzak franchisees use a trade association lawyer, who formerly represented her
franchisor, as their counsel in these matters. In her opinion, Muzak's franchise
agreement was "far less stringent than most franchise agreements" 
0 00). An example
is that although she started with just her franchise, her company now provides a variety
of video and audio products and services in addition to Muzak offerings. By
recognizing market needs and using technical and marketing resources available to her
in her family business, she has broadened her product and service offerings and
increased her firm's revenues. Ownership ofa complementary business is not
prohibited in her franchise agreement, and revenues from products or services outside
ofMuzak services are not subject to royalty payments to her franchisor.
When asked if an ability to use discretion and to adapt to changing market needs was
important to her, she replied "You bet"054). Shè noted, however, that in some
respects she is unable to meet the needs of some customers because of her franchise
relationship. An example of this was cited, when her franchisor began offering an
"advertising on-hold" product; she was prohibited from selling her customers a lower-
priced competitive product. Although those products were not part of 
her original
agreement, they were introduced by her franchisor as amendments to her agreement,
with terms negotiated by the trade association on behalf of all franchisees. She noted
that the influence of her trade group was declining, however, as the ratio offranchised
outlets to total outlets had declined from 80 percent to approximately 40 percent.
"Corporate is trying to buy more of them up" she noted, but "there are some large
franchisees with several territories who are not about to sell" ~ 197). Despite the ten-
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year term of her franchise agreement, numerous addendums have been added through
the years, which substantively changed the scope and provisions of her agreement.
The importance of adaptation was noted in Evelyn's assessment of the competitive
landscape. She observed that with proliferation of satellte technology, her present and
future competitors are no longer limited to a specific geography, resulting in "much
more competition than we had before" P49). Most of her competitors are equipment
dealers; she noted that Muzak is the only franchised business in this field.
In Evelyn's opinion, her franchise arrangement provides several competitive
advantages. First, her ten-year agreement provides assurance to her and her customers
of ongoing support. "With a dealership," she noted, "the vendor can pull its product
tomorrow morning. Although he may have more leeway to go to other competitive
products, he can lose them in a heartbeat"t27Q. Next, she opined that a "brotherhood
or sisterhood" exists in her franchise community, citing it as a "major reason why we
were successful, especially in the beginning" t276). She attributed this relationship to a
geographic exclusivity provision, which means that franchisees were not competing
with each other. When asked if her business would change significantly should the
territorial exclusivity provision be eliminated, she replied "Oh, yes"t32Q.
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7.2.2 Franchise Owner B
"I'm not the entrepreneurial tye that can just go and make it for themselves."
. Susan Swavely, Budget Blinds franchisee
Franchise B is a Budget Blinds franchise, which offers customers guaranteed lowest
prices on name brand window blinds, shades and coverings. Founded in 1992, Budget
Blinds reports that it is the largest and fastest growing window-covering company of its
kind in the U.S., with local service in over 1,200 cities and 37 st~tes.13 Susan is a
Budget Blinds franchise owner with operations in Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina.
Prior to her franchise purchase, Susan worked with her husband, Steve, who owned
another franchise, the Entrepreneur's Source. Susan's role was to follow-up with
people who indicated an interest in services offered by the franchise, and set up
appointments for them to meet with her husband. Susan's interest in becoming a
franchisee began while working with other prospe~tive franchisees. "It got me kind of
interested in the idea of owning a business," she said t2 q.
She explained that the business she purchased did not happen as the result of a
systematic search, but rather as serendipity. While attending a gymnastics meet with
her daughter, an opportunity to purchase a franchise was discussed with a friend. Susan
recalled that "The more we talked about it, the more I thought, well, maybe I could do
this" f30J. At the time, her husband was unsure of his business, and she was unsure of
her role in his business. She spoke with her husband, who "did the due diligence thing
for me, and explained it to me, and discussed it with me" f35J. She then called the
franchisor's corporate headquarters, and received the UFOC and franchise documents.
13 Information obtained through company's website, available at http://wwvv.budget-
bl inds.com/who/who.htmL
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Because the price of a new Budget Blinds franchise is based on number of households
in a given geographic area, the value of this franchise had increased considerably during
her friend's two and one-half years as franchisee. Appreciation in value was not the
result of substantial increases in her revenue, but because the number of households in
her territory had grown considerably. Sue's friend had purchased this franchise from a
previous owner, who had the territory for nine months. Despite asking twice the price
she had paid for the franchise, the asking price seemed fair to Susan, because it was
comparable to that of a new franchise. She paid a small transfer fee, and after a brief
interview, received franchisor approval for the transfer of ownership.
Because of the competitive nature of her business, and her company's strategy of
guaranteed low pricing, cost of products obtained from her franchisor is crucial to
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Susan's profitability. She stated that "We have great prices, but it is stil hard to
compete with somebody, an individual who has maybe two shops and they manufacture
their own (products)" 016). Susan has the ability to sell at or even below cost in order
to close a sale. Her franchisor is paid royalties based on a percentage of gross sales.
She said that she did not perceive a conflict between her franchisor's interests in
increasing sales and her compensation, which is based on post-royalty profits, because
she has discretion over pricing of her products and services. She noted that she does,
however, sense a conflict "... when I try to tell them (the franchisor) that price is an
issue (with my potential customers), and they tell me: no, it isn't" 044). Her
franchisor believes that customers will purchase based on value and not price, and has
repeatedly communicated a targeted 70 percent gross profit margin to its franchisees.
Susan's husband observed that because her customers are predominantly price
sensitive, if Susan priced her products to achieve a 70 percent profit, she would lose
customers and "she would be out of business" 040).
As a part of a fast-growing franchise, Susan attributed the growth in part to the
aggressive marketing efforts of her franchisor in attracting prospective franchisees.
Existing franchisees are paid a referral fee for new franchisee prospects. She rated her
corporate support as "wonderful," and the five men that own the business as "wonderful
guys" 066). What she liked most about her fianchisor was their approach of "Here's
what worked in the past.. . 
and we can just follow it. It was a guideline, and I needed
that. I'm not the entrepreneurial type that can just go and make it for themselves"
068). Unlike many other franchises that specify what products or services may be
offered, this franchise does not restrict her product purchases, and she is able to offer
products from any vendor. Susan could purchase products from a local vendor, never
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report it in her royalty report, and her franchisor would not be aware of it. This
discretionary power is not found in all franchise agreements. Despite her ability to
choose any supplier, Susan chooses to purchase a majority of her products from her
franchisor, because of the quality and value she receives.
Susan noted substantive differences between contractual requirements found in her
franchise agreement and in the manner in which her business actually operates on a
daily basis. For example, her franchise agreement stipulates that all franchisees must
purchase or lease a van that meets specific requirements in size, color, and appearance.
This van must be painted with the franchisor's logo boldly displayed. Susan presently
operates her business using her personal vehicle, because she cannot afford the cost of a
new van at this point in time. "If they (the franchisor) ask me, of course I'll tell them
that I don't have one yet. But they're not going to say...well, then you cannot be a
franchisee" U90J. Located more than 2,150 mileS from her franchisor's office in San
Diego California, Susan's franchise may not be visited often by her franchisor. When
she told one of the corporate owners that she could not yet afford the van as specified in
the contractual agreement, he replied, "How often do we get to South Carolina?"f20IJ.
In effect, the geographic separation between this franchisor and Susan's territory made
monitoring difficult, and this franchisor selectively enforced this contractual obligation.
Susan noted that the previous owner of this franchise also opted not to purchase a van
during the more than two years that she owned this franchise.
John E. Clarkin 259
use of area directors in its organization. There is only one company-owned outlet in
this system, located adjacent to the corporate headquarters in San Diego.
Susan attributed the positive, upbeat, and optillstic personalities of the owners as the
major reason for success of this franchise system. The franchisor does not "llcro-
manage" but rather provides support when asked. "They (the franchisor) wil spend
time with you. ..and say here's the things that we think wil help you with your
business. They're real people. And they are truly interested in us succeeding" f271).
When asked if she felt constrained by the terms of her agreement, Susan replied
"Absolutely not" 003). Both she and her husband noted that their relationship with
this franchisor and the wording in her UFOC are in "sharp, sharp contrast" to one
another 009). The last time they looked at their agreement was when they purchased
her business, 21 months before this interview. When asked if they believed that they
made a good decision when they purchased the frànchise, Susan replied, "Overall, it has
been good for us, and we're glad we did it" 048).
7.2.3 Franchise Owner C
"They (franchise agreements) are always written to the franchisor's advantage. But
this is one of the best ones I've seen."
Attorney advising Joan Lukehart, GNC franchisee
Franchise C is a General Nutrition Center (GNC) franchise, offering vitamins, herbs,
and diet supplements through franchised and company-owned retail locations across the
country. The company was founded in 1935, and now boasts more than 4,000 stores in
all 50 states and 20 foreign countries. In recent years, GNC acquired Health and Diet
Centre stores based in London, and has developed a comprehensive web site for
marketing its products. It formed strategic relationships with Rite Aid Corporation to
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open 1,500 GNC stores within Rite Aid's pharmacies within three years. The company
also merged with Netherlands-based Royal Numico N.V., a nutrition research firm.
loan and Howard own a GNC franchise in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Howard
was furloughed from his corporate nuddle management job in the early 1990s, and loan
was vying for an education superintendent's position in Pennsylvania. Howard spent
eighteen months researching various franchise opportunities at libraries and at the Small
Business Development Cent er near their home in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Together,
they attended some franchise fairs, looking at concepts that included a tool distributor
and mobile check cashing service. GNC caught their eye, partially because at the time
it was the top-ranked franchise in Entrepreneur Magazine, and it was headquartered in
their hometown of Pittsburgh. loan also stated "We had an interest in nutrition and
supplements, and had been a customer of GNC for a long time" t 17). The couple
chose a franchise over a non-franchised business b'ecause "We always thought we
needed the support" t 110).
Their initial plan called for loan to find a job somewhere, and Howard would then
purchase a franchise in a nearby location. After several jo b interviews, the couple
agreed to look for a franchise in an area where they could eventually retire. They met
with a GNC franchise director and found that a store was being planned for Hilton
Head, South Carolina. By the time the couple investigated the opportunity someone
else purchased the franchise. GNC suggested an alternative, a new location in Mount
Pleasant, South Carolina. After visiting the site and touring the area, they decided to
purchase this new franchise.
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loan recalled that she took the UFOC to a family friend who was also an attorney, who
said, "... well, you know they are always written to the franchisor's advantage. Butthis
is one of the better ones I've analyzed" t 45). The couple did not review the UFOC
documents from any other franchise, but rather relied on secondary sources of
information. When it came to purchasing a franchise, loan considered herself and her
husband as "total neophytes" t 4 7). Although her friends and family expressed
trepidation over their decision, loan was convinced: "I've always though that if 
you
work hard and learn, you can be successful" t50).
Now in business for nearly eight years, loan believes that the role of a UFOC and
franchise agreement is one that exists in the background. loan's franchisor has revised
its agreement several times since she purchased her franchise, and she is aware that new
GNC franchisees are operating under more restrictive agreements than one she signed.
She cited examples of newly instituted lease negotiation fees and requirements of
franchisees to participate in co-op local advertising as examples found in new
agreements that did not apply to her franchise. Her experience suggested that
advertising paid for by franchisees had benefits that accrued disproportionately to
company-owned stores. She has followed a targeted marketing approach, one that
reached only her potential customers.
In some cases, perceived value offranchisor support may diminish after an initial start-
up of a franchised outlet. loan believed that not only did her franchisor provide support
when asked, but also supported her business in areas such as new product development
and market research. The company's merger with Royal Numico N.V. provides her
with competitive advantages in her market. "We get products that other companies
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don't have, because they are proprietary" (117). She buys most, but not all products
offered at her store from her franchisor, and is satisfied with product quality and order
response time. Her franchise agreement requires that she pay royalties on every item
sold at her store, and she cannot introduce a product without approval of her franchisor.
loan noted that restrictions on product offerings also protected franchisees, by reducing
the likelihood of a customer's adverse reaction to one of her products.
loan cited an example where she was unable to quickly respond to a change in her
customer's demands. Promoted as a natural sleep aid, Melatonin was widely distributed
among independent health food and vitamin retailers. loan recalled, "Other stores had
it..and we could have sold bushels...but GNC wanted to do studies on it" 062). She
attributed the delay to her company's desire for safety, and their search to determie a
safe dosage. Although a comparatively short opportunity was missed, she felt that
adverse publicity about Melatonin made her compàny's conservative approach
beneficial in the long run.
Howard and loan are presently faced with three concerns. First, although the area in
which their business is located has grown considerably, for the first time in eight years,
they have not increased sales from previous year's levels. One reason may be the
opening of a new discount vitamin retailer less than two miles from their store.
Vitamins are the biggest part of their business. Referring to the new competition she
stated "We don't know ifthat' s a factor or not" pO 1). Another franchisee reported to
loan that when this competitor entered her market in North Carolina, it had not had any
effect on sales at her store. loan suggested that it also might be time for "a fresh look at
our market, and what we're doing" (204).
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Another concern is that they are nearing the end of their franchise agreement. She
described her feelings as "unsettled" f238). It is likely that loan and Howard wil have
to sign a new franchise agreement at the tinie of renewal, one that is different from the
one they signed eight years ago. New GNC franchisees operate under a more restrictive
agreement, as described earlier.
Her biggest concern, however, is her franchisor's ability to open competing GNC stores
in nearby areas. Their franchise agreement gives existing franchisees 'first right of
refusal' should her franchisor choose to open a store in close proximity to an existing
outlet. When asked if they would purchase a second store ifan offer were extended
today, loan replied "Probably not. . because of our age" PSI). She believes that a
second store would likely serve some of her already existing customers, resulting in
twice the worries without twice the income. Should loan and Howard pass on the offer
to purchase a second store in the area, it is likely that the value of their existing
franchise would diminish should they decide to sell and retire.
7.2.4 Franchise Owner D
"Steve, if everything goes as we hope it will, you'll sign this thing, put it in the drawer
and never need it."
Entrepreneur's Source Franchisor
Franchise D is the Entrepreneur's Source, a coaching and consulting service that
provides self-employment options, franchising information, education, and training.
The company also assists fianchisors find qualified and motivated candidates through
its process of matching potential franchisee skills and behaviors with the requirements
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Before purchasing the Entrepreneur's Source franchise, Steve considered only a limited
number of franchises, including an internet provider and other businesses that could be
operated out of his home. He stated "I really only looked at things that I thought I
might have an interest in" f8J. At the time, he based his decision on two principal
criteria: the enjoyment received through his anticipated role in the business and its
earnings potentiaL. Noting his extensive education, experience, and background, "I
looked at how could I use those skils to springboard me into business" 08J.
As a franchisee, Steve's role in The Entrepreneur's Source was helping potential
franchisees "identify franchises that would be a go'od fit for them" p5 J. His personal
experience with the franchise selection process, with thousands of franchise
opportunities available, generated his initial appeal for this concept. He recalled that
"... when I got hooked up with the Entrepreneur's Source, I thought, now here's a
system that makes a lot of 
sense, in terms of how you go about looking for a franchise.
I was experiencing the problem that this business would solve" P9J.
Because he was the first franchisee in the Entrepreneur's Source, Steve actually joined
the company before they began franchising. Set up as a "provider," he initially signed a
two-page contract that was basically a non-compete clause. "What we actually did is
probably illegal from the FTC's (U.S. Federal Trade Commission) point. The thing that
made it illegal, in retrospect, is that they made me put up a $25,000 performance
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deposit" f39J. Three months after joining the company, he was given an option to
become a franchisee or to remain under the performance agreement. After reviewing
the UFOC, Steve decided to become a franchisee.
Given Steve's experience in assisting prospective franchisees through a franchise
evaluation process, he gained first-hand experience with UFOC reviews. "They're (the
UFOC documents) very intimidating. I would say that the majority ofpeople I worked
with never read the UFOC. I know that from the questions they would ask me, or
questions about the terms that I would ask them. Generally, I would say that 90 percent
or more never read it" t 56J. When asked about the role of the documents in the daily
operation of his franchise, he noted that "in terms of running my business, very little. I
had an attorney look at it. ..after I signed that UFOC it went into the drawer and I never
saw it again until I decided to exit the franchise" t 64 J. In Steve' s judgment, his
experience with franchise documents is typical of òther franchisees. "It's a formality,
because it's the law," he observed P7J. He noted that strict enforcement of the terms
was not a part of his franchise relationship, citing his non-compliance with the
franchise's specific requirements to maintain certain office space and signage.
Like most of the franchisees he worked with, Steve had discussions with his
franchisor's representatives before receiving the UFOC and franchise agreement.
"They start talking about the opportunity, what's involvedwith being a franchisee.
Relationships are formed," he recalled t 84 J. Prospective franchisees are then presented
with a UFOC. "The experience of seeing the terms in the UFOC is 'WOW,' this is so
different from what's been happening in our conversations" t86J. He referred to his
discussion with his prospective franchisor before presentation of a UFOC as "... a
John E. Clarkin 266
conversation among friends" f 87J. After receiving from the franchisor what he called a
"shockingly detailed" UFOC, one that included specific hours of operation for his
business, he suggested it was 
"like two whole and separate people" f91J. When Steve
relayed his impressions to the CEO ofthe company, he was told, "Well, we do that
because that's what our attorneys tell us we need to do. Steve, if everything goes as we
hope it wil, you'll sign this thing, put it in the drawer and never need it. If you and I
have a disagreement, that's when we use it" f93J.
Steve noted that his company did not force compliance with a number of specific terms
contained in his agreement. The agreement did constrain him, however, in his ability to
serve his customers and generate additional revenues. He noted that the company had
"... a very narrow focus on the service they were going to provide" f 1 04 J. He
suggested that his franchisor had a vision, and the CEO would not allow his franchisees
to deviate from that vision. When asked about the1flexibility of services Steve could
provide to his customers, the CEO stated "This is the service we are going to provide,
and you're expected to provide that service, nothing else" f 1 07J. Although his
franchisor appeared not to care about the details of Steve' s operation, such as the
signage and hours of operation, "When it came down to how do you earn your money,
the big picture, they were pretty specific about what I could and could not do" f 109 J.
Steve cited his franchisor's unwillngness to allow him to generate additional revenues
through additional services as one of his reasons for leaving the system. When he told
his franchisor that he was leaving, the CEO conceded to his request, but imposed such
high royalties on additional services that it was unfeasible.
John E. Clarkin 267
At the time of his departure, Steve had seven and one-half years left on his ten-year
franchise agreement. He faced a dilemma that required him to choose between services
his customers desired and he was qualified to provide, and the contractual obligations
and provisions of his franchise agreement. This franchisor had been experiencing high
attrition among franchisees, and was concerned about reporting this outlet closure in
their UFOC. Because of this, Steve was able to negotiate a favorable exist strategy with
his franchisor. "Technically, when I walked away, the company did not owe me a
dime," he said 046J. His terms of separation were different from those outlined in the
UFOC.
Steve compared his own franchise purchase experience with his recommendations to
his clients. "I think I made the mistake that I told all my clients not to make," he said.
"I went into something that I had some experience with, and some knowledge and
comfort level with. I would tell my clients, don't Just look at what the business does,
look at the business itself' f 168 J. Steve advises prospective franchisees to talk to both
curent and former franchisees, those that are successful and those that got out of
franchising, asking them to describe their typical day while a member of a franchise.
He suggests reviewing the UFOC and franchise agreement with an attorney.
7.2.5 Franchise Owner E
"People believed they were going to be able to live off their business within a year"
Heidi Kunzel, former MaxCare franchisee
Franchise E is no longer a franchise. MaxCare and its parent company, The Maxim
Group, a floor covering retailer based in Kennesaw, Georgia, filed for Chapter 11
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bankuptcy protection in 2000. The parent company had been embroiled in several
lawsuits, including a class action filing in May of 1999, alleging that company
executives uusinformed shareholders about their earnings during 1998. The company's
share price fell from $25 per share in January to $4 per share in September 1999 after
re-stating a previously reported $3 million loss to a revised $17 million loss. The suit
also alleged that company insiders took advantage of inflated share prices to sell more
than $25 uullon of their own holdings in the company before reporting the actual
loss. I3 The Maxim Group operated several franchises, including Flooring America,
Georgia Carpet Outlets, and MaxCare Professional Cleaning Systems. Heidi was a
MaxCare franchisee in Charleston, South Carolina. She and her husband Seth continue
to operate under the MaxCare name, after buying themselves out of their franchise
agreement at the end of2000.
She recalled that the investigation of 
possible unlawful activities by the chairman of her
parent corporation became known before problems in the MaxCare division were
evident. At the time, there were potential buyers for the MaxCare division, but she
speculated, ".. . when they (potential buyers) did their homework and saw what a mess
the financials were in. ..and the negativity of 
many of the franchisees, they said
whoa...we don't need this" 07J.
Originally, the couple decided to purchase this franchise as a partnership venture with
Seth's sister and her husband, who were already in the carpet business under the same
parent corporation. Seth and his sister went to Atlanta, Georgia and toured the
133 Information obtained through CFO Magazine, available at
http:/íwww.cfo.comíprintarticle/I.4580.OI83IADI1391.OO.html.
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facilities, receiving what Heidi termed as a "cheerleading session" f28J. The trip had
sufficient impact on Seth to begin their process of exploring a family move to
Charleston, South Carolina from suburban New York City. Heidi recalled that Seth's
parents operated a family business in New Jersey for decades, and her father recently
sold his business. She never dreamed of owning her own business, but noted, "At least
we have it in our blood" f 40 J. The couple did not set out to star a business, nor did
they set out to buy a franchise. They did not evaluate alternative franchises, rather "the
opportunity was presented... we thought it made a heck of a lot of sense" f 41 J.
Heidi considers herself and her husband to be "totally out of the mould for franchisees"
f 52 J. Seth is an attorney, and she worked as a human resources administrator in a law
firm. They read the UFOC and franchise agreement documents, reviewed them with
their attorney, identified and asked specific questions before signing the agreement five
months after receiving it. In retrospect, she considered the lack of enforcement of
UFOC provisions to be more of a problem than the provisions themselves. She cited an
example where the couple was awarded "Franchise ofthe Year" at MaxCare's annual
meeting. She discovered at that meeting that"... we were one of a handful of franchises
that was up to date with our fees" p 4 J. Other franchisees were not able to pay their
bils, "so they didn't pay the franchisor" P7J.
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Despite inconsistent quality control and sporadic enforcement of fee collections,
MaxCare did assert control over their franchised outlet operations. Heidi cited an
example where her largest carpet-cleaning client asked her to also provide upholstery
and drapery cleaning. These additional services presented an opportunity to increase
her revenues and profits. Providing these services also prevented loss of 
her carpet-
cleaning service to competitors capable of meeting all ofthis customer's requirements.
MaxCare initially refused Heidi and Seth's request to provide upholstery and drapery
cleaning services. Only after the couple performeèl all the research and purchased the
equipment did the franchisor agree to make an exception for them. Heidi was required
to pay royalties on revenues from these additional cleaning services. She noted that an
ability to adapt and customize their business was an important consideration to the
couple when they purchased the franchise.
Initially, Heidi mdered all materials and supplies directly through her franchsor, or her
franchisor's designated supplier. She recalled having a problem ordering a specific
cleaning solution from a supplier, who told her "...it was not on the MaxCare list (of
approved products)" r 152 J. Heidi explained that she did not". . . give a damn if it's not
on the MaxCare list" and concluded "To go outside the mould, you have to make a lot
of noise" 052J. Since termination of her franchise agreement at the end of2000, she
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has used the same suppliers for some of her needs, but is working with other former
MaxCare franchisees to find other sources of supply, especially for printed materials.
"The printer who was doing the MaxCare stuff was stiffed by the parent organization
for tens of thousands of dollars. They (the printers) wanted us (the former franchisees)
as a group to sign an agreement and take over some of the remaining debt. Of course,
we weren't wiling to do that. ..so he (the printer) burned all the goods he could not sell
at clearance" ~ 165 J. At its height, there were 74 MaxCare franchise territories; by the
end of2000 there were forty. Some individuals bought themselves out of 
their
franchise agreement for a fraction of what they owed in unpaid fees, vehicle lease
payments, and territory fees to their parent organization.
In her opinion, although MaxCare was led by an industry expert, the individual did not
have franchising experience. MaxCare also did not maintain a company-owned outlet,
"widely believed by franchisees and ex- franchisees that the lack of a corporate model
was key in the downfall" P04 J. Although MaxCare did not provide an official
earnings claim under Item 19 of the UFOC, Heidi believed that her franchisor over-
promised sales and profit potential of the business ". ..people believed that they were
going to be able to live off their business after a year" P07J.
Nearly one year after termination of her franchise agreement, her MaxCare outlet
remains a viable business in Charleston, South Carolina. When Heidi was asked if she
believed that her business was better off today than it was before her franchise
agreement was terminated, she said "Hell, yes" P30J. She had gained the technical
expertise required to operate her business from her franchisor in the first year of
operations, ". ..and now we don't have to pay any fees. ..and that's really beautiful"
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t237). She recalled, "There were all these fabulous plans laid out for us. ..which I
totally believed. This was not what we signed on for" t263). Seth remider her that
they received the best of what the franchisor had to offer, they have a viable business,
and they do not have to pay fees anymore. Heidi believed that their business is and wil
continue to be profitable without the support and purchasing power of a franchisor
behind them.
7.2.6 Franchise Owner F
"From what I can tell, there are not a lot of ideas that bubble up from the field"
Jarrod Brooks, Quizno's Area Director
Franchise F is Quizno's Classic Subs. The company was founded in 1981, and began
franchising restaurants primarily in the Denver, Colorado area. In 1987, father and son
Dick and Rick Schaden purchased their first Quizno's franchise in nearby Boulder,
,
Colorado. Over the next four years, they bought two additional franchises. In January
1991, the Schadens purchased the entire chain of 18 restaurants from its founders, and
now have more than 1,300 outlets operational in 40 U.S. states, Puerto Rico, Japan,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Central America, and Australia. I34
Jarrod is a Quizno's area director franchisee, responsible for franchise development in a
65 county exclusive territory, covering parts of North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia. His responsibilities include marketing Quizno's franchises to prospective
franchisees, assisting franchisees with site selection and lease negotiations, and
performing quality assurance inspections of operating franchises within his territory.
134 Information obtained through company website at http://www.auiznos.com.
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Jarrods decision to purchase a Quizno's area director franchise was based on his
"comfort level with the chain" t 6). His father has owned a Quizno' s outlet for more
than three years, and his area development purchase decision was one based on an
"insider's view," not one based on external research 0 3 ). In legal terms, the area
development franchise is owned by Zita, Incorporated, a South Carolina Corporation,
jointly owned by Jarrod and his father, who share responsibilities for operations of a
franchised outlet and area development duties. The previous area developer in this
territory was terminated by his franchisor for non-compliance 
with terms of the
development agreement. Rights to this area had been reclaimed by the franchisor after
termination.
Quizno's UFOC discloses four cases of pending litigation, all of which are area
developers. Jarrod observed that each case involvèd "very blatant area director
misbehavior" and "almost always have something to do with monetary damages" t 62).
He noted that three separate UFOC documents and franchise agreements exist in
Quizno's system: franchisee unit; area development; and master franchises for
international development.
Purchase of this area development franchise involved a different UFOC review process
than that ofthe franchise unit purchase. Jarrod and his father realized that "its not
negotiable anyway," but noted that they "had a level of trust with the people who were
making the decisions" t78). Their experience with this franchisor led to a feeling that
"everybody was going to be reasonable, and that in the event that something arose, we
would be worked with.. .as opposed to being held to the letter of 
the law of the UFOC"
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-(83). Although his UFOC contains "dozens of ways to lose your rights," Jarrod noted
that his franchisor "has taken a consultative approach.. . coaching franchisees to do
things right rather than summarily citing chapter and verse, termiating agreements left
and right" -( 91 ) .
Jarrod described examples where Quizno's had demonstrated this consultative approach
in their relations with problem franchisees. He cited instances where his franchisor had
provided technical assistance, "trying to coach and re-train.. . even going to the point of
monetary help with marketing and food purchasing" -( 114). Jarrod noted that his
franchisor terminated franchise agreements of these problem franchisees "only after
things reached a pretty dire situation. . . and that was only to protect the brand" -( 124).
One of his area development responsibilities is reviewing and discussing UFOCs with
prospective franchisees. When asked to describe Bow prospective franchisees use a
UFOC, Jarrod offered, "My perception is that they don't read the UFOC, and have no
intention of ever reading it" -( 131). He described the document as ". . . very
intimidating. Its one or two inches thick.. . and every page is full of legalese" -( 133).
Jarrod coaches prospective franchisees through a UFOC review process, explaining that
the document is written in a restrictive manner for everyone's protection.
Unlike a majority of franchises, Quizno's has elected to make voluntary earnings claim
disclosure in Item 19 of the UFOC. Jarrod considers this disclosure helpful in selling
franchises, since his closest competitors do not make formal earnings claims. He noted
that a marketing advantage is created because Quizno's same store sales and earnings
have been better than that of their competitors. Jarrod stated that financial disclosures
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in franchising are regulated, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission "doesn't let
people in my position make a lot of 
monetary (claims) or give a lot of monetary advice
on average sales or cost of goods" t 168). He believed that his job would be more
difficult if Quizno's did not provide an earnings claim in their UFOC. Prospective
franchisees are also encouraged to contact existing franchisees for sales, income, and
other information. Lists of existing franchisees are contained in each UFOC.
Although Quizno's currently provides an earnings claim in their UFOC, Jarrod
speculated that changes in the competitive landscape in his industry may affect this
disclosure. He noted that "Typically, we come out...and I think mOst franchises come
out with a new UFOC every year" t 183). Although most changes are minor, he
recalled that Quizno's issued a new UFOC when they increased royalty fees from six to
seven percent two years ago. Jarrod suggested that recent improvements in same store
sales by Subway, a substantial competitor in the sandwich industry, may prompt them
to begin making an earnings claim in their next UFOC issue.
In addition to marketing franchises, area development agreements require Jarrod to
perform quality inspections of existing outlets. Despite his legal status as a franchisee,
Jarrods inspections offranchised outlets are duties normally assumed to be associated
with a franchisor. He described his role as a facilitator, between unit franchisees and
his franchisor, one that requires "a delicate balance" P26). Although he is
contractually obligated to marketing franchises, assisting with outlet openings, and
performing quality inspections, Jarrod sees his role in much broader terms. He does
note, however, that his compensation is based on sales at franchise outlets in his area,
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making it "in my best interests to do what I can to help them (franchisees) grow sales
and to help them stay profitable" f240J.
Quizno's is one ofthe fastest growing franchises in the United States. Jarrod recalled
that Quizno's was initially "very product-focused," becoming scientific only after
opening 1,000 outlets. The franchise was founded around a product with "flavor
mastery" f257L and a core concept of oven toasted sandwiches that provided a
competitive advantage in the marketplace. Jarrod attributes his franchisor's early
success to "almost dumb luck" t256J. Quizno's has since employed market research to
help them identify new product offerings and address potential customer objections.
Jarrod believes that his franchisor is "doing what we do a little smarter now," and
concluded that "the more scientific you get, you're able to make more qualified
decisions that help your chain grow" t274 J. In addition to product development,
Quizno's has paid attention to their business modeL. "We seem to be very unit-level
economic focused. We spend a lot of time thining about what we can do to drive
franchisee-level sales and profitability," he observed t277J.
The topic of innovation and adaptation within his franchise system was discussed.
Jarrod observed, "From what I can tell, there are not a lot of ideas that bubble up from
the field" t289J. Quizno's introduces three or four new sandwiches each year. After
extensive market testing, his company has reasonable assurance of acceptance before
introducing a new product in all of its outlets. A mechanism does exist within the
Quizno's system for franchisees to submit ideas for product additions and
enhancements. Franchisees must submit details of the new product, including suppliera
and samples. Jarrod believes that more ideas do not come from the field because so
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many come from his franchisor. He noted that some franchisees "actually complain
about how much we change menu items" P08J. Quizno's new products introduce
change at the franchise outlet leveL. Jarrod concluded"... when you're in an
environment that doesn't seem to get very stale, that kind of keeps franchisees focused
on managing what's coming down, not necessarily innovating" P09J. Innovation at
the franchisee level within Quizno's is limited to those that involve marketing and
promotion of the product.
Quizno's provides financial assistance to prospective franchisees through relationships
established with third-party lenders. "The effect of that (relationship) is to mitigate or
soften the underwriting requirements that franchisees may face at a normal commercial
lender" t437J. Lenders familiar with Quizno's operations have assurances that if
operated according to the franchisor's standards, franchisee profits should be sufficient
to repay the debt. Other fmancial assistance provitled by this franchisor include
equipment and supplier discounts.
7.3 CROSS CASE ANALYSIS
Eisenhardt posited that the key to good cross-case comparison is counteracting the
tendencies to reach premature and false conclusions resulting from information-
processing biases (Eisenhardt 1989). She suggested a tactic of selecting "categories or
dimensions, and then to look for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup
differences" (p. 540). Eisenhardt concluded that cross-case tactics enhance the
probability of capturing novel findings that may exist in the data. Categories for cross-
case comparisons emerged from these interviews, which are presented under separate
headings.
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7.3.1 Franchise Motivation and Selection Process
Interviewees revealed different motivations and evaluation criteria in their franchise
selection processes. Evelyn and Heidi selected their franchises to take advantage of
specific opportunities in specific locations. Evelyn's husband had worked for the
parent organization and they knew several people already a part of the franchise system,
while Heidi's sister-in-law was in a related business. Steve based his decision on his
technical ability and the job content presented by franchise ownership. His investment
in his education and experience within the field led him to choose a franchise based on
the technical aspects of the business. In contrast, Susan's primary selection criterion
was flexibility. She had no knowledge of the technical aspects of the business prior to
purchase of the franchise.
Joan and Howard chose their franchise in part becåuse they were customers, in part
because their franchisor's headquarters was located near their home, and in part because
Howard had lost his job. While the other franchisees were "pulled" into the opportunity
of a franchise, Howard was "pushed" by his loss of employment. Jarrod also had
considerable familiarity with his franchisor's concept, although it was from a different
perspective. He was actively involved in the selection process and ongoing operations
of his father's franchised outlet before he purchased an area development franchise
from the same franchisor. Evelyn, Heidi, and Jarrod purchased their franchises without
evaluating other opportunities. These franchise purchases each involved the
opportunity to work with falllY members. Steve and Susan evaluated a limited number
of franchises before choosing their respective businesses. Joan and Howard chose their
franchise after limited evaluations of other franchises using secondary data.
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7.3.2 Role of UFOC and Franchise Agreement in Selection Process
In the U.S., federal law requires franchisors to disclose material facts about a franchise
to prospective franchisees before purchase. UFOCs are designed to play a central role
in a formal disclosure process from franchisors to prospective franchisees. Their role in
the selection process appeared to differ among interviewees.
Heidi and her husband evaluated and questioned their franchisor about provisions in
their agreement over a five-month period. Although they were unable to 
negotiate any
contractual provisions, they felt as though all of their questions had been answered.
Despite the fact that Heidi's husband was a practicing attorney, they had their franchise
agreement reviewed by another attorney before signing it. At the other extreme, Evelyn
recalled that her UFOC "was about 90 nullion pages," and confessed, "I don't thin we
ever even read it" ~ 53). For her and her husband, the franchise was a good fit with their
future plans, and the UFOC review was little more than a formality.
Although loan and Howard had decided that their franchise decision was a sound one,
they asked an attorney to review the franchise documents prior to their purchase. Steve,
Susan, and larrod each performed their own evaluations of the franchise documents,
and did not seek legal advice before purchasing their franchise.
7.3.3 Role ofUFOC and Franchise Agreement in Daily Operations
Interviewees agreed that contractual provisions in their UFOCs and franchise
agreements had little to do with daily operations of their franchised businesses. In
Evelyn's franchise system, a trade association attorney, one who formerly worked for
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her franchisor, negotiates on behalf of all franchisees in her system. Although new
revisions to her agreement affect her business operations through new products or
services, the cohort of franchisees must approve these revisions before implementation.
In Jarrods role as area developer, his contractual responsibilities include little more
than marketing franchises to prospective franchisees, active participation in store
openings, and periodic quality inspections of franchised outlets. Because his
compensation is both directly and indirectly affected by sales at franchised outlets in his
territory, he assumes duties beyond those prescribed in an effort to enhance store-level
sales and profits. Jarrod's contractual agreement with his franchisor provides little
more than a set of minimum responsibilities in his view, not an all-encompassing job
description.
Perhaps the most apparent discrepancy between the contractual obligations and the
daily operations of a franchised business is evident in Susan's franchise. In violation of
contractual provisions, Susan operates her business using her personal vehicle, with the
knowledge of her franchisor. Selective enforcement of contractual provisions was also
evident in Steve's franchise, where hours of operation and signage requirements were
not enforced, but service offerings were strictly monitored. Steve summarized the role
of franchise documents in the daily operations of the business, recalling that his
franchisor told him that as long as things were going well, the documents would not
play a part in their relationship.
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loan, however, has less discretion over product offerings at her retail outlet, in part
because of liability issues associated with the nutritional supplements she sells. She
was not able to take advantage of short-term market opportunities for one supplement
because of her franchisor's concerns for safety. loan's competitors did not exercise the
same level of caution, and reaped substantial rewards. In Steve's case, his franchisor's
unwilingness to allow discretion in service offerings resulted in termination of his
franchise agreement. He was prohibited from offering additional services that would
enhance his profitability and improve his cash flow despite his qualifications and
expertise. In similar fashion, Heidi was initially prohibited from offering ancillary
services to her customer, only receiving permission to do so after agreeing to pay
royalties to her franchisor. In Steve's case, an inability to offer additional services was
a primary consideration in his decision to leave the system.
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7.3.5 Franchisor Control over Franchise Outlet Operations
Franchisor control over operations of an outlet was manifest in several different ways.
Although her franchisor allowed franchisees to operate related businesses, Muzak
exerted substantial influence over her outlet's operation through negotiation of 
national
agreements on behalf of all franchisees. Evelyn noted that although agreements with
large accounts provided her with sales tools, they were deeply discounted, and not
profitable.
Despite specific contractual provisions in UFOCs, franchisor control was often used in
the discretionary and selective enforcement of agreement terms in several cases. In
Susan's case, the requirement to purchase a van represented a substantial expense for
her emerging franchise. By not enforcing the contractual requirement to purchase a
van, Susan's franchisor imroved her profitability 'in the early months of operation, and
appeared to improve the working relationship between them. In contrast, selective
enforcement of quality standards and royalty payment collections by Heidi's franchisor
were contributors to the demise of the system. In Steve's case, the requirements for
office space and signage were not enforced. Jarrod's franchisor exercised restraint in
enforcing contractual provisions, only terminating agreements when other options were
exhausted. Selective enforcement helps to explain a detachment between franchising's
formal context and its operational realm.
7.3.6 Franchise Owner Interviews: Additional Insíghts
In addition to topics that covered research questions, franchise owners provided other
valuable insights into the daily operations offranchised businesses. First, as Heidi's
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case illustrated, bankuptcy by her franchisor did not necessarily result in a
simultaneous failure of all franchisees. Her business and the businesses of 40 former
franchisees continued without franchisor support, capitalizing on the technical training
and brand awareness built while a franchisee without continued royalty payments.
Second, although viewed as long-term contracts, franchisors revise UFOCs and
franchise agreements periodically. Provisions contained in one edition mayor may not
be present in subsequent editions, and franchisees in the same system may be operating
under different contractual provisions. Third, unit franchisees, area developers, and
master franchisees within the same franchise system may operate under different
contractual agreements. Despite their legal position of franchisee, area developers
assume roles of marketing and quality assurance, roles more similar to that of
franchisors than unit-level franchisees.
7.4 FRANCHISOR REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWS
Franchise agreements and UFOCs are widely accepted as adhesion contracts; non-
negotiable, presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (Brown 1985). Drafted by
franchisors and their attorneys, these documents defme the franchise relationship in
detail, designed specifically to ensure that franchisees adhere to their terms (Falbe and
Dandridge 1992).
Lafontaine and Shaw observed that theories of franchise contracting are "fundamentally
static," and do not incorporate the dynamic phenomena "that could produce systematic
changes in contract terms over time" (Lafontaine andShaw 1999, p. 1043). The
authors argued that franchisors learn during the process of franchising, which should
affect the terms oftheir agreements. Fees may be modified to attract additional
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franchisees, and technology changes such as the Internet may require additional
provisions to be written into franchise contracts. These issues, Lafontaine and Shaw
concluded, have not been addressed in the theoretical literature.
To explore the formulation process ofUFOC and franchise agreement provisions, and
to complement the perspective offered by franchisees, interviews were conducted with
representatives of a franchisor. The chief financial officer and general counsel of
Quizno's Corporation were selected forinterviews. This franchise represents one of the
fastest growing firms in the quick service restaurant business, a highly competitive
industry. Personal interviews were conducted at Quizno's corporate headquarters in
Denver, Colorado in September, 2001.
7.4.1 Franchisor Representative A
'The only time we look at the franchise agreement is when there is a problem."
Patrick Meyers
Patrick E. Meyers has been Vice President and General Counsel for Quizno's
Corporation since its incorporation in October 2000. He has held similar positions with
Quizno's since January 1997. Previously, Mr. Meyers was one of Quizno's Directors
(from 1993 to 1997). Before becoming general counsel, Mr. Meyers was an attorney at
the Denver, Colorado law firm of Moye, Giles, O'Keefe, Vermeire & Gorrell from
September 1991 to January 1997.
Mr. Meyers described the UFOC and franchise agreement process as an evolutionary
one. "Typically, when a franchisor is just starting out, its going to go to a franchise
lawyer and use basically whatever form that franchise lawyer is comfortable with.. . 
and
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that's basically what we did" f6). Quizno's present franchise agreement is "a
compilation between what some lawyers thought was good and what I thought was
good" f 12). In his opinion, all franchise agreements are going to have the "standard
boiler plate stuff' f23) in them, such as licensing the trademark, dispute resolution,
covenants not to compete, and confidentiality provisions. Differences among
agreements wil be driven by the industry 
and "the philosophy of the franchisor's legal
counsel" P2).
He explained, "I tend to have a philosophy of having a very tough franchise agreement.
The reason is that as long as the system is working.. .as long as we are working well
with the franchisee and the franchisee is complying with system standards, we never
look at the franchise agreement- we never worry about it. The only time we look at the
franchise agreement is when there is a problem. And so. ..1 want it to be as enforceable
and tough as possible" P5). The philosophy ofal\ agreement is communicated in the
language of a franchise agreement and UFOC. Noting the difference between UFOCs
and franchise agreements "... the UFOC has to describe all those things in plain
English, as opposed to the franchise agreement which do not have to be written in plain
English. Its easier to look at the UFOC to figure out what the franchise agreement is
saying" f 51).
Contract term and dispute resolution provisions were reviewed. The decision of a
fifteen-year agreement term dated back to the late 1980s, before Mr. Meyers joined the
firm. Although he did not thin that fifteen years was the norm for restaurants, he did
not consider the difference between ten and fifteen years to be significant. He noted
that Quizno's non-traditional agreements, such as those used in airport locations, have a
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Unlike a majority offranchisors, Quizno's elected to make an earnings claim in Item 19
of their UFOC. Meyers stated, "For one reason, the. first question that comes up in a
franchise sale is the prospect saying How much money am I going to make? It's very
difficult to put a sales person in the position of saying I can't tell you anything, I can't
share any number with you, at all" t 110). He believed there would be a tendency for
sales people to "cross the line" if no earnings claim were provided, noting that the
largest number of enforcement cases handled by the u.s. Federal Trade Commission
were related to earnings. Meyers is undecided, however on whether earnings claims
should be a mandatory disclosure for all franchises.
Asked to comment on pending franchise legislation, known as the Coble-Conyers Act,
Meyers offered the following: "The problem with Coble-Conyers, at least in the forms
that it has been introduced, is... that it is very draconian, and would make franchising
very difficult. The missing concept in Coble-Conyers is that, I believe, it comes from a
philosophical position that franchisors are inherently unfair to franchisees, and over-
reaching. I don't believe that that's true" 069). The bil also llsses what Meyers
believes is true: "...that franchisors, in order 
to protect all of the franchisees...have an
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inherent reason to enforce system standards" 075). Poor cleanliness in one store hurs
other operators, and the bil would make it difficult and time consuming to correct these
types of problems. He concluded "Coble-Conyers approaches things from a standpoint
that we're out there beating on people just for the sake of beating on them" 082).
According to Meyers, Quizno's made some decisions in the past that were not
necessarily popular with their franchisees. They began to automatically debit
franchisee accounts for royalty payments, as opposed to letting them pay by check.
Meyers recalled, "That was not a popular decision...but I'LL tell you what. ..it was the
best decision we ever made" 089). The company also changed the Point of Sale
(POS) system in all their stores. Although this change is expensive for franchisees to
imp lement, "it's the right thing to do for the system" t 197). He suggests that a focus
on franchisee profitability minimizes disputes between franchisors and franchisees. "If
a franchisee is making money, you won't have a dispute. If a franchisor loses sight of
unit profitability.. . and the units start to lose money.. .you're going to have disputes all
day long" f217).
Franchisors are required to disclose pending litigation in Item 3 of their UFOC. Meyers
opined that the amount oflitigation may be an indicator of the comparative harmony or
discord with any given system, but cautioned that "Some franchisors will take the
position that it's not material because, even if they have theoretically material claims,
their system is so large that one piece oflitigation is not material" f240). When asked
about the legal environment of the future, Meyers did not believe that franchise
associations and codes of ethics, such as those found in Australia, would play an
important part in the U.S., unless they are mandated. He also believes that more states
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wil shift away from regulation, especially when business opportunities (those
businesses that require less than $5,000 investment) are differentiated from franchises.
He believes that more and more countries overseas wil continue to adopt franchise
regulation "Whether it's a code of ethics, or registration process, or disclosure process,
or a myriad..." f281).
7.4.2 Franchisor Representative B
"A franchisee will work 12 hours a day, seven days a week and he'll love it. Our
paid people would never do that, no matter how hard we try."
John Gallvan
John L. Gallivan is Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, and Assistant Secretary of the
Quizno's Corporation. Mr. Gallvan has been Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer,
and a Director since incorporation in October 2000. He held similar positions with the
company since April 1994. From 1979 through March 1994, he was a director and
executive vice president of Grease Monkey Intern&Ìtional, Inc., located in Denver,
Colorado, a franchisor and operator of quick oil change centers.
With extensive franchising experience in two different industries, Gallvan noted that
both shared the same finance problem: ". ..sourcing competitive fmancing for our
franchisees to be able to purchase the franchise and start up the business" 02). He
concluded, "You have to have those financing sources available to continue to grow,
irrespective of how good your product is" f20). Growing franchisors encounter
potential problems with lenders because of the manner in which franchise fees appear
on their accounting statements. For all stores that have not yet opened, non-refundable
franchise fees are entered into an account called 'deferred franchise revenue,' a liability
on the balance sheet. Gallvan stated, "When we show the financial statements to
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bankers, we say this amount is not a debt. . we do not owe that money. .. but it's also not
recognizable as income; it's there in limbo" r42J.
Similar to non-franchised businesses, start-up franchises often have cash-flow
problems. Gallvan recalled "The first years were difficult... we were very, very
earnings conscious... we pinched pennies, until we started making money regularly"
rSSJ. Quizno's recent successes and growth have not substantially changes their
financial strategy. He noted "We still pinch pennies... we stil run this thing by the
budget" 'r 64 J. Gallivan believes that many young . franchises lack the financial
discipline to develop and adhere to a budget. He credits Quizno's CEO for his
complete support of their financial management process.
As noted earlier in this section, Quizno' s CEO is a former franchisee, who "knows what
it is like to be a franchisee and what it takes to make money in this business" r 100 J.
This could explain the company's focus on franchisee profitability. Although some
firms measure their success by the number of franchises sold, Gallvan offered "When
we get them open, we've got to make them profitable.. . and that's when we know we're
successful" r 114 J .
Unlike other franchises that begin by exploiting new market opportunities, Quizno's
entered a competitive market with large, established competitors. Gallivan mused "I
don't think anybody would ever sit around and say Boy, 1 think it would be a good idea
to get in the quick service restaurant business, and compete against Subway with
13,000 units, Blimpie with 5,000 units and every other person in the world..." 0 22 J.
The company targets customers who value premium ingredients, and does not compete
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directly for the more price conscious customers likely to patronize their competitors.
Quizno's same store sales are higher than that of their competitors, a fact that Gallvan
believes should be important to prospective franchisees. "If the franchisee is doing
their job, they will do those kinds of comparisons. I'm not sure that the majority of
them actually do that much due diligence...but the ones that do wil choose Quizno's"
055J.
The company used its company stores to establish a business model by which
franchisees could benchmark their unit profitability. Each day, the company
accumulates sales and cost data from each of 
its 1,300 outlets. Data is split by area, and
data from all stores are faxed back to every store for comparison. Outlets with higher
costs would then call better performig storeowners to see what that owner was doing
differently. Gallivan noted that the process created peer pressure and competition
among franchisees. He cited the major reason for low profitability at franchised outlets
is the franchisee's failure to control costs, and labor management is "the most important
thing" t213 J .
Gallivan suggested several ways to compare franchise opportunities using UFOC
disclosures. He would first look at earnings. If a franchise did not provide an earnings
claim, he recommends getting information from existing franchisees. He would also
look at the amount oflitigation, noting that a surge in legal problems could be an
indication that the system is in trouble. Next, he would look at the background of 
the
management team. Experience in service management could be an indicator of an
ability to provide service to franchisees. Lastly, he advises a review of the franchisor's
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fmancial statements. Well-capitalized franchisors "spend their time building a good
system.. . not all their time trying to raise money to pay the bils" f263 J.
Quizno's bases its fees and royalties on industry norms. Gallivan noted that franchisees
often combine royalties and national advertising fees together as a payment to a
franchisor. He noted that advertising fees are placed in a trust account and spent
exclusively on advertising, where franchisees get the real benefit of combining their
money to purchase advertising they could not afford on their own. The company looks
at individual store economics, what the franchisor brings in terms of reduced costs of ,
food, insurance, and other items. Quizno's solved the time-consuming problem of
collecting royalties by requiring weekly automatic debiting of franchisee accounts as a
condition of franchise purchase. Gallivan noted that he used to spend half of his time
callng franchisees, reminding them to subnut their royalty payments before
implementation of the automatic debit provision. '
Despite this franchise system's growth, this franchisor must deal with problem
franchisees. Gallivan offered, "...we like our franchisees...you get to knowthem...and
you meet them at gatherings. Sometimes we struggle.. .one gets in trouble and they are
losing money, then they are out of money f362J. He noted that it is human nature to
pull together all the resources of the firm to try to help this person, to make things work,
and to help get his loan paid. Despite the temptation, Gallivan noted that focusing the
company's limited resources on one-thireen-hundredth ofthe company may not be in
the best interest of the entire system. "As hard as it is to let this one unit fail, you've
got to let it fail" t 373 J.
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The role of company-owned outlets in Quizno's franchising system was discussed.
Although company-owned outlets may be more profitable in some systems, they are not
in this system. Gallivan observed, "Company stores do create cash flow, good cash
flow for us. But not necessarily profits after depreciation and amortization" f385). In
this system, company-owned outlets provide places to experiment with new ideas,
training facilities for new employees, and facilities in which to bring prospective
franchisees. He noted that given comparatively low sales volume and tight margins of
their system, a mistake in a company-owned outlet has a tremendous impact on profits,
much more so than in higher margin casual dining restaurants. Larger restaurants are
also better able to afford on-site, professional general managers than quick service
restaurants, which are better suited to owner-operators.
Noting a difference in work habits between franchisees and managers, Gallivan stated,
"A franchisee wil work 12 hours a day, seven daY'S a week and he'll love it. Our paid
people would never do that, no matter how hard we try" f399). Power of ownership
was evident in the conversion of 18 company-owned stores in Denver to four limited
partnerships; joint ventures between Quizno's and former managers ofthe stores.
These former managers, now compensated on a percentage of unit profits, are more
motivated to improve overall performance in their outlets. Gallvan noted that the
biggest challenges faced by his company are remaining consistently profitable and
finding good people. He believes the greatest risk faced by his firm is that of obtaining
credit for franchisees in need of start-up capitaL.
The ability to adapt and change in response to market dynamics is considered important
at Quizno's. Gallvan noted that Dairy Queen, one of the biggest franchisors in the
John E. Clarkin 293
country during the 1960s, "lost their system... they lost their niche... because they just
did not have the mechanics in place to upgrade or change their image and keep up with
the times" f 461 J. He noted that many franchisees ran their business for 20 years,
extracted all they could from the business, and allowed the chain to become dirty and
dilapidated. The main reason cited was the lack of a specific requirement for
franchisees to make upgrades. He noted that this requirement is especially important in
the food service business, where customers expect operators to "keep that image new all
the time" f473J.
Achieving growth through a limited number of new offerings while remaining focused
on their core competency is the strategy outlined at Quizno's. Unlike other franchisors
that have grown through acquisition of other chains, Gallivan stated that Quizno's
acquisitions are primarily real estate acquisitions. He noted that negotiations and due
diligence make acquisitions more time consuming 
'than growing their chain through
current methods. Quizno's is currently opening a new store, on average, every 16
hours.
7.4.3 Franchisor Representatives Summary
Interviews with Mr. Meyers and Mr. Gallivan revealed several aspects of franchisor-
franchisee relations germane to this study. First, UFOC and franchise agreements
evolve over time. As franchisors gain experience, franchise documents are likely to
reflect their business philosophy, as opposed to merely meeting the legal requirements
of disclosure. Competitive pressures in the marketplace for franchise fees and royalties
are also likely to influence contractual provisions as a franchise matures. Second, both
representatives believed that most prospective franchisees do not perform adequate due
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diligence. They confirmed opinions revealed by franchise owners that a majority do not
read UFOCs and franchise agreements before making a franchise purchase. Third,
supporting opinions expressed by franchise owners, franchise documents are primarily
used in the event of a dispute between franchisor and franchisee.
7.5 SUMMARY
This portion of the study focused on the operational realm offranchising. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen to explore subtleties, perceptions, and dynamics.
Four current franchise owners were selected, representing a variety of industries. Two
former franchise owners were also interviewed: one who voluntarily left the franchise
system, while the other continued in business after her franchisor ceased operations
after bankuptcy.
To provide additional insights into franchising's operational realm, interviews with the
general counsel and chief financial officer of a franchisor were performed. This
franchisor represents one of the fastest growing systems in North America, with
operations in several overseas markets as well as those in the U.S. and Canada. These
interviews revealed aspects of the formulation and enforcement of franchise contract
provisions, bridging the operational and formal realms of franchising.
Cross-case comparison of current and former franchisees revealed that individuals
purchased their franchise for different reasons. Some were attracted to the type of
business, some to the location in which the business opportunity was presented. Some
evaluated other opportunities, while others considered the franchise they purchased
exclusively. The role of the UFOC in their selection process also differed; some
John E. Clai'kin 295
performing detailed evaluations while others viewed it as a legal formality. Both
existing and former franchisees agreed, however, that the UFOC and franchise
agreement played little or no part in the daily operations of their business. Franchise
documents were examined by the former franchisees only when separation from their
franchisor became imminent.
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8.0 DISCUSSION
"Strategic alliances and parterships are like mariages..." (DeRose 1994, p. 182)
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The overall purpose of this study was to explore entrepreneurial opportunities within
franchising's formal and operational contexts. It began with an exploration of
franchising's formal context using primary data gathered from UFOC and franchise
agreements, and continued with an examination of contractual provisions using
secondary data sources. Although insightful, these assessments provided only a partial
view of the phenomenon. In order to present a more comprehensive study, an
examination offranchising's operational realm was performed, using semi-structured
interviews with present and former franchise owners and key representatives of a
franchisor.
Although opportunity exploitation is most often associated with the quick decision-
making, simple administrative structures, and flexible operations found in small firms
(Baldwin 1995), a number of large firms have exhibited entrepreneurial behaviour
within their organizations (e.g., (Kanter 1997); (Covin and Miles 1999) enabling them
to rapidly adapt to changing market demands (Jennings and Beaver 1997). Large firms
typically adopt flexible organization structures to enable quick response to dynamic
changes in the market. Although generally considered a hybrid organizational form
(Shane 1996), franchising creates a formally structured hierarchy, one in which
franchisors retain legal authority and operational control of franchisees through detailed
contractual provisions. When compared to non- franchised firms, franchising
organizations appear mechanistic, with goals to produce the same product repeatedly,
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and whose human "machies" comply with the rules as designed (Morgan 1997). In
contrast to inovation and adaptation, franchising' s underpinnings are replication,
standardization, and conforllty, creating a theoretically unprollsing context for
entrepreneurial opportunities and behaviours. Entrepreneurial behaviours, such as
innovation and adaptation, have been considered inherently ilegitimate in these and
other highly structured organizations (Kirzner 1979). Franchising's success, when
viewed from a societal or individual firm level, appears to create exceptions to
established constructs lining entrepreneurship with firm performance in both small and
large firms.
No longer considered a exclusively as small firm phenomenon, entrepreneurial
opportunities and processes have been found within corporate organizations, and have
been linked to firm performance (Kanter 1996); (Kanter 1997). Corporate
entrepreneurship has recently become a topic of discussion among both practitioners
and academics (Sharma and Chrisman 1999). Once viewed as an oxymoron,
(Stevenson and Jarilo 1990) corporate entrepreneurship has been legitiniatised by
growth in the field of firm-level entrepreneurship research (Zahra, Jennings et al. 1999).
Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) has been linked to profitability, survival, and growth
(Zahra 1996), the pursuit of competitive advantage (Covin and Miles 1999), improved
firm performance135 (Peters and Waterman Jr. 1982), value creation (Vozikis, Bruton et
al. 1999), and organizational adaptation and renewal in firms (Falbe, Dandridge et al.
1998).
135 Dess observed that the literature generally supports a notion that corporate entrepreneurship is related
to performance, but the relationship may not be immediately apparent. (Dess, Lumpkin et aL. 1999)
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When franchising firms open new outlets, they enter new markets and create new
revenue streams, arguably meeting criteria generally accepted for venturing. Although
comparative measures of entrepreneurial orientation have been developed, and shown
to be lined to improved firm performance in large firms (Covin and Miles 1999),
constructs developed in corporate entrepreneurship have not yet been applied to studies
lining entrepreneurial orientation to performance within franchising's context.
8.2 REVIEW OF THIS STUDY
One criticism of earlier theoretical approaches to studies offranchising is that they
often ignored much of the complexity and dynamics revealed in empirical studies.
Those that narrowly focused on contracting aspects or the principal and agent
relationship created by a franchise were unable to explain many of the complexities
found in empirical studies, such as multi-unit ownership, and simulataneous use of 
both
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franchised and company-owned outlets. Some franchise researchers have called for
additional theoretical development using more supple approaches, ones that link
strategies and performance. Consistent with that theme, this study pursued four primary
objectives:
1. To explore franchising's formal context, examining the nature and extent of
homogeneity in its disclosure and contractual provisions.
2. To examine relationships between firm characteristics, contractual provisions,
growth, and growth strategies among firms engaged in franchising.
3. To test the ability of characteristics and contractual provisions found in
franchising's formal context to predict measures of firm growth.
4. To examie relationships between franchising's formal context and its
operational realm, exploring the role of disclosure and contractual agreements in
franchise selection processes and daily operations of franchised businesses.
On the surface, franchised businesses appear to operate in a homogeneous and
regimented environment, circumscribed by contractual provisions in detailed, long-term
agreements. Innovation, creativity, adaptation, and risk-taking, widely accepted
indicators of entrepreneurship, are not likely to be found in organizations whose
underpinnings are replication, standardization, and strict adherence to detailed policies
and procedures. Franchising's success and socio-economic impact, despite apparent
regimentation and uniformity, creates a paradox with widely accepted paradigms of
entrepreneurship. Although potential discretion and adaptation was posited in the
literature, little or no empirical evidence was found to support its existence. The nature
and extent of entrepreneurial opportunities within franchising remained an area largely
unexplored.
Entrepreneurship research has identified characteristics and behaviours as contributors
to success in both small and large firms. As an academic discipline, entrepreneurship
has progressed beyond exclusive use of borrowed theories and broadened its scope past
the mere birth of small firms. Corporate entrepreneurship research has found that
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behaviours and strategies considered entrepreneurial among individuals were also
desirable in large firms. Empirical studies of large firms have lined performance with
entrepreneurial behaviours, strategies, and organic organization structures. Widely
accepted indicators of corporate entrepreneurship are: (1) strategic renewal within an
organization; and (2) corporate venturing through creation of new units within the same
organization. Research in corporate entrepreneurship has legitimized studies of
entrepreneurial behaviour using a firm as the unit of analysis, and has developed
entrepreneurial orientation constructs that serve as a basis of comparison among firms.
Although substantial advances have been made in establishing links between
entrepreneurship and performance in both small and large firms, entrepreneurship's
association with performance among franchised firms is less well developed.
Comparative neglect is especially apparent when franchising's socio-economic impact
is considered. One explanation is that franchising'does not conveniently fit within
previously established limits of any academic discipline. Another may be that
franchising has often been positioned in somewhat of a theoretical abyss; midway
between market and hierarchy, and half-way between corporate employment and
independent entrepreneurship.
This study's overall scope included explorations within franchising's formal context, as
defined by its disclosure documents and contractual provisions; and examinations
within its operational realm, one in which daily operations of franchised businesses are
conducted. This study began by testing assumptions ofuniforiiity within franchising's
formal context, focusing on areas that affect cooperation and fianchisee discretion in
the operations of their businesses. After an exploratory study, provisions most likely to
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affect franchise owners were gathered from disclosure and contractual documents. In
all, 24 variables that governed or defined franchisee responsibilities were
operationalized from a sample of 55 UFOC documents and franchise agreements.
Regimented disclosure requirements imposed on franchisors in the United States not
only provided fertile ground for this study, but also a logical framework for
categorizing contractual provisions. Although subjects were coded exclusively by the
author, a binary system indicating an absence or presence of specific contractual
provisions was devised to reduce error and ambiguity.
Analysis of this sample revealed differences among franchises, and areas where
franchisees were not completely circumscribed by contractual provisions. For example,
examined collectively, franchise agreements are often viewed as 'tying' agreements,
which violate anti-competitive laws in many countries. In contrast to this
generalization, nearly one-third of franchises in this sample did not require franchisees
to purchase supplies directly or through sources specified by the franchisor.
Additionally, more than 63 percent offranchisors did not require approval of local
advertising, providing discretion in local marketing to franchisees. Contrary to a
stereotypical image of a franchisee as an owner-manager of a single outlet, less than
half of franchises in this sample (49.1 percent) required that owners devote full time to
operations of their business. Based on analysis of data collected in this sample,
assumptions of uniformity and homogeneity could not be supported. Franchising does
not appear to create a uniformly constrained context in which entrepreneurial processes
are likely to be most apparent.
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The next section of this study expanded analysis offranchising's formal context,
examining relationships between franchise characteristics, contractual provisions, and
measures of firm performance. In the absence of an official source of franchise data,
facts were gathered from three independent sources. The first dataset was developed
from facts obtained through a random sample of 592 franchises posted on
FRADATA's FranchisePlanet website.136 The second gathered data from 598
franchises published in Entrepreneur Magazine's 2000 Edition of its Franchise 500(l.
The third dataset was constructed with facts from 1,201 North American franchises
obtained through Source Book Publications, publishers of Bond's Franchise Guide. m
These sources were selected because each were found to be reliable in previous studies
of franchising, because they contained information on contractual provisions and
franchise characteristics, and because they contained information on historical growth,
projected growth, and expansion strategies. The quantity of data and number of
franchises operationalized in these datasets enabled use of quantitative methods of
analysis, including factor analysis and multiple regressions.
Analysis of these datasets revealed contractual and organizational complexities among
firms not always considered in studies offranchising. For example, in FRADATA's
sample, more than 63 percent of firms employed both company-owned and franchised
outlets in their systems. Only a minority of frrms in this sample used franchising
exclusively as a means of expansion. In addition, some franchises offered different
programs and businesses within their systems. More than 15 percent offered other
programs, such as conversion programs and co-branding, while 17 percent of franchises
136 FRANDATA's FranchisePlanet website was available at http://www.fianchiseplanet.com. The
website was shut down in the Fall of2000.
137 Source Book Publication's franchise website is found at http:/hNww.worldfi'anchising.com.
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in this sample offered other business types, such as kiosks and express stores in addition
to their basic franchise concept. This suggests that all franchised outlets within a
concept or system may not necessarily require the same investment, fees, or operational
responsibilities.
A dataset was built using franchisor responses to a survey conducted by Source Book
Publications, publishers of Bond's Franchise Guide. It contained a number of franchise
characteristics, such as the year in which a company began operations, number of
outlets, and fees. This dataset also provided indicators of past performance and future
growth plans, such as the number of projected new openings in the next twelve months,
including the geographic focus of each franchisor's expansion plans. Analysis of 
this
sample revealed that franchises differed in measures of organizational complexity.
Area development agreements were offered by 51.8 percent of franchises in Source
Book's sample. Area developers assume roles corlonly associated with franchisors,
such as franchise marketing and quality control offranchised outlets. Contractual
provisions also varied among franchises. In this sample, more than two-thirds of
franchises (67.4 percent) provided financial assistance to franchisees, while 26.3
percent voluntarily disclosed earnings and/or average sales to prospective
franchisees.138
Using Source Book's dataset, three measures of growth were operationalized: (1)
compound average growth rate (CAGR); 139 (2) projected growth in number of new
outlets in the upcoming twelve month period; and (3) ratio of projected new units to
138 This finding contradicts a previous study by Mehta et aL. In this study, differences were revealed in an
ANOVA comparison of the three datasets, delimiting to only those firms within each dataset.139 CAGR= (current number of outlets) 1/11 -1; where n= age of the system in years.
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Twenty-seven variables operationalized in Source Book's dataset were reduced to a
manageable number through factor analysis. Emerging from this analysis were eight
factors, which served as inputs into a multiple regression analysis, using three measures
of franchise growth as dependent variables. The model produced an R-square value of
.500 using CAGR as the dependent variable, .367 for the percentage growth based on
projected new openings, and .283 using the actual number of projected new openings.
This model was clearly better at predicting CAGRi, an historic measure of growth, and
less effective at predicting future measures of growth.
The first two sections of this study focused entirely on franchising's formal context.
The third section concentrated on franchising' s operational realm. Semi-structured,
personal interviews were performed with six franchise owners, two of 
whom recently
terllnated agreements with their respective franchisors. Franchise owners were chosen
to represent a diverse sample of industry and franchise experience. In addition to
franchise owners, personal interviews with the general counsel and chief financial
officer of a rapidly growing franchisor were conducted. Within-case analysis was
performed on all interviewees. A cross-case comparison was performed for present and
former franchisees, comparing the role of disclosure documents in their franchise
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selection process, and in daily operations of their franchised businesses. Interviews
with franchisor representatives provided insights on franchise document creation and
evolution, as well as underlyÍng justification behind some contractual provisions. All
interviews were done in person by the author, audiotape recorded with permission from
interviewees, and transcribed.
8.3 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This section discusses the findings and implications of this study. It addresses the
initial research questions, followed by a review of the hypotheses tested, and concludes
with the examination offranchising's operational context.
8.3.1 Research Question of Homogeneity
The first research questions examined homogeneity within franchising's context, as
presented in Chapter 5 of this study. This study revealed differences among franchise
provisions, organizational structures, and concept offerings among firms in the sample.
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franchises in this sample did not include provisions to control product specifications at
a franchised outlet leveL.
Organizational complexity and diversity among franchising frrms were also revealed in
this portion ofthe study. Most franchise concepts simultaneously included company-
owned and franchised outlets in their system. Organizational hierarchies, such as area
development, sub- franchising, and master franchising agreements were also revealed.
Although collectively considered franchisees, area developers and master franchisees
may assume responsibilities for franchise sales and quality assurance, roles often
associated with franchisors. Area developers and master franchisees sign different
disclosure and franchise agreements from owners of franchised outlets, with different
fees, terms, and provisions. Combined with a prevalence of multi-unit ownership
revealed in previous studies, organizational hierarchies introduce complexity in what is
often viewed as a simple, dyadic relationship between franchisors and franchisees.
Additionally, some franchisors offered a portfolio of franchises, including different
business types and different programs to prospective franchisees, which mayor may not
be covered by the same franchise agreement. Different business types, such as kiosks,
are likely to have different franchise fees, equipment and staffing requirements, and
total start-up costs from other franchises within the same system. Some franchisors
offered other programs, such as conversion programs and co-branded outlets, which
required additional agreements to be signed as a condition of franchise purchase.
Shane's assertion that "franchisors actually offer standard contracts" (Shane 1998, p.
703) did not appear to apply when organizational hierarchies and differences among
franchise concept offerings were considered.
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8.3.2 Hypotheses Tested Using Secondary Sources of Data
In addition to broad research questions, several specific hypotheses emerged from the
literature review, as presented in Section 3.4. Details of hypotheses tested in this study
were presented in Chapter 6, and a summary ofthese findings is provided in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 provides references to correlation tables in Chapter 6, and identifies directions
of significant relationships revealed in the analysis.
Table 8.1: Summary of Specific Hypotheses Tested
No. Variable Hypothesized Variable Relationship TableRelationship Revealedla. Financial + CAGR + 6.20Assistance
PNU + 6.20
%GROW 6.20lb. Financial + Initial Start-up - 6.20Assistance Costs
2a. Area Development + CAGR 6.21
PNU + 6.21
%GROW + 6.212b. Sub- Franchising + CAGR 6.21
PNU 6.21
%GROW' 6.212c. Passive Ownership + CAGR 6.21
PNU + 6.21
%GROW + 6.213a. Area Development + Expand US 6.22
Expand Can. 6.22
Expand Intl. + 6.223b. Sub-Franch ising + Expand US 6.22
Expand Can. + 6.22
Expand Intl. + 6.223c. Passive Ownership + Expand US + 6.22
Expand Can. 6.22
Expand Intl. + 6.223d. Percent Franchised + CAGR + 6.23Outlets PNU + 6.23
.
%GROW - 6.233e. Percent Franchised
- Franchising + 6.23Outlets Experience
4a. Earnings Claim + CAGR 6.24
PNU 6.24
%GROW 6.244b. Earnings Claim + Franchise Fees + 6.244c. Earnings Claim + Agreement Term + 6.244d. Earnings Claim + Percent - 6.24
Franchised
l Outlets ! I
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As summarized in Table 8.1, positive and significant relationships were revealed
between fmancial assistance provisions in a franchise agreement, a firm's average
growth rate (as measured by CAGR), and the number of new outlets projected to be
opened in the next twelve months. Although a positive relationship between fmancing
provisions and projected growth percentage was also revealed, its coefficient was small
and not statistically significant. Contrary to Hypothesis 1 b, financial assistance
provisions were negatively associated with average investment costs, indicating that
franchisor assistance with fmancing is more likely to be found in smaller, less capital-
intensive franchise concepts. This finding suggests that potential franchisees may face
differing capital constraints dependent on the average investment cost associated with a
franchise purchase.
The second group of hypotheses examined relationships between three measures of
growth and three measures of franchisee-owned nètworks: area development, sub-
franchising, and passive ownership. Significant and positive associations were revealed
between number of projected openings, percentage growth, and two franchise network
variables; area development and passive ownership. Based on this analysis,
Hypothesis 2a and 2c were supported using projected measures of growth, but could not
be supported using CAGR as a measure of historic growth. Correlation coefficients
indicated, however, that relationships among these variables were weak. This finding
conflicts with an earlier study by Kaufmann and Kim which used CAGR as its measure
of growth (Kaufmann and Kim 1995). One reason for the discrepancy may be
associated with differences in the two datasets used for the studies. Hypothesis 2b
could not be supported using any of the three measures of growth employed in this
study.
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The third group of hypotheses tested relationships between growth strategies and
franchise networks. Franchise networks, as operationalized by area development, sub-
franchising, and passive ownership were positively and significantly associated with
franchisors that indicated more aggressive growth strategies overseas markets. In
addition to overseas market growth, passive ownership was also significantly correlated
with more aggressive growth strategies in the D.S. market. Based on this analysis,
Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c were supported for overseas growth strategies. Hypothesis
3b also received support for Canadian expansion, while 3c received support for D.S.
expansion strategies. Also tested in this group of hypotheses were relationships
between percentage of units franchised and the age and franchising experience of
franchisors. A positive and significant relationship between the numbers of years a firm
has been franchising and its ratio of franchised to total outlets was revealed. Similar
relationships were revealed between the ratio of franchised outlets and growth strategies
in the D.S., Canadian, and overseas markets. Based on this analysis, the ratio of outlets
franchised to total outlets was significantly associated with three measures of growth
and the growth strategies in U.S., Canadian, and overseas markets. Its relationship with
GROWTH, however, was negative. Hypothesis 3d, therefore, received qualified
support. Hypothesis 3e was supported, contrary to ownership redirection theories of
franchising.
The fourh group of hypotheses tested relationships between earnings claim disclosures
and measures of growth, franchisor investment risk, and ratio of franchised to total
outlets. No significant relationships were revealed between earnings claim disclosures
and any of the three measures of growth used in this study. Significant relationships
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were revealed, however, between earnings claims and measures of investment risk such
as agreement term, franchise fees, and average investment. A significant relationship
between disclosure of an earrÍings claim and the ratio of franchised outlets to total
outlets was found, but direction of the association was negative, contrary to the
hypothesized relationship. Hypothesis 4a, therefore, could not be supported. Although
Hypotheses 4b and 4c were supported, correlation coefficients indicated weak
relationships among these variables. Hypothesis 4d was not supported in this analysis.
This analysis supported a view that franchisors that disclose earnings information face
greater investment risk, and mitigate their increased risk through higher fees and
contractual provisions.
8.3.3 Formal Context Variables and Growth- Factor Analysis and Multiple
Regression
In broad terms, this section of the study examined 'the extent to which franchise
characteristics and contractual provisions explained differential performance among
franchising firms. Data were gathered from facts obtained through Source Book's
web site, operationalized into 24 variables. Factor analysis was employed to reduce the
variables to a manageable number, as detailed in Chapter 6, Section 6.7. Eight of 
the
nine factors that emerged from this analysis had eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which
were saved for input into a multiple regression analysis using SPSS v 10.0.
Firm performance was operationalized using three measures of franchise growth:
CAGR, ratio of projected new outlets to present number of outlets, and the number of
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projected outlets. 
140 Each dependent variable presented a different view of 
franchise
growth, although each had limitations. Growth, as measured by CAGR, ignored those
unts that transferred ownershi, either between franchisees or between franchisors and
franchisees. CAGR is also an unstable measure for firms in existence for less than five
years. Measures of growth based on number of projected new openings ignored
franchised outlets that ceased operations, or are acquired by franchisors. Because of
instability in CAGR, this portion of the study compared only those firms in operation
for five or more years.
Factor analysis revealed eight constructs with significant effects, although between-
subjects analysis revealed that effects differed among dependent variables. The
subsequent multiple regression model had adjusted R square of .500 for CAGR, .376
for ratio of projected openings to current number of outlets, and .283 for number of
projected openings. Regression analysis for these ithree dependent variables is
presented in Table 6.28, 6.32, and 6.30 respectively. The model exhibited limited
predictive power in projected growth of franchises, but explained half the variance in
the historic growth as measured by CAGR. Multiple regression analysis was described
in detail in Chapter 6, Section 6.8.
This finding suggests that firm characteristics and contractual provisions explain only a
portion of differential performance among franchising firms. Another finding is that
the effects of firm characteristics and contractual provisions differs depending on the
measure of growth used. The model had its greatest predictive power on historic
140 Aggregate measures of growth were not included because they ignored substantial differences among
the finns in this sample. A comparatively small number offinns exeited substantial influence on some
growth numbers. For example, in the Source Book sample, less than two percent of 
the firms accounted
for nearly ten percent of the total number of projected new outlets.
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measures of growth, and was less effective using predicted measures of growth. Since
prospective franchisees are likely to be more interested in future performance, this
study suggests that measures found in the disclosure documents and datasets derived
from them are less than effective predictors of future franchise performance.
8.3.4 Operational Realm
Analysis offranchising's formal context provided only a partial view of the
phenomenon. To exanUle franchising's operational realm, data were collected through
sell-structured interviews with franchise owners and franchisor representatives.
Although several areas were explored in these interviews, their focus was on daily
operations of a franchised business, and the role of disclosure and franchise documents
in franchise selection processes. Analysis of these interviews is presented in Chapter 7,
and transcripts of interviews are provided in Appendices G through N.
First, interviews with both franchisees and representatives of a franchisor revealed that
UFOCs and franchise agreements are periodically modified. Implications ofthis
fmding suggest that within a given franchise system or concept, established franchisees
may be operating under different contractual provisions than those who recently
purchased a franchise. Some franchisors reserve the right to make material changes to
contractual provisions during an agreement term. Items such as royalty fees or
mandatory purchases, changes that simultaneously affect all franchisees in their system,
may affect all franchisees, not just those entering the system. Contractual modifications
become especially evident at the time of contract renewal, as existing franchise owners
must now agree to provisions found in the current agreement.
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Since UFOCs and franchise agreements evolve over time, presence or absence of a
contractual provision does not necessarily mean that it was included in a previous
edition, nor can assurances be provided that will be found in subsequent editions. In
addition, at any given point in time, a franchisor may offer more than one franchise
using different franchise agreements. Area developers and master franchisees operate
under different agreements than owners of franchised outlets, which have different
provisions, fees, and contractual obligations. In other words, many different
agreements may simultaneously be in effect between a franchisor and franchisees
within the same system.
Second, franchisee interviews conducted in this study revealed that UFOC and
contractual provisions had little or no influence on daily operations of a franchised
business. In one case, a franchisee was not required to purchase an expensive piece of
equipment by her franchisor, despite a contractual requirement to do so. In another
case, a franchisee was permitted to perform cleaning services specifically prohibited by
provisions in her agreement. Although the franchise agreement specifically stated that
non-payment of royalties would result in ternUlation of the franchise, one franchisee
noted that his franchisor provided marketing and financial assistance to a franchisee that
had fallen behind in royalty payments for several months. Termination of 
this franchise
agreement by the franchisor resulted only after exhaustive efforts to improve this
franchisee's profitability failed. Although :fÌ"anchisors retain substantial power through
provisions in their franchise agreements, selective enforcement of contractual
provisions explains some of the potential differences between formal and operational
. contexts of franchising.
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As a contractual relationship between franchisors and franchisees, bound by general
business and franchise-specific regulations, it may be assumed that the formal context
of franchising defines the boundaries within which daily operations take place. As
depicted in Figure 3.6, franchising's formal context defined boundaries through
restrictions, obligations, retained franchisor authority, and other provisional aspects of
the agreement. The results of this study suggest, however, that selective or
discretionary enforcement of contractual provisions by franchisors places franchising's
operational realm partially within and partially outside the defined formal context, as
depicted in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1 Franchising's Formal Context and Operational Realm
Franchisor Authority
(implied or stated) Mandatory Obligations(i.e. Fees, Reporting)
Legal Requirements
(i.e. Trademark)
Figure 8.1 ilustrates that a franchisor's discretionary authority, as evidenced by
selective enforcement of contractual provisions, allows franchise owners to operate
outside formal boundaries defmed by their franchise agreements, as ilustrated by the
dashed lines. Enforcement of specific contractual provisions may change over time,
and mayor may not be uniformly applied to all franchise owners at any given point in
time. Although selective enforcement may involve fmancial or non-financial
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provisions, franchisors may be less likely, however, to allow operational discretion in
areas related to trademark or brand protection, or those that violate franchise regulatory
requirements. A solid line on the formal context boundary of legal requirements
indicates that this aspect of enforcement is less likely to be selectively enforced.
Third, this potion of the study revealed that many prospective franchise owners do not
read disclosure documents nor do they use them for comparative evaluation in a
franchise selection processes. Some franchisees selected a specific franchise because it
represented an opportunity to employ their technical skils. For others, purchase of a
franchised business coincided with relocation to a more desirable area in which to live
or subsequently retire. Despite a legal requirement to be written in "plain English,"
some viewed disclosure documents as "legalese," merely part of the formality
associated with a franchise purchase. One former franchisee noted that language used
in these documents stood in stark contrast to the càsual and friendly dialogues most
prospective franchisees have with franchisors before purchase. Only two franchise
owners in this sample evaluated alternative opportunities, examining UFOC documents
from several franchises before making their purchase.
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Although Muzak has embarked on a program to buy back its franchised territories, it is
continuing to support existing franchisees through national sales efforts and investments
in technology. Studies that examined franchise failures often included firms that are no
longer franchising as an indicator offailure (e.g., (Shane 1995); (Shane 1998)).
Because Muzak is no longer offering franchises, this franchise would likely be included
in a cohort of franchise failures, despite its long and continuing history of business
success for both this franchisor and existing franchisees.
8.4 COMPATIBILITY OF FINDiNGS ÍN THE LITERATURE
The author's interpretation of this study's findings is compatible with previous findings
in the literature. Phan et aI's 1996 article posited that potential for entrepreneurship by
franchisees existed because of the incomplete nature of franchise agreements (Phan,
Butler et al. 1996). The authors argued that franchisors would attempt to modify
franchise agreements over time in an effort to protect their interests. In contrast,
Lafontaine and Shaw found "a great deal of persistence in franchise contract terms
within firms" (Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, p. 1042). They concluded that franchisors
make changes in various fees every few years and that there was "significant
heterogeneity across firms in the frequency with which they change the terms of 
their
contracts" (p. 1049). Through interviews with franchisees and representatives of a
franchisor, tlus study found that franchisors make periodic revisions to their UFOC and
franchise agreements, not only in terms of fees but also in other contractual provisions.
A franchise agreement is likely to evolve over time, as experience is gained, additional
outlets are opened, and as a franchisor adds new programs or business types. Some
agreement changes may affect all franchisees in a chain, while others only affect new
franchisees and renewals.
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Earlier studies of franchising firms by Bradach revealed a plural organization form, one
in which franchised and company-owned outlets exist simultaneously within the same
firm (Bradach 1997); (Bradach 1998). His case studies described how control and
inovation processes in plural organizations mitigate weaknesses and enhance
organizational performance. This study found more than two-thirds of the 1,201
franchise firms in one sample simultaneously employed both franchised and company-
owned outlets in their organizations. A positive and significant relationship between
the ratio of franchised to total outlets and measures of firm growth was revealed in this
study.
Shane and Hoy offered the notion of a franchise as an entrepreneurial venture, arguing
that creation of franchise networks was consistent with entrepreneurial acts (Shane and
. Hoy 1996). An example of franchise networks arè those created through multi-unit
ownership by franchisees, a phenomenon prevalent in Kalnin and Lafontaine's
empirical study of the fast food industry (Kalnins and Lafontaine 1996). This study
found a prevalence of other types of franchise networks, created through area
development agreements, sub- franchising provisions, and passive ownership structures
among firms in this sample. A significant relationship between the projected growth
and presence ofthese networks was also revealed in this study. A discrepancy between
the findings of this study and that of Kaufmann and Kim's study of master franchising
and growth (Kaufmann and Kim 1995) suggests that area development, master
franchising, and sub- franchising represent differing strategies, and should be considered
separately.
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Frignani referred to disclosure requirements in the United States as "particularly dense
and complex" (Frignani 1995). Despite comprehensive franchise laws that require
extensive disclosure by franchisors, disclosure of sales or earnings information to
prospective franchisees is voluntary under present U.S. law. In Price's analysis of278
franchise documents, 26 percent of her sample made voluntary earnings claims
disclosures (Price 2000). She hypothesized that franchisors who made this voluntary
disclosure would compensate for higher investment risk associated with this disclosure
by charging higher fees. Consistent with Price's study, 26 percent of 1,201 franchises in
this study's sample provided voluntary earnings claims. This study also provided
further support for Price's conclusion that disclosure of earnings increases investment
risk for franchisors, as significant relationships between earnings claims disclosure and
franchise fees and average investment were revealed. Augmenting Price's work, this
study found a significant relationship between earnigs claim disclosure and the
average length of a franchise agreement, reflective' of the increased investment risk
faced by franchisors making earnings disclosure.
The findings of this study are compatible with Stanworth and Curran's work toward a
sociological model offranchising (Stanworth and Curran 1999). Contrary to ownership
redirection theory, 141 the authors argued that franchising is a "relatively permanent and
genuine f organization) form, rather than temporary and likely to lapse into a vertically-
integrated hierarchical organization" (p. 333). This study revealed a positive
141 Dant, Paswan, and Stanworth noted: "The ownership redirection thesis in franchising points to the
premise that franchising and franchisees may simply be short-term, early stage, development feature in
the growth patterns of certain service-oriented businesses in Western (and increasingly global)
economics. Once financial, human capital and local market intelligence resources are no longer at a
premium, the (now former) franchisor will prefer to adopt more conventional growth strategies (e.g.,
opening company branches) in order to meet future challenges and the needs for future growth (Dant,
Paswan et al. 1996, p. 48)
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relationship between the ratio of franchised to total units, and two measures of
longevity: the number of years a firm had been in existence, and the number of years it
had been franchising. In other words, firms in this sample did not reduce the ratio of
franchised to total units over time, preferring to adopt more traditional expansion
strategies through increased use of company-owned outlets. Contrary to an ownership
redirection thesis, an interview with the chief financial offcer of a franchise revealed
that company-owned stores are not always more profitable for franchisors once
depreciation and amortization are considered. Stanworth and Curran also posited that
franchising will be common when strategies of rapid market penetration over a wide
geographic area were employed. This study found that more aggressive expansion
strategies in U.S., Canadian, and overseas markets were associated with firms that had a
higher ratio of franchised to total outlets.
8.5 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Data collection and analysis revealed a number of methodological issues relevant to this
and future studies offranchising. Among them were organizational complexity, data
availability, and unit of analysis consistency.
8.5.1 Organizational complexity
What appeared on the surface to be a simple, dyadic relationship between franchisors
and owner-operator franchisees, is actually one complicated by various forms of
organizational hierarchies and structures. Organizational complexities were not always
considered in studies where relationships or contractiiig were considered exclusively as
dyadic associations among franchisors and franchisees (e.g., (Larson 1992); (Manaresi
1993); (MolTison 1997); (Spinelli Jr. and Birley 1997)). This study revealed a large
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Although collectively considered franchisees, area developers, master franchisees, and
owners of multiple outlets, and passive owners within the same franchise system have
different roles and responsibilities that were not always considered in studies of
franchisee performance, satisfaction, competence, or performance (e.g., (Brown and
Dev 1997); (Fenwick and Strombom 1998); (Knight 1986); (Shane 1998)). In some
cases, ownership and management duties of a franchised outlet may be separate.
Relationships between different franchisees and their common franchisor may differ
based, at least in part, on their position within the hierarchy. Additionally, owner-
managers' relationships with franchisors may be ihfluenced by their relationship with
an area developer or master franchisee, who often assume duties most commonly
associated with a franchisor.
Franchising, often assumed to be a collective group of individual owner-managers and a
single franchisor, is an organizational form comprised of networks of partnerships and
corporations. Franchisees may be area developers, master- franchisees, passive owners,
and/or multi-outlet owners. Some franchisee corporations, particularly in the restaurant
industry, are international firms operating hundreds of outlets. In addition to multi-unit
ownership by franchisees, other programs and business types often operate within the
same franchise concept, while co-branded outlets and multi-concept offerings by
franchisors are becoming increasingly popular. This and other empirical studies have
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revealed complexity and dynamic interactions beyond those explained by franchising's
role as a simple marketing channel or a relational contract between independent parties.
These considerations are especially important to consider when surveys of franchisees
are conducted.
8.5.2 Data Collection and Analysis
Data availability problems typically associated with studies offranchising were also
encountered during this study. UFOC and franchise agreement documents are not
readily available to the public, and only thirteen of fifty U.S. states currently require
registration of franchises (Price 2000). In registration states, national franchises and
those with no operations within the state are exempted from registration requirements
(Bercovitz 1999). In the U.S., there is no single repository of documents containing
the population of franchises. Whether through survey (e.g., (Castrogiovanni, Justis et
al. 1993)) or examination of franchise documents åt government offices, obtaining
representative samples ofUFOC and franchise agreements has been problematic in this
and other studies of franchising.
UFOCs and franchise agreements were found to contain a substantial amount of
information. The regimented framework provided a complete and reproducible format
for comparisons and cross-case analysis, however, the language used in these
documents required subjective and interpretive judgment to be exercised. To reduce
codification errors in data collection from these lengthy documents, dichotomous
variables were used to indicate a presence or absence of certain contractual
requirements. Although this system worked well for codification, it limited the number
and type of analysis options available once data had been collected.
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In the absence of an official data source on franchising, this study constructed datasets
from facts accumulated by independent publishers and other commercial organizations.
Although considered reliable in previous studies of franchising (Lafontaine 1995);
(Mehta, Luza et aI. 1999), data derived from these secondary sources imposed
limitations on this study. First, contrary to previous fmdings by Mehta, et aI., this study
found differences among sources offranchise information, restricting the fmdings
obtained in anyone sample exclusively to firms within that sample. Second, datasets
derived from these sources change over time, as firms included in one year's
publication may be omitted from the next year's edition. This was especially evident in
Entrepreneur Magazine's dataset, as revealed in a study by Clarkin, et aI. (Clarkin,
Hasbrouck et aI. 2002). Their findings support a view that the cohort of franchises
appearing in one year's publication may not be representative of those firms that
appeared in previous years or ones likely to appeat in subsequent editions.
Third, despite using comparatively large datasets, normal distributions were not
evident, presenting challenges with data screening. Outliers in firm characteristics such
as size, age, and measures of growth introduced potential distortion in the quantitative
analyses. A relatively small number oflarge firms, such as McDonald's and Subway,
often appeared as outliers in the data, and their inclusion or exclusion from a dataset
had substantial effects on some measures. Use ofCAGR as a measure of growth also
imposed limitations on this study, as it was considered unstable for firms less than five
years old. Firms less than five years old are often the fastest growing firms when
measured on a percentage basis, and have been found in previous studies to be most
likely to fail (Bates 1997); (Shane and Foo 1998).
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Larger datasets obtained from secondary sources enabled a variety of quantitative
analysis tools, although these datasets often ignored organizational complexity revealed
in more fme-grained studies of franchising. For example, while total number of
franchised and company-owned outlets was provided, numbers of co-branded outlets,
outlets operating on different programs or business types, or number of area
development and/or master franchises were not revealed. Although part of 
the same
system, these franchises differ in fees, terms, and other provisions from those of
franchise outlets.
8.5.3 Unit of Analysis
Unit of analysis distinctions have been problematic in studies of franchising.
Franchisees, often used as a unit of analysis in studies of franchising, represent a
diverse group; from individual owner-managers off a single outlet, to multi-outlet
owners, to multinational corporations with hundreds of franchised outlets. Larger
franchisees are likely to have operations that more closely resemble a franchisor than
owner-managers of single franchised outlets. Franchisees within the same franchise
system may include those that own one or more franchised outlets, area developers,
sub-franchisees, master franchisees, or be passive owners of one or more outlets.
Franchisees within the same system may be operating under different programs or
business types, such as kiosks or express locations, with different financial and
management obligations and requirements. Franchisees within the same system may
also operate co-branded outlets, with two or more concepts offered at a single outlet.
Because franchisors periodically modify their agreements, franchisees in the same
system may be operating under different franchise agreements than other fì'anchisees.
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Further, a distinction betweenFanchisees andfranchised outlets was not always
evident in previous studies of franchising.
Franchisors often serve as a unit of analysis, routinely found in studies of success or
failure (e.g., (Bates 1996);(Shane 1997)). Studies offranchisors do not always consider
that some franchisors offer franchises in several different concepts. Examples are
Tricon Global Restaurants that offers Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and KFC franchises, and
Brinker International with eight different franchise concepts.142 In addition, franchisors
of one or more concepts may also be franchisees of one or more other concepts, as
described earlier in this study. Success or failure of anyone concept does not
necessarily equate to failure of a franchisor, and distinctions between franchise concept
and franchisor are essentiaL. These distinctions have not always been made clear in
previous studies offranchising. An example is evident in Shane's study that used exit
from Entrepreneur Magazine's listing as an indicalfor offranchisor failure (Shane
1995). This magazine's listing is comprised of franchise concepts, separately listing
and differentiating between Tricon's Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and KFC concepts.
8.6 IMPLICATIONS
8.6.1 Implications for Theory
This study found support for Stanworth's observation that a study offranchising based
exclusively on its formal context presents only a partial view of the phenomenon
(Stanworth 1995). Stanworth's study revealed that despite contractual provisions that
"appeared to closely circumscribe the franchisee's freedom of action as a businessman,"
142 Brinker International is the parent company ofChili's Gril and Bar, Romano's Macaroni Grill, On the
Border Mexican Café, Maggiano's Little Italy, Coymel's Coastal Mexican Grill and Corner Bakery, and
three smaller concepts, eatZi's Market and Bakery, Big Bowl, and Wildfire. Obtained 1 
l/25/01 frOll:http://www.reportgaIlerv.com/work/Brinker2000/Brinker2000arÎ5.html.
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(p. 163) franchisees reported relatively high levels of independence. He concluded that
franchising's formal contract "was often a poor guide to the world of operational
reality," (p. 161) suggesting that an operational realm offranchisor-franchisee relations
is "not necessarily revealed by an analysis of contractual relations" (p. 165). Stanworth
posited that both a formal context and operational realm must be considered in studies
of franchising.
Consistent with Stanworth's earlier work, several differences between franchising's
formal context and its operational realm were revealed in this study. One explanation
for disparity between formal and operational contexts may be found in the selective
enforcement of contract terms by franchisors revealed in interviews with franchise
owners. Selective enforcement by franchisors suggests that substantive differences may
exist between contractual stipulations found in franchise agreements and UFOCs, and
what actually occurs in the day-to-day operations df franchised outlets. Additionally,
data derived from franchising's formal context, such as firm characteristics and
contractual provisions, had limited power in explaining firm growth as revealed in this
study's regression analysis. This finding also supports Stanworth's view that suggests
analysis offranchising's formal context presents only a parial view of the phenomenon.
This study's fmdings also offer evidence contradictory to some previous studies of
franchising. Citing Horne (1995), Price opined that most franchisors are ruthless with
franchisees that attempt to bend the rules (Horne, 1995 in (Price 1997, p. 45). Although
the sample size was small and not intended to represent the population, franchisees in
this study offered no examples of ruthless franchisor behaviour, but cited several
instances where franchisors relaxed, ignored, or did not enforce contractual
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requirements. In the case of one former franchisee, his franchisor agreed to reimburse
him for his initial investment when a new franchisee purchases his former territory,
contrary to provisions in the franchise agreement. In another case, a contractual
obligation to purchase a van was not enforced in order to give a new franchisee an
opportunity to grow her business without incurring more debt. Enforcement of
contractual provisions was not absolute, but rather remained at the discretion of
franchisors.
Stereotypical images of franchisees as owner-managers of single franchised outlets
were not supported in this study. Secondary data revealed that franchisee-owned
chains, some exceeding 700 outlets, were prevalent in the restaurant industry (FFCA
2000). The population of franchisees was found to also include area developers, master
franchisees, and those who purchased outlet(s) from another franchisee under a sub-
franchise agreement. Despite their common categorization asfranchisees, area
developers, master franchisees, multi-unit franchise owners, and single-unit owner-
managers are likely to have diverse responsibilities and duties. Interviews with
franchisees revealed that franchise marketing and quality control duties, widely
assumed to be duties of franchisors, were actually performed by area development or
master franchisees. Diversity in roles and responsibilities among a collective group of
franchisees would appear to conflict with development of a franchisee as a separate
'type' of entrepreneur, as advocated by Ucbasaran et al. (Ucbasaran, Westhead et al.
2000). Area developers and master franchisees introduce variables not always
considered in previous studies offranchisor-franchisee relations. In other words, an
owner-manager's opinion of relations with their franchisor is likely to be influenced by
an absence or presence of area developers and master franchisees in their system.
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This study also found differences among widely used sources of secondary data,
presented in Section 6.3.4, contrary to a previous study by Mehta et aL. (Mehta, Luza et
aL. 1999). In the absence of a single, official source of data on franchising, these
secondary sources of data are important to practitioners, are often used in franchise
marketing literature, and are frequently cited in the popular press. In addition,
secondary data from these sources have been previously used for theoretical
development, hypothesis testing, and sample validation in academic studies. This
suggests lillts on generalizability ofthis and other studies of franchising that employ
secondary sources of franchising data.
8.6.2 Implications for Practice
There were a number of fmdings revealed in this study with implications for those
involved in a franchise purchase. First, this study offered support for a view that most
i
prospective franchisees do not read a UFOC before making their franchise purchase.
Although these documents were shown to have consistent frameworks, and are widely
believed to be non-negotiable, this study found that franchises differed significantly in
contractual provisions and in the organizational complexity in their systems. Multi-unit
ownership, area development agreements, sub-franchising and master franchising create
hierarchies within some franchise systems. Owners of single outlets may have clear
paths for increased responsibilities and wealth creation within these organizations,
creating entrepreneurial networks (Shane and Hoy 1996).
Franchisors who provide financing may lower capital constraints faced by prospective
franchisees, enabling their systems to grow more rapidly. Although growth is not a
predictor of success, it does provide franchÌsors with econolles of scale in purchasing
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materials and marketing, widely considered to represent competitive advantages in
franchising. Voluntary earnings claim disclosures, made by 26 percent of franchises in
this sample, may be made only by more successful franchisors, those with "good news"
to report. Franchisors who disclose average outlet sales or earnings are likely to
recover their increased investment risk through higher fees, increased average start-up
costs, and longer contract terms.
Disclosure and contractual documents, those that define the formal context of
franchising, were found to have litte effect on daily operations of a franchised business.
The documents do, however, become important should a franchisor-franchisee dispute
arise, and at time of renewaL. Some franchisors selectively enforced contractual
provisions, creating disparities between what is contractually specified in an agreement
and what actually occurs in the operational realm. Despite an average term often years,
franchise contractual provisions evolve over time. 'Franchisors may retain a right to
increase fees or require upgrades to equipment or facilities during an agreement's term.
Franchisees operating within the same franchise organization may be doing so under
different contractual agreements, depending on the agreement in effect at the time of
purchase. Differences between existing and current agreements become most evident at
tinie of contract renewaL.
Another finding with implications for prospective franchisees is that substantial
differences were found among franchising firms in terms of their historical growth,
projected growth, and in their growth strategies. The inclusion or exclusion of a few,
large franchise firms, such as McDonald's or KFC, may influence aggregate measures
of franchise growth in secondary data sources. Differences between three widely used
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Measures of historic growth, such as CAGR, have limitations when used with firms in
existence for less than five years, which excludes some of the fastest growing firms.
Projected growth expressed as the number of outlets or as a ratio of projected outlets to
current size, only presents a partial picture of the dynamics of growth within
franchising, since it ignores outlet closures and transfers. Franchise firms in Source
Book's sample were also found to differ in their growth strategies, some preferring
regional or targeted growth in selected markets, while others pursued more aggressive
expansion in all designated markets.
8.6.3 Implications for Policy
Findings of this study also have implications for policy makers. Designed in similar
fashion to securities offering documents, UFOCs were perceived by franchisees as
lengthy, legal documents. Arguably, the selection process of a franchise purchase has
few similarities to a selection process of a unit trust or mutual fund, especially when
individual commitments to management are considered. Contractual provisions and
language in these documents often contrasts with discussions between prospective
franchisees and franchisor representatives. Given the language, complexity, and non-
negotiable nature of franchise agreements, these documents were viewed by some as a
formality, the "fine print" ofthis complex business transaction. Despite a requirement
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to be written in plain English, DFOCs are read by few prospective franchisees, making
it an ineffective communication and disclosure vehicle.
Nearly 40 percent of North American franchisors surveyed by Source Book
Publications intend to expand into overseas markets. Emerging economies, such as
Poland, represent potentially attractive markets for franchisors (Service 1998).
Emerging and developed countries and provinces have considered adoption ofthe D.S.
system of franchise legislation. The Canadian Province of Alberta, for example, first
adopted a system of franchise registration in 1971, and has recently enacted more
stringent disclosure regulations, in similar fashion to a DFOC (Coleman 1998). Ontario
and the remainder of Canadian provinces have also debated statutory obligations of
franchise disclosure (Cohen 1998). This study revealed that the D.S. system of
disclosure, as characterized by a DFOC and franchise agreement, has limitations as an
efficient communication vehicle between franchisòrsand prospective franchisees, and
may provide a less than effective prototype for jurisdictions considering franchise-
specific legislation.
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comparison system had not been scrutinized by systematic research (Clarkin,
Hasbrouck et al. 2002). The adequacy of these secondary data sources as a reliable
source of comparative information on franchises is questionable, requiring further
study.
Given an official source of reliable information on firms engaged in franchising,
rigorous acadellc research would be facilitated, establishing meaningful constructs for
comparing success and performance among firms. When franchising's socio-economic
impact in North America is considered, and the costs of dispute and litigation between
franchisors and franchisees is weighed, an offcial source of franchise data appears
justified.
Although tec1mical and lifestyle aspects are also considered, an ability of a franchised
business to produce profits is an important part of 
'many franchise selection processes.
Despite its importance to prospective franchisees, disclosure of average outlet sales,
costs, or earnings is voluntary under present U.S. Federal Trade Commission
regulations. 143 Earnings disclosure has been a topic of debate for many years
(Wieczorek 1999), and is often a subject of franchisor- franchisee disputes, litigation,
and federal investigations. Employing a larger sample, this study found that 26 percent
of franchises disclosed earnings information in their UFOC, consistent with Price's
earlier study (Price 2000). Representing 800 franchisors and 28,000 franchisees, the
,International Franchise Association (IF A) strongly opposed mandatory earnings
disclosure (DeBolt and Shay 1999). The authors noted that the membership viewed a
143 The only lawful mechanism for franchisors or their representatives to disclose outlet sales, costs, or
profits is through Item 19 ofa UFOC.
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mandatory one-size- fits-all approach to fmancial performance as impractical, and fails
to consider the many variations that exist among the dozens of industries and thousands
of companies in franchising. . They argue that information is available through direct
communication with existing franchisees. This study revealed through interviews with
existing and former franchise owners the importance of due diligence through UFOC
examination and direct communication with existing and former franchisees before
franchise purchase. This study also revealed that franchisors that disclose earnigs seek
to recover their increased investment risk through higher fees and longer contract terms.
8.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Lewis observed that contracts are mutual business plans, and while they fortify
prollses, they restrict flexibility (Lewis 1990). He argued that too much planning
implies a lack of trust. 144 Trust becomes both possible and important in contexts where
both parties have something at risk (Wicks, Berman et aL. 1999). In his review of 
the
literature, Ring concluded that trust played two important roles in facilitating econollc
exchange: (l) trust served as a substitute for more formal control systems, such s
contracts; and (2) trust served as an enabling condition facilitating ongoing cooperative
relationships (Ring 1996). Empirical studies have found that trustworthiness among
parties to a contract were positively associated with resource exchange and
combination, creating value for a firm, and increasing innovation (Tsai and Ghoshal
1998). Falbe and Dandridge found the most troubling results revealed in their study
was a lack of trust in the franchisor by franchisees (Falbe and Dandridge 1992).
Greater trust facilitated "open" agreements, ones focused on desired outcomes rather
than interim structures and plans (Haii, Stevenson et aL. 1995). The context of
144 Trust refers to the belief 
that contracting partners wil honor the contractual tenus and will not take
advantage even when the opportunity is available, and is key to contracting longevity and success
(Hudson and McArthur 1994).
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franchising appears to represent fertile ground for studies that examie trust among
contracting parties.
This study employed several measures of growth, each derived from changes in the
number of outlets. Within organizations, growth through additional outlets is consistent
with venturing, one of the widely accepted indicators of corporate entrepreneurship
(Guth and Ginsberg 1990). Although preliminary in nature, the explanatory power of
the regression analysis in this study suggests that a typology of firms within franchising
is possible, consistent with the entrepreneurial orientation approach used by Covin and
Slevin (Covin and Slevin 1991). Further research could develop a typology of
franchising firms, based on their entrepreneurial orientation using franchisee networks
as a basis for comparison.
This study represented one of the first explorations of franchise networks, examining
the relationship between area development agreements, master franchising, and passive
ownership with various forms of firm growth. In Kaufmann and Kim's survey of 169
franchisors, the authors found that master franchisors grew faster than those that did not
engage in that practice (Kaufiann and Kim 1995). The authors did not rule out that
these systems grew because of their ability to attract individuals interested in area
development and sub- franchising, while slower growing systems may be less likely to
offer the same opportunities. Causality was not examined in either Kaufìnann and
Kim's or in this study, and further examination is needed to determine whether presence
of franchise networks is an enabling attribute or a result of franchise system growth.
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This study exallned the potential for entrepreneurial opportunities within franchising's
context, building on a framework of context and opportunity recognition. While this
study focused on associations among variables, future work in this area may employ
longitudinal studies offranchising firms. One example would be an examination of
changes in firm performance realized by a franchise before and after providing financial
assistance or earnigs claim disclosure. Following the theme established in
entrepreneurship research, future studies could build on this examination of context and
presence of opportunities toward exploitation of identified opportunities. Development
of franchise networks provides a basis for continued exploration in this area.
Relationships among individuals in franchising and between franchising's formal and
operational contexts may be better performed using a case study methodology,
considering variations among franchise documents and organizational complexity found
within franchise organizations. De Rose observed'that strategic alliances and various
forms of partnerships are analogous to marriages (DeRose 1994). In similar fashion,
relationships between franchisors and franchisees have also been compared to
marriages (Mendelsohn 1992); (Morrison 1997). As in relationships between partners
in a marriage, personalities and other human behaviours become key determinants of
performance, success, and/or failure. If franchising is analogous to marriage, franchise
agreements and disclosure documents may serve a function analogous to pre-nuptial
agreements between marital partners. In both instances, these documents have little to
do with the daily conduct of the parties, but usually play an important par in
determining each party's legal rights in the event of separation or dissolution.
John E. Clarkin 335
REFERENCES
Aaker, D. A. and A. L. Biel, Eds. (1993). Brand Equity and Advertising: Advertising's Role in Building
Strong Brands. Hillsdale ,New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Abell, M. (1998). "Tough Times Ahead for EU Franchisors." Franchising Business & Law Alert 4(1): 1.
Adams, 1. N., K. V. P. Jones, et al. (1997). Franchising. London, England, Butterworths.
Adler, M. F. (1999). Statement ofMichael F. Adler to the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives,
United States House of Representatives. 1999.
AlIen, R. L. (1999). Republicans' 'fair-franchising' revival stirs conflict. Nation's Restaurant News. New
York: 1,6.
Anderson, A. R. and A. McAuley (1999). "Marketing Landscapes: The Social Context." Qualitative
Market Research: An International Journal 2(3): 176- 188.
anonymous (1994). FTC Continues Increased Enforcement of Flourishing Fránchise Industry, US.
Federal Trade Commission.
anonymous (1996). The Lanham Act: Alive and Well After 50 Years, International Trademark
Association. 2001.
anonymous (1998). Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, DC, US. Federal Trade Commission:
445.
anonymous (1998). Lanham Act, Bitlaw: A Resource on Technology Law. 2001.
anonymous (1998). Trends in Franchising, Arthur Andersen. 1999.
anonymous (1999). "Franchising ProfileOffers Comprehensive Overview." Franchising World 31(1): 42.
anonymous (1999). International Trends in Franchising, Arthur Andersen. 1999.
anonymous (1999). Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising, International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law. 2001.
anonymous (1999). Non-Compete Agreements Protect Competitive Edge, Too, Duff, Dubberly, Turer,
White & Boykin, LLC.1999.
anonymous (2000). An Antitrust Primer, US. Federal Trade Coimnission. 2001.
anonymous (2000). Appendix 1- Laws Enforced by the FTC, US. Federal Trade Commission. 2001.
anonymous (2000). State Offces Administering Franchise Disclosure Laws, US. Federal Trade
Commission. 2001.
anonymous (2000). The Uniform Franchise Offering Circulal- Guidelines, North American Securities
Administrators Association. 2002.
anonymous (2000). Vision, Mission & Goals, US. Federal Trade Commission. 2001.
anonymous (2001). 22nd Anual Franchise 500tI. Entrepreneur: 308.
anonymous (2001). Canada Country Commercial Guide, US. Commercial Service.
anonymous (2001). European Code of Ethics for Franchising, Field Fisher Waterhouse. 2001.
Baldwin, 1. R. (1995). Inovation: The Key To Success in Small Firs. Canada, Micro-Economic
Studies and Analysis Division, Statistics Canada and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research:
1-25.
Barney, 1. (1991). "Fir Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage." Journal of 
Management 17(1): 99-120.
Barney,1. B. (1999). "How a Fir's Capabilities Affect Boundary Decisions." Sloan Management
Review 40(3): 137-146.
Barrett, H. and A. Weinstein (1998). "The Effect of Market Orientation and Organizational Flexibility on
Corporate Entrepreneurship." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23(1): 57.
Barrow, C. (1989). Franchising. Small Business and Entrepreneurship. P. Burns and 1. Dewhurst.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, MacMillan Press L TD: 166-179.
Barzel, Y. (1989). Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University
Press.
Bates, T. (1995). "Analysis of Survival Rates Among Franchise and Independent Small Business
Startups." Journal of Small Business Management(April): 26-37.
Bates, T. (1996). Survival Patterns Among Franchise and Nonfranchise Firms Started in 1986 and 1987,
United States Small Business Administration; Offce of Advocacy. 1998.
Bates, T. (1997). "Survival Patterns Among Newcomers to Franchising." Journal of Business Venturing
13(2).
Bates, T. (1999). Statement ofDr. Timothy Bates to the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives,
United States House of Representatives. 1999.
John E. Clarkin 336
Bates, T. and W. Bradford (1995). "Look Before You Leap: The Franchise Route to Self-Employment."
The Review of Black Political Economy(Spring): 77-83.
Baucus, D. A., M. S. Baucus, et aL. (1993). "Choosing a Franchise: How Base Fees and Royalties Relate
to the Value of the Franchise." journal of Small Business Management(April).
Baucus, D. A., M. S. Baucus, et aL.,(1996). "Consensus in Franchise Organizations: A Cooperative
Arangement Among Entrepreneurs." Journal of Business Venturing 11: 359-378.
Baum, 1. R., E. A. Locke, et al. (1998). "A Longitudinal Study of 
the Relation of Vision and VisionCommunication to Venture Growth in Entrepreneurial Finns." Journal of Applied Psychology
83(1): 43-54.
Baumol, W. 1. (1993). "Formal Entrepreneurship Theory in Economics: Existence and Bounds." Journal
of Business Venturing 8: 197-210.
Beales Il, 1. H. and T. Muris (1995). "The Foundations of Franchise Regulation: Issues and Evidence."
Journal of Corporate Finance 2: 157-197.
Bello, D. c., S. P. Dant, et aL. (1997). "Hybrid Governance: The Role of 
Transaction Costs, Production
Costs and Strategic Considerations." Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 12(2): 118-133.
Bercovitz,1. E. L. (1999). An analysis of the Contract Provisions in Business-Format Franchise
Agreements. 13th Annual Society of Franchising Conference, Miami Beach, Florida.
Bhat, S. and S. K. Reddy (1998). "Symbolic and Functional Positioning of 
Brands. " Journal of Consumer Marketing 15(1): 32-43.
Bhide, A. V. (2000). The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses. New York, Oxford University Press.
Biel, A. L. (1993). Converting Image into Equity. Brand Equity & Advertising: Advertising's Role in
Building Strong Brands. D. A. Aaker and A. L. BieL. Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Biggadike (1979). "The Risky Business of Diversification. "Harvard Business Review May-June: 103-
111.
Birch, D. L. (1987). Job creation in America: how our smallest companies put the most people to work.
New York
London, Free Press;
Collier Macmillan.
Birch, D. L. and S. McCracken (1987). The Small Business Share of Job Creation: Lessons Learned from
the Use of Longitudinal Data. Washington, DC, US .Small Business Administration.
Bird, B. (1988). "Implementing Entrepreneurial Ideas: The Gase for Intention." Academy of 
Management Review 13(3): 442-453.
Birkinshaw,1. (1997). "Entrepreneurship in Multinational Corporations: The Characteristics of
Subsidiary Initiatives." Strategic Management Journal 18(3): 207-229.
Birley, S., B. Leleux, et aL. (1997). "Franchising Your Way to Riches? An Analysis of 
Value Creation in
Public Franchisors." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Birley, S. and P. Westhead (1990). "Growth and Performance Contrasts Between 'Types' of 
SmallFirms." Strategic Management Journal 11: 535-557.
Birley, S. and P. Westhead (1993). "A Comparison of New Businesses Established by 'Novice' and
'Habitual' Founders in Great Britain." International Small Business Journal 12(1): 38-60.Blackett, T. (1998). Trademarks. Houndmills, England, MacMilan Press Ltd.
Blair, M. M. (1995). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Comorate Governance for the Twenty-First
Century. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution.
Blanchflower, D. G. and A. 1. Oswald (1998). "What Makes an Entrepreneur?" Journal of 
Lab or Economics 16(1): 26-61.
Block, Z. and i. C. MacMiIan (1993). Corporate Venturing: Creating New Businesses Within the Firm.
Boston, Harvard Business School Press.
Blois, K. (1998). "Don't All Firms Have Relationships?" Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
13(3): 256-270.
Bouchikhi, H. (1993). "A Constructivist Framework for Understanding Entrepreneurship Performance."
Organization Studies 14(4): 549-570.
Boyd, N. G. and G. S. Vozikis (1994). "The Influence of Self-Effcacy on the Development of
Entrepreneurial Intentions and Actions." Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 18(4): 63-89.
Bradach,1. L. (1995). Chains Within Chains: The Role of Multi-Unit Franchisees. Franchising:
Contemporary Issues and Research. P. 1. Kaufinann and R. P. Dant. New York, The Haworth
Press, Incl: 65-80.
Bradach, 1. L. (1997). "Using the Plural Fonn in the Management of Restaurant Chains." AdministrativeScience Quarterly 42(2): 276-303.
Bradach,1. L. (1998). Franchise Organizations. Boston, Harvard Business School Press.
John E. Clarkin 337
Brickley,1. A. and F. H. Dark (1987). "The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case for Franchising."
Journal of Financial Economics 18: 401-420.
Brockhaus, R. H. S. (1980). "Risk Taking Propensity of 
Entrepreneurs. 
" Academy of Management Journal 23(3): 509-520.
Brown, H. (1985). Franchising: Realities and Remedies. New York, Law Journal Seminars-Press.
Brown, 1., Willam O. (1998). "Transaction Costs, Corporate Hierarchies, and the Theory of
Franchising." Joural of Economic Behavior & Organization 36: 319-329.
Brown, 1. R. and C. S. Dev (1997). "The Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship: A Key to Franchise
Performance." Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly(December): 30-38.
Brush, C. G. and R. Chaganti (1996). "Cooperative Strategies in Non-High- Tech New Ventures: An
Exploratory Study." Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Winter).
Bucklin, L. P. (1971). The Economic Base ofFranchising. Contractual Marketing Systems. D. N.
Thompson. Lexington, MA, Heath Lexington.
Bull, i. and G. E. Wilard (1993). "Towards a Theory of 
Entrepreneurship. 
" Journal of Business 
Venturing 8: 183-195.
Burgelman, R. A. (1983). "A Process Model ofInternal Corporate Ventuing in the Diversified Major
Firm." Administrative Science Quarterly 28(June): 223-244.
Burshtein, S. (1998). "The First Five Years of the New Canadian Trademark Licensing Regime." IDEA:
The Journal of Law and Technology 38(569).
Bygrave, W. D. (1989). "The Entrepreneurship Paradigm (I): A Philosophical Look at Its Research
Methodologies." Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Fall): 7-26.
Bygrave, W. D. and 1. S. Spinelli (1992). "Partnership Franchising: Maximizing the Entrepreneurial and
Financial Leverage in Franchising." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research: 575-583.
Cahil, D. 1. (1998). "Organizational Decline and Innovation: Are Entrepreneurs a Special Case?"
Academy of Management Review 23(3): 387-388.
Camerer, C. and D. Lovallo (1999). "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach."
The American Economic Review 89(1): 306-318.
Carland,1. W., F. Hoy, et al. (1984). "Differentiating Entrepreneurs from Small Business Owners: A
Conceptualization." Academy of Management Review 9(2): 354-359.
Castrogiovanni, G. 1., N. Bennet, et al. (1995). "Franchisor Types: Reexamination and Clarification."
Journal of Small Business Management 33(1): 45-55.
Castrogiovanni, G. 1. and R. T. Justis (1998). "Franchising Oonfigurations and Transitions." Journal of
Consumer Marketing 15(2).
Castrogiovanni, G. 1., R. T. Justis, et al. (1993). "Franchise Failure Rates: An Assessment of 
Magnitude
and Influencing Factors." Journal of Small Business Management(April): 105-114.
Caulkins, D. (1988). Networks and Narratives: An Anthropological Perspective for Small Business
Research. Stirling, Scottish Enterprise Foundation.
Caves, R. E. and W. F. Murphy (1976). "Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets." Southern
Economic Journal 42(April): 572-586.
Celedonia, B. H. (1999). Review of Basic Principles of Trademark Law, Cowan, Liebowitz & Latinan,
PC; Lawoffice.com. 1999.
Chaston, i. (1997). "Small Firm Performance: Assessing the Interaction Between Entrepreneurial Style
and Organizational Structure." European Journal of 
Marketing 31(11/12).
Chell, E. (1999). "The Social Constructionism of Entrepreneurship. "
Chell, E., 1. M. Haworth, et al. (1991). The entrepreneurial personality: concepts, cases and categories.
London; New York, Rout!edge.
Chrisman, 1. 1., A. Bauerschmidt, et al. (1998). "The Determinants of new venture performance: an
extended modeL." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23(1): 5(2).
Chung, L. H. and P. T. Gibbons (1997). "Corporate Entrepreneurship: The Roles ofIdealogy and Social
CapitaL." Group & Organization Management 22(1): 10-30.
Churchill, N. (1997). Mastering Enterprise 8: The Six Key Phases of Company Growth. Financial Times:
2.
Clarkin, 1. and P. Rosa (2000). The Franchisee as Entrepreneur. 10th Anual Global Entrepreneurship
Research Conference, The Management School, Imperial College of Science, Technology &
Medicine, London, UK.
Clarkin,1. E., R. B. Hasbrouck, et al. (2002). Predicting the Winners of the Franchise 500. 16th AnnualInternational Society ofFranchising Conference, Orlando, Florida.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature ofthe Firm. The Nature of the Firm. O. E. Williamson and S. G. Winter.
New York, Oxford University Press: 18-33.
Coble, H. (1998). The Small Business Franchise Act of 1998, US House of 
Representatives. 1999.
John E. Clarkil1 338
Cohen,1. S. (1971). Conflict and its Resolution in a Franchise System. Contractual Marketing Systems.
D. N. Thompson. Lexington, MA, Heath Lexington.
Cohen, L. (1999). Statement of Lawrence Cohen to the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives,United States House ofRepresentatives. 1999.
Cohen, M. (1998). "View From Canada: Ontario to Enact Franchise Law?" Franchising Business & Law
Alert 4(11): 1.
Cohen, M. (1999). Alberta Franchises Act, Marcus Cohen Law Office. 2001.
Coleman, e. E. (1998). "Comment: The Alberta Franchises Act, a Change in Approach for the First
Provincial Regulation of the Franchisng Industry in Canada." The Transnational Lawyer
11(135).
Combs, 1. G. and 1. Ketchen, David 1. (1999). "Can Capital Scarcity Help Agency Theory Explain
Franchising? Revisiting the Capital Scarcity Hypothesis." Academy of Management Journal
42(2): 196.
Commission, U. S. F. T. (1986). Part 436- Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventues. Title 16- Commercial Practices; Chapter 1;
Subchapter D- Trade Regulation Rules. Washington, D.e.
Cooper, A., M. Ramachandran, et aL. (1996). "Entrepreneurial Time Allocation: Antecedents and
Performance Implications." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Cooper, A. C., T. B. Folta, et al. (1995). "Entrepreneurial Information Search." Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 10: 107-120.
Covin, 1. G. and M. P. Miles (1999). "Corporate Entrepreneurship and the Pursuit of CompetitiveAdvantage." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23(3): 47.
Covin, 1. G. and D. P. Slevin (1989). "Strategic Management of Small Firms in Hostile and Benign
Environments." Strategic Management Journal 10: 75-87.Covin, 1. G. and D. P. Slevin (1991). "A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship as Firm Behavior."
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Fall): 7-25.
Covin, 1. G., D. P. Slevin, et aL. (1994). "Content and Performance of Growth-Seeking Strategies: A
Comparison of Small Firs in High and Low Technology Industries." Journal of 
Business Venturing 3: 391-411.
Cuningham, F. (1998). Ireland- New Franchise Regulations: Dublin, U.S. Department of 
State: 8.Curan,1. and 1. Stanworth (1983). "Franchising in the Mod~rn Economy- Towards a Theoretical
Understanding." International Small Business Journal 2(1): 8-37.Dana, L. P. (1992). "A Look at Small Business in Austria." Journal of Small Business
Management(October): 126-130.
Dant, R. P. (1995). "Motivation for Franchising: Rhetoric vs. Reality." International Small Business
Journal 14(1): 10-32.
Dant, R. P. and N. i. Nasr (1998). "Control Techniques and Upward Flow ofInformation in Franchising
in Distant Markets: Conceptualization and Preliminary Evidence." Joural of 
Business Venturing 13(1): 3-28.
Dant, R. P., A. K. Paswan, et al. (1996). "Ownership Redirection Trends in Franchising." Interational
Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research 2(3): 48-67.
Das, T. K. and B.-S. Teng (1998). "Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner
Cooperation in Alliances." Academy of Management Review 23(3): 491-512.
Davidow,1. and e. P. MacKernan (1997). An Introduction to European Union Competition Law,
Ablondi, Foster, Sobin & Davidow, p.c. 2000.
Davidsson, P. (1989). "Entrepreneurship- and After? A Study of Growth Wilingness in Small Firms."
Journal of Business Venturing 4: 211-226.
Davis, 1. H., F. D. Schoorman, et al. (1997). "Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management." Academy
of Management Review 22(1): 20-47.
de Vaus, D. A. (1996). Surveys in Social Research. London, UCL Press Limited.
DeBolt, D. 1. and M. R. Shay (1999). Franchise Rule Comment, International Franchise Association.
2000.
DeCastro,1. 0., S. A. Alvarez, et aL. (1997). "Nature of Business Closings." Frontiers of
Entrepreneurship Research.
Deeks,1. (1976). The Small Finn Owner-Manager: Entrepreneurial Behavior and Management Practice.
New York, Praeger Publishers.
Deligonul, Z. S. and S. T. Cavusgil (1997). "Does the Comparative Advantage Theory of 
Competition
Really Replace the Neoclassical Theory of 
Perfect Competition?" Journal of Marketing 61(4):65-74.
John E. Clarkin 339
Demsetz, H. (1987). The Theory of the Firm Revisited. The Nature of the Fir. O. E. WiIiamson and S.
G. Winter. New York, Oxford University Press: 159-178.
DeRose, L. 1. (1994). The Value Network: Integrating the Five Critical Processes That Create Customer
Satisfaction. New York, AMCOM.
Dess, G. G., G. T. Lumpkin, et al. (1999). "Linking Corporate Entrepreneurship to Strategy, Structure,
and Process: Suggested Research Directions." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23(3): 85.
Drucker, P. F. (1985). Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles. New York, Harper &
Row.
Dunam, E. W., W. A. Darrin Jr., et al. (1998). "Franchisor Attempts to Control the Dispute Resolution
Forum: Why the Federal Arbitration Act Trumps the New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision in
Kubis." Rutgers Law Journal 29(Winter): 237.
Easterby-Smith, M., R. Thorpe, et al. (1991). Management Research: An Introduction. London, Sage
Publications.
Eggers, 1. H., K. T. Leahy, et al. (1996). "Leadership, Management, and Culture in High-Performance
Entrepreneurial Companies." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review." Academy of 
Management Review 14(1): 57-74.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). "Buiding Theories From Case Study Research." Academy of 
Management Review 14(4): 532-550.
Elango, B. and V. H. Fried (1997). "Franchising Research: A Literature Review and Synthesis." Journal
of Small Business Management 35(3): 68-81.
Emerson, R. W. (1998). "Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees
Claim the Franchisor Discriminates." American Business Law Journal35( 4): 559-646.
Evans, D. S. and L. S. Leighton (1989). "Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship. " The American
Economic Review 79(3): 519-535.
Falbe, C. M. and T. C. Dandridge (1992). "Franchising as a Strategic Partnership: Issues of Co-operation
and Conflict." International Small Business Journal 10(3): 40-52.
Falbe, C. M., T. C. Dandridge, et aL. (1998). "The Effect of Organizational Context on Entrepreneurial
Strategies in Franchising." Journal of Business Venturing 14: 125-140.
Felstead, A. (1991). Facing Up to the Fragility of , Minding Your Own Business' as a Franchisee. Paths of
Enterprise: The Future of the Small Business. 1. Curran and R. A. Blackburn. London,
Routledge.
Fenwick, G. D. and M. Strombom (1998). "The Determinants ofFranchisee Performance: An Empirical
Investigation." International Small Business Journal 16(4): 28-46.
FFCA (1999). 1999 Chain Restaurant Industry Review & Outlook. Scottsdale, AZ, Franchise Finance
Corporation of America (FFCA): i-74.
FFCA (2000). 2000 Chain Restaurant Industry Review & Outlook. Scottsdale, AZ, Franchise Finance
Corporation of America (FFCA): i-84.
Filion,1. L. (1998). Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owner-Managers. The State of
the Art in Small Business and Entrepreneurship. P.-A. Julien. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing.
Frankel, R., 1. S. Whipple, et al. (1996). "Formal versus Infonnal Contracts: Achieving Allance
Success." International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 26(3): 47-63.
Freeman, 1. (1999). "Efficiency and Rationality in Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly
44(1): 163-175.
Frignani, A. (1995). Disclosure in Franchise Agreements, Bruxelles.
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. London, England,
Hamish Hamilton.
Galbraith, C. S. and D. R. Latham (1996). "Reluctant Entrepreneurs: Factors of Participation,
Satisfaction, and Success." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Gamir, A. and R. Mendez (2000). "Business Networks and New Distribution Methods: The Spread of
Franchises in Spain." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24(3): 653-674.
Gartner, W. B. (1985). "A Conceptual Framework for Describing the Phenomenon of New Venture
Creation." Academy of Management Review 10(4): 696-706.
Gartner, W. B. (1988). ""Who is an Entrepreneur?" Is the Wrong Question." Entrepreneurship Theory &
Practice(Summer): 47-68.
Gartner, W. B. (1990). "What are we Talking About When we Talk About Entrepreneurship?" Journal of
Business Venturing 5(1): 15-28.
Gartner, W. B., T. R. Mitchell, et al. (1989). "A Taxonomy of New Business Ventures." Journal of
Business Venturing 4: 169-186.
John E. Clarkin 340
Gaski,1. F. (1996). "Distribution Channels: A Validation Study." International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 26(5): 64-93.
Gassenheimer, 1. B., D. B. Baucus, et al. (1996). "Cooperative Arrangements Among Entrepreneurs: An
Analysis of Opportunism and Communication in Franchise Structures." Journal of 
Business Research 36: 67-79.
Gentry, 1. 1. (1996). "Carrier Involvement in Buyer-Supplier Strategic Partnerships." International
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 26(3): 14-25.
Gibbons, R. (1999). "Taking Coase Seriously." Administrative Science Quarterly 44: 145-157.
Gorman, G., D. Hanlon, et al. (1997). "Some Research Perspectives on Entrepreneurship Education,
Enterprise Education and Education for Small Business Management: A Ten-Year Literature
Review." International Small Business Journal 15(3): 56-77.
Govermnent, U. S. (1986). Subchapter D- Trade Regulation Rules
Title 16- Commercial Practices
Part 436- Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising ~md Business Opportunity
Ventures, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. 1999.
Government, U. S. (1997). FTC Seeks Public Comment on Revisions to Franchise Rule, U.S. Federal
Trade Commission. 1999.
Gray, 1. H. (1998). A Predictive Model of Small Business Success. Allied Academies International
Conference, Las Vegas, Allied Academies, Inc.
Greene, P. G., C. G. Brush, et al. (1999). "The Corporate Venture Champion: A Resource-Based
Approach to Role and Process." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23(3): 103.
Gulati, R. (1998). "Allances and Networks." Strategic Management Journal 19: 293-317.Guth, W. D. and A. Ginsberg (1990). "Guest Editors' Introduction: Corporate Entrepreneurship."
Strategic Management Journalll(Summer): 5-15.
Ha, C. L. (1998). "The Theory of Reasoned Action Applied to Brand Loyalty." Journal of Product &Brand Management 7(1): 51-61.
Harrigan, K. R. (1998). "Franchise Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 43(4): 963-966.
Harris, N. and M. France (1997). Pranchisees get Feisty. Business Week: 65-67.
Hart, M. M., H. H. Stevenson, et al. (1995). "Entrepreneurship: A Definition Revisited." Frontiers of
Entrepreneurship Research.
Hart, O. D. (1987). Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of 
the Firm. The Nature of the Fir. O. E.Williamson and S. G. Winter. New York, Oxford University Press.
Herbert, T. T. and D. V. Brazeal (1999). Entrepreneurializing the Organization: Archetypes of
Commitment to Corporate Entrepreneurship and Implications for Strategic Entrepreneurship.
International Council for Small Business, Naples, Italy.
Hill, 1. and P. McGowan (1996). "Marketing Development Through Networking: A Competancy Based
Approach for Small Finn Entrepreneurs." Small Business and Enterprise Development 3: 148-
156.
Hills, G. E., G. T. Lumpkin, et al. (1997). "Opportuity Recognition: Perceptions and Behaviors."
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Hoffinan, R. C. and 1. F. Preble (1993). "Franchising Into the Twenty-First Century." Business Horizons
36(6): 35-44.
Hornsby,1. S., D. W. Naffziger, et al. (1993). "An Interactive Model of the Corporate Entrepreneurship
Process." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice Winter: 29-37.
Howe, M. (1996). Vertical Restraints: A United Kingdom Perspective, Offce of Fair Trading. 2000.
Hoy, F. (1994). "The Dark Side ofFranchising." International Small Business Journal 12(2): 26-38.Hudson, R. L. and A. W. McArthur (1994). "Contracting Strategies in Entrepreneurial and Established
Finns." Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Spring): 43-59.
Huse, M. and H. Landstrom (1997). "European Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research:
Methodological Openness and Contextual Differences." International Studies of 
Management 
and Organization 27(3): 3-12.
Jambulingham, T. and 1. R. Nevin (1999). "Influence on Pranchisee Selection Criteria on Outcomes
Desired by the Franchisor." Journal of Business Venturing 14: 363-395.
Jarilo, 1. C. (1988). "On Strategic Networks." Strategic Management Journal 9: 31-41.
Jarilo,1. C. (1993). Strategic Networks: Creating the Borderless Organization. Oxford, England,
Butterworth- Heinemann.
Jeffries, F. L. and R. Reed (2000). "Trust and Adaptation in Relational Contracting." Academy of
Management Review 25(4): 873.
Jehn, K. A. (1997). "A Qualitative Analysis of Conflict Types and Dimensions in Organizational
Groups." Administrative Science Quarterly 42(3): 530-557.
John E. Clarkin 341
Jennings, P. and G. Beaver (1997). "The Performance and Competitive Advantage of 
Small Firs: AManagement Perspective." International Small Business Joural 15(2).
Johnson,1. L. (1999). "Strategic Integration in Industrial Distribution Channels: Managing the Interfirm
Relationship as a Strategic Asset." Academy of Marketing Science Journal 27(1): 4-18.
Johnson, T. P. (2000). Franchisor v. Franchisor and the Lanham Act: False Advertising and Infringement
of Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Dress. American Bar Association Forum on
Franchising, New Orleans, Louisiana, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP.
Jones, G. R. and 1. E. Butler (1992). "Managing Internal Corporate Entrepreneurship: An Agency Theory
Perspective." Journal of Management 18(4): 733-750.
Jones, G. R. and 1. M. George (1998). "The Experience and Evolution of Trust: hiiplications for
Cooperation and Teamwork." Academy of Management Review 23(3): 531-547.
Justis, R. T. and R. Judd (1986). "Master Franchising: A New Look." Journal of Small BusinessManagement(July): 16-21.
Kalnins, A. and F. Lafontaine (1996). The Characteristics of Multi-Unit Own,ership in Franchising:
Evidence from Fast-Food Restaurants in Texas. Cambridge, MA, NBER Working Papers. 5859.
Kanouse, K. 1. (1990). Business Expansion Strategies, Kanouse & Walker, PA. 2000.
Kanter, R. M. (1996). The Change Masters: Corporate Entrepreneurs at Work. London, International
Thomson Business Press.
Kanter, R. M. (1997). When Giants Learn to Dance. London, International Thomson Business Press.
Kao, 1. 1. (1991). The Entrepreneurial Organization. London, England, Prentice-HalL.
Kaufiii an, 1. H. and P. 1. Hines (1997). Europe's One-Stop Trademark Shop, Oblon Spivak. 2001.
Kaufiiiann, P. 1. and R. P. Dant (1996). "Multi-Unit Franchising: Growth and Management Issues."
Journal of Business Venturing 11(5): 343-358.
Kaufrann, P. 1. and R. P. Dant (1998). "Franchising and the Domain of 
Entrepreneurship Research."
Journal of Business Venturing 14: 5-16.
Kaufiiiann, P. 1. and S. Eroglu (1998). "Standardization and Adaptation in Business Foniiat Franchising."
Journal of Business Venturing 14: 69-85.
Kaufrann, P. 1., R. M. Gordon, et aL. (2000). "Alternative Profitability Measures and Marketing Channel
Structure: The Franchise Decision." Journal of Business Research 50: 217-224.
Kaufrann, P. 1. and S. H. Kim (1995). Master Franchising and System Growth Rates. Franchising:
Contemporary Issues and Research. P. 1. Kaufiiiann.and R. P. Dant. New York, The HaworthPress, Inc.: 49-61. 1
Kaufiiiann, P. 1. and F. Lafontaine (1994). "Costs of 
Control: The Source of Economic Rents for
McDona1ds Franchisees." Journal of Law and Economics XXXVII(October): 417-453.
Kaufiiiann, P. 1. and 1. Stanworth (1995). "The Decision to Purchase a Franchise: A Study of 
ProspectiveFranchisees." Journal of Small Business Management 33(4): 22-31.
Kauranen, i. (1997). "Corporate Personality in Young Entrepreneurial Manufacturing Firms." Small
Business and Enterprise Development 4: 115-127.
Keh, H. T. and S. Y. Park (1998). "An Expanded Perspective on Power in Distribution Channels:
Strategies and Implications." The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer
Research 8(1).
Kehoe, M. R. (1996). "Franchising, Agency Problems, and the Cost of CapitaL." Applied Economics
28(11): 1485-1494.
Kets de Vries, M., F. R. (1996). Family business: human dilemmas in the family finii : text and cases.
London, International Thomson Business Press.
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (1985). "The Dark Side of 
Entrepreneurship. " Harvard Business
Review(November/December): 160-167.
Kezios, S. P. (1999). Statement of Sus an P. Kezios to the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives,
United States House of Representatives. 1999.
Kim, K. and G. L. Frazier (1996). "A Typology of Distribution Channel Systems: A Contextual
Approach." International Marketing Review 13(1): 1 9-32.
Kirchhoff B. A. (1991). "Entrepreneurship's Contribution to Economics." Entrepreneurship Theory &
Practice(Winter): 93-112.
Kirzner, i. M. (1979). Perception, Opportunity and Profit: Studies in the Theory of 
Entrepreneurship.
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Kirzner, i. M. (1997). How Markets Work: Disequilibrium, Entrepreneurship and Discovery. London,
Institute of Economic Affairs.
Klein, B. (1995). "The Economics of Franchise Contracts." Journal of Corporate Finance 2: 9-37.
John E. Clarkin 342
Knight, R. M. (1986). "Franchising from the Franchisor and Franchisee Points of 
View." Journal of Small Business Mangement(July): 8-15.
Kodithuwakk, S. S. and P. Rosa (1999). "The Entrepreneurial Process and Economic Success in a
Constrained Environment." unpublished.
Kohli, C. and M. Thakor (1997). "Branding Consumer Goods: Insights From Theory and Practice."
Journal of Consumer Marketing 14(3): 206-219.
Koiranen, M., K. Hyrsky, et aL. (1997). "Paradoxes and Reaction Pairs in Franchising." Frontiers of
Entrepreneurship Research.
Kolton, 1. (1999). Policy Issues Regarding Franchise Filings. Franchising World: 48-50.
Konigsberg, A. S. (1999). Around the World with Franchise Legislation. Franchising World: 18-22.
Konigsberg, A. S. (2001). Franchise Legislation in France, Lapointe Rosenstein. 2001.
Kostecka, A. (1988). Franchise Opportunities Handbook. Washington, D.C., United States Department of
Commerce: ii-257.
Krondstrom, C. (1998). Franchising- Sweden. Stockholm, US. & Foreign & Commercial Service and
US. Department of State: 7.
Krueger, N. 1. and P. R. Dickson (1994). "How Believing in Ourselves Increases Risk Taking: Perceived
Self-Efficacy and Opportunity Recognition." Decision Sciences 25(3): 385-400.
Kuratko, D. F. and R. M. Hodgetts (1995). Entrepreneurship: A Contemporary Approach. Fort Worth,
TX, The Dryden Press: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Lado, A. A., N. G. Boyd, et al. (1997). "Competition, Cooperation, and the Search for Economic Rents:
A Syncretic ModeL." Academy of Management Review 22(1): 110-141.
LaFalce, 1. 1. (1999). Statement to Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, US House of
Representatives. 1999.
Lafontaine, F. (1995). A Critical Appraisal of Data Sources on Franchising. Franchising: Contemporary
Issues and Research. P. 1. Kaufrann and R. P. Dant. New York, The Haworth Press, Ic.: 5-18.
Lafontaine, F. and S. E. Masten (1995). "Franchise Contracting, Organization, and Regulation:
Introduction." Journal of Corporate Finance 2: 1-7.
Lafontaine, F. and K. L. Shaw (1998). "Franchising Growth and Franchisor Entry and Exit in the US.
Market: Myth and Reality." Journal of Business Venturing 13(2): 95-112.
Lafontaine, F. and K. L. Shaw (1999). "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel
Data." Journal of Political Economy 107(5): 1041. ,
Lafontaine, F. and M. E. Slade (1998). Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision. Cambridge,
MA, NBER Working Paper. 6544.
Landes, D. S. (1969). The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present. London, Cambridge University Press.
Lane, V. R. (1998). "Brand leverage power: The role of brand balance." Business Horizons 41(1): 75-85.
Larson, A. (1992). "Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of 
the Governance of ExchangeRelationships." Administrative Science Quarterly 37(March): 76-104.
Lassar, W. M. and 1. L. Kerr (1996). "Strategy and Control in Supplier-Distributor Relationships: An
Agency Perspective." Strategic Management Journal 17: 613-632.
Leblebici, H. and C. E. Shalley (1996). "The Organization of Relational Contracts: The Allocation of
Rights in Franchising." Joural of Business Venturing 11(5): 403-418.
Lewis, 1. D. (1990). Partnerships for Profit: Structuring and Managing Strategic Allances. New York,
The Free Press.
Litz, R. A. and A. C. Stewart (1997). "Franchising for Sustainable Competitive Advantage? Comparing
the Performance ofIndependent Retailers and Trade-Name Franchisees." Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 13: 131-150.
Love, 1. F. (1995). McDonald's: Behind the Arches. New York, Bantam Books.
Low, M. B. and i. C. MacMillan (1988). "Entrepreneurship: Past Research and Future Challenges."
Journal of Management 14(2): 139-161.
Lumpkin, G. T. and G. G. Dess (1996). "ClarifYing the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and
Linking it to Performance." Academy of Management Review 21(1): 135-172.
Lutz, N. A. (1995). "Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising." Journal of Corporate Finance 2:
103-131.
Macdonald, E. and B. Sharp (1996). "Management Perceptions of the Importance of Brand Awareness as
an Indication of Advertising Effectiveness." Marketing Research On-Line i: 1-15.
Manaresi, A. (1993). Franchise Channel Relationships: A Cross-Country Comparison. London Business
SchooL. London, University of London.
Maness, R. (1996). "Incomplete Contracts and the Choice Between Vertical Integration and Franchising."
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 31: 101-115.
John E. Clarkin 343
Mann, M. A., L. L. Brokenbaugh, et al. (2000). Cross-Border Trade in 1999 and Sales Through Affliates
in 1998, US. Deparment of Commerce- Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2001.
Marshall, C. and G. B. Rossman (1989). Designing Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, CA, Sage
Publications, Inc.
Martinez,1. i. and 1. C. Jarilo (1989). "The Evolution of Research on Coordination MechansIms in
Multinational Corporations." Joural ofInternational Business Studies 20(3): 489-515.
Mathewson, F. and R. Winter (1994). "Territorial Restrictions in Franchise Contracts." Economic Inquiry
32(2): 181 (12).
McCracken, G. (1993). The Value of the Brand: An Anthropoligical Approach. Brand Equity &
Advertising: Advertising's Role in Building Strong Brands. D. A. Aaker and A. L. Biel.
HiIsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
McKnight, D. H., L. L. Cummings, et al. (1998). "Initial Trust Fonnation in New Organizational
Relationships." Academy of Management Review 23(3): 473-490.
McMahon, R. G. P. and A. M. 1. Stanger (1995). "Understanding the Small Enterprise Financial
Objective Function." Entrepreneurship; Theory and Practice 19(4): 21-40.
Meese, A. 1. (1996). "Antitrust Balancing in a (near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise TyingContracts." Michigan Law Review 95(1): 111-166.
Mehta, S. S., D. Luza, et al. (1999). Analysis ofFranchising Data: A Comparative Evaluation of 
Leading 
Secondary Sources. Thireenth Annual Society of Franchising Conference, Miami, Florida.
Mendelsohn, M. (1992). The Guide to Franchising. New York, Cassell Publishers Ltd.
Mendelsohn, M. (1999). "European and UK Franchise Surveys Offer Useful Information." Franchising
World 31(4): 52-54.
Mendelsohn, M. and R. Bynoe (1995). Franchising. London, FT Law & Tax.
Michael, S. C. (1993). "Why Franchising Works: An Analysis of 
Property Rights and Organizational
Form Shares." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research: 676-688.
Michael, S. C. (1996). "To Franchise or Not to Franchise: An Analysis of Decision Rights and
Organizational Form Shares." Joural of Business Venturing 11: 57-71.
Michael, S. C. (2000). "The Effect of Organizational Form on Quality: The Case ofFranchising." Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 43: 295-318.
Miler, D. (1983). "The Correlates of 
Entrepreneurship in Thee Types of Firms. " Management Science29(7): 770-791. ,
Miner, 1. B. (1996). "Evidence for the Existence of a Set of Personality Types, Defined by Psychological
Test, That Predict Entrepreneurial Success." Frontiers of 
Entrepreneurship Research.Minsker, H. H.(2000). Section ofIntellectual Property Law: 1998-1999 Annual Report, Committee 207.
Washington, DC, Delegation of the European Commission.
Mitchell, R. K. (1997). "Oral History and Expert Scripts: DemystifYing the Entrepreneurial Experience."
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research 3(2).
Mitton, D. G. (1997). "Entrepreneurship: One More Time- Non-Cognitive Characteristics That Make the
Cognitive Click." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Molina,1. (1998). "On the Relational View." Academy of Management Review 24(2): 184-186.
Mone, M. A., W. McKinley, et al. (1998). "Organizational Decline and Innovation: A Contingency
Framework." Academy of Management Review 23(1): 115-132.
Monroe, S. R., C. Price, et al. (1996). "The Triad Theory Essential to Entrepreneurial Success." Frontiers
of Entrepreneurship Research.
Morgan, F. W. and 1. 1. Stoltman (1997). "Vicarious Franchisor Liability: Marketing and Public Policy. "
Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 12(5): 0-34.
Morgan, G. (1997). Images of Organization. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications.
Morrison, K. (1995). "Why Do Finns Franchise? A Test of Two Theoretical Perspectives." Journal of
Small Business and Entrepreneurship 12(1): 84-100.
Morrison, K. A. (1997). "How Franchisee Job Satisfaction and Personality Affects Performance,
Organizational Commitment, Franchisor Relations, and Intentionto Remain." Journal of Small
Business Management 35(3): 39-67.
Mudambi, R. and S. Helper (1998). "The 'Close But Adversarial' Model of Supplier Relations in the US.Auto Industry." Strategic Management Journal 19: 775-792.
Nelson, R. and M. Marcheso (1998). Franchise Legal Provisions- United Kingdom. London, US. &
Foreign Commercial Service and US. Department of 
State: 2.Norton, S. W. (1988). "An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form." Journal of
Business 61(2): 197-217.
Parasuraman, S., Y. S. Purohit, et al. (1996). "Work and Family Variables, Entrepreneurial Career
Success, and Psychological Well-Being." Journal of Vocational Behavior 48: 275-300.
John E. Clai'kin 344
Parsa, H. G. (1999). "Interaction of Strategy Implementation and Power Perceptions in Franchise
Systems: An Empirical Investigation." Journal of 
Business Research 45: 173-185.
Penrose, E. T. (1968). The Theory of 
the Growth of the Firm. Oxford, Oxford Press.
Peters, T. 1. and R. H. Waterman Jr. (1982). In Search of Excellence. London, Harper & Row.
Phan, P. H., 1. E. Butler, et aL. (1996). "Crossing Mother: Entrepreneur-Franchisees' Attempts to Reduce
Franchisor Influence." Journal of Business Venturing 11: 379-402.
Piling, B. K. (1991). "Assessing Competitive Advantage in Small Businesses: An Application to
Franchising." Joural of Small Business Management 29(4): 55-63.
Piling, B. K., S. W. Henson, et al. (1995). Competition Among Franchises, Company-Owned Units and
Independent Operators: A Population Ecology Application. Franchising: Contemporary Issues
and Research. P. 1. Kaufinann and R. P. Dant. New York, The Haworth Press, Inc.: 177-192.
Pinchot, G. E. (1994). The End of 
Bureaucracy & The Rise of the Intelligent Organization. San
Francisco, Berrett-Koehler.
Pinchot Il, G. (1985). Intrapreneuring: Why you don't have to leave the corporation to become an
entrepreneur. New York, Harper & Row.
Preble, 1. F. and R. C. Hoffian (1995). "Franchising Systems Around the Globe: A Status Report."
Journal of Small Business Management 33(2): 80-88.
Price, R. (2000). "Voluntary Earnings Disclosures in Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars." Joural of
Accounting and Economics 28: 391-423.
Price, S. (1997). The Franchise Paradox. London, Cassell.
Reynolds, P. D. (1991). "Sociology and Entrepreneurship: Concepts and Contributions."
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Winter): 47-71.
Ring,P. S. (1996). "Fragile and Resilient Trust and Their Roles in Economic Exchange." Business &
Society 35(2): 148-176.
Ring, P. S. and A. H. Van de Ven (1994). "Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational
Relationships." Academy of Management Review 19(1): 90-119.
Rosa, P. and A. Bowes (1990). "Entrepreneurship: Some Lessons of Social Anthropology." unpublished.
Scase, R. (1997). "The Role of Small Businesses in the Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe:Real but Relatively Unimportant?" International Small Business Journal 16(1): 13-21.
Scheidl, M. (1998). Austria- The Franchising Market. Vienna, US. Department of State: 17.
Schell, B. H. and S. McGilis (1995). "How Type A Franchisees Cope With Failed Businesses: An
Analysis of Micro- and Macro-System Factors." Jmirnal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship
12(4): 27-48.
Schumpeter, 1. A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, CapitaL,
Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Schwartz, R. G. and R. D. Teach (2000). "Research Note: Entrepreneurship Research: An Empirical
Perspective." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 24(3): 77.
Scott, M. and P. Rosa (1996). "Has Firm Level Analysis Reached its Limits? Time for a Rethink."
International Small Business Journal 14(4): 81-89.
Selden, A. C. (1998). Superior System Governance: A New Approach to Structuring Successful
Franchise Organizations, West Legal Directory Lawoffce.com. 1999.
Selden, A. C. (1998). Superior System Governance: A New Approach to Structuring Successful
Franchise Organizations, Briggs and Morgan; Lawoffce.com. 1999.
Service, US. F. C. (1998). Marketing US. Products and Services. Warsaw, US. Department of 
State.Sexton, D. L. (1987). "Advancing Small Business Research: Utilizing Research from Other Areas."
American Journal of Small Business(Winter): 25-30.
Shane, S. (1995). Differences Between Successful and Unsuccessful Franchisors, US. Small Business
Administration- Offce of Advocacy: 38.
Shane, S. (1997). Why New Franchisors Succeed, United States Small Business Administration- Office
of Advocacy. 1998.
Shane, S. (2000). "The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research. " Academy of Management Review.
Shane, S. and M.-D. Foo (1998). "New Firm Survival: Institutional Explanations for New Franchisor
SurvivaL." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Shane, S. A. (1996). "Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implications for Finn Growth and
Survival: A Study of New Franchisors." Academy of 
Management Journal 39(1): 216-234.
Shane, S. A. (1996). "Why Franchise Companies Expand Overseas." Journal of Business Venturing11(2): 73-88.
Shane, S. A. (1998). "Making New Franchise Systems Work." Strategic Management Journal 19: 697-
707.
John E. Clarkin 345
Shane, S. A. and F. Hoy (1996). "Franchising: A Gateway to Cooperative Entrepreneurship." Joural of
Business Ventuing 11: 325-328.
Shane, S. A. and C. Spell (1998). "Factors for New Franchise Success." Sloan Management Review
39(3): 43-53.
Sharma, P. and J. J. Chrisman (1999). "Toward a Reconciliation of the Definitional Issues in the Field of
Corporate Entrepreneurship." Entrepreneuship: Theory and Practice 23(3): 11.
Shaver, K. G. and L. R. Scott (1991). "Person, Process, Choice: The Psychology of New VentureCreation." Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Winter): 23-44.
Siu, W.-s. and D. A. Kirby (1998). "Approaches to Small Finn Marketing." European Journal of
Marketing 32(112): 40-60.
Slevin, D. P: and J. G. Covin (1995). "New Ventures and Total Competitiveness: A Conceptual Model,
Empirical Results, and Case Study Examples." Frontiers of 
Entrepreneurship Research.Slevin, D. P. and J. G. Covin (1997). "Strategy Formation Patterns, Performance, and the Significance of
Context." Journal of Management 23(2): 189-210.
Smilor, R. W. (1997). "Entrepreneurship; Reflections on a Subversive Activity." Journal of 
Business Venturing 12(5): 341-344.
Smith, G. V. (1997). Trademark Valuation. New York, NY, John Wiley & Sons.
Solymossy, E. (2000). "Entrepreneurial Dimensions: The Relationship ofIndividual, Venture, and
Environmental Factors to Success." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 24(4): 79.
Soy, S. K. (1996). The Case Study as a Research Method, University of Texas. 2001.
Spinell Jr., S. and S. Birley (1997). An Investigation of Conflict in the Franchisee-Franchisor
Relationships: Findings of the pilot study. Entrepreneurship in a Global Context. S. Birley and i.C. MacMilan. London, Routledge.
Spinel1i Jr., S. and W. D. Bygrave (1995). A Predictive Model of Litigation Between Channel Members
in a Franchise Channel of Distribution. International Entrepreneurship. S. Birley and i. C.
MacMiIan. London, Routledge.
Spinelli, S.(1994). Franchising. The Portable MBA in Entrepreneurship. W. D. Bygrave. New York,
John Wiley & Sons: v-468.
Spinelli, S. (1997). The Pitfalls and Potential ofFranchising. Mastering Enterprise. S. Birley and D. F.
Muzyka. London, Pitman Publishing.
Spinelli, S. and S. Birley (1996). "An Examination of 
the Effects of Exit and Switching Costs on Trade
Mark Valuation and Franchisee Satisfaction." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Spinell, S. and S. Birley (1996). "Toward a Theory of Conflict in the Franchise System." Joural of
Business Venturing 11: 329-342.
Stabell, e. B. and O. D. Fjeldstad (1998). "Configuring Value for Competitive Advantage: On Chains,
Shops, and Networks." Strategic Management Journal 19: 413-437.
Stana, R. M. (2001). Federal Trade Com~nission: Enforcement of the Franchise Rule. Washington, D.e.,
United States General Accounting Offce: 77.
Stanworth, J. (1995). The Franchise Relationship: Entrepreneurship or Dependence. Franchising:
Contemporary Issues and Research. P. J. Kaufiann and R. P. Dant. New York, The Haworth
Press, Inc.: 161-171.
Stanworth, J. and J. Curran (1999). "Colas, Burgers, Shakes, and Shirkers: Towards a Sociological Model
ofFranchising in the Market Economy." Joural of Business Venturing 14: 323-344.
Stanworth, J. and A. Gibb (1984). Success and Failure in Small Business. Aldershot, Gower Publishing
Co.
Stanworth, J. and P. Kaufiann (1996). "Similarities and Differences in UK and US Franchise Research
Data: Towards a Dynamic Model ofFranchisee Motivation." International Small Business
Journal 14(3): 57-70.
Stanworth, J., D. Purdy, et al. (1997). "Franchise Growth and Failure in the USA and the UK: A Troubled
Dreamworld Revisited." Franchising Research 2(2): 75-94.
Stanworth, J., D. Purdy, et al. (1998). "Franchise Versus Conventional Small Business Failure Rates in
the US and UK: More Similarities Than Differences." International Small Business Journal
16(3): 56-70.
Stem, P. and J. Stanworth (1993). "Improving Small Business Survival Rates via Franchising- The Role
of the Banks in Europe." International Small Business Journal 
12(2): 15-38.
Stevenson, H. H. and D.E. Gumpert (1985). "The Heart of Entrepreneurship. "Harvard Business
Review(March-April): 85-94.
Stevenson, H. H. and J. C. Jarillo (1990). "A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial
Management." Strategic Management Journal 11: 17-27.
John E. Clarkin 346
Stevenson,1. H., M. 1. Roberts, et al. (1985). New Business Ventures and the Entrepreneur. Homewood,
IL, Irwin.
Stewart, D. B. and A. McAuley (2000). "Congruence of Domestic and Export Marketing Strategies."
International Marketing Review 17(6): 563-585.
Storey, D. 1. (1987). The Performance of small firms. Wolfeboro, N.H., Croom Helm.
Storey, D. 1. (1994). Understanding the small business sector. London, Rout!edge.
Strutton, D., L. E. Pelton, et al. (1995). "Psychological Climate in Franchising System Channels and
Franchisor-Franchisee Solidarity." Journal of Business Research 34(2): 81-91.
Teegen, H. (2000). "Examining Strategic and Economic Development Implications of Globalising
Through Franchising." International Business Review 9: 497-521.
Tells, W. (1997). "Application of a Case Study Methodology." The Qualitative Report 3(3).
Thompson, D. N. (1971). Contractual Marketing Systems: An Overview. Contractual Marketing
Systems. D. N. Thompson. Lexington, MA, Heath Lexington.
Thompson, 1. L. (1998). "Competance and Strategic Paradox." Management Decision 36(4).
Thorelli, H. B. (1986). "Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies." Strategic Management Joural 7:
37-51.
Thurow, L. C. (1999). Building Wealth: The New Rules for Individuals, Companies, and Nations in a
Knowledge- Based Economy. New York, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
Timmons,1. A. (1994). Opportunity Recognition: The Search for Higher-Potential Ventures. The
Portable MEA in Entrepreneurship. W. D. Bygrave. New York, John Wiley & Sons: v-468.
Treynor,1. (1999). "The Investment Value of Brand Franchise." Financial Analysts Journal 55(2): 27-34.
Trochim, W. M. (2001). Research Methods Knowledge Base: External Validity, Cornell University.
2002.
Trutko, 1., 1. Trutko, et al. (1993). Franchising's Growing Role in the US. Economy, 1975-2000, US.
Small Business Administration. 1999.
Tsai, W. and S. Ghoshal (1998). "Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role ofIntrafim Networks."
Academy of Management Journal 41(4): 464-477.
Tuttle, K. and M. Marcheso (2000). The Franchise Market. London, US. & Foreign Commercial
Service: 23.
Ucbasaran, D., P. Westhead, et al. (2000). The Focus of Entrepreneurial Research: Contextual and
Process Issues. 10th Anual Global Entrepreneurship Research Conference, The Management
School, Imperial College of Science, Technology & Medicine, London, UK.
Van de Ven, A. H. and M. S. Poole (1995). "Explaining Development and Change in Organizations."
Academy of Management Review 20(3): 510-541.
Vaughn, C. L. (1979). Franchising: Its Nature, Scope, Advantages, and Development. Lexington, MA,
Lexington Books.
Vincent, W. S. (1998). "Encroachment: Legal Restrictions on Retail Franchise Expansion." Journal of
Business Venturing 13: 29-41.
von Mises, L. (1949). Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. London, William Hodge & Co.
Vozikis, G. S., G. D. Bruton, et al. (1999). "Linking Corporate Entrepreneurship to Financial Theory
Though Additional Value Creation." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 24(2): 33.
Watson,1. and 1. E. Everett (1996). "Do Small Businesses Have High Failure Rates? Evidence From
Australia." Journal of Small Business Management 34(4): 51.
Weaver, R. Y. (1996). "The Origin of the Species: Genes, Darwin, and Entrepreneurs." Frontiers of
Entrepreneurship Research.
Westhead, P. and D. Storey (1996). "Management Training and Small Firm Performance: Why is the
Link so Weak?" International Small Business Journal 
14(4): 13-25.Westhead, P. and M. Wright (1998). "Novice, Portfolio, and Serial Founders: Are They Different?"
Journal of Business Venturing 13: 173-204.
Whyte, G., A. M. Saks, et al. (1997). "When Success Breeds Failure: The Role ofSelf-Efficacy in
Escalating Commitment to a Losing Course of Action." Joural of Organizational Behavior 18:
415-432.
Wicks, A. c., S. L. Berman, et al. (1999). "The Structure of Optimal Trust: Moral and Strategic
Implications." Academy of Management Review 24(1): 99-116.
Wieczorek, D. (1999). Earnings Claims: Where We've Been; Where We're Going. Franchising World:
16-17.
Wieczorek, D. E. (1999). Statement ofDennis E. Wieczorek to the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law ofthe Judiciary Committee ofthe United States House of Representatives,
US House of Representatives. 1999.
John E. Clarkin 347
Wiliams, D. L. (1998). "Why Do Entrepreneurs Become Franchisees? An Empirical Analysis of
Organizational Choice." .Joural of Business Ventuing 14: 103-124.
Wiliamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrst Implications. New York,
Macmillan Publishing Co.
Wiliamson, O. E. (1991). The Logic of 
Economic Organization. The Nature of the Fir. O. E.Williamson and S. G. Winter. New York, Oxford University Press: 90- 116.
Wiliamson, O. E. and S. G. Winter, Eds. (1993). The Nature of 
the Fir: Origins, Evolution, and
Development. New York, Oxford University Press.
Williamson, O. E., S. G. Winter, et al. (1991). The Nature of the finn : origins, evolution, and
development. New York, Oxford University Press.
Winborg,1. and H. Landstrom (1997). "Financial Bootstrapping in Small Businesses A Resource-Based
View on Small Business Finance." Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.
Withane, S. (1991). "Franchising and Franchisee Behavior: An Examination of Opinions, PersonalCharacteristics, and Motives of Canadian Franchisee Entrepreneurs.:' Joural of Small Business
Management 29(1): 22-29.
Wren, B. M. and J. T. Simpson (1998). "Marketing Channel Relationships Among Small Business."
International Small Business Journal 16(4): 64-78.
Wright, M., K. Robbie, et al. (1997). "Serial Entrepreneurs." British Journal of 
Management 8: 251-268.Wu, L. (1998). "The Pricing of a Brand Name Product: Franchising in the Motel Services Industry."
Journal of Business Venturing 14: 87-102.
Yin, R. K. (1989). Case Study Research Design and Methods. London, Sage Publications.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, Sage.
Young, 1. A., C. D. Hoggatt, et al. (1999). Co-Branding Relationships: Franchisors Partering with Other
Franchisors. Thirteenth Annual Society ofFranchising, Miami, Florida.
Zahra, S. A. (1993). "A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship as Firm Behavior: A Critique and
Extension." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 17(4): 45.
Zahra, S. A. (1996). "Governance, Ownership, and Corporate Entrepreneurship: The Moderating Impact
ofIndustry Technological Opportunities." Academy of Management Journal 39(6): 1713-1735.Zahra, S. A. and D. M. Garvis (2000). "International Corporate Entrepreneurship and Fir Performance:
The Moderating Effect ofInternational Environmental Hostility." Joural of Business Venturing15(6): 469-492. .
Zahra, S. A., D. F. Jennings, et al. (1999). "The Antecedents,and Consequences of 
Finn-Level
Entrepreneurship: The State of the Field." Entrepreneurship: Theory 
and Practice 24(2): 45.Zahra, S. A., A. P. Nielsen, et al. (1999). "Corporate Entrepreneurship, Knowledge, and Competance
Development." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23(3): 169.
Zimmerman,1. (1998). "Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreements and the
Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?" Vanderbilt Law Review(April).
John E. Clarkin 348
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A ..................................................................................................................................350
FIGURE AI: FRANCHISE VALUE CHAIN ............................................................................................ 350
FIGUR A2: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS FIRM BEHA VIOR ....................................................................... 351
FIGUR A3: BRINKER INTERNATIONAL 2000 ANUAL REPORT ......................................................... 352
APPENDIX B ..................................................................................................................................353
TABLE B 1 : ALBERTA FRANCHISE STATUTES AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS............. ........... .......... 353
TABLE B2: SUMMARY OF EUROPEAN UNION AND U.S. COMPETITIVE PRACTICES LAW.. ...................... 355
TABLE B3: EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: DEFINITONS AN CHARACTRISTICS ............. 356
TABLE B4: SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF FRANCHISING...................... .....358
TABLE B5: TAU B CORRLATION COEFFICIENTS OF UFOC PROVISIONS .........'..................................... 366
TABLE B6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FRANDATADATASET VARIABLES......................................... 
367
TABLE B7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SOURCEBOOKDATASET VARABLES..................................... 
368
TABLE B8: CROSSTABS ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS AND CHARCTERISTICS................. 
369
TABLE B9: CROSSTABS ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS................. 
370
TABLE BIO: T-TEST FOR FINANCING PROVISION................................................................................371
TABLE B 11: T -TEST FOR AREA DEVELOPMENT PROVISION................................................................. 372
TABLE B12: T-TEST FOR PASSIVE OWNERSHIP ..................................................................................373
TABLE B 13: T -TEST FOR EARNINGS CLAIM................................................ .......................................374
TABLE B 14: T -TEST FOR PERMISSION TO SUB-FRACHISE.................................................................. 375
TABLE B15: PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF EXPANSION STRATEGY IN U.S. MARKET................................. 376
TABLE B16: PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF EXPANSION STRATEGY IN OVERSEAS MARKET .......................378
TABLE B 17: EXISTING DEFINITIONS IN CORPORATE ENTREPRNEURSHIP.............................. ................380
TABLE B 18: ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS ......... ...... ....... 382
TABLE B19: SOURCEBOOK PUBLICATIONS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRLATIONS ...................383TABLE B20: ENTREPRENEURAL ORIENTATION DEFINITIONS............................................................. 384
TABLE B21: ITEM 9: FRACHISEE OBLIGATIONS ............................................................................... 385
TABLE B22: INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION COpE OF ETHICS ........................................... 386
APPENDIX C: U.S. FEDERAL REGISTER: DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING
FRANCHISING .................................................................................................................387
APPENDIX D ..................................................................................................................................398
TABLE D 1: EXPLORATORY STUDY OF UFOC AND FRACHISE AGREEMENTS, PART 1........................... 398
TABLED2: EXPLORATORY STUDY OF UFOC AND FRACHISE AGREEMENTS, PART 2...........................422
APPENDIX E ..................................................................................................................................429
TABLE El: FRADATA 'SNAPSHOT' OF MCDONALD'S CORPORATION ................................................429
APPENDIX F: SOURCE BOOK PUBLICATIONS: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ...................432
APPENDIX G: FRANCHISE OWNER 'A' INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS ................................438
APPENDIX H: FRANCHISE OWNER 'B' INTERVIEW TRASCRIPTS ................................443
APPENDIX I: FRANCHISE OWNER 'c' INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS ................................. 449
APPENDIX J: FRANCHISE OWNER 'D' INTERVIEW TRASCRIPTS .................................454
APPENDIX K: FRACHISE OWNER 'E' INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS ................................457
APPENDIX L: FRANCHISE OWNER 'F' INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS .................................462
APPENDIX M: FRANCHISOR 'A' INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS ............................................469
APPENDIX N: FRACHISOR 'B' INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS .............................................474
APPENDIX 0: REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPARATION OF A UFOC .....................................482
John E. Clarkin 349
Figue AI: Franchise Value Chain
FRANCHISOR
'\Property \\,
\
~
Human ll \\
Resources :3 e) \
~ ~ /
Information .g 5 ;'
Systems ~~' !
a~ LAdvertising 0.1
& Marketing /
Suppliers & /
Sourcing lo/
Financial
Assortment
& Range
Planning
\Product! Service Delivery " .'.'\ \\ ,
ì ~:;~;;:~/ ') M'~::~,m \~""'.\'i I  /
./ ,I / ,.\\
Franchise Management ,(,ç~~~:er'
\\ \\ \.. ..,"-
\\FranChisee\\ Operational \\.. Operational 1"
/Training) Standards / Monitori?g//.'! I // ! i ,/ /' / /'Franchisee
Ë3
iJirect """i'"hip
ll -i:: ..Q. ll
" ::
.. Ul
ll ci:: ..() 0:T _
w' ;0
CD 0
,,'-CD ~
CD -
Ul '-
~':-~
Supplier's Value
Chain
-i
ID g:: ..
Ul CD
SE si
o ;0
- CDA ~
is õ'
~ ::CD ~Q. _.
co '0
CD
-i
il
::
~
Q.
G)
o
o0.
00
s-
o.
~.
Q.
::
CDÕi
g
::
00::
§.
Promotion &
Advertising
FRAN
.. .
\\
GOOdS\
'OW'"'1
!
\\
:?\
~\
~ \CD !i /
~!/
oi:
CD
~
õ'
::
~ /
11
:?\
~ \.
~ 1-'..l/001
Administrative Routines: Supplier selection/ Staff Recruitment!
Accountancy
Activities in a Franchise Dyad
Source: The Franchise Paradox Price (1997) p. 532.
350
r - - -- - - - - - -- -- - - - - _ __ _ _ _ __ __ ___ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ _ ~I I' ,1 1' I1 1I .' ,I I' 11
~ , ,1 1. ' 1 I11
I
,
1
.
1
I
1
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
I
1
,
,
1
.
1
1
I
1
1
I
,
I: I I I:r i  i
:_- - - - - - -- - - y. - -- -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -. -- _ _ _ _ _ --y- _ _ _ -- -- _ _ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ _ _ -- __ _ _ _ Y- __ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___,
Figure A2: Entrepreneurship as Firm Behavior
FIRM
PERFORMNCE
...
- ----- - - ------ --- ----- - - -- - ----.
'ir
.. Entrepreneurial L.Il ro
Posture
....
, , ,. ,
External Variables Strategic Variables j Internal Variables
Extenial Environment ¡ Top Management ValuesMission Strategy
- Technological
& PhilosophySophistication Business Practices & Organizational Resources- Dynamism
Competitive Tactics & Competencies- Hostility
Organizational Culture
- Industry Life Cycle Stage
Organizational Structure
i i
~ Indicates a Strong Main Effect
~ Indicates a Weaker Main Effect
---------. Indicates a Moderating Effect
A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship as Fimi Behavior, Covin & Slevin (I 99 I) p. 10
351
Figure A3
8RINKER INTERNAI!ONAL 1NL
SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
Ú\imi:W~jtb:lü ~t~~~t¥Affl.~" ~Ú;;~-¡1if tt;~t~fh;ii~àÜii%Hdl1)
1I¡1!Q
fl~I'Y~Jt*
100n, 11!!l
352
Appendix B
Table B 1: Alberta Franchise Statutes and Disclosure Requirements
1. Franchisor Information a. Name and address offranchisor
b. Name under which franchisor does business
c. Principal business address, and address of
franchisor's attorney
d. Business form of franchisor
e. Length of time franchisor has conducted business
£ Length of time franchisor has offered franchises
of same type
g. Whether franchisor has offered franchises of
different tyes, including descriptions of other
lines, number sold in previous five years, length
of time other franchises offered
h. Names of directors, partners, offcers of
franchisor
2. Previous Convictions and Pending a. For commission of indictable offenses involving
Charges franchise or other business
b. For commission of offenses involving fraud,
embezzlement, unfair or deceptive acts
3. Civil Litigation and Liabilities Details from franchisor, directors, general partners, and
managers of any civil actions invoIving franchises or other
businesses, involving misrepresentation, unfair or
deceptive acts
4. Administrative Proceedings Details from franchisor, directors, general partners, and
managers of any currently effective injunctive or
restrictive orders or pending administrative actions before
any public agency
5. Bankruptcy Details of any bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings in
previous 6 years against franchisor or associates, against a
corporation ~hose directors have management
responsibilities for the franchise
6. Nature of the Business Franchisor's business and franchises to be offered
7. Initial Franchise Fee and Other Fees Include conditions under which fees are refundable, other
recurring or isolated fees or payments franchisees must
make to franchisor
8. Initial Investment Required Details of amounts required to start business operations
9. Financing Disclose terms and conditions of each financing
arrangement offered directly or indirectly by franchisor
10. Working Capital If estimate provided, must have reasonable basis and
include material assumptions underlying presentation. If
estimate not provided, disclosure must include statement
of additional funds required to finance operations until
positive cash flow is produced.
11. Restrictions on Sources of Products Franchisee's obligations to purchase or lease from
and Services and on What franchisor or from approved suppliers. Include restrictions
Franchisees May Sell on goods that franchisee may sell, or that limit the
customers to whom the franchisee may sell
12. Rebates or Other Benefits to the Rebates or other benefits received by franchisor as result
Franchisor of purchase of goods by franchisees, indicating whether
benefits are shared directly or indirectly with franchisees.
13. Obligations to Participate in Actual Whether or not franchisor requires franchisee to personally
Operations participate in direct operation of business. 
14. Existing Outlets Names, addresses, and phone numbers of all existing
franchisees in Alberta under same trade name, and
addresses and phone numbers of outlets
15. Franchise Closures Information about closures of outlets operated under same
trade name within past three fiscal years, including total
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number that have been terminated or cancelled by
franchisor, not renewed by franchisor, reacquired by
franchisor, otherwise left system.
16. Earnings Claims If information is given on specific level or range of actual
or potential sales, costs, income, or profit, it must have
reasonable basis and include material assumptions
underlying its presentation.
17. Termination, Renewal, and Transfer Disclose whether or not provisions in agreement address
renewal, termination, and transfer, and if so, where they
can be found.
18. Territory Describe any exclusive territory granted, include policy on
how franchisor may establish another franchise, a
franchised outlet may be established, the franchisor may
establish other methods of distribution, franchisor may
establish other franchises to distribute similar products
under different mark. Describe policy, if any, whether
continuation ofterritory depends on achievement of sales
volume, market penetration, or other contingency.
19. Notice of Rescission and Effect of
Quote sections 13 and 14 of the ActCancellation
20. Right of Action for Damages
Quote section 9 of the Act
21. Financial Statements Financial statements must be included, and must comply
with sections 2 and 3 of the Regulation
Source: Alberta Statutes and Regulations
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Table B2: Summary of European Union and o.S. Competitive Practices Law
SIMILARITIES 1. Elements of Article 85 violations are similar to Sherman Act
violations:
a. Two or more participants.
b. Conduct must restrict competition.
c. Prosecutors often look for conspiracy.
2. Both EU and US enforcement agencies highly suspicious of
agreements:
a. Between competitors.
b. Which involve prices.
c. Involving companies with high market power.
3. Similar analysis of abuse in market power.
4. Increasing similarity in enforcement'power and size of 
penalties. 
5. Both have vehicles for defensive use of antitrust law
(counterclaims in US, and "null and void" contracts in EO.
6. Both feature:
a. Merger control systems.
.
b. Favorable view of intellectual propert licensing, allances,
joint ventures, etc.
DIFFERENCES 1. Significantly different procedures followed in restraint of 
trade 
area.
a. EU uses block exemption or individual exemption threshold.
b. US uses rule of reason.
2. US antitrust connected to economic philosophy favoring
competition, EU Treaty focused on preventing market
segmentation.
3. US antitrst analysis of vertical restraints consider level of
interbrand competition more important than level of intrabrand
competition; EU considers both levels relevant.
4. Substantially different legal environment for private enforcement
of antitrust. US system provides greater 'access to courthouse'.
5. Treatment of mergers and acquisitions:
a. EU merger that does not require notification wil not be
challenged.
b. US government may challenge any merger.
6. Analysis of joint ventures and strategic alliances:
a. EU views venture as either consolidation (analyzed under
Merger Control Rules) or collaboration (analyzed under
Aricle 85).
b. US views these ventures as somewhere between consolidation
and agreement between separate entities.
7. Restrictions in intellectual property licensing or association
restrictions may require exemption from Aricle 85. Some EU
member states may have price discrimination statutes in national
legislation.
Source: Steven P. Reynolds (1996), International Antitrust Compliance for a Company with Multinational
Operations, International Quarterly, Vol. 76.
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Appendix B
Table B6: Descriptive Statistics FRANDATA Dataset Variables
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Percent.YBFa 0 118 5.92 11.91NUa 1 17 3.23 2.13
NFRAa 0 11541 266.08 886.55
NCOMa 0 5014 48.60 278.02
PERF" 0 100 81.78 28.84
FEEL" 0 72500 21598.54 11139.51
FEEHa 0 500000 27141.6 27290.50
ATER" 0 40 10.80 5.20
RTERc 0 40 10.8025 5.2046
RFEEu 1 25000 3440.09 3531.89
TFEEe 0 25000 4599.38 3381.95
AGEa 2 123 21.6 15.8EXpa 2 75 15044 12.06
MUAa No 416 70.3%Yes 176 29.7%DEVa No 417 7004%Yes 175 29.6%EXCa No 127 21.%Yes 465 78.5%FINa No 312 52.7%Yes 280 47.3%OTHRa No 502 84.8%
1 65 11.0%2
15 2.5%3 4 0.7%4 2 0.3%7 4 0.7%TYPEa No 487 82.3%
1 , 90 15.2%2
13 2.2%3 2 0.3%aN= 592; "N= 569; cN= 567; °N= 142; eN= 324
YBF= Number of years in business before TFEE= Transfer fee (in U.S. dollars)
franchising
AGE= Number of years since franchisorNU= Number oflegal agreements required to incorporated
sign
EXP= Number of years experience in franchisingNFRA= number offranchised outlets MUA= Multi-unit agreements offered
NCOM= number of company-owned outlets DEV= Area development agreements offered
PERF= Percent of units franchised EXC= Exclusive territory
FEEL= Franchise fee low FIN= Financial assistance provided
FEEH= Franchise fee high OTHR= Other programs offered to become
ATER= Agreement term in years franchisee
RTER= Renewal term in years
TYPE= Number of other tyes of businesses offeredRFEE= Renewal fee (in U.S. dollars)
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Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Percent.
0 12627 212.14 749.19
0 3555 27.04 139.19
0 12836 57044 567048
1 26588 303.95 1265.53
0 20531 260.85 1068.51
0 6057 43.10 300.77
Ö 100 81.4 26.32
0 82.00 21.91 11.94
0 22000 242.21 1079.19
0 44000 500.13 2326.73
0 40.00 10.64 5.09
1 136 23.14 16.2
1 76 15.37 10.88
0 1782 33.2 96.88
0 40.0 5.38 2.96Cm~a 1~U.S. 1026
~ 8TIYes 312No 3~Discouraged 626Permitted 248No 545Yes 623No 916Yes 266No l~Yes 999
~ 3~Indirect 554Direct 176Both 20
aN= 1201' DN= 1202' cN= 1175' N= 1171' eN= 1162.T 1156' g 1185' II 1176' j 1168'
jN=1l82.'kN=1165.ÌN=1113.~lN=1126"llN=1l00' , , , ,, , , ,
NUMUS= Number ofU.S. outlets ATER= Agreement term in years
NUCA= Number of Canadian outlets AGE= Number of years since franchisor incorporated
NUIN= Number of international outlets EXP= Number of years experience in franchising
SIZE= Total number of outlets PNU= Projected new unit openings
NFRA= Number offranchised outlets ROY= Royalties in percent
NCOM= Number of company-owned outlets HQ= Location of headquarters
PERF= Percentage of units franchised EC= Earnings claim provided
FFEE= Franchise fee in $1,OOOs PO= Passive ownership
STARTLO= Average start-up fees low in $1,000 AD= Area directorships offered
STARTHl= Average start-up fees high in $1,000 SF= Sub-franchising permitted
ET= Expansion within territory allowed
, FIN= Financial assistance provided
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25.1%
52.1%
21.%
45.3%
51.8%
76.2%
22.1%
13.8%
83.1%
30.2%
46.1%
14.6%
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Appendix B
Table BlO: Independent Sample T-Test for Provision to Provide Financing
FIN N Mean Std. Dev. Equal F Sig. df Sig. M.
Variance (2-tailed) DiffNUS 0 363 204.10 843049 A 0.10 0.7471
-0.56 ii 1 1 0.5770
-27.65
1 750 231.75 739.98 NA
-0.53 639 0.5941
-27.65NINT 0 363 61.61 699.67 A 0.02 0.8947 0.04 ii ii 0.9717 1.4
1 750 60.28 526.20 NA 0.03 567 0.9743 1.4AGE 0 363 23.37 15.38 A 0.10 0.7550 0040 1 ii 1 0.6868 0041
1 750 22.95 16040 NA 0041 759 0.6801 0041EXP 0 362 15.88 10.99 A 0048 004885 0.60 1110 0.5509 0042
1 750 15046 10.90 NA 0.59 708 0.5521 0042SIZE 0 363 304042 1594.58 A 0.00 0.9513
-0.18 ii 1 1 0.8543
-15.38
1 750 319.80 1146041 NA
-0.1'6 549 0.8695
-15.38NFRA 0 363 241.89 1265.85 A 0.22 0.6410
-0.58 1111 0.5621
-40.91
1 750 282.80 1015.64 NA
-0.54 595 0.5910
-40.91NCOM 0 363 62.53 374.63 A 4.29 0.0386 1.28 1 ii 1 0.2009 25.53
1 750 36.99 276.79 NA 1.5 560 0.2486 25.53PNU 0 341 23.68 52.08 A 7.
-2.27 1075 0.0234
-14.64
1 736 38.32 113.64 NA
-2.90
-14.64GROW 0 340 60.79 142.32 A 16.83 2.05 13.78
1 731 47.01 76.74 NA 1.68 13.78PERF 0 363 76.21 29.31 A 53.69 0;0000 -5.75
-9.22
1 750 85043 22.75 NA
-5.27
-9.22AILO 0 352 326.53 1416.68 A 16.85 2.83 160.60
1 733 165.93 413.93 NA 2.08 160.60AILHI 0 349 598041 2526044 A 10.22 0.0014 2.22 1074 0.0270 257.68
1 727 340.73 1288.86 NA 1.80 437 0.0731 257.68FFEE 0 352 22.89 13.05 A 4.98 0.0259 2.01 1089 0.0450 1.5
1 739 21.34 11.2 NA 1.91 611 0.0567 1.55TERM 0 346 10.84 5.29 A 0.58 1071 0.5633 0.19
1 727 10.65 5.00 NA 0.57 645 0.5712 0.19EXUS 0 354 1.47 0.66 A 39.64 0;0000 -4.97 1081 0.0000
-0.19
1 729 1.66 0.56 NA
-4.70
-0.19EXIN 0 360 0.56 0.80 A 17.56 0.0000
-3.08
-0.17
1 743 0.73 0.87 NA
-3.18
-0.17YBF 0 362 7.52 12.07 A 0.37 0.5420 0.04 0.03
1 750 7049 13.23 NA 0.04 0.03CAGR 0 363 0.26 0.28 A 2.78 0.0958
-1.88
-0.08
1 750 0.34 0.75 NA
-2046
-0.08
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Table Bll: Independent Sample T-Test for Area Development
AD N Mean Std. Dev. Equal F Sig. t df Sig. M.
Variance (2-tailed) DiffNUS 0 545 233.19 841.02 A 1.99 0.1582 0.80 1166 004261 35.37
1 623 197.82 676.07 NA 0.78 1042 004327 35.37NINT 0 545 82.60 784.84 A 6.91/().1 1.4 1166 0.1790 45.34
1 623 37.26 284040 NA 1.28 668 0.2019 45.34AGE 0 545 23.08 16.69 A 1.46 0.2279
-0.18 1166 0.8559
-0.17
1 623 23.25 15.86 NA
-0.18 1127 0.8564
-0.17EXP 0 545 15.51 11.07 A 4.84Cq.O¥a9 0.56 1165 0.5737 0.35
1 622 15.16 10042 NA 0.56 1123 0.5752 0.35SIZE 0 545 358.80 1606041 A 5.00...q;qg5G 1.28 1166 0.2004 96.24
1 623 262.56 904.71 NA 1.24 832 0.2163 96.24NFRA 0 545 316.17 1313.58 A 6.370.0118 1.5 1166 0.1202 98049
1 623 217.69 822.73 NA 1.1 890 0.1313 98049NCOM 0 545 42.63 379.17 A 0.02 0.8793 ~0.13 1166 0.9002
-2.24
1 623 44.87 220040 NA
-0.12 848 0.9034
-2.24PNU 0 514 29.13 59.18 A 2.27 0.1320 -1.2 1098 0.1861
-7.81
1 586 36.94 121.81 NA
-1.8 870 0.1686
-7.81GROW 0 511 53.37 115.22 A 2045 0.1177 0.38 1091 0.7061 2.37
1 582 51.00 92.50 NA 0.37 976 0.7100 2.37PERF 0 545 83.15 26.63 A 0.11 0.7444 1.76 1166 0.0795 2.69
1 623 80046 25.68 NA 1.75 1133 0.0802 2.69AILO 0 526 250.03 1289.28 A 1.91 0.1672 0.13 1139 0.8971 8040
1 615 241.63 892046 NA 0.13 912 0.8999 8040AILHI 0 522 562.18 2870.18 A 5.54q.plaZ 0.72 1130 004726 100.97
1 610 461.21 1806.05 NA i 0.69 850 004875 100.97FFEE 0 530 21.4 13042 A 21.25iq.9PP9
-2.06 1142 0.0399
-1.46
1 614 22.60 10.62 NA
-2.02 1003
-1.46TERM 0 518 9.81 5.20 A 4.47...i9.0'l47
-5.24 1127 0.0000
-1.8
1 611 11.9 4.93 NA
-5.22
-1.58EXUS 0 529 1.59 0.63 A 1.49 0.2224 0.14 1137 0.8890 0.01
1 610 1.9 0.59 NA 0.14 1085 0.8896 0.01EXIN 0 521 0.55 0.81 A 14.560;9Q91
-3.86 1121 0.0001
-0.19
1 602 0.75 0.87 NA
-3.88 1115
-0.19YBF 0 545 7.57 13.05 A 0.06 0.8062
-0.71 1165 0.4797
-0.55
1 622 8.12 13.38 NA
-0.71 1152 004790
-0.55CAGR 0 545 0.34 0.87 A 6.140;9133 1.3 1166 0.1272 0.06
1 623 0.29 0.29 NA 1.45 653 0.1483 0.06
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Table B12: Independent SampleT-Test for Passive Ownership
PO N Mean Std. Dev. Equal F Sig. t df Sig. M.
Variance (2-tailed) DiffNUS 0 302 245.21 1103.95 A 5.76 0.0166 1.1 926 0.1908 69.72
i 626 175048 518.91 NA 1.04 367 0.2975 69.72NINT 0 302 112.25 1035.07 A 13.20 0.0003 1.87 926 0.0614 80.21
1 626 32.05 194.20 NA 1.4 311 0.1828 80.21AGE 0 302 23.05 15.13 A 1.94 0.1639 -0047 926 0.6379
-0.53
1 626 23.58 16.72 NA
-0049 651 0.6261
-0.53EXP 0 301 15.51 10.19 A 1.46 0.2265
-0.14 925 0.8890
-0.11
1 626 15.62 11.23 NA
-0.14 647 0.8852
-0.11SIZE 0 302 413.66 2124.93 A 12.06 0.0005 2.00 926 0.0455 186.31
1 626 227.35 662040 NA 1.49 330 0.1374 186.31NFRA 0 302 347.30 1755.55 A 12.03 A AfiA, 1.98 926 0.0481 152.82i..........
1.48 331 0.1407 152.821 626 194048 561.3 NANCOM 0 302 66.36 447.62 A 7.00q.qOSB 1.49 926 0.1368 33049
1 626 32.86 237.13 NA 1.22 385 0.2231 33049PNU 0 282 29.82 76.82 A 1.92 0.1660 0.67 873 0.5012 3.26
1 593 26.56 61.74 NA 0.62 460 0.5335 3.26GROW 0 281 46.90 104.63 A 0.13 0.7180
-0049 867 0.6275
-3045
1 588 50.36 94.83 NA
-0047 506 0.6393
-3045PERF 0 302 78.68 29.20 A 16.72 0.0000 -2046 926 0.0142
-4.52
1 626 83.20 24.72 NA
-2.32 51
-4.52AILO 0 292 179.98 245.09 A 2.12 0.1458 1.5 904 0.1771 29.89
1 614 150.09 338.19 NA 1.1 761 0.1315 29.89AILHI 0 292 291.73 403.96 A 0.10 0.7543 0043 900 0.6707 14.11
1 610 277.63 493.10 NA 0046 687 0.6486 14.11FFEE 0 292 22.30 11.59 A 0.0'1 0.9357 0.53 908 0.5950 0045
1 618 21.85 12.13 NA 0.54 595 0.5890 0045TERM 0 290 10.83 5.07 A 0.70 004044 1.5 896 0.2486 0041
1 608 10042 4.94 NA 1.4 556 0.2531 0041EXUS 0 285 1.50 0.65 A 2.98 0.0846
-1.40 899 0.1630
-0.06
1 616 1.56 0.62 NA
-1.7 529 0.1711
-0.06EXIN 0 291 0.53 0.80 A 13.84 0.0002
-3.00 892 0.0027
-0.18
1 603 0.71 0.86 NA
-3.09 616
-0.18YBF 0 301 7.58 12.38 A 0.73 0.3927
-0041 925 0.6802
-0.38
1 626 7.97 13.73 NA
-0043 650 0.6691
-0.38CAGR 0 302 0.26 0.22 A 2.75 0.0977 -1.8 926 0.2366
-0.06
1 626 0.32 0.80 NA
-1.61 796 0.1069
-0.06
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Table B13: Independent Sample T-Test for Earnings Claims
EC N Mean Std. Dev. Equal F Sig. t df Sig. M.
Variance (2-tailed) DiffNUS 0 873 221.5 8'26.25 A 2045 0.1I75 0.65 1183 0.5142 32041
1 312 188.73 493.62 NA 0.82 918 004125 32041NINT 0 873 70041 656.20 A 5.58 0.0183 1.26 1 i 83 0.2084 47042
1 312 22.99 182.19 NA 1.94 1I40 0.0531 47042AGE 0 873 22.92 16.74 A 1.2 0.251I
-0.83 1I83 004063
-0.89
1 312 23.81 14.92 NA
-0.88 609 0.3809
-0.89EXP 0 872 15.26 11.24 A 0.74 0.3891
-0.54 1I82 0.5881
-0.39
1 312 15.65 9.95 NA
-0.57 614 0.5662
-0.39SIZE 0 873 326.89 1424.68 A 4.05 ''i 0.98 1183 0.3283 82.16",-'(77-'
1 312 244.73 692.52 NA 1.2 1081 0.1864 82.16NFRA 0 873 285.19 1201.78 A 5040 0.0203 1.9 1183 0.2357 84.15
1 312 201.04 590.12 NA 1.60 1074 0.1102 84.15NCOM 0 873 41.70 323.74 A 0.02 0.8974 -0.10 1183 0.9205
-1.98
1 312 43.68 225.52 NA
-0.12 786 0.9062
-1.98PNU 0 822 34.57 98.92 A 2.04 0.1530 0.66 1114 0.5088 4.37
1 294 30.20 92.63 NA 0.68 548 004957 4.37GROW 0 815 57.11 1I5.58 A 19.96 0.0000 2.78 1107 0.0055 19041
1 294 37.69 50.86 NA 3.87 1 19.41PERF 0 873 82.01 26042 A 0.22 0.6382 0.89 1I83 0.3750 1.4
1 312 80047 26.07 NA 0.89 554 0.3723 1.54AILO 0 850 210.82 955.05 A 5.620,9179
-1.73 1I53 0.0834
-125.54
1 305 336.36 1386.27 NA
-1.46 412 0.1445
-125.54AILHI 0 844 438.61 2100.16 A 5.38 0.0206 -1.9 1I44 0.1I19
-249.76
1 302 688.37 2911.20 NA
-1.7 418 0.1718
-249.76FFEE 0 850 21.44 11.75 A 0.51 004734
-2049 l~~
-1.98
1 308 23042 12.52 NA
-2041 515
-1.98TERM 0 836 10045 5.03 A 7.72
-2.51 1139 0.0121
-0.85
1 305 11.30 5.23 NA
-2047
-0.85EXUS 0 851 1.61 0.60 A 3.75 0.0531 0.99 1151 0.3235 0.04
1 302 1.57 0.64 NA 0.96 499 0.3394 0.04EXIN 0 841 0.68 0.86 A 5.10\0!0?,41 1.42 1I39 0.1555 0.08
1 300 0.60 0.82 NA 1.45 550 0.1464 0.08YBF 0 872 7.67 13040 A 0.00 0.9596
-0.56 1I82 0.5740
-0049
1 312 8.16 12.34 NA
-0.58 591 0.5591
-0049CAGR 0 873 0.33 0.72 A 3.56 0.0593 1.1 1I83 0.2680 0.05
1 312 0.28 0.28 NA 1.9 1I72 0.1127 0.05
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Table B14: Independent Sample T-Test for Permission to Sub-Franchise
SF N Mean Std. Dev. Equal F Sig. t df Sig. M.
Variance (2-tailed) DiffNUS 0 916 218.29 786.61 A 0.16 0.6932 0.33 ll80 0.7440 17.18
1 266 201. 1 634.56 NA 0.37 524 0.7137 17.18NINT 0 916 66.37 644.50 A 3.25 0.0718 0.91 1180 0.3640 36.18
1 266 30.19 150.96 NA 1.6 ll51 0.1194 36.18
AGE 0 916 23041 16.65 A 8.07 0.0046 0.95 ll80 0.3418 1.08
1 266 22.33 14.89 NA 1.01 474 0.3 125 1.08EXP 0 915 15.09 10.81 A 0.07 0.7909
-1.63 1179 0.1033
-1.23
1 266 16.32 11.04 NA
-1.61 424 0.1077
-1.23SIZE 0 916 314.89 1374040 A 0.52 004721 0.37 ll80 0.7112 32.92
1 266 281.97 854.80 NA 0047 698 0.6352 32.92NFRA 0 916 262.55 1136044 A 0.01 0.9122
-0.07 ll80 0.9431
-5.35
1 266 267.91 841.07 NA
-0.08 574 0.9331
-5.35NCOM 0 916 52.34 341.69 A 1.81 ll80 0.0699 38.27
1 266 14.07 72047 NA 3.15 1127 0.0017 38.27PNU 0 864 29.56 64.83 A 14.83
-2042 llll 0.0156
-16.93
1 249 46049 166044 NA
-1.7 270 ll73 -16.93GROW 0 859 51.60 103.50 A 0.53 004687 0.07 1104 0.9462 0049
1 247 51.1 92.75 NA 0.07 438 0.9428 0049PERF 0 916 79.72 27.61 A 48.09 0;0000 -4.35 1180 0.0000
-7.90
1 266 87.62 19.81 NA
-5.20
-7.90AILO 0 896 282.99 1229.10 A 11 2.28 175.20
1 257 107.79 119.82 NA 4.20 175.20
AILHI 0 889 589.58 2650047 A 14043 2.34 389041
1 255 200.17 213.02 NA 4.33 389041FFEE 0 900 22048 12.35 A 11. (Y 0.0009 2.85 ll54 0.0044 2041
1 256 20.07 10043 NA 3.13 2041TERM 0 879 10.62 5.ll A 0042 0.5181
-0.20
-0.07
1 261 10.69 5.04 NA
-0.20 0.8434
-0.07EXUS 0 891 1.60 0.59 A 6.79 0.98 0.3268 0.04
1 262 1.6 0.66 NA 0.92 0.3559 0.04EXIN 0 882 0.58 0.83 A 2.39 0.1223
-5.25 0.0000
-0.31
1 254 0.90 0.87 NA
-5.10
-0.31YBF 0 915 8.33 13,51 A 2.55 2.33
1 266 6.00 11.66 NA 2.76 2.33CAGR 0 916 0.32 0.70 A 1.08 0.3000 0.51 1 i 80 0.6135 0.02
1 266 0.30 0.31 NA 0.74 985 004589 0.02
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Table B15: Tamhane Pairwise Comparisons of Expansion Strategy in U.S. Market
EXPUS Mean Dif. Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
(I) (J) I minus J Lower UpperNumber of 0 1 -143.7222 96.9888 0.0003
-230.99
-56045US outlets 2 -227.0577 91.620 0.0000
-304.90
-149.22
1 0 143.7222 96.9888 0.0003 56045 230.99
2 -83.3354 50.1317 0.1946
-193.07 26040
2 0 227.0577 91.620 0.0000 149.22 304.90
1 83.3354 50.1317 0.1946
-26040 193.07Number of 0 1 -50.8298 73.6215 004774
-144.67 43.01
international outlets 2 -57.6515 69.5022 0.0124
-105.65
-9.66
1 0 50.8298 73.6215 004774
-43.01 144.67
2
-6.8218 38.0536 0.9981
-111.07 97043
2 0 57.6515 69.5022 iOi01?4 9.66 105.65
1 6.8218 38.0536 0.9981
-97043 111.07
Age of Business 0 1 1.7944 2.0850 0.8191
-3.76 7.35
2 4.8670 1.9683 0.0866
-0.50 10.23
1 0
-1.7944 2.0850 0.8191
-7.35 3.76
2 3.0726 1.0777 0;0097 0.58 5.56
2 0 -4.8670 1.9683 0.0866
-10.23 0.50
1
-3.0726 1.0777 0.0097
-5.56
-0.58Experience 0 1 2.3404 1.972 0.1886
-0.73 5041
2 3.6025 1.191 0.0091 0.72 6048
1 0 -2.3404 1.972 0.1886
-5041 0.73
2 1.2622 0.7222 0.2243
-0047 2.99
2 0 -3.6025 1.191 0.0091
-6048
-0.72
1 -1.2622 0.7222 0.2243
-2.99 0047
Total outlets 0 1 -12804770 164.3081 0.1743
-293.00 36.05
2 -238.3685 155.1148 0.0000
-363.27
-113047
1 0 12804770 164.3081 0.1743
-36.05 293.00
2 -109.8914 84.9279 004605
-308.55 88.77
2 0 238.3685 155.1148 0.0000 113047 363.27
1 109.8914 84.9279 004605
-88.77 308.55Number of 0 1
-82.5333 138.5845 0.3652
-216.58 51.1franchised outlets 2 -20904896 130.8304 0.00.00
-317040
-101.58
1 0 82.5333 138.5845 0.3652
-51.51 216.58
2 -126.9562 71.6318 0.1794
-290.63 36.71
2 0 20904896 130.8304 0.0000. 101.58 317040
1 126.9562 71.6318 0.1794
-36.71 290.63Number of 0 1 -45.9437 39.0781 0.0649
-93.90 2.01
company outlets 2 -28.8789 36.8916 (ii()Q?
-55.58
-2.18
1 0 45.9437 39.0781 0.0649
-2.01 93.90
2 17.0648 20.1987 0.8312
-36.69 70.82
2 0 28.8789 36.8916 liiO .i 0') ()') 2.18 55.58
1 -17.0648 20.1987 0.8312
-70.82 36.69Projected 0 1
-9.2000 12.7621 0:0026
-15.77
-2.63
new openings 2
-3004788 12.0240 0..0000
-41.67
-19.29
1 0 9.2000 12.7621 0,0026 2.63 15.77
2 -21.2788 6.6645 0.0000
-32.88
-9.68
2 0 3004788 12.0240 0.0000 19.29 41.67
1 21.2788 6.6645 0.0000 9.68 32.88Growth 0 1 -1804600 17.5365 0.6663
-62.07 25.15Percentage 2
-32.9073 16.5223 0.1707
-75.03 9.22
1 0 1804600 17.5365 0.6663
-25.15 62.07
2 -1404472 9.1578 0.2632
-35.25 6.35
2 0 32.9073 16.5223 0.1707
-9.22 75.03
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1 1404472 9.1578 0.2632
-6.35 35.25Percent of 0 1 11.747 3.3304 0.0004 4.28 18.07units franchised 2 304031 3.1441 004640
-2.83 9.63
1 0 -11.747 3.3304 0.0004
-18.07
-4.28
2
-7.7715 1.7214 0;0001
-12.10
-3045
2 0
-304031 3.1441 004640
-9.63 2.83
1 7.7715 1.7214 0.0001 3045 12.10Average 0 1 4604018 141.2373 0.6394
-59.25 152.06Investment Low 2
-37.3897 133.2581 0.9132
-190.09 115.31
1 0 -4604018 141.2373 0.6394
-152.06 59.25
2 -83.7916 73.3467 0.2683
-205.14 37.55
2 0 37.3897 133.2581 0.9132
-115.31 190.09
1 83.7916 73.3467 0.2683
-37.55 205.14Average 0 1 580.6104 305.9241 0.5569
-611.4 1772.36investment high 2 42504135 288.9744 0.7770
-784.71 1635.54
1 0 -580.6104 305.9241 0.5569
-1772.36 611.4
2 -155.1969 158.2491 0.3123
-392.05 81.65
2 0 -42504135 288.9744 0.7770
-1635.54 784.71
I 155.1969 158.2491 0.3123
-81.65 392.05Franchise Fee 0 1 5.3984 1.5487 tOOJ9"ì 0.69 10.11
2 504078 1.4643 ?0.Ö157 0.81 10.00
1 0 -5.3984 1.487 (O.()191
-1O.11
-0.69
2 0.0094 0.7966 1.0000
- 1.80 1.82
2 0 -504078 1.4643 (\/)1 &:'7
-1000
-0.81
1 -0.0094 0.7966 1.0000
- 1.82 1.80ROYALTY 0 1 0.1617 004037 0.9448
-0.62 0.95
2 0.0872 0.3826 0.9875
-0.63 0.80
1 0 -0.1617 004037 0.9448
-0.95 0.62
2
-0.0745 0.2053 0.9791
-0.58 0043
2 0
-0.0872 0.3826 0.9875
-0.80 0.63
1 0.0745 0.2053 0.9791
-0043 0.58Agreement term 0 1 -2.5820 0.6627 0.0002
-4.07
-1.09
2
-1.8047 0.6271 0.0074
-3.22
-0.39
1 0 2.5820 0.6627 0.0002 1.09 4.07
2 0.7773
..
0.3403 0.0629
-0.03 1.8
2 0 1.8047 0.6271 0;0074 0.39 3.22
1 -0.7773 0.3403 0.0629
-1.8 0.03Years 0 1 -0.5459 1.6865 0.9897
-5.33 4.23
before franchising 2 1.2645 1.921 0.8787
-3.34 5.87
1 0 0.5459 1.6865 0.9897
-4.23 5.33
2 1.8104 0.8717 0.1039
-0.25 3.87
2 0
-1.2645 1.921 0.8787
-5.87 3.34
1
-1.8104 0.8717 0.1039
-3.87 0.25CAGR 0 1 0.0013 0.0812 0.9999
-0.05 0.05
2 -0.1423 0.0766 """" ,
-0.22
-0.06v.VYUi
1 0
-0.0013 0.0812 0.9999
-0.05 0.05
2
-0.1436 0.0419 0.0000
-0.22
-0.07
2 0 0.1423 0.0766 0.0001 0.06 0.22
1 0.1436 0.0419 0.0000 0.07 0.22
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Table B16: Tamhane Pairwise Comparisons of Expansion Strategy in Overseas Market
EXPUS Mean Dif. Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
(I) (J) (1) minus (1) Lower UpperNumber of 0 1
-158.92 62.36 .007
-282.48
-35.36US outlets 2
-290.01 52.98 .000
-471.50
-108.51
1 0 158.92 62.36 .007 35.36 282.48
2
-131.09 70.98 .362
-343.15 80.98
2 0 290.01 52.98
.000 108.51 471.50
1 13 1.09 70.98 .362
-80.98 343.15
Number of 0 1
-28.97 47.61
.613
-91.98 34.03international outlets 2
-133.74 40.45 .044
-264.72
-2.75
1 0 28.97 47.61
.613
-34.03 91.98
2
-104.76 54.13 .164
-236.80 27.28
2 0 133.74 40.45 .044 2.75 264.72
1 104.76 54.13 .164
-27.28 236.80
Age of Business 0 1
-1.94 1.5 .404
-5.24 1.6
2
-1.5 1.5 .626
-4.33 1.64
1 0 1.94 1.5 .404
-1.6 5.24
2
.59 1.53 .979
-3.0 4.58
2 0 1.5 1.5 .626
-1.64 4.33
1
-.59 1.3 .979
-4.58 3.40Experience 0 1
-2.50
.90 .030
-4.83
-.18
2
-I. 71
.76 .103
-3.66
.24
1 0 2.50
.90 .030
.18 4.83
2
.79 1.02 .868
-1.96 3.54
2 0 1.71
.76 .103
-.24 3.66
1
-.79 1.02
.868
-3.54 1.96Total outlets 0 1
-206.41 105.41 .010
-373.08
-39.74
2
-472.80 89.56 .001
-783.31
-162.28
1 0 206.41 105.41 .010 39.74 373.08
2
-266.38 119.83 .165
-602.91 70.14
2 0 472.80 89.56 .001 162.28 783.31
1 266.38 119.83
.165
-70.14 602.91
Number of 0 1
-177.43 88.69 .006
-314.36
-40.51franchised outlets 2
-438.56 75.36 .000
-702.28
-174.84
i 0 17743 88.69 .006 40.51 314.36
2
-261.2 100.83
.083
-545.68 23.43
2 0 438.56 75.36
.000 174.84 702.28
1 261.2 100.83
.083
-23.43 545.68
Number of 0 1
-28.98 25.37
.523
-85.43 27.48company outlets 2
-34.24 21.55 .514
-100.22 31.75
1 0 28.98 25.37
.523
-27.48 85.43
2
-5.26 28.84
.998
-86.63 76.11
2 0 34.24 21.5 .514
-3 I. 75 100.22
1 5.26 28.84
.998
-76.11 86.63Projected 0 1
-9.46 8.07 .050
-18.92 2.06E-03new openings 2
-42.08 6.86 .000
-67.20
-16.97
1 0 9.46 8.07 .050
-2.06E-03 18.92
2
-32.62 9.19
.008
-58.52
-6.72
2 0 42.08 6.86 .000 16.97 67.20
1 32.62 9.19 .008 6.72 58.52Growth 0 1 12.7965 11.2216
.515
-11.8878 37.4809Percentage 2 9.6308 9.5458
.646
-12.2573 31.5188
1 0
-12.7965 11.2216
.515
-37.4809 11.8878
2
-3.1658 12.7770
.989
-30.3097 23.9781
2 0
-9.6308 9.5458 .646
-31.5188 12.2573
1 3.1658 12.7770
.989 -23.9781 30.3097Percent of 0 1
-6.7422 2.1380
.002
-11.5259
-1.9585
units fi'anchised 2
-10.2371 1.8166 .000
-14.1356
-6.3386
i 0 6.7422 2.1380
.002 1.9585 11.5259
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2
-3.4949 2.4305 .247
-8.4331 1.4432
2 0 10.2371 1.8166
.000 6.3386 14.1356
1 3.4949 2.4305 .247
-1.4432 8.4331Average 0 1
-112.2758 74.1322
.554 -339.6368 115.0852Investment Low 2
-22.8995 62.7704
.958 -144.3636 98.5646
I 0 112.2758 74.1322
.554
-115.0852 339.6368
2 89.3763 84.1178
.728
-140.9107 319.6633
2 0 22.8995 62.7704
.958
-98.5646 144.3636
1
-89.3763 84. 1178
.728
-3 I 9.6633 140.9107Average 0 1 -284.1361 158.8215
.269
-696.6529 128.3806investment high 2
- 113.3904 134.8935
.802 -448.1714 221.905
1 0 284.1361 158.8215 .269
-128.3806 696.6529
2 170.7457 180.5113
.775 -306.6114 648.1028
2 0 113.3904 134.8935
.802 -221.905 448.1714
I -170.7457 180.5113
.775
-648.1028 306.6114Franchise Fee 0 1 -2.4939 1.0064
.036
-4.8638
-.1241
2
-1.954
.8492
.316
-3.5367
.7459
1 0 2.4939 1.0064
.036
.1241 4.8638
2 1.0985 1.426
.724
-1.7103 3.9073
2 0 1.954
.8492 .316
-.7459 3.5367
1
-1.0985 1.426 .724
-3.9073 1. 7103ROYALTY 0 1 -5.5885E-02
.2555
.996
-.7339
.6221
2 7.649E-02
.2197
.977
-.4232
.5762
1 0 5.589E-02
.2555
.996
-.6221
.7339
2
.1324 .2917
.964
-.6087
.8734
2 0 -7.6490E-02
.2197
.977
-.5762
.4332
I
-.1324
.2917 .964
-.8734 .6087Agreement term 0 1
-.5985
.4280 .456
-1.770
.4799
2
-.4360
.3661 .559
-1.212
.4493
I 0
.5985
.4280 .456
-.4799 1.6770
2
.1625
.4872
.985
-1.928 1.0677
2 0 .4360
.3661 .559
-.4493 1.212
1
-.1625 14872 .985
-1.928 1.0677Years 0 I .5828 1.0922
.935
-2.0679 3.2335before franchising 2 .3836
.9280
.973
-2.0055 2.7728
I 0
-.5828 1.0922
.935
-3.2335 2.0679
2
-.1991 1.2414
.998
-3.3858 2.9875
2 0
-3836
.9280 .973
-2.7728 2.0055
1 .1991 1.2414
.998
-2.9875 3.3858CAGR 0 1 -5.7535E-02 5.233E-02
.086
-.1208 5.681E-02
2
-.2002 4.446E-02
.014
-.3683
-3.2131E-02
I 0 5.7535E-02 5.233E-02
.086 -5.6808E-02
.1208
2
-.1427 5.949E-02
.151
-.3191 3.374E-02
2 0 .2002 4.446E-02
.014 3.213E-02
.3683
1 .1427 5.949E-02
.151 -3.3742E-02
.3191
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Appendix B
Table B20: Entrepreneurial Orientation Definitions
Attibute Definition Other WorkAutonomy Independent action of individual Mintzberg (1973)
or team in bringing forth idea or Mintzberg & Waters (1985)
.vision and carrying it through to Hart (1992)
completion. Ability and wil to Miler (1983)
be self-directed in pursuit of (p. 141)
opportunities (p. 140).
Innovativeness A firm's tendency to engage in Kimberly (1981)
and support new ideas, novelty, Downs & Mohr (1976)
experimentation and creative Miller & Friesen (1978)
processes that may result in new Miller (1978, 1988)
products, services, or Covin & Slevin (1989)
technological processes (p. (p. 142,3)
142).
Risk Taking Risk taking at the firm level is Cantilon (1734)
the proclivity to engage in risky Baird & Thomas (1985)
projects and manager's Miler & Friesen (1978)
preferences for bold versus Brockhaus (1980)
cautious acts to achieve firm Miler (1983)
objectives (p. 146) Venkatraman (1989)
(p. 145,6)Proactiveness Processes aimed at anticipating Venkatraman (1989)
and acting on future needs by Covin & Slevin (1989)
seeking new opportunities Chen & Hambrick (1995)
which mayor may not be Morris & Paul (1987)
related to the present line of Miles & Snow (1978)
operations (p. 146) (p. 147,8)
Competitive Aggressiveness A firm's propensity to directly Cooper et al. (1986)
and intensely challenge its MacMilan & Jones (1984)
competitors to achieve entry or Porter (11985)
improve position; to outperform MacMilan & Day (1987)
industry rivals in the Covin & Covin (1990)
marketplace (p. 148,50) (p. 148,9)Clarifing the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and Linking it to Pe¡jormance, Lumpkin, G. T.
and G. G. Dess (1996). "ClarifYing the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and Linking it to
Performance." Academy of Management Review 21(1): 135-172.
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Appendix B
Table B21: Item 9 Franchisee's Obligations
OBLIGATION SECTION IN AGREEMENT ITEM IN OFFERIG
CIRCULAR
a. Site selection and n/a 7,8,11
acquisition/lease
b. Pre-opening purchases/leases 7.5.1 5,8
c. Site development and other n/a 5,7,12pre-opening requirements
d. Initial and ongoing training 5.1, 604 11
e. Opening 7.3.1 11
f Fees 6.1- 6.8 5,6
g. Compliance with standards 3.10,3.13, 7.3 11
and policies/ Operating Manual
h. Trademarks and proprietary 3.11,3.13,3.16,5.3, 7.1,8.1, 13,14information 804, Attachment 3
i. Restrictions on 7.3.3. 16
products/services offered
j. Warranty and customer 7.304
service requirements
k. Territorial development and 3.16,4.2,6.3 12
sales quota
i. Ongoing product/ service 5.5, 6.2, 7.3.3, Attachment 2 8,10purchases
m. Maintenance, appearance, n/a 8,17
and remodeling requirements
n. Insurance 7.7 6,8
o. Advertising 7.5 6,8,11p. Indemnification 8.5 6
q. Owner's participation/ 704 15
management! staffng i
r. Records/ reports 7.6 6
s. Inspections/ Audits 7.3.5 6
1. Transfer 3.17 17
u. Renewal 4.3.2 17
v. Post-termination obligations 1004 17
w. Non-Competition covenants 8.6, Attachment 3 17
x. Dispute Resolution 11., 11.6- 11.0 17
Source: The Pet Pantry International, Inc. UFOC- December 31, 1998 p. 8.
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Appendix 8
Table B22: IF A Code of Ethics
Code of Ethics
International Franchise Association
Each member company pledges:
1. In the advertisement and grant of franchises for dealerships, a member shall comply
with all applicable laws and regulations and the member's offering circular shall be
complete, accurate, and not misleading with respect to the franchisee's or dealer's
investment, the obligations of a member, and the franchise or dealer under the franchise
or dealership and all material facts relating to the franchise for dealership.
2. All matters material to the member's franchise or dealership's, shall be contained in
one more written agreements, which shall clearly set forth the terms of the relationship
and the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
3. A member shall select and accept only those franchisee's or dealers who, upon
reasonable investigation, appear to possess the basic skils, education, experience,
personal characteristics and financial resources requisite to conduct the franchised
business or dealership and meet the obligations of the franchise or dealer under the
franchise and other agreements. There shall be no discrimination in the granting of
franchisees based solely on race, color, religion, national origin or sex. However, this
in no way prohibits the franchisor from granting franchises to prospective franchisees as
part of a program to make franchises available to persons lacking the capital, training,
business experience, or other qualifications ordinarily required a franchisee's or any
other affirmative action program adopted by the franchisor.
4. A member shall provide reasonable guidance to its franchisees or dealers in a
manner consistent with its franchise agreement. .
5. Fairness shall characterize all dealings between a member and its franchisees or
dealers. A member shall make every good faith effort to resolve complaints by and
disputes with its franchisees or dealers through direct communication and negotiation.
To the extent reasonably appropriate in the circumstances, a member shall give its
franchisee or dealer notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to cure, a breach of their
contractual relationship.
6. No member shall engage in the pyramid system of distribution. A pyramid is a
system wherein a buyer's feature compensation is expected to be based primarily upon
recruitment of new participants, rather than upon the sale of products or services.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration and
Minority Business Development Agency, Franchise Opportunities Handbook, January
1988, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.e., p. xxxiii.
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*** THE FEDERAL REGISTER ***
TITLE 16 --COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
CHAPTER 1-- FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER C -- REGULATIONS UNDER SPECIFIC ACTS OF CONGRESS
PART 436 --DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING
FRANCHISING AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY VENTURES
16 CFR 436.1 § 436.1
The Rule.
In connection with the advertising, offering, licensing, contracting, sale, or other promotion in or
affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, of any franchise, or
any relationship which is represented either orally or in writing to be a franchise, it is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice within the meaning of section 5 of that Act for any franchisor or franchise
broker:
(a) To fail to furnish any prospective franchisee with the following information accurately, clearly, and
concisely stated, in a legible, written document at the earlier of the "time for making of disclosures" or
the first "personal meeting":
(1 )(i) The offcial name and address and principal place of business of the franchisor, and of the parent
firm or holding company of the franchisor, if any;
(ii) The name under which the franchisor is doing or intends to do business; and
(iii) The trademarks, trade names, service marks, advertising or other commercial symbols (hereinafter
collectively refelTed to as "marks") which identify the goods, commodities, or services to be offered,
sold, or distributed by the prospective franchisee, or under'which the prospective franchisee will be
operating.
(2) The business experience during the past 5 years, stated individually, of each of the franchisor's current
directors and executive officers (including, and hereinafter to include, the chief executive and chief
operating officer, financial, franchise marketing, training and service offcers). With regard to each
person listed, those persons' principal occupations and employers must be included.
(3) The business experience of the franchisor and the franchisor's parent firm (if any), including the
length of time each: (i) Has conducted a business of the type to be operated by the franchisee; (ii) has
offered or sold a franchise for such business; (iii) has conducted a business or offered or sold a franchise
for a business (A) operating under a name using any mark set forth under paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of 
this
section, or (B) involving the sale, offering, or distribution of goods, commodities, or services which are
identified by any mark set forth under paragraph (a)(1 )(iii) of this section; and (iv) has offered for sale or
sold franchises in other lines of business, together with a description of such other lines of business.
(4) A statement disclosing who, if any, of the persons listed in paragraphs (a) (2) and (3) of this section:
(i) Has, at any time during the previous seven fiscal years, been convicted of a felony or pleaded nolo
contendere to a felony charge if the felony involved fraud (including violation of any franchise law, or
unfair or deceptive practices law), embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, misappropriation of 
property, or
restraint of trade;
(ii) Has, at any time during the previous seven fiscal years, been held liable in a civil action resulting in a
final judgment or has settled out of court any civil action or is a part to any civil action (A) involving
allegations of fraud (including violation of any franchise law, or unfair or deceptive practices law),
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embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, misappropriation of propert, or restraint of trade, or (B) which
was brought by a present or foimer franchisee or franchisees and which involves or involved the
franchise relationship; Provided, however, That only material individual civil actions need be so listed
pursuant to paragraph (4)(ii) of this section, including any group of civil actions which, irrespective of the
materiality of any single such action, in the aggregate is material;
(iii) Is subject to any currently effective State or Federal agency or court injunctive or restrictive order, or
is a party to a proceeding currently pending in which such order is sought, relating to or affecting
franchise activities or the franchisor-franchisee relationship, or involving fraud (including violation of
any franchise law, or unfair or deceptive practices law), embezzlement, fra,udulentconversion,
misappropriation of property, or restraint of trade.
Such statement shall set fOlih the identity and location of the court or agency; the date of conviction,
judgment, or decision; the penalty imposed; the damages assessed; the terms of settlement or the terms of
the order; and the date, nature, and issuer of each such order or ruling. A franchisor may include a
summaiy opinion of counsel as to any pending litigation, but only if counsel's consent to the use of such
opinion is included in the disclosure statement.
(5) A statement disclosing who, if any, of the persons listed in paragraphs (a) (2) and (3) of this section at
any time during the previous 7 fiscal years has:
(i) Filed in bankruptcy;
(ii) Been adjudged bankrpt;
(iii) Been reorganized due to insolvency; or
(iv) Been a principal, director, executive offcer, or partner of any other person that has so fied or was so
adjudged or reorganized, during or within 1 year after the period that such person held such position in
such other person. If so, the name and location of the person having so fied, or having been so adjudged
or reorganized, the date thereof, and any other material facts relating thereto, shall be set forth.
(6) A factual description of the franchise offered to be sold by the franchisor.
(7) A statement of the total funds which must be paid by the franchisee to the franchisor or to a person
affiiated with the franchisor, or which the franchisor or such affliated person imposes or collects in
whole or in part on behalf of a third party, in order to obtain or commence the franchise operation, such
as initial franchise fees, deposits, downpayments, prepaid rent, and equipment and inventory purchases. If
all or part of these fees or deposits are returnablè under certain conditions, these conditions shall be set
forth; and if not retumable, such fact shall be disclosed.
(8) A statement describing any recurring funds required to be paid, in connection with carrying on the
franchise business, by the franchisee to the franchisor or to a person affiiated with the franchisor, or
which the franchisor or such affiliated person imposes or collects in whole or in part on behalf of a third
paiiy, including, but not limited to, royalty, lease, advertising, training, and sign rental fees, and
equipment or inventoiy purchases.
(9) A statement setting foiih the name of each person (including the franchisor) the franchisee is directly
or indirectly required or advised to do business with by the franchisor, where such persons are affiiated
with the franchisor.
(10) A statement describing any real estate, services, supplies, products, inventories, signs, fixtures, or
equipment relating to the establishment or the operation of the franchise business which the franchisee is
directly or indirectly required by the franchisor to purchase, lease or rent; and if such purchases, leases or
rentals must be made from specific persons (including the franchisor), a list of the names and addresses
of each such person. Such list may bemade in a separate document delivered to the prospective
388
AppendixC
franchisee with the prospectus i(the existence of such separate document is disclosed in the prospectus.
(I I) A description of the basis for calculating, and, if such infoimation is readily available, the actual
amount of, any revenue or other consideration to be received by the franchisor or persons affliated with
the franchisor from suppliers to the prospective franchisee in consideration for goods or services which
the franchisor requires or advises the franchisee to obtain from such suppliers.
(l2)(i) A statement of all the material terms and conditions of any financing alTangement offered directly
or indirectly by the franchisor, or any person affliated with the franchisor, to the prospective franchisee;
and
(ii) A description of the terms by which any payment is to be received by the franchisor from (A) any
person offering financing to a prospective franchisee; and (B) any person an'anging for financing for a
prospective franchisee.
(13) A statement describing the material facts of whether, by the terms of the franchise agreement or
other device or practice, the franchisee is:
(i) Limited in the goods or services he or she may offer for sale;
(ii) Limited in the customers to whom he or she may sell such goods or services;
(iii) Limited in the geographic area in which he or she may offer for sale or sell goods or services; or
(iv) Granted territorial protection by the franchisor, by which, with respect to a territory or area, (A) the
franchisor will not establish another, or more than any fixed number of, franchises or company-owned
outlets, either operating under, or selling, offering, or distributing goods, commodities or services,
identified by any mark set forth under paragraph (a)(I)(iii) of this section; or (B) the franchisor or its
parent will not establish other franchises or company-owned outlets selling or leasing the same or similar
products or services under a different trade name, trademark, service mark, advertising or other
commercial symboL.
(14) A statement of the extent to which the franchisor requires thefranchisee (or, if the franchisee is a
corporation, any person affliated with the franchisee) to participate personally in the direct operation of
the franchis e.
(15) A statement disclosing, with respect to the franchise agreement and any related agreements:
(i) The term (i.e., duration of arrangement), if any, of such agreement, and whether such term is or may
be affected by any agreement (including leases or subleases) other than the one from which such term
arises;
(ii) The conditions under which the franchisee may renew or extend;
(iii) The coriditions under which the franchisor may refuse to renew or extend;
(iv) The conditions under which the franchisee may terminate;
(v) The conditions under which the franchisor may terminate;
(vi) The obligations (including lease or sublease obligations) ofthefranchisee after teniiination of the
franchise by the franchisor, and the obligations of the franchisee (including lease or sublease obligations)
after teniiination of the franchise by the franchisee and after the expiration of the franchise;
(vii) The franchisee's interest upon termination of the franchise, or upon refusal to renew or extend the
franchise, whether by the franchisor or by the franchisee;
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(viii) The conditions under which the franchisor may repurchase, whether by right of first refusal or at the
option of the franchisor (and if the franchisor has the option to repurchase the franchise, whether there
wil be an independent appraisal of the franchise, whether the repurchase price will be determined by a
predetemlined formula and whether there wil be a recognition of goodwill or other intangibles associated
therewith in the repurchase price to be given the franchisee);
(ix) The conditions under which the franchisee may sell or assign all or any interest in the ownership of
the franchise, or of the assets of the franchise business;
(x) The conditions under which the franchisor may sell or assign, in whole or in part, its interest under
such agreements;
(xi) The conditions under which the franchisee may modify;
(xii) The conditions under which the franchisor may modify;
(xiii) The rights of the franchisee's heirs or personal represent ative upon the death or incapacity of the
franchisee; and
(xiv) The provisions of any covenant not to compete.
(I 6) A statement disclosing, with respect to the franchisor and as to the particular named business being
offered:
(i) The total number of franchises operating at the end of the preceding fiscal year;
(ii) The total number of company -owned outlets operating at the end of the preceding fiscal year;
(iii) The names, addresses, and telephone numbers of (A)! The ~° franchised outlets of the named
franchise business nearest the prospective franchisee's intended location; or (B) all franchisees of 
the
franchisor, or (C) all franchisees of the franchisor in the State in which the prospective franchisee lives or
where the proposed franchise is to be located, Provided, however, That there are more than lO such
franchisees. If the number of franchisees to be disclosed pursuant to paragraph (a)(l6)(iii)(B) or (C) of
this section exceeds 50, such listing may be made in a separate document delivered to the prospective
franchisee with the prospectus if the existence of such separate document is disclosed in the prospectus;
(iv) The number of franchises voluntarily terminated or not renewed by franchisees within, or at the
conclusion of, the term of the frnchise agreement, during the preceding fiscal year;
(v) The number of franchises reacquired by purchase by the franchisor during the term of the franchise
agreement, and upon the conclusion of the term of the franchise agreement, during the preceding fiscal
year;
(vi) The number of franchises otheiwise reacquired by the franchisor during the term of the franchise
agreement, and upon the conclusion of the term of the franchise agreement, during the preceding fiscal
year;
(vii) The number of franchise; for which the franchisor refused renewal of the franchise agreement or
other agreements relating to the franchise during the preceding fiscal year; and
(viii) The number of franchises that were canceled or tem1inated by the franchisor during the teim of the
franchise agreement, and upon conclusion of the term of the franchise agreement, during the preceding
fiscal year.
With respect to the disclosures required by paragraphs (a)(l6) (v), (vi), (vii), and (viii) of this
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section, the disclosure statemént shall also include a general categorization of the reasons for such
reacquisitions, refusals to renew or terminations, and the number falling within each such category,
including but not limited to the following: failure to comply with quality control standards, failure to
make suffcient sales, and other breaches of contract.
(17) (i) If site selection or approval thereof by the franchisor is involved in the franchise relationship, a
statement disclosing the range of time that has elapsed between signing of franchise agreements or other
agreements relating to the franchise and site selection, for agreements entered into during the preceding
fiscal year; and
(ii) If operating franchise outlets are to be provided by the franchisor, a statemeÍit disclosing the range oftime that has elapsed between the signing of franchise agreements or other agreements relating to the
franchise and the commencement of the franchisee's business, for agreements entered into during the
preceding fiscal year.
With respect to the disclosures required by paragraphs (a)(l7) (i) and (ii) of this section, a franchisor may
at its option also provide a distribution chart using meaningful classifications with respect to such ranges
of time.
(18) If the franchisor offers an initial training program or informs the prospective franchisee that it
intends to provide such person with initial training, a statement disclosing:
(i) The type and nature of such training;
(ii) The minimum amount, if any, of training that will be provided toa franchisee; and
(iii) The cost, if any, to be borne by the franchisee for the training to be provided, or for obtaining such
training.
(19) If the name of a public figure is used in connection with,a recommendation to purchase a franchise,
or as a part of the name of the franchise operation, or if the public figure is stated to be involved with the
management of the franchisor, a statement disclosing:
(i) The nature and extent of the public figure's involvement and obligations to the franchisor, including
but not limited to the promotional assistance the public figure wil provide to the franchisor and to the
franchisee;
(ii) The total investment of the public figure in the franchise operation; and
(iii) The amount of any fee or fees the franchisee will be obligated to pay for such involvement or
assistance provided by the public figure.
(20) (i) A balance sheet (statement of financial position) for the franchisor for the most recent fiscal year,
and an income statement (statement of results of operations) and statement of changes in financial
position for the franchisor for the most recent 3 fiscal years. Such statements are required to have been
examined in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by an independent certified or
licensed public accountant.
Provided, however, That where a franchisor is a subsidiaiy of another corporation which is peimitted
under generally accepted accounting principles to prepare financial statements on a consolidated or
combined statement basis, the above information may be submitted for the parent if (A) the
corresponding unaudited financial statements of the franchisor are also provided, and (B) the parent
absolutely and irrevocably has agreed to gnarantee all obligations of the subsidiary;
(ii) Unaudited statements shall be used only to the extent that audited statements have not been made, and
provided that such statements are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure that they are
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unaudited. Statements shall be prepared on an audited basis as soon as practicable, but, at a minimum,
financial statements for the first full fiscal year following the date on which the franchisor must first
comply with this part shall contain a balance sheet opinion prepared by an independent certified or
licensed public accountant, and financial statements for the following fiscal year shall be fully audited.
(21) All of the foregoing information in paragraphs (a) (1) through (20) of this section shall be containedin a single disclosure statement or prospectus, which shall not contain any materials or information other
than that required by this part or by State law not preempted by this part. This does not preclude
franchisors or franchise brokers from giving other nondeceptive information orally, visually, or in
separate literature so long as such information is not contradictory to the information in the disclosure
statement required by paragraph (a) of this section. This disclosure statement shall carry a cover sheet
distinctively and conspicuously showing the name of the franchisor, the date of issuance of the disclosure
statement, and the following notice imprinted thereon in upper and lower case bold-face type of 
not less
than 12 point size:
Information for Prospective Franchises Required by Federal Trade Commission
* * * * *
To protect you, we've required your franchisor to give you this information. We haven't checked it, and
don't know if it's correct. It should help you make up your mind. Study it carefully. While it includes
some information about your contract, don't rely on it alone to understand your contract. Read all of 
yourcontract carefully. Buying a franchise is a complicated investment. Take your time to decide. Ifpossible,
show your contract and this inforniation to an advisor, like a lawyer or an accountant. If you find
anything you think may be wrong or anything important that's been left out, you should let us know about
it. It may be against the law.
There may also be laws on franchising in your state. Ask your state agencies about them.
Federal Trade Comiiission,
Washington, D.C.
Provided, That the obligation to furnish such disclosure statement shall be deemed to have been met for
both the franchisor and the franchise broker if either such party furnishes the pra;pective franchisee with
such disclosure statement.
(22) All information contained in the disclosure statement shall be current as of the close of the
franchisor's most recent fiscal year. After the close of each fiscal year, the franchisor shall be given a
period not exceeding 90 days to prepare a revised disclosure statement and, following such 90 days, may
distribute only the revised prospectus and no other. The franchisor shall, within a reasonable time after
the close of each quarter of the fiscal year, prepare revisions to be attached to the disclosure statement to
reflect any material change in the franchisor or relating to the franchise business of the franchisor, about
which the franchisor or franchise broker, or any agent, representative, or employee thereof, knows or
should know. Each prospective franchisee shall have in his or her possession, at the "time for making of
disclosures," the disclosure statement and quarterly revision for the period most recent to the "time for
making of disclosures" and available at that time. Information which is required to be audited pursuant to
paragraph (a)(20) of this section is not required to be audited for quaiierly revisions, Provided, however,
That the unaudited information be accompanied by a statement in immediate conjunction therewith that
clearly and conspicuously discloses that such information has not been audited.
(23) A table of contents shall be included within the disclosure statement.
(24) The disclosure statement shall include a comment which either positively or negatively responds to
each disclosure item required to be in the disclosure statement, by use of a statement which fully
incorporates the information required by the item. Each disclosure item therein must be preceded
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by the apprópriate heading, as set forth in Note 3 of 
this part.
(b) To make any oral, written, or visual representation to a prospective franchisee which states a specific
level of potential sales, income, gross or net profit for that prospective franchisee, or which states other
facts which suggest such a specific level, unless:
(I) At the time such representation is made, such representation is relevant to the geographic market in
which the franchise is to be located;
(2) At the time such representation is made, a reasonable basis exists for such representation and the
franchisor has in its possession material which constitutes a reasonable basis for such representation, and
such material is made available to any prospective franchiseeand to the Commission or its staff 
upon
reasonable demand.
Provided, further, That in immediate conjunction with such representation, the franchisor shall disclose in
a clear and conspicuous manner that such material is available to the prospective franchisee; and
Provided, however, That no provision within paragraph (b) of this section shall be construed as requiring
the disclosure to any prospective franchisee of the identity of any specific franchisee or of information
reasonably likely to lead to the disclosure of such person's identity; and Provided, further, That no
additional representation as to a prospective franchisee's potential sales, income, or profits may be made
later than the "time for making of disclosures";
(3) Such representation is set forth in detail along with the material bases and assumptions therefor in a
single legible written document whose text accurately, clearly and concisely discloses such information,
and none other than that provided for by this part or by State law not preempted by this part. Each
prospective franchisee to whom the representation is made shall be furnished with such document no later
than the "time for making of disclosures"; Provided, however, That if the representation is made at or
prior to a "personal meeting" and such meeting occurs before the "time for making of disclosures", the
document shall be furnished to the prospective franchiseetQ whom the representation is made at that
"personal meeting'l;
(4) The following statement is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the document described by
paragraph (b)(3) of this section in immediate conjunction with such representation and in not less than
twelve point upper and lower-case boldface type:
CAUTION
These figures are only estimates of what we think you may earn. There isno assurance you'll do as welL.
If you rely upon our figures, you must accept the risk of not doing as welL.
(5) The following information is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the document described by
paragraph (b)(3) of this section in immediate conjunction with such representation:
(i) The number and percentage of outlets of the named franchise business which are located in the
geographic markets that form the basis for any such representation and which are known to the franchisor
or franchise broker to have earned or made at least the same sales, income, or profits during a period of
corresponding length in the immediate past as those potential sales, income, or profits represented; and
(ii) The beginning and ending dates for the cOlTesponding time period refelTed to by paragraph (b)(5)(i)
of this section, Provided, however, That any franchisor without prior franchising experience as to the
named franchise business so indicate such lack of experience in the document described in paragraph
(b )(3) of this section.
Except, That representations of the sales, income or profits of existing franchise outlets need not comply
with paragraph (b) of this section.
393
Appendix C
(c) To make any oral, written or visual representation to a prospective franchisee which states a specific
level of sales, income, gross or net profits of existing outlets (whether franchised or company -owned) of
the named franchise business, or which states other facts which suggest such a specific level, unless:
(1) At the time such representation is made, such representation is relevant to the geographic market in
which the franchise is to be located;
(2) At the time such representation is made, a reasonable basis exists for such representation and the
franchisor has in its possession material which constitutes a reasonable basis for such 
representation, and
such material is made available to any prospective franchiseeand to the Commission or its staff 
upon
reasonable demand,
Provided, however, That in immediate conjunction with such representation, the franchisor discloses in a
clear and conspicuous manner that such material is available to the prospective franchisee; and Provided,
fUliher, That no provision within paragraph (c) of this section shall be construed as requiring the
disclosure to any prospective franchisee of the identity of any specific franchiseeor of information
reasonably likely to lead to the disclosure of such person's identity; and Provided, further, That no
additional representation as to the sales, income, or gross or net profits of existing outlets (whether
franchised or company -owned) of the named franchise business may be made later than the "time for
making of disclosures";
(3) Such representation is set forth in detail along with the material bases and assurrtions therefor in a
single legible written document which accurately, clearly and concisely discloses such information, and
none other than that provided for by this part or by State law not preempted by this paii. Each prospective
franchiseeto whom the representation is made shall be furnished with such document no later than the
"time for making of disclosures",
Provided, however, That if the representation is made at or prior to a "personal meeting" and such
meeting occurs before the "time for making of disclosures," the document shall be funiished to the
prospective franchisee to whom the representation i~ made at that "personal meeting";
(4) The underlying data on which the representation is based have been prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles;
(5) The following statement is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the document described by
paragraph (c )(3) of this section in immediate conjunction with such representation, and in not less than
twelve point upper and lower case boldface type:
CAUTION
Some outlets have (sold) (earned) this amount. There is no assurance you'll do as welL. If 
you rely upon
our figures, you must accept the risk of not doing as well.
(6) The following information is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the document described by
paragraph (c)(3) of this section in immediate conjunction with such representation:
(i) The number and percentage of outlets of the named franchise business which are located in the
geographic markets that form the basis for any such representation and which are known to the franchisor
or franchise broker to have earned or made at least the same sales, income, or profits during a period of
corresponding length in the immediate past as those sales, income, or profits represented; and
(ii) The beginning and ending dates for the corresponding time period referred to by paragraph (c)(6)(i)
of this section,
Provided, however, That any franchisor without prior franchising experience as to the named franchise
business so indicate such lack of experience in the document described in paragraph (c )(3) of this
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section.
(d) To fail to provide the following infom1ation within the document(s) required by paragraphs (b)(3) and
(c)(3) of this section whenever any representation is made to a prospective franchisee regarding its
potential sales, income, or profits, or the sales, income, gross or net profits of existing outlets (whether
franchised or company -owned) of the named franchise business:
(I) A cover sheet distinctively and conspicuously showing the name of the franchisor, the date ofissuance of the document and the following notice imprinted thereon in upper and lower case boldface
type of not less than twelve point size:
INFORMA TION FOR PROSPECTIVE FRANCHISES ABOUT FRANCHISES (SALES) (INCOME)
(PROFIT) REQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION.
To protect you, we've required the franchisor to give you this infoimation. We haven't checked it and
don't know if it's correct. Study these facts and figures carefully. If possible, show them to someone who
can advise you, like a lawyer or an accountant. Then take your time and think it over.
If you find anything you think may be wrong or anything important that's been left out, let us know about
it. It may be against the law.
There may also be laws on franchising in your State. Ask your State agencies about them.
Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D.C.
(2) A table of contents.
Provided, however, That each prospective franchisee to whonl the representation is made shall be notified
at the "time for making of disclosures" of any material change (about which the franchisor, franchise
broker, or any of the agents, representatives, or employees thereof, knows or should know) in the
information contained in the document(s) described by paragraphs (b)(3) and (c)(3) of 
this section.
(e) To make any oral, written, or visual representation for general dissemination (not otheiwise covered
by paragraph (b) or (c) of this section) which states a specific level of sales, income, gross or net profits,
either actual or potential, of existing or prospective outlets (whether franchised or company-owned) of
the named franchise business or which states other facts which suggest such a specific level, unless:
(I) At the time such representation is made, a reasonable basis exists for such representation and the
franchisor has in its possession material which constitutes a reasonable basis for such representation and
which is madeavailable to the Commission or its staff upon reasonable demand;
(2) The underlying data on which each representation of sales, income or profit for existing outlets is
based have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
(3) In immediate conjunction with such repres entation, there shall be clearly and conspicuously disclosed
the number and percentage of outlets of the named franchise business which the franchisor or the
franchise broker knows to have earned or made at least the same sales, income, or profits during aperiod
of corresponding length in the immediate past as those sales, income, or profits represented, and the
beginning and ending dates for said time period;
(4) In immediate conjuction with each such representation of potential sales, income or profits, the
following statement shall be clearly and conspicuously disclosed:
CAUTION
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These figures are only estimates; there is no assurance you'll do as welL. If you rely upon our figures, you
must accept the risk of not doing as welL.
Provided, however, That if such representation is not based on actual experience of existing outlets of the
named franchise business, that fact also should be disclosed;
(5) No later than the earlier of the first "personal meeting" or the "time for making of disclosures," each
prospective franchisee shall be given a single, legible written document which accurately, clearly and
concisely sets forth the following infomiation and materials (and none other than that provided for by this
part or by State law not preempted by t his part):
(i) The representation, set foiih in detail along with the material bases and assumptions therefor;
(ii) The number and percentage of outlets of the named franchise business which the franchisor or the
franchise broker knows to have earned or made at least the same sales, income or profits during a period
of cOlTesponding length in the immediate past as those sales, income, or profits represented, and the
beginning and ending dates for said time period;
(iii) With respect to each such representation of sales, income, or profits of existing outlets, the following
statement shall be clearly and conspicuously disclosed in immediate conjunction therewith, printed in not
less than 12 point upper and lower case boldface type:
CAUTION
Some outlets have (sold) (earned) this amount. There is no assurance you'll do as welL. If you rely upon
our figures, you must accept the risk of not doing as welL.
(iv) With respect to each such representation of potential 'sales, income, or profits, the following
statement shall be clearly and conspicuously disclosed in inlltiediate conjunction therewith, printed in not
less than 12 point upper and lower case boldface type:
CAUTION
These figures are only estimates. There is no assurance that you'll do as welL. If you rely upon our figures,
you must accept the risk of not doing as welL.
(v) If applicable, a statement clearly and conspicuously disclosing that the franchisor lacks prior
franchising experience as to the named franchise business;
(vi) If applicable, a statement clearly and conspicuously disclosing that the franchisor has not been in
business long enough to have actual business data;
(vii) A cover sheet, distinctively and conspicuously showing the name of the franchisor, the date of
issuance of the document, and the following notice printed thereon in not less than 12 point upper and
lower case boldface type:
INFORMA TION FOR PROSPECTIVE FRANCHISES ABOUT FRANCHISE (SALES) (INCOME)
(PROFIT) REQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION.
To protect you, we've required the franchisor to give you this information. We haven't checked it and
don't know if it's correct. Study these facts and figures carefully. Ifpossible, show them to someone who
can advise you, like a lawyer or an accountant. If you find anything you think may be wrong or anything
impOliant that's been left out, let us know about it. It may be against the law. There may also be laws
about franchising in your State. Ask your State agencies about them.
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Appendix C
Federal Trade Commisssion,
Washington, D.e.
(viii) A table of contents;
(6) Each prospective franchisee shall be notified at the "time for making of disclosures" of any material
changes that have occurred in the information contained in this document.
(t) To make any claim or representation which is contradictory to the information required to be disclosed
by this part.
(g) To fail to furnish the prospective franchisee with a copy of the franchisor's franchise agreement and
related agreements with the document, and a copy of the completed franchise and related agreements
intended to be executed by the parties at least 5 business days prior to the date the agreements are to be
executed.
Provided, however, That the obligations defined in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section shall be
deemed to have been met for both the franchisor and the franchise broker if either such person furnishes
the prospective franchisee with the written disclosures required thereby.
(h) To fail to return any funds or deposits in accordance with any conditions disclosed pursuant to
paragraph (a)(7) of this section.
HISTORY:
43 FR 59614, Dec. 21,1978.
AUTHORITY:
38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 V.S.C. 41-58.
,
NOTES:
NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE PART:
(PUBLISHER'S NOTE: For Federal Register citations concerning Part 436 Authorizations, see: 58 FR
69224, Dec. 30, 1993; 60 FR 51895, Oct. 4, 1995.)
(PUBLISHER'S NOTE: For Federal Register citations concerning Part 436 Grants of 
Petition for
Exemption, see: 63 FR 64616, Nov. 23,1998.)
6132 words
Copyright ¡Ç 1998 LEXISQY-NEXISQY, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Appendix E
Table El
o
You have selected a snapshot for the following system:
Contact: McDonald's Corporation dba
McDonald's
One McDonald's Plaza
Oak Brook, IL 60521
630-623-3000
Description: Franchise which operates a quick
service restaurant offering a limited
menu of value-priced foods using the
McDonald's System.
Corporate Date Founded: 1955
Information:
Date Franchised: 1955
Parent Company:
Legal
Agreements:
The franchisor may require you to sign
the following agreement(s) as part of
the franchise purchase:
Programs
Offered:
ACH Agreement
Franchise Agreement
Operator's Land Lease
Operator's Lease
Preliminary Agreement
Promissory Note
Security Agreement
In addition to its original concept, the
franchisor also offers the following
other program(s) for becoming a
Franchisee in this system:
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Business
Types:
System Size:
Initial
Payments:
Initial
Investment:
None
In addition to its standard program, the
franchisor also offers the following
other program(s) for becoming a
Franchisee in this system:
None
The franchisor has 10732 operational
domestic franchised location(s) and
1850 company-owned locations.
Initial Fee: A flat fee of $45000.00 per
franchise.
Payment Terms: Payment is to made
in full when the franchise agreement is
signed.
Development Programs: No
development programs are discussed
in the offering circular.
Reduction for Multiple Units? There is
no reduction in Initial Fee for multiple
franchise purchases.
The following minimum and maximum
cost items are based on estimates
provided by the franchisor. The actual
amount may be determined by cost of
living standards in your area. Higher
costs of living usually relate to higher
start-up costs.
Cost Minimum Maximum
Additional funds $0.00 $25000.00
Initial franchise fee $45000,00 $45000.00
Equipment $50000.00 $175000.00
Travel & living $2800.00 $8500.00
expenses while
Initial inventory $4000.00 $22000.00
Other working $18000.00 $33000,00
capital/miscellaneous
Total Excluding Real $119800.00 $308500.00
Estate
Rent $3000.00 $97050,00
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Total Including Real
Estate $591800.00 $1073550.00
Royalties: Not Available.
Advertising: The franchisor indicates in its offering
circular that the following advertising
expenditures may be required of the
franchisee in addition to any
independent promotion of the
franchisee's Business:
National
Advertising
4% of gross sales
or revenues
Exclusive
Territory
Offered?
TermlRenewal: The initial term of the franchise
agreement is 20 year(s).
No, territory limited to store
The renewal term of the franchise
agreement is 20 year(s). The number
of renewals allowed are not disclosed.
Transfer:
Financing: Standard financing is offered for
Initial Franchise Fee. The financing
is available through the franchisor.
Search for a company:
about us i partners ¡ privacy Ilegal¡ contact us ¡ search I site map
Copyright is 2000 by FRANDATA Corporation, All rights reserved.
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BOND'S FRANCHISE GUIDE
FRANCHISOR QUESTIONNAIRE
If you wish to receive an autoconfirmation of your submission by E-Mail,
please be sure to fill in the "E -Mail" field.
Franchise Trade
Name:
Address:
Fax:
I
I
I
i
i
City:
State:
Zip:
Country:
(800) Phone:
Local Phone:
E-Mail:
Internet Address:
Contact:
Position:
President/CEO:
Title:
5. Description of Business: (Use the full space available to set yourself apart from
other franchising opportnities, i.e. sell your system to the potential franchisee.)
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6. Company was founded in:
First year as franchisor was:
of
nits.
8. Actual number of Company-Owned Units as
of
Total Operating Units as of
9. Of Total Operating Units listed above,
nits.
ere in the U.S.
10. Of the Total Operating Units listed above, in ho\\ many States/Provinces did you
have operating units?
umber ofU.S.
States
umber of
Canadian Provinces
umber of
Foreign Countries
ere in Canada.
ere in Overseas.
What 3 States/Provinces had the largest number of operating units?
B) Top 3 States/Provinces
1.
2.
3.
# Units in Each of B)
Ne\v Units do you plan to open in the next 12
months? nits.
12. Do you provide potential franchisees with an Eamings Claim
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Statement? 0 Yes 0 No
13. What is the minimum net worth required of
the franchisee?
14. Even though the cash investment may vary
substantially by individual unit, what is the
range of equity capital (up-front cash) required?
15. What is the range of total investment
required?
16. How much is the initial franchise fee for a
new franchisee?
17. How much is the oft-going royalty tèe?
18. How much is the on-going adveiiising ree?
$
$
$
$
or
orYo
19. The following States/Province require a separate registration (or disclosure,
indicated by an *) document. In which are you currently registered to franchise?
o All Below or 0 IN 0 ND' 0 W A
o WI
o DC
0 0 0f CA MD OR*
0 FL* 0 MI* 0 RI
HI 0 MN 0 SD
0 IL 0 NY 0 VA
20.What is the term of the original fhinchise
agreement?
21. What is the term of the renewal period?
Alberta
ears
ears
period?
o 022. Do you have Area Development Agreements? -" Yes ,,' No; If 
Yes for what
ears
23. Do you have Sub-Franchisor Contracts covering
specified territories? OYes 0 No
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24. Can the franchisee establish additional outlets DYes D No
within his area?
25. Is passive ownership of the initial unit D Allowed Allowed, But
Discouraged D Not Allowed
26. Do you encourage conversions? DYes D No
Applicable
Not
27. Is financial assistance available? D Yes No D Not Applicable; If
yes, D Direct or D Indirect
28. Do you assist the franchisee in site selection? D' D D'
, Yes .',' No - Not
Applicable
29. What square footage and types of sites do most of your
franchise units require? F
D Free-Standing D Store front
Building
D Home-Based D Other
Strip Center D Regional Mall
D Not Applicable
30. Do you assist the franchisee in lease negotiations? DYes D NoD Not
Applicable
31. Do you participate in co-operative advertising? DYes D NoD Not
Applicable
32., Including the owner/operator, how manv em Jloveesare recommended to
properly staff the average franchised unit? ull- Time art-Time
33. How many full-time, paid persOlmel are currently
on your corporate staff?
34. In qualifying a potential franchisee, please rank the following criteria from 1
(Unimp0l1ant) to 5 (Very Important):
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Unimportant Very
Important
Financial Net 0 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5Worth
General Business 0 i 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5Experience
Specific Industry 0 i 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5Experience
Formal Education 0 i 0 2 0 3 0, 4 0 5
Psychological 0 i 2 0 3 0 4 0 5Profile
Personal 0 i 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5Interview(s)
35. What are the location and duration of any initial training sessions included in the
franchise fee?
A.
B.
C. ,
Location Duration
36. Which of the following on-going services do you provide to the franchisee?
Service Included in Fees At Additional Cost N.A.
Central Data Processing A. 0 a. 0 0
Central Purchasing B. 0 b. 0 0
Field Operations Evaluation C. 0 c. 0 0
Field Training D. 0 d 0 0
Initial Store Opening E. 0 e.
Inventory Control F. 0 f. 0 0
Franchisee Newsletter G. 0 g. 0
Regional or National H. 0 h. 0 0Meetings
800 Telephone Hotline i. 1. 0
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37. Does your system have a franchise association? 0 0 NoYes "A
0
Yes 0 No
If Yes, are you a member?
38. In which specific regions of the U.S. are you actively seeking new franchisees?
For exam le: All D.S., or NW & SW, or NJ
Only.
39. Are you actively seeking franchisees in Canada? 0 Yes 0 No
If Yes, in which Provinces? 0 All
or:
40. Are you actively seeking franchisees Overseas? 0 Yes 0 No
If Yes, in which
countres?
~-~~'_'-A=A-N='._'.A~_Y_.Á=Y_.__~_~~=~,_,=,._=~W_."~_.='~.=-='_.==._=~_._-"='._.~C.~W'_.'=._._'.__~_._c.~_.,_-___v.,~_.___'==~.A=_._.___",=
Thank you very much for your time aÏid prompt attention.
If you wish to mail this infonnation instead of submitting it electronically, please
print the completed fonn and return it to:
Source Book Publications
P.O. Box 12488
Oakland, CA 94604
(510) 839-S471/FAX (510) 839-2104
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1 Franchise Owner A: Evelyn
2
3 Q. Please tell me how long you have owned the Muzak franchise about the selection process you used
4 in choosing this franchise.
5
6 A. We have owned this franchise for 17 years, having purchased it in 1984. Frankly, we were not
7 looking for a franchise. We were not necessarily even looking for business. My husband was vice-
8 president of Westinghouse Broadcasting at the time, and Westinghouse Broadcasting bought a little
9 company called Telecom, a cable company. Part of that purchase was a little company called Muzak.
10 It just happened to be owned by Telecom. When they got it, it was in pretty bad shape. It had very weak11 management at the time, and the president of Westinghouse Broadcasting went to my husband and
12 asked him to go over there and fix it. My husband said I don't know anything about Muzak, I'm in
13 broadcasting. Well, the president said to have two choices: you can go fix it or you can go find another
14 job. And so, we started going to their conferences and started meeting people and started to see their
15 style of life, and what the business was all about, and we decided that we were on the wrong end of 
the16 business. And that's what interested us in Muzak. And so, we put the word out that if one of these
17 comes up for sale that we would be interested in purchasing it. You have to understand that Muzak was
18 65 years old, was the first franchise ever, and it's geographically exclusive. The whole world was
19 divided up in the beginning. So it's not like McDonald's, where you have one on every three corners.
20 All the ten-itories were already given out, so the only way to get into the franchise community was to be
21 the son or daughter of the existing owner, or to buy one from somebody. It was different then than it is
22 now, in those days they Vlre very, very infrequently up for sale. And somebody one day called us and
23 said that Charleston South Carolina was up for sale. We asked where is that?
24
25 Q. At the time, where were you living?
26
27 A. I was living in Raleigh North Carolina, and my husband was commuting from New York. We had a
28 commuter marriage. So, we came down to Charleston. We looked at Charleston, and we looked at the
29 business. We said this was great.
30
31 Q. SO you did not evaluate any other franchises before choosing this Muzak franchise.
32
33 A. There were no other Muzak franchises to buy.
34
35 Q. Did you look at other franchises other than Muzak?
36
37 A. No. That really was not our vision. Buck (husband) had always worked for large corporations, and I
38 had been consulting with small groups ... private, not-for-profit. We weren't specifically looking to own
39 a business. But, we knew that we did not want to work for someone else forever.
40
41 Q. Do you remember if you got a UFOC and franchise agreement to review prior to buying the Muzak
42 franchise?
43
44 A. Yes. What we had to do was this. Muzak has the right in their contract to accept or reject anybody
45 who wants to buy a franchise. They didn't have to give us a contract. I remember seeing the Muzak
46 contract, and I think the contract came with the UFOC, and the other documents, which was about 90
47 milion pages. I frankly, if you want to know the honest to God's truth, I don't think we ever even read
48 it. We read the contract, and we sat down with other franchisees, and asked is there any room to do
49 anything within this contract one way or the other. They said no ... it's a take-it-or-leave-it contract. You
50 read it, you review it, and that's the end. And that was it. By the time we bought the business ... it had
51 probably been about two and a half years ... we had met a lot of people around the business, had very
52 good friends in the business ... including other franchisees. The franchisees had told us what the
53 business was like. What the corporate was like. At that time there is a good deal of chaffng between
54 franchisees and the franchisor. And we were at that time kind of the good guys in the corporation ... so55 we leamed a great deal about the business ... from both sides of the street. Maybe, we were too stupid or
56 too green to know any better.
57
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57
58 Q. Most of your information came from franchisees?
59
60 A. Absolutely.
61
62 Q. Having been in this business for 17 years, tell me what role these documents (the UFOC and
63 franchise agreement) play in the daily operation of your business?
64
65 A. The UFOC really plays no role. At one time we got into a big battle with corporate ... we meaning
66 all the franchisees ... and we essentially learned that we have no protection under those documents. It
67 did not do a thing for us. We learned that there is very little in the way of 
laws that protect franchisees,
68 at all. You are kind of hung out there on your own, whatever you signed. The contracts themselves had
69 been prett well written. The franchise has a group, a trade association, who,hired an attorney. This
70 attorney has been with them for years. Before becoming the trade association's attorney, he was the
71 corporation's attorney. So he also knows both sides of 
the street. He was the one that did most of the72 negotiating for uS...he really did a very good job for us, on behalf of the whole franchise community.
73
74 Q. SO if you had a problem with the UFOC or franchise agreement, you would likely go to the trade
75 association attorney?
76
77 A. We would likely go to him first, for advice. He knows both sides, and he knew what he wrote when
78 he wrote the documents. Yes, if there was any issue with the documentation, he is the one i would go
79 to.
80
81 Q. When most people think of entrepreneurship, they think of creativity, innovation, and the like. On
82 the one hand, the contract cannot cover all contingencies, which creates some 'holes' or gaps. As
83 markets and competition changes, there may be empty spots. On the other hand, the detailed
84 documents may create a culture of just following the rules, do what you're supposed to do. Are you
85 aware of any 'holes' oi'gaps in the agreement that either you or someone else identified where you can
86 use your own discretion? Or is your agreement rather loose, in that you are allowed to exercise your
87 own judgment and discretion?
88
89 A. I think that our agreement is far less stringent than most franchise agreements. i say this because at
90 one time...when our agreement was up for renewal...they (the corporation) brought in a franchise
91 lawyer, who tried to make our agreement more like a McDonald's agreement. We all just sat there and
92 laughed at it. We told them to go back to the drawing board, and give us something we can look at.
93 Nobody would put up with that. It was nonsense. There are two things about this. There are 0 and
94 O's, owned and operated, or franchises that the corporation owns, and then there are those of 
us that are95 the lA's, or independent affiliates. We are supposed to function the same. We don't..because they get
96 all kinds of things from corporate that we don't get. On the other side of it, we as independent affiliates
97 are not precluded from doing anything else...other than selling a direct competitor's product. i may not
98 sell somebody else's music in this territory. i can sell somebody else's music in another territory.
99 There is a gentleman's agreement among the franchisees that we don't do that. .it is just not done.
100
101 Q. SO, within your telTitOlY, you are not prohibited from being involved with other businesses.
102
103 A. Correct. And we do have other businesses. We started off being the Muzak franchise, and did not
104 do anything else. We now do just about anything that involves sound or video.
105
106 Q. And that was your initiative...identifying the market needs, and acting upon it.
107
108 A. Two things happened. One, we identified the market needs, and two, we identified the skills that we
109 had in the fiJ11. Being a family franchise makes it a little more colorful. I have two engineers in the
110 family, and i have a sales person in the family. With two engineers, one of 
whom is a PE, we are open111 to do a whole lot of things that other Muzak franchisees could not do, unless they went out and hired
112 somebody.
113
114 Q. And Muzak receives no credit or royalties on this aspect of your business?
115
116 A. No. Absolutely not. We have another entire company that acts as a distributor of other products.
117 And we do business in education and healthcare, lines that Muzak has nothing to do with. We do cross
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118 sell...if! have a hospital that I sell Dukane equipment to, I will try to sell them the Muzak as welL.
119 Muzak will get a piece of the music sale, but not the other. On the other side of that, we do sound
120 systems and music systems. And because of the way that the franchise contract is put together, if! go
121 to a store and put in a sound system, and I lease those things to them along with the Muzak, the
122 corporation has a right to get a royalty on the whole thing. If you can explain that to me, I'd be thriled.
123 The copyright people have a right not just to the percentage of the royalties for the music they
124 represent, but to any income I receive based on the fact that I have music in that place. So it's a huge
125 chunk that goes out every month.
126
127 Q. SO you have a lot of discretion in your franchise.
128
129 A. I have a lot of discretion over those things... I have no discretion over the kind of music that is
130 playff. That's all programmed and sent out. I have to use the music reception equipment that they tell
131 me to use. As far as the speakers and amplifiers and the kind of wiring I use...its up to me.
132
133 Q. Because you've decided to branch out and customize your business, it appears that discretion and
134 the ability to adapt is impOliant to you.
135
136 A. You bet.
137
138 Q. SO, do you think you would be happy in a McDonald's franchise?
139
140 A. No. That would make me crazy.
141
142 Q. Tell me about the times that you had identified opportunities, and acted upon them, other than the
143 formation of the other business. Was there a time when you really wanted to do something, but felt that
144 it would be in violation of your agreement?
145
146 A. There are products that the corporation sells...I couk! get equally good ifnot better products at a
147 lower price...but I'm not permitted to do it. Advertising on. hold is an example. It's a big product for
148 Muzak, and they charge us a lot of money for it. There are other providers who do a good job, but we
149 are not allowed to use them. Those were not originally in the agreement. But with each contract
150 revision or renewal, they are bringing in more products. Its not really a constraint, because we agreed
151 to it, but indirectly it is. In general, where a product is named Muzak, we are prohibited from using
152 something else.
153
154 Q. And these kinds of things were not in the original agreement?
155
156 A. The original agreement only dealt with the music product. We were obliged to use that music
157 product. Then over the years, the means of delivering that music product came up. And in order to use
158 those means, there had to be separate agreements, some with third parties.
159
160 Q. SO, the corporation would come to you...
161
162 A. Right, they would come to us and say because of this change, we want an amendment. And the
163 trade association acted as negotiator in these things. They almost act as a union for us. So instead of
164 the individual franchisee fighting battles one at a time, we fight them as a group. We have the attorney
165 that represents us, and it is a very strong group. It has become less strong over the years, because
166 corporate has been buying up the franchises.
167
168 Q. SO the number of independent affliates is going down?
169
170 A. Yes. Where we used to be 80% of the total market, we are now about 40%.
171
172 Q. Are you saying that the distribution of territories within Muzak that used to be 80% franchisees and
173 20% corporate, is now 40% franchisees and 60% corporate?
174
175 A. Right. And corporate is trying to buy more of them up. There are some large franchisees who own
176 several territories who are not about to selL. They (corporate J have to come to us if there is anything
177 outside that contract, that they want to enter into, that would make us follow whatever side agreement
178 they're considering.
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179
180 Q. SO, what you are saying is that if a new technology, product, or service that corporate wanted to
181 become involved with, they would send you a contract addendum that would become part of 
your182 agreement.
183
184 A. And in some cases they have permitted us to 
become part of the negotiating wing with the third185 party, so that we have some say in how the contract is written with a third party, because it very much
186 affects us. We had a group that came to us who was involved with sending in advertising to grocery
187 stores. A third party came in and said we will be your arm to go out and sell adveitising. We will do
188 all the negotiating between the grocer and the other vendors and you supply the equipment and the
189 speakers and everything through which we play it, and we'll give you a percentage of 
it. You just give190 us the right to play through your equipment. We'll get the large majority of it, and we'll get to work
191 with your customers. So there were a lot of things at stake there... we did not want them dealing with
192 all of our clients, but it looked as though there would be some good revenue in there for us. We were
193 brought into that negotiation with the parent company and the third party. That would require an
194 additional contract to make that a part of the Muzak contract.
195
196 Q. SO the contract with Muzak has changed over its term.
197
198 A. They are all 10 year contracts. And during those ten years, there may be umpteen things that change
199 and become side amendments. Once the amendments are signed, they are part and parcel of the
200 contract. What's happened in some cases is that there are one or two affliates who say no...I don't like
201 that...I'm not going to sign it. There is not a damned thing anyone can do about it, and it holds
202 everybody up. Unless the corporate people can negotiate something with those people, it can hold
203 everybody up.
204
205 Q. It is either all or none?
206
207 A. It is all or none. They have no right to say majority rules, and fOltunately, our contract states that. I
208 don't think that most franchise contracts are like that. But ours is. I think the majority of 
them are just209 dictated to. Well, this is not. In fact, this is one reason why corporate is buying up franchises. They
210 feel that their hands are tied, somewhat, in some of their rregotiations with national contracts, because
211 they cannot sign one without us. They cannot go into a nàtional agreement without our OK...where
212 they are competing with people who can...dealerships, not franchises. And there is a huge difference.
213
214 Q. Keeping it focused just on the Muz ak franchise poition of your business, do you see competitive
215 pressures in the marketplace?
216
217 A. There have always been competitors who nipped on our heels. A lot of the competition has been led
218 by the technology. In the past, at the very beginning, Muz ak was the only company who had the
219 technology down pat to do this. And then there were tape companies who offered foreground music to
220 compete with the background or elevator music. And that brought us into the tape business, following
221 them. And then came satellites. With the advent of satellites, We have had much more competition
222 than we had before, because it is no longer limited by geography. You can be anyone, anywhere...put a
223 satellite dish in, and you've got it. There is a huge difference between the competitors that we224 have... the big difference between us and them is that they haven't figured out that we are not in the
225 music business... we're in the service business. They don't have local representation, they don't have
226 anyone who will respond to a problem. With the kind of customers that we have, customer response is
227 huge. It's a big pait of what we do. We've been able to keep people out, get them out, and get
228 customers back, because when a restaurant with a music system has the music go out on a &turday
229 night for some reason, they do not want to wait two weeks for someone to come from three states away,
230 which is what the competitors provide.
231
232 Q. Are your competitors primarily dealers?
233
234 A. They're dealers. We are the only franchised business in this type of business.
235
236 Q. One of the advantages of franchising mentioned in a variety of publications is the local
237 implementation of a proprietary product or service. What you're saying is that in your business, the
238 franchisee's ownership of the territory and commitment to service the customer functions better than a
239 dealership arrangement, right?
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240
241 A. Absolutely. For several reasons. Number one, with a dealership, the vendor can pull its product
242 tomorrow morning. Ifhe decides that you are not representing him well, you're out of there. Our243 franchise agreement gives me ten years to fix it. That's pretty huge. And a dealer really has little
244 control of his product line. Although he may have more leeway to go to other competitive products, he
245 can lose them in a heartbeat. And I don't think he has the brotherhood or sisterhood that we have in our
246 franchise community. And that is huge. That has been a major reason why we were successful,
247 especially at the beginning. Since we are geographically exclusive, we are not competing with our
248 other franchisees. We're able to pick up the telephone and ask we're having this problem, how did you
249 fix this or what did you do. They (other franchiseesJ are all for helping you...they want you to be
250 successful in the business. Its really helpful to them to have another successful franchisee in another
251 area. I can without hesitation say to a customer that I can cover them in any city, I can promise you that
252 you can get service in any city. I can call up another franclisee, tell them that I sold a contract, ask
253 them when they can get it done, and have it handled.
254
255 Q. SO there is no competition among franchisees?
256
257 A. Right. I can't sell in their territory, and they can't sell in mine. I can sell an account for their
258 territory, but I have to give it to them.
259
260 Q. SO there is no financial gain to be made at another's expense.
261
262 A. And we've trained each other. Our franchisor does not give us much of anything. We don't get
263 advertising free, we don't get training free...all that is something that we have to accomplish through
264 our trade association. So, we train each other. And I don't think that happens in a dealership.
265
266 Q. Do you feel that you have the ability to exercise discretion over pricing and terms?
267 A. Yes, and it causes problems sometimes. I have a customer that I have provided Christmas music to
268 for the past three years. My neighboring franchisee a few states away was selling it for a quarter of 
the269 price. My customer has a contract with me, and pay it every year. My client found out what the others
270 were offered and called up to ask why. We said, OOPS...biling error. So it can go either way.
271 Corporate cannot tell us what to charge, in some ways it is. good, and in some ways it is bad, because
272 we cannot tell them (corporate J what to charge either. WI'en they do a national deal, they sometimes
273 give away the store...they get 3,000 units and I only get I13000 of the deaL. So, I am losing money on
274 the one store, because I am forced to go along with their national deaL. The good news is that I would
275 not have gotten the account on my own. I cannot go out and make a deal with a chain like The Gap.
276 They (The Gap J only makes national deals, so the fact that Muzak went in and made the deal with the
277 Gap is wonderful for me... the sad part is, I only get $ i 0 a month for it. I cannot start my truck for $ 10,
278 literally. What I do get for it is tat I am able to walk into my clients "We do the Gap, we do etc." That
279 alone is impressive. We do a lot of selling on that... we don't make a lot of money on it (The Gap J.
280
281 Q. Would you say that your business would change significantly if, for some reason, the franchise
282 arrangement was structured such that you did not have an exclusive territory?
283
284 A. Oh yes. I would have people marching through here every day selling Muzak. I would then have to
285 kill people (laughing). In fact, its very interesting. One of those side agreements is with Echo Star, the
286 DISH Network. Because we use paii of their satellites. And they have dealers æ well as us folks, and
287 their dealers are allowed to go into commercial locations and sell our products. Which is the first time
288 we ever committed to anything like that. It was a horrible deaL. But we are supposed to get an override
289 for any dealer of theirs that goes into one of our territories and sells our products. The problem is, there
290 is no way to enforce that. We're not allowed in their books...we have no way of knowing, unless we291 see a dish sitting on someone's roof. So when you were saying would it be a problem, it already is a
292 small problem. But very few of them sell commercial, most sell residentiaL.
293
294 Q. But if Echo Star decided to sell commercial, which is a decision out of your control and the control
295 of Muzak...
296
297 A. Yes, they could do that tomorrow morning. That would be big.
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1 Franchise Owner B: Sue
2
3 Q. Tell me a little bit aboüt your decision to purchase a franchise.
4
5 A. Before I bought the franchise, I worked with my husband, Steve, at the Entrepreneur's
6 Source. My role there was calling total strangers, and my goal was to get an appointment for a
7 meeting or a phone meeting with Steve. Once I got that, it was over for me...1 no longer had
8 any contact with that person.
9
10 Q. It was prospecting for clients?
11
12 A. Yes, but the people I called were leads given to me. There were no cold calls. They were
13 people who had shown an interest in the service either over the internef or through corporate. I
14 contacted them, told them the basics of the process, and would try to set up a meeting with him
15 (Steve). Once that meeting was set up, I was finished with that person. Typically, I would try to
16 call a person, leave messages...keep track of when I called them, how many days between calls.
17 I did this for a while, and to be honest, it wasn't very exciting. I needed to do more than just that
18 set up. Steve said, "how about coming in and doing kind of what I do too?" But, 1just didn't
19 see that for me. So I started thinking about it...here we are working with different businesses,
20 and I'm reading about some of them, and it got me kind of interested in the idea of owning a
21 business.
22
23 Q. SO, working with prospective franchisees got you interested in becoming one?
24
25 A. Yes, because I would hear Steve's stories, and I would read about the businesses that he was
26 showing people, and they sounded interesting. So, I thought... what about me? And really, the
27 business that I bought kind of fell in my lap. A friend of mine owned it for two and a half years.
28 Our daughters were gymnasts together, and we were sitting at a gymnastics meet, talking about
29 it. The more we talked about it, the more I thought, well, maybe I could do this. So, I went with
30 her on a couple of sales calls, and got interested. He (Steve) was not so sure about
31 Entrepreneur's Source...1 wasn't too sure about my r9le in the business, so I thought, well,
32 maybe this is something I should look into. So I wei~t to him (Steve) and said "Look at this."
33 So he did the due diligence thing for me, and explained it to me and discussed it with me, and
34 explained how he understood it would run. I called corporate, and they sent the UFOC. Steve
35 looked at the UFOC and did all that kind of work for me... I talked to corporate. Ours
36 (franchises) are sold by zip codes, and the population within those zip codes. My friend had
37 bought it two and one half years ago as a single ten'itory, but it had grown to more than a double
38 territory, so at the time I did spend more than what she had. I spent like a double ten'itory, but it
39 seemed fair, and we ran the price by corporate. I don't think they (corporate) cou Id say "You
40 must sell it for this price" because they never did that. They just listened, and said its
41 OK... they learned a little bit about me... we had to pay a little transfer fee, but that was
42 essentially it.
43
44 Q. SO, you purchased an existing franchise.
45
46 A. Yes. She had run it for about two and a half years, after purchasing it from a man who had it
47 for nine months.
48
49 Q. Had she grown the business during that time?
50
51 A. She had grown some, but the population had grown.
52
53 Q. And because the fees were based on population, you had to pay a little more for the market
54 opportunity.
55
56 A. Yes. My friend was asking a little more...corporate never said anything. That was her price,
57 based on what she had paid and what they (the franchises) were going for and the size it (the
58 territoiy) had grown to. That's how she got her price. The territoiy had grown to be the size of
59 two territories, based on the number of households.
60
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61 Q. SO the zip code structure remained the same, but the number of households doubled.62
63 A. Right, but as a zip code branched off (a single zip code geography was split into two codes)
64 you inherit the other zip codes. I inherited a new zip code on Daniel Island.
65
66 Q. Did you evaluate some other franchises?
67
68 A. No. I mean I had looked. I had a couple of ideas, and say "Hmmm...maybe I should look at
69 that." And he (Steve) would say "No, I don't think that one is right." So I really, truly did not
70 look at any other one beside this.
71
72 Q. What was it about this one (franchise) that appealed to you the most?
73
74 A. Flexibility. Being a mom is first, and I needed something that would let me work from home.
75 I could see that I decided when I would see customers. I set my own schedule.
76
77 Q. Was the potential to make money part of your consideration?
78
79 A. Part of it. I'm not really a person driven by money...I mean I am a little bit... but I'm not
80 really focused on it. But the thing that really drove me was the flexibility. I could stil pick my
81 youngest up from school, and stil do the 'mom things' that were importait to me.
82
83 Q. You told me that Steve helped you with the UFOC review process. Do you know of any or
84 have you discussed any other potential business opportunities that are not expressly prohibited
85 by your agreement, to offer some other products or services to your customers?
86
87 A. The only thing we thought of was the (window) fim. You mean related to the blinds
88 business?
89
90 Q. Yes, or other things that your customers might need.
91
92 A. I have not approached that as of yet.
93
94 Q. Is that your choice?
95
96 A. Yes, and if! were to think of the rest of the company, nobody really does. We're very
97 focused on windows. (Steve speaking) I think that the company has been very successful at
98 doing just that. But the oppoiiunity is celiainly there to do other things. And we've talked a
99 little bit about it, but have not really pursued it.
100
101 Q. One of the most noted benefits of franchising is realized in the economies of scale that a
102 franchisor can bring through their negotiations with suppliers. Do you believe that you can buy
103 products (from your franchisor) at a substantially lower price?
104
105 A. I should be able to, but just today I saw where some of these independent businesses are now
106 manufacturing their own products, cutting their costs. I don't know if I'm going to get a job
107 from a woman Ijust saw yesterday because of that very concept. We have great prices, but it is
108 still hard to compete with somebody, an individual who has maybe two shops and they
109 manufacture their own (product). They get the parts, and they put them together themselves.
110 They cut out the labor in the middle, and are able to offer products at a lower price. She (the
111 customer) quoted me their prices, and they are lower than mine, or what I would typically sell
112 for. Now, I have total control over what I sell my products for. I can sell them at cost, or even
113 below cost if I wanted to help somebody furnish their house. I can mark it (the products and
114 services) up however I choose. So in this situation...I told her that I would look at the numbers
115 and see what I can do... and I will do that. Whether I will come down to that lower price...I
116 don't think I wilL.
117
118 Q. Your franchisor is paid on sales?
119
120 A. Yes, they are paid on gross sales.
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121
122 Q. SO, when you discount, they (the franchisor) realize less?
123
124 A. They realize less (royalty fees), but we can sell at a net loss, and they stil get their
125 percentage. (Steve talking) They have a sales training program that they require all their
126 franchisees to go through...and they strongly encourage a certain percentage ofprofit..they
127 don't want you selling below that certain percentage profit leveL. And they train you to go after
128 that or higher. There are mechanisms in place to help people increase their profit levels, which
129 will help increase the royalties, but there is not a requirement to do so.
130
131 Q. Do you feel as though there is a conflict between your interests in profits and the franchisor's
132 interests in sales, given the pricing discretion you have?
133
134 A. No. The only time I sense a conflict is when I try to tell them (corporate) that price is an
135 issue, and they tell me "no, it isn't." I don't always agree with them. (Steve talking)
136 Sometimes they tell her to go for a 70% profit margin, and if she did so, she would be out of
137 business. Realistic for her.. . and we've experimented with this...Is more in the 50% range.
138
139 Q. You are competing in a price conscious market?
140
141 A. Veiy much so. '
142
143 Q. One of the interesting aspects of your franchise is that it is a fast growing one. They have
144 been adding franchisees quickly. To what do you attribute their success?
145
146 A. Part of it has to be they're aggressive...they're after people. One indicator is that we
147 (franchisees) get paid a finder's fee if we bring somebody. It is a good business, too. You
148 know, I knew absolutely nothing about window treatment...I knew nothing. We did what I tell
149 my customers not to do... we went to Lowe's (do-it-yourself store) and put them up. Ijust
150 knew...own a business, flexibility, work from home.
151
152 Q. SO, the product didn't affect your decision?
153
154 A. No. I thought... it could be fun. I think if people just look at it, it is a good business.
155 Corporate support is wonderfuL. The five men that own the business are wonderful guys. And if
156 anybody spent any time talking to them, they'll get that. What I liked about it was "Here's what
157 has worked in the past.. .and we can follow it." It was a guideline, and I needed that. I'm not
158 the entrepreneurial type that can just go and make it for themselves. To follow a system was
159 something I needed. I think if somebody wants that kind of system, this is a good one.. .and
160 they'll see it.
161
162 Q. (Question directed at Steve) In your evaluation of the UFOC, and because of your experience163 in evaluation hundreds of franchise documents, would you say that this one is a 'loose' one or
164 does the franchisor have this one pretty tight?
165
166 A. (Steve) I think that its pretty loose.
167
168 Q. Are you restricted in the products that you sell
169
170 A. I can buy from anyone. I can offer products from any vendor. (Steve) it's a bit surprising,
171 because technically, we could go find a local vendor, never repmi it in our royalty repoii, and
172 they would never know. Now, they know what we buy from their vendors, and the company
173 that they formed to manufacture the blinds. I'm sure that they get a report from them, and match
174 the royalties with the orders. But we could buy from...and we've done it...from those guys in
175 Charlotte (North Carolina)...and because we're honest folks, we repoiied on our royalty report.
176 They (corporate) would have no idea that we're buying from United Supply. (Sue) And other
177 things. They want you to have this big, white van painted with Budget Blinds (company name),
178 and Ijust have not been able to afford one yet. So, I don't have it. If 
they ask me, of course I'll
179 tell them that I don't have one yet. But they're not going to say "well, then you cannot be a
180 franchisee."
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181
182 Q. But, it states in the UFOC that you must have this van.
183
184 A. Yes. (Steve) The UFOC states you will purchase a white van, has all the dimensions, specs,
185 and everything.
186
187 Q. Did the previous owner have one (a van)?
188
189 A. No. But even Tony (one of the franchisor owners) said to me at training when I told him "I
190 don't think I can afford this yet"...he said, "well, how often do we get to South Carolina?" We
191 (the franchisor) don't see it...and they never ask me about it when I'm on the phone with them.
192
193 Q. How are royalties paid?
194
195 A. We send them a check every month. (Steve) Every month we do a royalty report, its all
1% computerized...you list customers, sales, profit margins.
197
198 Q. SO, in addition to sales, the franchisor knows your profit margins?
199
200 A. Yes.
201
202 Q. Does this franchise disclose earnings in Item 19 of the UFOC?
203
204 A. (Steve) No. What they have is the profit margin on the product..they do not know what
205 your operational costs are, your overhead, and all the other costs. They (the franchisor) does not
206 really know if you are a profitable business.
207
208 Q. Are all of the businesses home-based, operated out of vans, or are there some retail209 locations?
210
211 A. A few have a small retail location, most folks have a small home offce and a van. Some of
212 the more successful ones have a small offce and several sales people with vans. (Steve) When
213 Sue brought this to me and said let's look at this, one of the things that really attracted me to it
214 was that there was a wide variety of people in this business. From the owner-operator...the one
215 man show... where one person does everything from marketing to sales, to installation and
216 administration...and there are other franchisees that have a whole operation. They've hired
217 employees to do sales, they've hired others to do the installations, and they (the franchisee) run
218 the business. Its kind of like you can bootstrap yourself up. Which is kind of the plan that Sue
219 and I talked about. We'll take tliis thing on, and we'll boots trap ourselves up. We will grow it
220 into a business that allows us what we're looking for in a business...that sophistication that I
221 didn't have a few years ago, I've got now. And this is the vehicle that we'll use to get there.
222
223 Q. Do they have area directors in your franchise?
224
225 A. No. But, they just started with...because they have so many franchises around the
226 country... they have divided the country into regions... with a regional guy... that if you have a
227 problem or a question, call the regional guy. And those regional guys wil meet with corporate.
228
229 Q. Does your franchise have company-owned outlets or are they all franchised?
230
231 A. Their only company -owned store is in San Diego (the location of the franchisor
232 headquarters).
233
234 Q. How big is the franchisor's headquarters operation?
235
236 A. There's the five owners...but then there's a couple office people, some training people, and
237 someone who all he does is tiy to sell franchises...I think there are a couple of those now. I
238 would say, no more than is employees. (Steve) i think it's a little unusual that they have five
239 owners, including twin brothers.
240
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241 Q. What do you think is the major reason for their success?
242
243 A. (Steve) I would say that it's the personalities of the guys running it. (Sue) They are very,
244 very positive and upbeat. . complimentary . ..how can we help you... they're just so positive,
245 nothing negative. I like that about them. They're hard working and optimistic. I never feel as
246 though they're the super guys up here, and we're the little pee-ons down here. Its not that I'm in
247 contact with them a lot, but I don't feel that way. (Steve) I think that they are really interested in
248 the success of their franchisees, eveiy one of us. This is evidenced by the fact that they don't
249 micro-manage your royalty repoi1s. As long as you're sending in your royalty checks...I think
250 they have a system with parameters that looks at an offce that stays open, and they're (the
251 franchisee) is only sending in $500 a month in royalties, something's wrong. Tley (the
252 franchisee) cannot stay open that long and maintain that Iow level of sales. So I think they have
253 some parameters. They do have the right... the UFOC states that they liave the right to come
254 visit you any time they want. But interestingly, they also say that if you want them (corporate) to
255 come visit and make an evaluation of your business, they will fly in and do it for free. They will
256 spend time with you.. .and say here's the things that we think will help you with your business.
257 (Sue) Yes, they will follow you for several days...I think that you may have to have a certain
258 sales level...a minimal criteria. And they'll give you some pointers.
259
260 Q. On the one hand, you said that the franchisor is upbeat, positive, reinforcing and supportive.
261 Yet, when you look at the UFOC, there are some pretty draconian terms in there...you must do
262 this, you shall do this, etc. When you approached this franchisor with questions about the
263 UFOC, how were your questions handled.
264
265 A. (Steve) Sue actually talked to them, I gave her a bunch of questions to ask. She asked Tony,
266 one of the owners a question, and he said... "You know, I don't know the answer to that.. .I'm
267 the owner of the company, and I don't know. I'll have to get back to you on that. I'll have to
268 find out." And he did. But to me it was an indication... these aren't guys that are just going by
269 the UFOC...it was an indication that these are guys who are going to do right by their
270 franchisees. They are not sitting there with their UFOCs, stating "Wait a minute, according to
271 the document, you're supposed to have a white van..:you're not doing it..so we're going to
272 shut you down." (Sue) They're real people. And th'ìY are truly interested in us succeeding.
273 And they have their ideas on what we need to do. Now Tony and I butt heads a little there,
274 because I don't want to do one of the things that he wants me to do, and I've told him that. And
275 I think it probably annoys him, but only because he feels it is something that will help make me
276 more successful if I do this. So, they (the franchisor) definitely has our interests at heart,
277 definitely.
278
279 Q. You've shared a little about your lifestyle and the reasons that you purchased the franchise.
280 Given that, do you feel constrained in any way by the terms of the agreement in any way that
281 affects the daily operation of your business, and in your ability to serve your customers?
282
283 A. Absolutely not.
284
285 Q. That appears to be in contrast to the literal teiIDS of the UFOC and franchise agreement.
286
287 A. (Steve) You have this whole relationship (with the franchisor) that's established over here.
288 And its in sharp, sharp contrast to what you get when you get that UFOC. And when you read
289 through the thing and they're telling you all these specifics.
290
291 Q. Where is your UFOC?
292
293 A. (Puzzled look, then laughter) (Sue) I think its in your office, Steve. In the drawer.
294
295 Q. When was the last time you looked at it?
296
297 A. When we bought the business.. .one year and nine months ago.
298
299 Q. Is there a detailed operations manual for your business?
300
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301 A. Yes. I have the book we got at training.
302
303 Q. When was the last time you looked at that?
304
305 A. Well, it was about four weeks ago, because when I brought on my new sales associate, I
306 wanted to give her part of it to read. (Steve) That's been my experience with franchisees as well
307 with the operations manuaL. Initially, they use it quite a bit. When we first opened the business,
308 we were using it all the time. After a while, it went on the shelf. We've now entered the new
309 phase of us bootstrapping ourselves up... we've hir ed the salesperson. And so we asked
310 ourselves... OK, what do we do? So, we pulled out the manual, and kind of went through it.311 (Sue) And I called Tony (franchisorJ. So we got all this input on the steps we should take, to
312 bring this person on, and help to make them and us successfuL.
313
314 Q. Did the guidance include how to provide incentives for the person?
315
316 A. Yes.
317
318 Q. Did you get helpful information at training?
319
320 A. Yes. One of the things was they taught us how to set our office up. (Steve) An entire session
321 on how to set the offce up, which was really helpful for Sue. (Sue) I'm not really organized,
322 can't you tell
323
324 Q. At this point in your franchise career, do you think that you made a good decision?
325
326 A. Yes. Overall, it has been good for us, and we're glad we did it.
327
448
APPENDIX I
1 Franchise Owner c: Joan
2
3 Q. Tell me a little about your decision to purchase a franchise.
4
5 A. Well, I was not very involved in the selection process. I'm an education administrator by
6 background. My husband was laid off from his middle management job in the 90s, when
7 everybody was downsizing. So he spent about a year and a halfresearching...looking
8 around. I went to some franchise fairs with him... but he went to libraries and Small
9 Business Development Centers, and so forth. We looked at things that ranged from Snap-on-
10 Tools to... actually he (husband) looked, really. I thought I was going to continue my career,
11 and advance to a superintendent position, and he would open whatever franchise near where I
12 would be located. One of the franchises that seemed atractive to him was a mobile check-
13 cashing service...I don't even know if that has survived or not. They would take a
14 traiJer...an armored car, I guess, to a mill, and cash people's paychecks. I'm not sure what
15 all the ins and outs were of all the safety factors, but that was one of the interests he had.
16 GNC at that time was the top ranked franchise in the country, it has since been near the top.
17 We had an interest in nutrition and supplements for a long time, and had been a customer of
18 GNC for a long time. Their home offce is in Pittsburgh (where they lived).
19
20 Q. When did this take place?
21
22 A. It was the early 1990s. Howard (husband) did his research in 1991 and 1992, we made a
23 decision in 1993, and we opened in 1994. It was a fit in tem1S of our inte:ests. In the
24 meantime, I was traveling all over the state interviewing...it became a second job, preparing25 for the interview, while keeping up my current job. I was offered a place in Erie
26 (Pennsylvania), but I didn't like the idea of moving to an area with worse weather than we
27 already had. So that went by the wayside, and I continued to search. Finally, I told Howard
28 that this was the last interview I was going on. If that doesn't work out, how about if I join
29 you in the business, and we choose a place that we'd like to live, with the climate and the
30 amenities that we'd like when we retire. So, that job didn't work out...if it had, I'm not
31 sure... because we kind of liked this idea. And we had been meeting with the franchise
32 director for our section with GNC in Pittsburgh. Wtì asked him they were looking at
33 something in Hilton Head (South Carolina). He said, as a matter of fact, we are. So we did a
34 time share, and went down, and looked at the store, called back...it was a beautiful site...and
35 he said that two men had just bought that franchise, and it was unavailable. He said, we have
36 demographics and have found an area that we would like to open a store in Mount Pleasant,
37 South Carolina. So we drove up here one day. We couldn't find Wando Crossing (the
38 shopping center in which the store was to be located), and after getting better directions we
39 found it. At that time, the Wal-Mart con'idor had not yet been built. The center kind of
40 ended right where we were. I didn't like that idea, but they showed us t he plans of what was
41 to be built, and so on. With more investigation about the area, we decided to do it. We had a
42 family friend who is an attorney look at the franchise agreement. He said, well, you know
43 they are always written to the franchisor's advantage. But this is one of the better ones I've44 analyzed. And we were total neophytes. My background was in social sciences, and
45 Howard's was in computers, with a business background in accounting. He always worked
46 for big corporations. So we were brand new to this. I think our friends and family had a lot
47 of trepidation about our decision, but I've always thought that if you work hard and learn,
48 you can be successfuL.
49
50 Q. SO, you have had the franchise for...
51
52 A. It will be eight years in March.
53
54 Q. In your franchise selection process, did you get a UFOC from any other franchise other
55 than GNC?
56
57 A. I don't think so.
58
59 Q. SO in Howard's research, he used secondary sources of infol"nation, such as Entrepreneur
60 Magazine?
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61
62 A. Yes.
63
64 Q. Having completed the UFOC review at the time of purchase, now that you have been in
65 business for eight years, what role does the document play in the daily operations of your
66 business?
67
68 A. Its always in the background, but we were fOltunate to be early enough in GNC
69 franchising that we had some rights or some omissions that newer franchisees don't have.
70 Things were added later that did constrict newer franchisees more. Like not being able to
71 negotiate their own leases, the requirement to participate in co-op advertising...thosethings
72 come to mind.
73
74 Q. SO, those conditions apply to newer franchisees but do not apply to you?
75
76 A. Yes. And I think GNC may have backed off the lease negotiation part, because they are
77 tiying to attract new franchisees. Negotiating our own lease is important, because we pay i
78 percent less royalty each month.
79
80 Q. So GNC charges its franchisees for lease negotiation assistance?
81
82 A. Yes.
83
84 Q. Do you pay into an advertising fund?
85
86 A. Yes, which we were disappointed with at first. Charleston, I guess, wæ not a big market
87 for them (the franchisor), but they have improved a lot in the last few years.. . 
especially with88 cable television. We also went into a co-op a few years ago. It was very restrictive in terms
89 of the conti'ol we would have on what was advertised, and how it was done. We had
90 developed a marketing philosophy early on with the advice of a consultant who continues to
91 work with us, to restrict our advertising to East Cooper (geographic area). Because
92 otherwise, we were advertising for all the other stores, and most of them were corporate
93 stores.
94
95 Q. SO you developed a highly targeted campaign to attract just your potential customers?
96
97 A. Right. GNC was wiling to back down on the national advertising if we used the co-op,
98 and we decided it was not in our best interests. We had a feeling that we were footing the
99 bill..it gets back into that corporate franchise split.. that we were paying more than our fair
ioo share for it. We think we were right, because they did not institute it (the co-op advertising)
101 without us.
102
103 Q. When you were thinking of buying a franchise, did you and Howard discuss non-
104 franchised businesses as well? '
105
106 A. No. We always thought that we needed the support.
107
108 Q. Looking back over the past eight years, do you think you've received it and would
109 continue to get it today if you needed it?
110
111 A. Oh, yes. And there are things that we don't request... like the development of new
112 products. And that is particularly impoitant now because of Numico (Royal Numico N.V.)...
113 because they are a researcher and manufacturer... we get products that other companies don't
114 have, because they're proprietary. Numico does put a lot of research, and publishes a lot of
115 statistics behind their products.
116
117 Q. SO this gives you credibility in the marketplace?
118
119 A Yes.
120
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121 Q. The Dutch company Numico acquired GNC?
122
123 A. Right.
124
125 Q. When did the acquisition occur?
126
127 A. Probably three or four years ago.
128
129 Q. Are you required to buy your products from GNC?
130
131 A. We buy most of them, yes. They (franchisor) for a long time were very discouraging
132 about franchisees getting third-party products. They don't seem to complain about that much
133 anymore. We're satisfied with the quality. I have toured the plant in Greenville (South
134 Carolina). They like doing business in South Carolina...they moved the warehouse from
135 Atlanta (Georgia~ to Anderson, South Carolina...and now that it is so close to us, we can get
136 an order overnight.
137
138 Q. You can products from anyone?
139
140 A. Yes, but I'm not sure how much control we'd have if we staiied buying too much from141 others.
142
143 Q. SO you would perceive that there's a band of tolerance in which you can operate?
144
145 A. Yes. Our consultant keeps track of the percentage, and we've always been low enough
146 not to cause a problem.
147
148 Q. Do you pay royalties on those third party products?
149
150 A. Yes. Everything that goes through the register.
151
152 Q. Even if you were to find something all on your own, and be very successful at selling it,
153 you would still have to pay royalties?
154
155 A. Yes, and we really can't introduce something without their approvaL. And that would be
156 part of the agreement. And its for our protection too, being in the field that we're in...if
157 someone were to have an adverse reaction to something. You had asked if we felt that the
158 market wanted something...melatonin when it first came out..other stores had it, and we
159 could have sold bushels...but GNC wanted to do studies on it...and in the long run it was
160 probably good. They wanted to be sure that it was safe, and what dosages it should be.
161 Another thing, more recently, in that categoiy would be the endro... that the athlete's are
162 taking. Part of it is that they (the franchisor) doesn't want to be sued, but GNC being the big
163 guy on the block in the countiy, we've had settlements wíth the FTC on what we can dO...in
164 labeling and advertising our products. GNC signed these agreements, without admitting any
165 guilt, but it was my understanding was that the dispute was over third-party products
166 labeling, making claims that weren't true. GNC didn't adveiiise it but we sold it with their
167 labeling. Its at the point now where some companies...especially big companies...will put
168 different labels for GNC. They also wil make different formulas, because GNC wil not sell
169 products that have certain quantities of things in them...such as caffeine.. ..in the diet and
170 energy and spOlis nutrition drinks.
171
172 Q. Are those products a big part of your business?
173
174 A. Vitamins are the biggest. Sports nutrition is typically something that young men will be
175 big consumers of from 16 to 30 or 35, and as that population moves on... vitamins are more
176 for everyone. Other ways we're helped by the franchise is signage... they do marketing
177 studies about the layout of the store.
178
179 Q. Do you receive printed materials as well
180
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181 A. Yes, a lot of it is printed materials, video and audio tapes...
182
183 Q. Given the schedule of operation at your store, would you have a diffcult time producing
184 these materials yourself?
185
186 A. No. They (the franchisor) also have regional consultants...we've had three of them, and
187 one was good.
188
189 Q. These are employees of the franchisor who help you?
190
191 A. Yes.
192
193 Q. In the past year, a new vitamin retailer opened just two miles from you. What impact has
194 this had on your business?
195
1% A. This is the first year that we have not grown our revenues, and we don't know if that's a197 factor or not. We talked to our consultant, when this new store opened. She has a store in
198 North Carolina, and she said that Vitamin World has not had any effect on her store. So, that
199 made us hopeful.. but that was a couple years ago. I think We might need to take a fresh
200 look at our market, and what we're doing. You know, we get into a routine, and it might be
201 time for a fresh look.
202
203 Q. How do you think GNC and you have responded to things like the popularity of sports
204 drinks? Have they introduced new products, and maybe re-allocated your shelf space?
205
206 A. Definitely. We've expanded the area from one section to four. The allocation within
207 sports nutrition has changed, certain companies have come forward with their own
208 advertising, in some case; publishing their own magazines. We trust GNC to study the
209 market and make good suggestions.
210
211 Q. Does the franchisor provide a recommended layout for your store.
212
213 A. Yes.
214
215 Q. Are you required to follow that layout?
216
217 A. Pretty much, as best as we can. They do come up with different plans for different types
218 of stores.
219
220 Q. Your agreement wil soon be up for renewal...
221
222 A. Yes, and we've already begun our research on what the process is.
223
224 Q. You wil likely be required to sign the agreement that the new franchisees currently have.
225
226 A. Ifwe renew, yes.
227
228 Q. Under the new agreement, there will be some changes. How do you feel about that?
229
230 A. Unsettled.
231
232 Q. What would you say is your biggest concern?
233
234 A. Probably their (the franchisor's) ability to open competing GNC stores nearby.
235
236 Q. Do you have an exclusive territOlY?
237
238 A. We have a ceiiain mileage written in to our agreement, and if there's going to be one
239 nearby, we have first right of refusaL.
240
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241 Q. If you had to make a decision on a second store today, would you buy it?
242
243 A. Probably not, because of our age. My brother's comments on the subject carried a lot of
244 weight with me. He said that you will more than double your worries and won't double your
245 income. We think that we would just be serving a lot of the same customers. The new
246 population centers around here are going to start to look attractive. Now, those people have
247 to come down to our store.
248
249
250
251
252
253
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1 Franchise owner D: Steve:
2
3 Q. Tell me about the selection process you went through in the purchase of your franchise. Tell4 me how you went about choosing your franchise, and what role did the UFOC and disclosure
5 documents play in your selection?
6
7 A. In terms of how I went about investigating it, the number of franchises I considered was
8 pretty limited. I really only looked at things that I thought I might have an interest in. I looked
9 at an intemet provider franchise, I looked at the Entrepreneur's Source, the franchise I
10 eventually purchased, and then I looked at a couple of other franchises that were appealing to me
11 because they required no retail space, that I could operate the business out of my home. The
12 process I went through, as I evaluated franchises, there were two things foremost on my mind.
13 Number one was what kind of eamings could I make running a business like this. And the
14 second thing was what would my role be in a business like this. How much fun would I have.
15 And, if! had to prioritize those two, that was the most important to me. Being someone that has
16 a lot of schooling, and a lot of experience and background in my particular skil, I looked at how
17 could I use those skills to springboard me into business.
18
19 Q. The nature of your business at the Entrepreneur's Source was helping other prospective
20 franchisees choose a franchise, was it not?
21
22 A. The franchise I chose helped other people identify franchises that would be a good fit for
23 them. Part of what was appealing to me about that was that I knew the struggle I went through
24 looking at opportunities...1 felt as though I was shooting in the dark. There were thousands and
25 thousands of opportunities out there and I didn't know how to begin the selection process.
26 There are far too many to take an in-depth look at even a small percentage of 
them. So when I
27 got hooked up with the Entrepreneur's Source I thought, now here's a system, a system that
28 makes a lot of sense, in terms of how you go about looking at franchises. Going through th::
29 selection process myself, I thought, this is a marketable product. I was experiencing the
30 problem that this business would solve.
31
32 Q. Tell me what role the UFOC and franchise disclosure documents played in the selection
33 process.
34
35 A. Actually, the way I became involved in the company...1 was the first franchisee in the
36 company...1 actually joined the company before they began franchising. What we actually did
37 is probably illegal from the FTC's point. They set me up as a "provider"...there was a two-page
38 contract that I signed, basically a non-compete clause. The thing that made it ilegal, in
39 retrospect, is that they made me put up a $25,000 performance deposit. I put up the deposit,
40 with the understanding that as I made placements, I would get that money back in $5,000
41 increments. That's how I entered the company. However, within three months from when I
42 started, they were ready to launch the franchise. This was, I think, an interim way to bring me
43 on-board, and not to lose me as a franchisee. Three moiths after I came on board I had the
44 option to either come on as a franchisee or to continue under the perfonnance agreement. At
45 that time, I got a UFOC, and I evaluated it, and decided to come on as a franchisee.
46
47 Q. Paii of your role as a franchisee of the Entrepreneur's Source was helping prospective
48 franchisees review UFOCs. In your experience with them, how do prospective franchisees
49 approach the UFOC review?
50
51 A. They're very intimidating. I would say that the majority of people I worked with neverread52 the UFOC. I know that from questions they would ask me, or questions about the telIDS that I
53 would ask them. Generally, I would say that 90% or more never read it.
54
55 Q. What role did the UFOC and franchise agreement play in your daily business operations?
56
57 A. In telIDS of running my business, very little. In fact, I can remember telling my clients" you
58 want to have your attorney review it, you want to read it, and make sure that you understand
59 everything that's in there. But once you operate your business, its going to go into the drawer
60 and stay there unless there is a problem. And if there's a problem, that's when it comes out. So,
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61 make sure you know about everything that's in there. And that was my experience as welL. I
62 had an attomey look at it and he suggested some minor changes...after I signed that UFOC it
63 went into the drawer and I never saw it again until I decided to exit the franchise. Then I said
64 "OK let me pull it out and see what I'm supposed to do." Literally, I never saw it again. In fact,
65 I had trouble finding it.
66
67 Q. Given your experience, do you think that what you described is typical?
68
69 A. I think so. It's a f0l11ality, because it's the law. You know, there were a lot of things in the70 UFOC that the company never followed, they never held me to certain conditions, such as the
71 offce set-up and office conditions. The UFOC was 'shockingly detailed.' That's one of the
72 experiences I remember. When I first things when I first got the thing, and I think that everyone
73 that goes into a franchise has a similar experience... they interact with péople in the
74 company...somebody from franchise sales or if it's a small franchise the CEO, and they develop
75 this relationship with these guys. They staii talking about the opportunity, what's involved with
76 being a franchisee. Relationships are formed. And then at some point, the UFOC is 'plopped
77 down.' The experience of seeing the terms in the UFOC is 'WOW, this is so different from
78 what's been happening in our conversations." Prior to this, it was a conversation among friends,
79 there may have been phone conversations and even visits to other franchisees. I've got a
80 friendship with these people, and now they've put this legal document down here and tell me
81 what time I have to have my phones on and answer them, what time do I open and close the
82 office, what kind of signage I can and cannot have.. . all these specifics. It was like two whole
83 and separate people. And I expressed that to the CEO of the company. He said, "Well, we do
84 that because that's what our attorneys tell us we need to do." In fact, he said to me "Steve, if
85 everything goes as we hope it wil, you'll sign this thing, put it in the drawer and never need it."
86 If you and I have a disagreement, that's when we use it. There were a lot of things in that UFOC
87 that I was supposed to do, and I never did them. The company never said anything about it, and
88 there were no problems.
89
90 Q. Did you feel in running your business that there were a lot of things that you would have
91 really liked to do, to add to the value that you delivered to your clients, that you were prohibited
92 from doing by the terms of the UFOC?
93
94 A; Yes, in fact it was one of the things that eventually caused me to leave the company. The
95 company had a very narrow focus on the service they were going to provide. I think the CEO
96 had a vision he was following, and he would not let people get outside that vision. This is the
97 service we are going to provide, and you're expected to provide that service, nothing else. Now,
98 if you want to get outside of that, then that's going to cause a problem. You know, when it came
99 to the details, such as what kind of sign to have, and when to open and close my doors, they
ioo really didn't care, even though it was in the UFOC. When it came down to how do you earn
101 your money, the big picture, they were prett specific about what I could and could not do. One
102 of the problems I had with that business was that my income was entirely based on a big
103 purchase...a big decision. My only income and revenue stream was based on someone making
104 a major life decision. I wanted to develop other avenUes of income to allow me to have some
105 cash flow between the big purchases.
106
107 Q. SO you could not take on another line of business, or offer different services, that you knew
108 professionally you could solve problems for your clients? You were prohibited from doing so
109 by the contractual terms of your agreement?
110
III A. Yes, that was one of the reasons why I left. The tools we were using had other applications.
112 And I wanted to explore using those tools in those applications. Not even outside offranchising,
113 like helping existing franchisees find good employees. And the company said no. Being the
114 first franchisee, there were about 40 franchisees when I left, so I had a good relationship with the
115 CEO. So I went to him and said that this is something that all franchisees could benefit from
116 offering this service. He wouldn't let me do it, and when he sensed I was getting ready to leave
117 because of it, he came back to me and said, "OK you can do it, and here's the royalty I'm going
118 to collect on it." It was so...intense...It was too high, and it did not make sense to do it. I kncw
119 then, it was time for mc to lcave.
120
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121 Q. You were in the franchise how long?
122
123 A. Two and a half years of a 10 year agreement.
124
125 Q. How did the separation occur? In strict compliance with the terms of the agreement?
126
127 A. It went actually veiy welL. Part of it was because the company was experiencing a lot of
128 turnover. They were concemed about how that wo uld look on the UFOC. I was able to use that
129 to get a favorable exit strategy for myself. To be honest, it does not fit what the UFOC stated. I
130 was able to negotiate a favorable strategy. Its still pending, I stil have a financial interest in my
131 territory, but i will compensated when it sells, it just has not sold yet. That was something the
132 UFOC did not address. Technically, when I walked away, the company did not owe me a dime.
133 How I exited, and the relationship I had with them, they said OK if and when the territory sells,
134 we'll reimburse you.
135
136 Q. Does your exit show up as a turnover on the UFOC?
137
138 A. Right now, it shows up as a closed offce. So, technically, I am no longer a franchisee, but
139 the agreement I have with the company is outside the UFOC. And I know that they have done
140 that with a couple other people, but not everyone. How solid that agreement is, I don't know.
141 There are some changes going on in the company, and all of a sudden, my territoiy is not as well
142 defined as it once was. It may, in fact, disappear from under me. The defined marketing
143 territories, such as the state of South Carolina, were the way it used to be. I could only market in
144 that territoiy. If! got a call from Germany or someplace, I could take the call, but I could not
145 market anywhere other than my teiTitory. They have now shifted to a virtual territory
146 distribution, based on a percentage of population. Leads and referrals from the national office
147 are handed out based on the percentage of population.
148
149 Q. How would you rate yourself as a franchise buyer?
150
151 A. I think I made the mistake that I told all my clients not to make. I went into something that I
152 had some experience with, and some knowledge andicomfort level with. I would tell my clients,
153 don't just look at what the business does, look at the business itself. I don't think I was a good
154 fit for that franchise. In reality, what I thought it was, was an opportunity to use my assessment
155 skills. It really was a sales position. ..and I'm really not a sales person. I had to sell that
156 product, and I'm not good at that. It was too late when I discovered it.
157
158 Q. If you had to give advice to a prospective franchisee, what would you say.
159
160 A. Talk to as many franchisees as you can. Give the UFOC to your attorney, make sure your
161 rights are protected, make sure you understand it at some leveL. ''Tell me what do you do...the
162 typical day. What do you have to do to make money?" What's interesting is, as a closed offce,
163 I get a lot of calls from people that are exploring the Entrepreneur's Source as a franchise. They
164 want to talk to people that are no longer in the system.. .at least the good ones are. Its
165 interesting...my current paiiner does the training for the Entrepreneur's Source...he knows the
166 people that are coming into training, that are signing on board...and veiy few of those guys do I167 hear from. They haven't talked to the other franchisees. They only hear what the company
168 says. If they did talk to other franchisees, they would know that there is a huge failure rate in
169 this business. The level of sophistication of the people going into the business is very low... the
170 level of sophistication of people calling me is very high. My advice, talk to people that are
171 successful, and talk to people that have gotten out..they're a wealth of information.
456
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
APPENDIXK
Franchise Owner E: Heidi
Q. Please tell me a little ábout when you purchased the franchise and the events that led up to
you becoming a franchisee, and how long you have a been a franchisee.
A. As you know, we are not a franchisee any longer. I guess it was the end of 2000 that a group
of Maxcare franchisees bonght ourselves out from the franchisor, who had declared Chapter i i
(bankruptcy). This had been dragging out for over half the year.. .so a good pali of 2000 was
screwed.
Q. You knew about the financial woes of the franchisor?
A. Yes. It had been in the news that the chairman of the parent corporation was being
investigated for possible financial wrongdoing. That came to light several months before the
division problems happened. There were act ually a couple of suitors (potential buyers) who
were for our group (Maxcare franchisees), but I guess when they did their homework and saw
what a mess the financials were in, and the negativity of many of the franchisees, they said
"Whoa.. .don't need this." Back to your question. We did not just say "Hey, we want to buy a
franchise." The opportunity was presented to us. My husband's sister and her husband were in
the carpet business, and their parent corporation created this carpet cleaning franchise
opportunity. Originally, (my husband) Seth's sister presented it as a paiinership
oppoiiunity...they wanted to go into it.
Q. As an addition to their existing carpet business?
A. Right. Seth and his sister went to Atlanta, where the headquarters is, toured the
facilities...spent the day there...I guess getting the cheerleading session, and they were
impressed. Impressed enough for Seth to begin investigating it seriously. And that's when we
took a trip to Charleston to see ifit was a place that we wanted to live, and move my family.
Q. Charleston was a ten'itoiy that was available?
iA. Yes. This was the specific area that Seth's sister had the carpet business. I have never had
this dream of owning my own business, but I think that at least in the back of his mind, Seth did.
His parents were entrepreneurs, they had a family business...a shoe business in New Jersey for
decades and decades. And actually, my father is an entrepreneur... I never thought of it that
way...yes, he had his own business...he just sold it. At least we have it in the blood. But we
never said, "OK we want to run our own business, and we want to buy a franchise." So, we
never laid out different choices... the opportunity was presented... we thought it made a heck of a
lot of sense, and we said OK.
Q. Didn't you tell me that your husband is an attorney?
A. He is. Not in corporate law, he was in environmental insurance.
Q. Would you consider him to be a more sophisticated buyer than the average franchisee?
A. We were totally out of the mold for franchisees. Another thing that was unique about us was
when we decided to buy it..I think we bought it in March...and we didn't move and open the
business until August. They had never had anyone take five months to go through the process.
So we presented them (the franchisor) with all kinds of new questions. We probably had too
much time to think about it.. .at least as far as they were concerned.
Q. What was your work background?
A. I was in human resources in a law firm. With our backgrounds, it was an easy pitch to our
banker.
Q. What role did the UFOC and franchise agreement play in the process?
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61 A. Seth read through it, I read through it...we circled questions for our attorney...one was about
62 services outside of those specified in the UFOC...which came about later on. But the
63 enforcement of anything in the UFOC and agreement was really poor.
64
65 Q. The franchisor's enforcement?
66
67 A. Yes. The collection of royalties and advertising funds was poor. We reached a point in the
68 life of the organization.. .it was an annual meeting... and we won the franchise of the year award.
69 We found out that we were one of a handful of franchisees that was up to date with our fees.
70 Franchise of the year... whoopee doo. Number one, it indicated poor management. Number
71 two... well, people (franchisees) couldn't pay their bils, so they didn't pay the franchisor. The
72 franchisor may have wanted to help them succeed, but couldn't help them enough to succeed.
73 And it was just reaching the point where they (franchisor) was starting to say "we're going to
74 talk to those franchisees who we don't think are not going to make it, and start to get them out.
75 Which, should have happened a year before. ..at least. No one wants to see somebody lose their
76 life's savings.
77
78 Q. You mentioned the collection of fees. What about the other franchisor functions, inspections,
79 quality control, and support?
80
81 A. There was a reporting requirement..theoretically... people (franchisees) didn't do it.
82 Finally, after a year and a half or so... we staiied getting representatives assigned to different
83 territories, and those people were supposed to call up and ask where the report was. That staiied
84 to happen a little bit..but there was just no enforcement. The enforcement of quality control
85 and support was just not unifo rm. We found out that we had not had anyone visit us during our
86 first year. Maybe we were unique...because we didn't ask for somebody. We kind of knew
87 how we wanted to do things. ..and we would call up and ask for help whenever we needed
88 it... we were in touch a lot over the phone. We got our money's woiih, I guess, with the
89 questions we got answered over the phone, but nobody visited us. One of the new
90 presidents... we changed presidents several times... was shocked that nobody visited us. We
91 were doing OK, but there were others who had reque!'ted help...the ones that were recruited
92 from another company, were the ones that got two or, three visits a year. And when 1 heard
93 about that..l was also on the advisory council for a couple years...I thought this was strange.
94 What I later found out was that the parent corporation had made huge loans to some of these95 recruits... to get these guys in, they (the franchisor) financed them. Of course they had a vested
96 interest in those guys (the recruited franchisees from another company). Of course they visited
97 them three or four times a year...they had a lot at stake. As far as following the guidelines...I
98 mean, I guess if the model is really great..and it works, you're not going to want to break the
99 rules. But if you don't have a strong model, then you want to do things to make the business
100 work. For instance, we were very lucky in our first year. We got a very big client, Kiawah
101 Resort. They were unhappy with their current cleaner... we went out and did a demo.. .and it
102 turned into our largest commercial client. The (the client) also wanted us to clean
103 drapes...which needs to be dry cleaned...and all we have is steam cleaning equipment. So we
104 investigated what it would take, and I resisted at first...because 1 didn't want to break the rules.
105
106 Q. SO you were prohibited from offering these other services?
107
108 A. Yes. There was a specific part (in the agreement) and we had asked about that paii of the
109 UFOC... we asked them (the franchisor) what happens if we want to go into janitorial services,
110 for example. Seth said that we could create another corporation, to keep the businesses separate.
111 So we talked to the vice president and said "Look, we've got this major client... we want to
112 make them happy, and we don't want another cleaner going in there." We went back and forth a
113 little bit, and finally he said, well if you get trained, and as long as you know what you're
114 doing." Seth researched it, and you know, its not brain surgery. We do it..its an ancilary paii
115 of the business that allows us to clean upholstery and drapery.
116
117 Q. What this customer was looking for was one cleaning company that could handle all those
118 needs.
119
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A. Yes. Another thing with this customer is that they had some buildings that were six floors
up. The truck-mounted equipment will on ly stretch so far. So we asked about a pOliable. So
we got a portable unit, which was different than the other 65 franchisees... we got it because we
asked for it..and we told them (the franchisor) that it was what we needed to do our business.
Q. When you went into this.. .did you think that the ability to customize and adapt was
important?
A. Oh God, yes. There were just a few places in the UFOC that had restrictions that we
questioned... we were trying to look ahead, and we saw the places where there were restrictions.
There were no big, big stumbling blocks.
Q. Were you required to buy supplies from your franchisor?
A. We started out ordering everything from them. There were certain things that we ordered
through a supplier that was set up by MaxCare. But other things...like printed materials and
advertising things we got from the parent corporation... unifomis, shiiis, jackets... that sort of
thing. They weren't really set up to do that SOli of thing. You'd put the call in to so and
so... they would e-mail so and so... they eventually outsourced most of this. But you know,
sometimes we would call these.suppliers and tell them that we needed this Yellow Rx, a de-
browning solution, and they would tell us "That's not on the MaxCare list." 1 would tell them "1
don't give a damn if its not on the MaxCare list...l have a paiiicular situation...I'll call you up
and tell you that I'm Joe Smith's carpet cleaning. To go outside the little mold, you have to
make a lot of noise.
Q. When did your franchise agreement terminate?
A. The end of 2000.
Q. So you have been on your own for about a year. Do you still get your supplies from the same
suppliers?
,A. Some of them. One of the things I've been doing is trying to find other sources, for printed
materials and the like. The printer who was doing the MaxCare stuff was stiffed by the parent
corporation for tens of thousands of dollars... they wanted us (the former franchisees) as a group
to sign an agreement and take over some of the remaining debt. Of course, we weren't wiling
to do that...so he bumed all the goods that he couldn't sell at clearance. To try to get all of theseindependent organizations (the former franchisees) together for the common goal of even
printing invoices.. .its been months in the making. It might be my poor motivational skills at
getting people together...so ifnot everyone wants to cooperate, I'll find the few who do. But to
try to get the discounts that you can get from ordering in quantity is tough.
Q. How many former franchisees are there?
A. At the time we bought ourselves out there were 40 individuals. Now, some owned more than
one franchise telTitoiy. At the height, there were 72 or 74 franchise ten'Itories. Some of the
people who bought themselves out did so that they would not have to pay 0 ffhuge debts to the
parent corporation. That's what motivated some of them to do it...they had unpaid fees, and
truck lease payments, territory fees... some owned the truck lease payments to the parent. We
got out of that for all but one truck...I'm kicking my self now because we would have been able
to buy ourselves out for $ I 2,500 per truck, that's half of what I would have to pay. But, who
knew?
Q. What was the first indication that you had that the franchisor was in trouble?
A. We knew in some ways...the franchisor didn't seem to know their...from their... 1
personally had no knowledge about the parent corporation, because we never had any contact
with the parent corporation, we just dealt with the home offce of the MaxCare division.
Q. You're speaking of a parent company who had several concepts under their control?
459
APPENDIXK
180
181 A. Right. The umbrella organization. MaxCare Corporate had as a president an industry expert,
182 but he wasn't a franchisíng expert. They didn't have enough expertise there. They also had a
183 corporate modeL.for a while they had one company -owned MaxCare, and that was in Atlanta.
184
185 Q. You mean a corporate owned territory, staffed with the franchisor's employees as opposed to
186 a franchised territory?
187
188 A. Yes. That one lasted a year and a half or so. I think it is widely believed among franchisees
189 and ex-franchisees that the lack of a corporate model (company-owned territory) was key in the
190 downfall. Forget the financial mis -management... it was a part of the equation. Also, over-
191 promising...people believed that they were going to be able to live off,their business after a
192 year.
193
194 Q. You had different expectations that you had built into your consumption plans where you
195 were not going to extract the eamings from the business for a while?
196
197 A. I also worked on the side for my in-laws. They were very generous in helping to support us
198 during that first year.
199
200 Q. This franchise system did not make an earnings claim under Item 19?
201
202 A. No. They stayed away from that. I don't know how they could have done that without
203 having been in business for a certain number of years. And maybe that was the problem...on
204 one hand you want to get in on a ground floor opportunity...and on the other, you leave yourself
205 wide open for the unknown weaknesses.
206
207 Q. As you look back...yoo've established yourself in this community as MaxCare...you have a
208 right to continue to use that name, in all of your marketing materials. And as you go forward,
209 you are going to run this business the way you want to. Taking the best of the business model210 you had to start with, and adapting it going forward.. With a year of experience on your own, do
211 you think you are better off? ,
212
213 A. Hell, yes! It is like us not missing the lack of visits in the first year. We knew what we
214 wanted to do and how we wanted to do it. The actual 'how to' of carpet cleaning we depended
215 on the franchisor for...and we really tapped those resources.
216
217 Q. The technical aspects of the business.
218
219 A. Right. So we leamed the technical aspects of the business, and went on from there. We got
220 the best of it, I guess...and now we don't have to pay any fees. And that's really beautifuL. The
221 one thing that the parent corporation was really weak in was advertising support. Their answer
222 for adveltising support was this pyramid... which, it makes sense, but "first of all you want to do
223 all the footwork"...but that took time. There was no national adveitising...because they
224 couldn't afford to...we paid into an adveitising fund...a few of us did...but there wasn't much
225 to spend. They put it towards, theoretically, the brochures and printing.
226
227 Q. You are competing against both franchised and independent businesses. Who would you say
228 are your stronger competitors?
229
230 A. That's an interesting question. I don't quite know how to answer it. There are a large
231 number of carpet cleaners in Charleston. Some are low-end...they advertise $50 for a whole
232 house. And then there are some independents and some franchisoes that are around us, price-
233 wise. So I would tend to say more the franchises...just based on my narrow look at it.
234
235 Q. You must deal with customers who were dissatisfied with their previous service. Would you
236 say that most were dissatisfied with independents or franchises?
237
238 A. And they (the customers) most often mention franchises.
239
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240 Q. Looking back on your original decision, are you better off?
241
242 A. When it became c1ear'that we were going to buy ourselves out, and were no longer going to
243 be franchisees...It kind of threw me for a litte bit. I thought, gee...this is not what I signed on
244 for. There were all these fabulous plans laid out for uS...which I totally believed. This is not
245 what we signed on for. We totally changed our lives...we moved from New Jersey...we
246 uprooted our child and ourselves and moved from a loving community to someplace totally
247 different. Which is lovely...but totally different. But then my husband reminded me...we don't
248 have to pay fees anymore. We got the best of what they had to offer, we've got a viable
249 business, and we're franchise of the year forever. We're in a good place. For a franchise system
250 that could not offer us what a franchise system is supposed to offer.. .ifthey had been giving us
251 what..now, I haven't talked with any McDonald's franchise owners...but presumably your
252 profit margins are set... things are pretty well laid out for you... ths is how you run a
253 McDonald's...this is how much you're going to make, etc.
254
255 Q. You didn't get that?
256
257 A. Not at all...not at alL. The things that were said in the last year of existence about the parent
258 corporation...1 mean...people's lives were changed. One of the guys (franchiseesJ who came
259 over from another carpet cleaning company found out that his daughter had a life-threatening
260 disease. He had tohave health insurance. He could not take the risk of not having health
261 insurance, and had to find ajob somewhere. Although it was a painful transition, we did OK.
262 There were people who lost a lot of money, although it could have been a hell of a lot worse if
263 we had not been able to buy ourselves out as a group. We formed an LLC...its not doing much
264 of anything.
265
266 Q. How did the group of franchisees get started?
267
268 A. People started talking about it. Some wanted to do it..just a couple ofthem...and bid
269 against the others...but that didn't go anyplace. The parent did not even listen to their offer.
270 Didn't even respond to it, which was stupid. Once the other suitors got involved, and the parent
271 corporation started threatening the franchisees to coUect the money due to them... they (the
272 franchisorJ were negotiating with each franchisee individually...how much of the debt they
273 would write off. Theoretically, if you kept up with your fees, they would go easier on you.
274
275 Q. The value of the LLC formed by the franchisees is in the power to negotiate for supplies and
276 printed advertising?
277
278 A. I wouldn't say its power, yet. I think its just having rescued ourselves from a crisis and
279 potential bankruptcy.
280
281 Q. And you believe that you can be profitable even buying supplies and advertising on your
282 own?
283
284 A. Right. And, we can go in whatever direction our particular situation propels us.
285
286 Thank you.
287
288
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1 Franchise Owner F: Jarrod
2
3 Q. Discuss your selection process in choosing the Quizno's area director franchise.
4
5 A. Fortunately, we had some experience with the franchise already...with my dad having been a
6 franchisee at the unit leveL. We had a comfort level with the chain, what it was about and where
7 it was headed. We knew that our franchisees could be profitable. And we also looked at the
8 other people who were performing this role in other markets...other area directors...and felt like
9 they were doing well for themselves. We believed that we could outperform them, based on
10 what our knowledge and skils are. Combined with that we felt very comfoiiable that we could
11 develop and maintain a market. In a word. ..I guess it was our experience. We were foiiunate in
12 that we had an insider's view. Ifwe had been on the outside looking in, it might have been a
13 very different decision process. It was probably one of the easiest decisions that either of us had14 ever made. Other than internal experience, there was not a great deal of external research.
15
16 Q. In other words, you did not evaluate other area director franchise oppoiiunities, and your
17 decision was based solely on your internal knowledge of the concept?
18
19 A. Absolutely. In fact, what gave rise to the opportunity was that the prior area director in this
20 market defaulted on his franchise agreement, in terms of development. He actually did some
21 things contrary to the franchise agreement...namely, he sold the rights to his territory without
22 first obtaining the frandiIsor's approvaL. That led to some litigation... the parties severed ties,
23 and after a year Quizno's resolved it and awarded the rights to us.
24
25 Q. SO you purchased an existing franchise?
26
27 A. Yes, actually one that had been reclaimed by the franchisor.
28
29 Q. Technically, the actual owners of your area director franchise is a partnership or corporation,
30 correct?
31
32 A. Absolutely. The offcial owner of the franchise i$ Zita, a South Carolina S-Corporation,
33 owned by my dad and 1. That entity has development and oversight responsibilities for
34 Quizno's operations in roughly 65 counties in three states. My dad and I divide responsibilities.
35 At this point, I am primarily responsible for most of the development and oversight work. He
36 owns a store in North Carolina, which he has day-to-day responsibilities for. So we have a
37 pretty clear split in terms ofresponsibilities...how each of 
us spends our days. Our long-term
38 goal is to be in a position to move him down to Charleston (South Carolina) and open stores
39 here while we are developing the market. So we can at least be in the same area to combine
40 energies, and maybe share the responsibilities a little more equally.
41
42 Q. SO, technically you are equal partners, but you pretty much are responsible for the duties of
43 area developer?
44
45 A. Yes.
46
47 Q. How long was your dad operating the franchise outlet before you purchased the area
48 developer franchise?
49
50 A. He purchased the franchise roughly four years ago, but it took a year to get up and running,
51 so its been about three years. We purchased the rights officially in December 2000, we then
52 attended training, retumed in February or March... so we've been at this a little less than a year.
53
54 Q. There are only a few cases of pending litigation in Quizno's UFOC, but all of them involve55 area directors. What do you think are the reasons?
56
57 A. If you read in there, what is disclosed is very blatant area director misbehavior. My
58 counterpaiis in other markets are doing things that are in clear violation of the franchise
59 agreement or operating procedures. They almost always have something to do with monetary
60 damages as welL.
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61
62 Q. Your area developer UFOC is different from that of unit franchisees?
63
64 A. Yes. In the Quizno's system there are three UFOCs: one for individual store owners, one for
65 area director development agreements, and then there is a third for master
66 agreements.. . appropriate for someone who wants to develop an entire country, such as Canada
67 or the UK. Typically, those guys are well-heeled, and they have a master franchise agreement.
68
69 Q. Reviewing your selection process, what role did the UFOC play in the selection?
70
71 A. The UFOC review process for the area directorship was nothing like the way we scrutinized
72 the one at the franchisee leveL. At this point... we were experienced a little more in the world of
73 franchising.. . realized that its not negotiable anyway. We also had a level of trust with the
74 people who were making the decisions. Once again, that is a result of having an insider's view.
75 We knew the company execs that were making the judgment calls in the event there was some
76 sort of discrepancy. So, we had a feeling that everybody was going to be reasonable, and that in
77 the event that something arose, we would be worked with.. .as opposed to being held to the letter
78 of the law of the UFOC. What's so scaiy about the UFOC, whether you're at the franchisee
79 level or any level, is that there are dozens of ways to loose your rights to operate the franchise.
80 We have since leamed that it is mainly for the protection of the other franchisees. You don't
81 want one franchisee in an area doing things wrong...so that it ruins the brand name or the
82 image...any of the attributes of the franchise. So, the UFOC has teeth, to take corrective action
83 if necessary. In practicality, and I've got some experience with this, our franchise has taken a
84 consultative approach.. .coaching franchisees to do things right rather than summarily citing
85 chapter and verse, terminating agreements left and right. It's a much more different tone taken
86 in practice.
87
88 Q. Were you able to negotiate anything in your area director franchise purchase?
89
90 A. I found that the UFOC at the area director level was much more negotiable than an the
91 franchisee leveL. The most remarkable piece was the price. We actually negotiated down by 30
92 percent off of what the initial franchise fee was. Of fourse, nothing like that happens at the
93 franchisee unit leveL. Part of that is driven by the number of people that are affected. With
94 thousands of franchisees, the need for standardization is obvious, where at the upper levels,
95 maybe there are 50 area developer agreements and just a handful of master franchise
96 agreements. There's a lot more flexibility at those levels. No flexibility in tenns of standards.
97 Quizno' s expects certain standards to be upheld and maintained. But some of the monetary and
98 procedural issues seem to be negotiable at the higher levels.
99
ioo Q. Have you found that your franchisor has taken a consultative approach with existing
101 franchisees, especially those having problems?
102
103 A. When I came back from training several months ago, I inherited a couple of franchisees that
104 were in trouble. I was very impressed with the steps my franchisor took in trying to coach and
105 retrain...even going to the point of monetary help with marketing and food purchasing. Sending
106 corporate people to help work the store along side the franchisee. In another instance, we had a
107 poorly performing store set to be transferred from the previous franchise owner who really
108 wasn't doing things right. .and there was a lot of corporate suppoli to affect that transfer to a
109 new franchisee who seems to be doing things a lot better.
110
ILL Q. In those cases, the franchisor had the right to step in and close the stores because of violations
112 of the franchise agreement. They did not do that?
113
114 A. Not immediately. Only after things reached a pretty dire situation did the franchisor feel they
115 had to step in.. .and that was to protect the brand and to protect the franchisor.
116
117 Q. When you present prospective franchisees with the UFOC, what is their typical reaction?
118
119 A. My perception is that they don't read the UFOC, and have no intention of ever reading it. In
120 all actuality, it's a daunting task...its very intimidating. Its one or two pages thick...and every
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121 page is full oflegalese. I've learned to do a good job of prefacing the UFOC...coaching them
122 (prospective franchisees) through what they need to read...the parts that they need to be aware
123 of. I coach them as to why the UFOC is written in the restrictive manner that it is. And why it
124 is really there for everyone's protection. I think that after the 'soft peddle'.. . 
after you introduce125 it like that, it's a little more acceptable. I still think that most people don't read them... which is
126 a shame, because it really dictates eveiyone's responsibility to each other.
127
128 Q. One aspect of the UFOC that differentiates Quizno's from the majority of others is in the area
129 of disclosing earnings in Item 19. Can you comment on it?
130
131 A. It becomes an importnt item. One of the first questions I'm asked is How much money can I
132 make? There are five or six questions I get asked religiously...How much money can I make,
133 what does it cost to get started, do I get a protected territory, how do you help me, how do you
134 choose sites...a lot of those issues are money related. The FTC regulates franchises, and its that
135 governing body that mandates that we make certain disclosures. The result of that is the UFOC.136 The UFOC is to franchising what the prospectus is to the investment world. Its supposed to give
137 people the information that they need. Back to your question about earnings claims. Its tough to
138 say what our true motivation is in providing that. It just so happens that our earnings claim is
139 very good. It helps me sell franchises, because if you compare our earnings to our closest
140 competitors, that's one of our advantages.
141
142 Q. Do your closest competitors disclose earnings?
143
144 A. No, our closest competitors are Subway and Blimpie...and neither of them make earnings145 claims. Of course, if I were them, I probably would not make earnings claims either.
146
147 Q. SO, you believe that unless there is good news, don't give any news?
148
149 A. Right. One alternative is that the list of names and contact infoimation for each of the
150 franchisees isin the UFOC. So, prospects are encouraged to contact franchisees that are in the
151 business now, and ask the questions that would help themmake a good decision. The FTC
152 doesn't let people in my position make a lot of monetary or give a lot of monetary advice on
153 what are average sales or cost of goods. It would be interesting to me to see that if our sales
154 declined, would we stil disclose that. One of our closest competitors, Subway, is coming on
155 strong in terms of average store sales, same store sales this year compared to last year. It will be
156 interesting to see...ifthat trend continues, will they add that (earnings claim), because it
157 becomes a sales tool.
158
159 Q. Because there is an earnings claim in the CUlTent UFOC, doesn't mean that the claim is in
160 there permanently?
161
162 A. Right.
163
164 Q. You have to present franchisees with the most current UFOC. How often are new UFOCs
165 introduced?
166
167 A. Typically, we come out..and I think most franchises come out with a new UFOC every year.
168 Especially those that are growing and have new infonnation to present i n terms of 
units they're
169 adding and sales increases. Most of the information that changes is not material, its just more
170 disclosure of information. Every once in a while, they do change materially. Two or three years
171 ago, Quizno's took its royalty rate from six percent to seven. In last year's UFOC, we set forth
172 restrictions on the amount of debt a franchisee could carry. And that had a big impact. There
173 are changes that allow...in our instance, new needs arise. The changes we're going to see this
174 year is an addendum that allows us to choose local market people, accountants and professionals
175 to provide accounting services in a local service market. The first year of operations, our
176 franchisees were required to use a Quizno's approved accounting service provider. You know,
177 there are changes that come along. Most of the time, I think it's a function of growth or need or178 desire.
179
180 Q. Do you think your job would be harder if Quizno's did not make an earnings claim?
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181
182 A. It's veiy possible. Personally, I like the fact that we disclose more infofl1ation; it makes us
183 appear more forthcoming: People like that. Certinly, if! can't earn someone's trust I'm not
184 going to earn their business. Giving that type of infonnation helps ns to cut through some of the
185 distrust that's inherent. The other good thing for us, is that our sales and earnings are leading
186 the industiy.. . for what we do. And so that makes it easier. Do I think I could still sell
187 franchises? Yes...I would just go about it differently if we didn't make the earnings claims. We
188 would have to encourage our prospects to contact franchisees directly.
189
190 Q. Do your nearest competitors offer area development agreements?
191
192 A. They have an area director structure...but I must tell you that I don't know much about the
193 others. If you were to call to find out more about a Blimpie or Subway,'there is someone in the
194 local market that will answer the questions that a prospect might be interested in. So there is
195 some structure on that level, but I don't know what it is.
1%
197 Q. Your role is not only to sell franchises but to support and do quality inspections as welL.
198 This places you between the franchisor and unit franchisees. It's a question of perspective. To199 the franchisor, you are a franchisee. But to the unit fi'anchisees, don't you appear to be a
200 representative of the franchisor?
201
202 A. Yes.
203
204 Q. Isn't that at times a diffcult role to play?
205
206 A. Yes, it's a delicate balance. Through the changes that the franchisor puts into place... they're
207 not all easy. In our case, I think the franchisor keeps the franchisee in mind in virtually every
208 decision. I think of myself more as a facilitator...to make one side talk to the other...and to
209 work out arrangements that are mutually beneficiaL. Its not always easy to deliver information
210 about changes that pop up as to what the franchisor is doing. But its my role to try to implement
211 that in the best way possible. Not eveiybody that does what I do for Quizno's has the same
212 attitude, I don't think. I think most of them tiy harC\'and work hard. Contractually, what an
213 area director has to do is attract people to the system...help them through the opening
214 process...in terms of choosing a site, and helping manage the design and construction process,
215 and ordering equipment..all of the functional items. Contractually, I have to be there for the
216 first 80 hours of the store's opening... then I have to be in there at least once a month doing a
217 quality inspection, to make sure that Quizno's standards are being met. And outside of that, I218 don't have to do much more. It just so happens that I am paid off of my franchisee sales. It is in
219 my best interests to do what I can to help them grow sales, and to help them stay profitable. The
220 other incentive in my position is that as prospects contact prospECtive franchisees, you would
221 like those franchisees... especially those in your market... to have good things to say about you
222 and the franchisor. There is some pressure there, but it is indirect.
223
224 Q. And these duties are outside the contractual obligations?
225
226 A. Exactly. My hope is that I wil continue as I add stores to add value at the unit level to make
227 them better operationally and better sales and better internal control.
228
229 Q. What do you think has been the major reason for the exponential growth of Quizno's?
230
231 A. I think we were very product focused in the early days, and it wasn't until we reached the
232 1,000 store mark that we got scientific about what we did. Up to that point, I think it was almost
233 dumb luck. We were very prodnct focused, tiying to go for a taste profie that included flavor
234 masteiy. When you take a bite of our sandwich, you have an explosion in your mouth. That's
235 what we were going for. We have one advantage that not many people are doing in our
236 industry...and that is an oven-toasted, oven.baked hot sub (sandwich). Its where the sandwich
237 goes through a conveyor oven open. faced which allows the meats and cheese to be heated and
238 the bread warmed and toasted. An by that process, we are seen as different from our
239 competitors. So from the early days, we were very product focused, and we stumbled on this
240 core competency that happened to work for us. Our market research, which we did not too long
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ago, confirmed a few things, and told us a few things that we could do a little better. The one
thing that was confirmed that we're glad to see is that we need to continue to support the toasted
image. Our customers sée us as distinct and different and better than our competitors because of
that. The areas that we could have done better on were in the areas of menu variety, in terms of
having more light items (lower calorie) and more of a value menu, that had sandwiches
consistent with our standards for quality and taste but a little less expensive than the average
sub. We also did a very bad job with kids...kids couldn't stand our food. And we were getting
the veto factor from kids, so we've implemented changes there. We're doing what we do a little
smaiier now. So, the more scientific you get, you're able to make more qualified decisions that
help your chain grow. Our core competency hasn't changed through all ofthat...and that is the
oven-baked sub with fresh ingredients. And I think that's why we're doing welL. Plus, we seem
to be very unit-level economic focused. We seem to spend a lot of time thinking about what we
can do to drive franchisee level sales and profitability. And certinly, ifpeople are not making
money using our business model, that word is going to get out. And it will be hard to attract
others to a chain that is not making much money. So, I think those are the reasons why we're
doing welL. In fact, by the end of the year, we will probably sell about 800 franchises this year
(2001). For a chain with 1,300 or 1,400 stores open and an additional I,400 or I,500 already
sold but not opened...the prospects are very strong.
Q. Can you describe how adaptation and innovation occurs in your system?
A. From what I can tell, there are not a lot of ideas that 'bubble up' from the field. Most of the
innovation comes from research and development at the franchisor leveL. We introduce three or
four new sandwiches each year that are tested in four test markets across the country. So we
have a good feel on how the sandwich will be accepted before it rolls out. Then we test it in
company stores, or in a pilot market, and then we roll it out nationwide. I am sure that little
ideas come from the field, but most of it is top -down.
Q. Living in the South, where the tastes perhaps call for a little spicier food than in the
Midwest, how would you handle a franchisee who wanted to introduce something different on
the menu to accommodate his or her local patrons?
,
A. I would ask him to provide all of the details of the sandwich he wanted to offer...right down
to brand-names, how he would get the product... who distributes it. And be prepared to submit
samples, back to the franchisor. There actually is a process for new sandwiches to be considered
from the field, but I don't know anyone who has actually gone through that process, but there is
something in place. Based on what I know of the people who make those kinds of decisions,
they would consider it. I think one of the reasons we don't see more bubbling up from the field
is that there are so many coming from the franchisor leveL. A lot of our franchisees...some of
them...actually complain about how much we change menu items. So when you're in an
environment that doesn't seem to get very stale, that kind of keeps franchisees focused on
managing what's coming down, not necessarily innovating. But I don't think that the franchisor
would be opposed to innovation at the unit level, especially now that we are still comparatively
smalL. As we add more franchisees, I don't know what the acceptance will be, because it just
makes it harder to manage.
Q. If a prospective franchisee told you that the ability to change and adapt was impoiiant to
them, would you view that as a positive or negative for someone entering your concept?
A. I would view it as a positive, but I would want to explore it further. Its impoiiant to me to
attract the right kind of people up -front, rather than finding out on the back-end that these people
really aren't suitable. Quizno's does offer its franchisees a good bit of flexibility, I think.
Franchisees have local pricing freedom, and can price however they want to. Corporate does
recommend pricing, based on what's going on in the market and costs, but if there are local
competitive pressures they're allowed to price either upwards or downwards. Our franchisor
does not seem to be very interested in running the franchisee's business, outside of does the
franchisee meet the standards that Quizno's teaches. And so, for our prospects that express
interest in that kind of flexibility, that's what I tend to focus on. But I make it clear that they're
buying a system, and that innovation is great in the areas of marketing and promoting your
business and managing your employees, but not when it comes to doing things outside of what
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our operations manual says, in terms of how to make a sandwich and what products to carry. ..all
the health aspects associated with it, and keeping a clean place. And those are the areas we
would not compromise on.
Q. You would look for creativity and innovation in they way that they market and promote the
core concept?
A. Sure.
Q. The quick service restaurant business is a highly competitive one. What things have you
seen to indicate that the franchise is responsive to changes in the competitive landscape?
A A couple things. We found in our marketing research that when Qu¡'zno's customers are not
eating at Quizno's, they're eating Mexican (food). We think that is because we think that they
crave a flavor profie that has a lot of flavor, spicy or otherwise. And on certin sandwiches we
give flavor packets that come with it, whether customers ask for it or not. We have recently
introduced a lite menu, that probably has a lot of competitive pressure from Subway's
advertising that subs are healthy. And we think that's great. They (Subway) spent a lot of
money convincing customers that subs are healthy. We are rolling out a value menu, that seeks
to preserve the taste and quality, but offers sandwiches lower in price. So, we can still get
customers that want to eat with us, but may be unwilling to pay the extra 10 to 15 percent that it
typically costs. The trick is introducing a sandwich that tastes good, but doesn't cannibalize
sales of higher-priced items. So, we know that people are sensitive to a number of things. We
know that for Quizno's customers, price is probably second or third or fourth on their list of
considerations. A lot of our customers are feeling flush, and want to reward themselves, so they
are wiling to pay the extra money to get what most people consider a superiòr-tasting sandwich.
So we balance price in there somewhere, but it is not usually the primary consideration. Taste
and flavor and perception of quality normally is.
Q. Considering the franchisees you've spoken with, if you had to judge how most of them would
rank the product and the business model in order, how would they do it?
1
A. Most people come to Quizno's, in terms of interest in buying a franchise based on a couple of
things. Either they've eaten at a Quizno's in another market, or they've seen our advertising. A
key component of our advertising at the end of each ad is a 'beauty shot' of a sandwich rolling
out of a hot oven. Ones that see that are veiy inclined to call in order to find out more. I think
people experience it either personally or through our advertising, and that intrigues them. And
after visiting us, it confirms that it is a good-tasting sub...1 like it, I think other people will like
it, or I can sell this to somebody else. So I think they approach it much the same way a customer
does.. .do I like this place? Then, once they hear about the business model, their suspicions are
confirmed that if! do a good job of managing, I can make money. I have not talked to one
person yet... who is a prospect... that did not agree that our product was better than our
competitors...not one time. Even the competitors such asSchlotsky's (deli) that is a lot more
expensive to get into, and has much higher sales volumes compared to what we do. Very few
people don't like the sandwich.
Q. Your franchisees are not offered an exclusive teiTitoiy?
A. Correct. And that's a big question early on.
Q, As an area director, you have an exclusive territory, correct?
A. Right.
Q. One of your roles is in site selection. Do you see the absence of an exclusive territory as
more of an emotional fear or is it real in the minds of unit franchisees?
A. Its probably a split... 70 percent emotional and 30 percent reaL. ..especially for people who
have done a lot of research in our industry, particularly those that have looked at a Subway
UFOC that is riddled with litigation on encroachment. My prospects that have called
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361 franchisees in other markets have expressed concerns about the franchisor putting units too close
362 to them. Whether its real or perceived, I don't know. The typical mindset of an existing
363 Quizno's franchisee is that if you put one within ten miles, that's encroachment...because they
364 may get one customer from that ten-mile ring. So for me, it's a very emotionally-charged issue
365 from an existing franchisee's perspective. When I'm asked about that, I take a lot of time to
366 explain why there is not a protected territory offered. The main reason for that is that there is a
367 big difference in markets, and there is one UFOC that goes out, whether you're in New York
368 City or rural South Carolina. There is no way to write in one clause that is suitable to all of
369 those markets in a single document. The other thing is that demographics change over time. An
370 area that could only suppoli one, in five years may support two. So if you had that kind of
371 language, even the franchisee could not locate a unit within that territory, not being able to take
372 advantage of those changes. Its an issue that comes up a great deal, and one that I explain using
373 the trust factor. They have got to trust me to make a good decision on where to place it
374 (additional outlets). Part of trusting me is to make sure that they (existing franchisees) are given
375 the courtesy of being offered the new location first. And the second thing is that they are shown
376 the courtesy of me providing evidence of why a new location in an adjacent market would not
377 hurt them.
378
379 Q. These courtesies are not contractual obligations, are they?
380
381 A. No. Of course, there is always recourse... back to the franchisor, and legally, if it came to
382 that. So its best to do the due diligence up front, and coalition build. But not everybody in my
383 position does that or feels that way about it. In exchange for them trusting me on those issues,
384 I've got to trust them to put in their best effort to operate that location, because in a market there
385 may be room for 12 stores, and so at some point it becomes a scarce resource. So I've got to
386 have the best 12 people, because my income is derived from having them run their store better
387 than anyone els e. I explain it as one of the trust factors.
388
389 Q. Following the line of best effoiis, does Quizno's set operating hours?
390
391 A. We set minimum operating hours, but we do try to apply the common sense rule. If, after a
392 franchisee has exerted his best efforts to get business; if he stil is unable to attract business
393 during certain hours, then we look at approving shoiier hours.
394
395 Q. What level of financial assistance is provided by the franchisor?
3%
397 A. The franchisor has made arrangements with third-party lenders that are approved Quizno's
398 lenders. All of that goes through the SBA (U.S. Small Business Administration) loan guaranty
399 program. The effect of that is to mitigate or soften the underwriting requirements that
40 franc hi sees may face at a normal commercià lender. So our franchisees get financed earlier
401 because of the franchsor's relationship with that lender. And that lender has come in and
402 analyzed our operations, where we're going, and the support that's offered, and has a comfort
403 level with us. Despite the strength or weaknesses of the franchisee, the concept, if operated at a
40 baseline level should perform well enough to repay the debt. The other financial assistance
405 offered comes in the way of pre-negotiated deals in teims of pricing on equipment, food, and
40 services...such as Muzak, that are far better than could be negotiated by the individual by
407 themselves.
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Franchisor A: Patrick E. Meyers, Vice President and General Counsel, Quizno's Corporation
Q. Aside from following a normal template, can you describe the franchise agreement creation
process. Specifically, how are the language and terms generally chosen?
A. It evolves. Typically, when a franchisor is just starting out, its going to go to a franchise
Jawyer and use basically whatever fonn that franchise lawyer is comfortable with. And that's
basically what we did. As time goes on, and either circumstances in the company change or you
go through something that makes you feel like you need to change the agreement. In our case,
we started with a fiim in the early '90s, then we switched over to a Denver franchise lawyer in
the mid- 1990s and used their fonn, and then when I came on board I tailored the foim. And so,
our franchise agreement is now a compilation between what some lawyers thought was good
and what I thought was good.
Q. So it evolved over time? And that's kind of typical of most franchises?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. How are these documents likely to differ among franchises?
A. Franchise agreements really differ depending on the industry. That's what's probably going
to drive a franchise agreement. All of them are going to have the boiler plate stuff in it, they're
all going to license the mark, they're all going to Jicense the system, they're all going to take
control of the system to varying degrees. They're going to have dispute resolution provisions in
them, they're going to have choice of law provisions in them, they're going to have in-term and
post termination covenants not to compete and confidentiality provisions. Those are going to
be universal in virtually any agreement. What's going to change is that a quick service
restaurant is a lot different than a hoteJ and different than a car rentaJ agency, and there's going
to be terms within each of those types of franchise agreements that are going to be specific to
that industry. That is probabJy the biggest driving force in the change of a franchise agreement,
along with the phiJosophy of the franchisor's legal collnsel.
i
I tend to have a philosophy of having a very tough franchise agreement. The reason is because
as long as the system is working.. .as long as we are working well with the franchisee and the
franchisee is complying with the system standards, we never look at the franchise agreement _ we
never wony about it. The only time we look at the franchise agreement is when there is a
problem. And so, I want it to be as enforceable and tough as possible. Other franchisors don't
necessarily share that same philosophy. That's probably the other driving force. That's kind of
how you generally approach a franchise agreement.
Q. So if I wanted to find the things that ar e associated with that, I would find it in the language?
A. Yes.
Q. So I would have to read the entire agreement?
A. It's probabJy easier to work with the UFOC. Because the UFOC has to describe all of those
types of things in plain English, as opposed to franchise agreements which don't have to be
written in plain English. It's easier to look at the UFOC to figure out what the franchise
agreement is saying.
Q. You would say, then, that because you believe in the strength of this agreement, which
would be used should litigation result, that you would find yours to be veiy tough?
A. I would find ours to be on the tougher side. It is a stronger agreement in favor of the
franchisor than probably some others.
Q. I found some differences in the tErms of your agreement than what I would call the typical:
the J 5 year term of the agreement, the other is the manner of dispute resolution, and the other is
earnings claims. Can you comment on those?
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61
62 A. The difference in the length of the agreement date; back to the late '80s, I don't know that
63 there was any particular reason why we chose that. That choice predates me. In restaurants, I
64 don't think 15 years is the norm, but it's not way out of the park either, and our non-traditional
65 agreements, like airports, those are five-year agreements. But, otherwise, if we have a good
66 franchisee in the system, and they're operating well, and they're up and profitable, the difference
67 between i 0 and i 5 years is not really significant.
68
69 The dispute resolution provision, that comes from my philosophy. My philosophy is that, in
70 order of preference, I do not want the company to be put before ajuiy...because 1 don't like the
71 jury dynamic. When you have a small mom-aiid-pop operator, which is what we cater to, and a
72 large corporation on the other side of the table- not that juries are bad- but that particular
73 dynamic is not a good one for franchisors. So we have jury waivers in ãll our agreements.
74
75 i don't like arbitration. So, I try to avoid arbitration. So the forum I like the best is before a
76 judge. There are now I believe nine or i 0 states which either have statutes or traditional
77 pronouncements that forum selection clauses, which say that you have to resolve a dispute in the
78 franchisor's state are void in that state, and are against public policy. The way to circumvent
79 that, if you want to circumvent it, is through an arbitration provision. The U.S. Supreme Court
80 has said that Federal arbitration pre-empts those kinds of state laws. So if you have an
81 arbitration provision, and the arbitration provision says that you're going to arbitrate in Denver,
82 that trumps a state law that says that the forum selection clause is void. And from a practical
83 standpoint, corporate resource standpoint, it is better to be here in Denver for us than it is to be
84 in another state. So, in those handful of states where forum selection clauses are void, we have
85 arbitration provisions. And, just as an aside, the franchisee community, paiiicularly the
86 American Franchisee Association, take the position that franchisors want to litigate in their
87 home state because they have some judicial advantage. I don't think that that is true. That's not
88 true and there is no empirical evidence of that. It's a resource-if you have to take... if you are89 litigating against a franchisee, typically the franchisee will counterclaim your claim against you
90 with a multiple of claims, everything from misrepresenting the franchise system when you sold
91 it, or you did not give me suppOli what you sold it or you en croached or, on and on. To deal
92 with all those claims have the witness to talk about tltat particular claim. So we take IO
93 corporate offcers from Denver Colorado and fly them to Michigan to sit around and wait for an
94 arbitrator to witness them ... it's a huge resource problem. It's not the we think the judges and
95 Denver are biased in favor of us, in fact is not true at alL. But it is a resource problem. So that's
96 why franchisors I think it want to litigate in their home state.
97
98 The last time I looked, I think 80 percent offranchisors' offering circulars did not contain
99 earnings claims. We choose to. For one reason, the first question that comes up in a franchise
100 sale is the prospect saying, "how much money am I going to make." It's very diffcult to put a
101 sales person in the position of saying "I can't tell you anything, I can't share any number with
102 you, at alL." I think that probably there is a tendency, if you had no eaniings claim at all, for sales
103 people to cross the line. And as you know, the largest number of enforcement cases from the
104 FTC, and the largest number of civil lawsuits, have at least an eaniings claim in them. And so, I
105 think frankly, it's dangerous for franchisor not to give their salespeople anything to use. We
106 choose to use a fairly limited eaniings claim which is tied to sales, average sales. But that at
107 least gives the salespeople the tool that they can use. We've had years when it's gone down, so it
108 hasn't always been good. And, if a franchisee later comes back and says" your sales guy said
109 this was going to generate $450,000 to $500,000 a year in gross sales, we can point back to the
110 earnings claim and say "Well, we say right here what our average unit volume is", and we have
111 specific disclaimers about it. We think that its been helpful, both from a legal standpoint, and
112 frankly from a litigation standpoint, and from a sales standpoint.
113
114 Q. In your opinion, do you think that (earnings) disclosure should be mandatory?
115
116 A. I go back and forth on that. Most franchisor lawyers don't think it ought to be mandatory,
117 but as I said, I came from the securities world...and securities was exactly the opposite. In the
118 securities world, you had to disclose eveiy financial item that could be of any importance to a
119 prospective investor. And so, it wouldn't bother me if it were mandatoiy. I think one of the
120 problems with mandatory disclosures is trying to have some sort of a set guideline on what kind
470
APPENDIX M
121 of disclosures to make. Again, the hotel industry, their type of earnings claim is going to be
122 much different than the ()ther industries. Theirs will involve room-nights, room rates, average
123 occupancy. Average gross sales of the hotel is not that important. And so, that's where it gets a
124 little bit dicey. But, I wouldn't be against mandatory earnings claims.
125
126 Q. We touched on franchise associations, with the AFA previously. Can I have your opinion on
127 franchise associations in general, both in the U.S., the IFA and the AF A, and also, it appears as
128 though you've embarked on an aggressive international expansion, your comments on the roles
129 of franchise associations overseas.
130
131 A. We've never dealt with a franchise associations overseas, so I have no history. We're
132 members of the IFA. I think the IFA is a good organization. As far aS,a selling tool, I'm not
133 sure whether its been that helpful for us or not. I know that there is some validation, because
134 you go on the IFA web site, and can see that we're an IFA member. I think that has some
135 message that it sends to a prospect, although I'm rot sure. The IF A, I think, is a good forum, its
136 helpful to get together. I go to the IF A symposium every year, I speak at it eveiy other year. Its
137 helpful, you learn a lot, or you can learn a lot. You meet with people who have thought of some
138 way ofapproaching something that I haven't thought of, and I think that its lobbying efforts
139 have been very good, particularly at the state leveL. Obviously, we're not members of 
the140 franchisee association. I have no problem with the franchisee association, but disagree often
141 times with their positions, but generally they haven't posed a problem for us.
142
143 Q. One of the hot legislative debates that went on, then went away for a while, and now appears
144 to have re-surfaced is the Coble-Conyers (Small Business Franchise Act). Can you give me
145 your comments on that.
146
147 A. Well, I hope it never passes. Coble-Conyers is a... well, I'm not sure...I don't want to be
148 unfair. I think, that to some extent, it's a product of one very aggressive lobbyist, who had a
149 significant problem with the Holiday Inn system, and has pushed and pushed and pushed...and
150 luckily, the bil has never got anywhere. Now it gained about 40 co-sponsors when it was
151 introduced in the last session... which worried, I mean, that really got our attention. So, a
152 number of us went out through the IF A, I think aboùt 150 people went out and did this blanket
153 lobbying effort against it in Washington... that was two years ago. The problem with Coble-
154 Conyers, at least in the foiIDs that its been introduced, it is, I think, and obviously I'm coming
155 fi'om my personal bias, it is veiy draconian, and would make franchising veiy diffcult. The
156 missing concept in Coble-Conyers is that, I believe, it comes from a philosophical position that
157 franchisors are inherently unfair to franchisees, and oveHeaching. I don't believe that that's
158 true. And it misses what I think is true, that franchisors, in order to protect all of the franchisees,
159 not just the franchisor, have an inherent reason to enforce system standards. If you have a
160 McDonald's in the middle of a city, that has bugs in the shake machine, that's the Robinson
161 case, and you have a law out there that says, you know, that may not be good cause for
162 termination. Even if it is good cause for termination, you're going to have to wait 90 days to
163 terminate that person, and you may have to pay them compensation... that store is hurting every
164 other franchise operator in that city. There is no question in my mind about that. And that's
165 what Coble-Conyers does. Coble-Conyers approaches things from a standpoint that we're out
166 there beating on people just for the sake of beating on them.
167
168 Q. Using the power...
169
170 A. That's right, and unfairly. And I don't think we do that. We make decisions that are not
171 popular. We made the decision six or seven years ago to auto-debit our franchisees, as opposed
172 to letting them continue to pay by check. That was not a popular decision...but I'll tell you
173 what...it was the best decision we ever made. It is one of the reasons why this system has run
174 the way it has.. .its one of the reasons why we have a veiy Iow default rate. That's just an
175 example. We make a decision to change our POS (Point of Sale) system. Franchisees don't
176 want to change the POS system... they don't want to spend money on something else...I
177 understand that. But it helps the system...there are multitudes of reasons why we're making that178 change. And its not because we've got some interest in IBM, and that we're going to make a lot
179 of money from changing our POS system. Its because it's the right thing to do for the system.
180 Not to say that franchisors don't screw-up and make bad decisions, sometimes they do. But, by
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181 and large, I think that franchisors are out to make the decisions that are going to help the system.
182 Bils like Coble-Conyers,make it diffcult to make those decisions, and to keep a franchise
183 network viable, particularly against competition.
184
185 Q. Can you talk a little about the Codes of Ethics that are in place in Australia and paits of
186 Europe?
187
188 A. Australia is pretty new, and they just changed it..they just revised it. And you know that
189 the IF A also has a code of ethics, though obviously its not imposed.. .not mandatory... but IFA
190 members are supposed to adhere to it. I think codes of ethics are fine...I don't have a strong
191 feeling about them one way or the other. Australia has not been any kind of a problem for us.
192
193 Q. You covered a couple of things about disputes, encroachment and bargaining in good faith,
194 and those kinds of things. What, in your opinion, can be done to minimize the number of
195 disputes that occur between franchisors and franchisees?
1%
197 A. Focus on unit profitability. If a franchisee is making money, you won't have a dispute. They
198 might get angry at you if you make a change that they don't like, but that wil be a 20 minute
199 conversation, and usually go away after that. If a franchisor loses sight of unit
200 profitability...and the units start to lose money...you're going to have disputes all day long.
201
202 Q. If you're looking at a foreign country in which to expand, can you compare the
203 importance...ifyou had to rank them...ofthe trademark laws of the country, the anti-
204 competitive laws, such as the tying contracts, or the dispute resolution laws.
205
206 A. i think trademark is the most impOltant, just because you typically have more of a problem
207 with third-party piracy than your have in contract difficulties with your franchisee. So, it's
208 important to get a trademark registered if you are going to go into a country. We haven't really
209 experienced any problems with anti-competitive laws, trade laws or tying laws. It could,
210 potentially, be a problem for a franchisor that is large, or a franchisor that has a lot of 
vertical211 integration. But we really haven't experienced any problem with that.12 ,
213 Q. Do you think, if! had four or five franchise agreements and UFOCs in front of 
me, and I214 focused on the amount of litigation, do you think that a small number of disclosed disputes is an
215 indicator of harmony in the system or franchisor strength?
216
217 A. It can be. There's also a variance. You have to disclose material cases. Some franchisors
218 wil take the position, that its not material because, even if they have theoretically material
219 claims, their system is so large that one piece of litigation is not materiaL.
220
221 Q. You mean its relative...compared to the size of our system...
222
223 A. Yes, compared to our system, this is small, and we therefore do have to disclose it. We tend
224 to go the other direction. We tend to disclose. I think that.. .I'm certainly very pleased with our
225 amount of litigation compared to the size of our system. And I would be very displeased if we
226 had a lot of litigation compared to the size of our system. And I think if you're looking at a
227 system that has a lot of cases disclosed, that could be an indication of a systemic problem, not
228 necessarily, but it may be a problem. And it is probably, nice to see...its viitually impossible
229 not to have any litigation. You have independent business people...and some wil faiL. Some
230 people are not going to be able to operate a business. Its not their fault... but they're going to be
231 in a tough position. They're going to owe the bank money, they got a lease to make, and they
232 have personal liability on that. And they often times don't feel like they have any choice but to
233 fie something against the franchisor,just to try and get out of the problem. So, I think you're
234 always going to have some litigation, but a low number is probably a good sign.
235
236 Q. What do you see as far as the legal environments of the future? More reliance on disclosure
237 documents, or more shifting more toward franchise associations and their codes of ethics?
238
239 A. Franchise associations and codes of ethics are never going to be something that... well, codes
240 of ethics if its mandated through a government regulatory agency will be imposed...
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241
242 Q. Like Australia?
243
244 A. Like Australia. But in the United States it's a voluntary thing, and I think its going to remain
245 a voluntary thing. I think that the legal environment wil be... well the FTC will adopt its new
246 rule at some point. Its going to change the format of the offering circular (UFOC), and its going
247 to change some nuances, but its not going to be a big change to franchising. I think you're going
248 to see more and more states shifting away from regulation...its very costly and states, I think,
249 are beginning to view franchising as not a big problem. Business Opportunities, that's a big
250 problem. And so they're focusing more on Biz Op ( Business Opportunities). Indiana, for
251 example, just did away with their whole registration process, and its now a fie of notice state,
252 like Wisconsin. Probably overseas, there are more and more countries that are adopting some
253 form of franchise regulation, and that wil continue. Whether it's a cod~ of ethics, or registration
254 process, or disclosure process, or a myriad, I think we'll continue to see that. That seems to be
255 kind of a wave right now.
256
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1 Franchisor B: John L. Gallivan, Chief Financial Offcer, Treasurer, and Assistant Secretary,
2 Quizno's Corporation
3
4 Q. You've got extensive franchising experience in two different industries. Can you talk about
5 how they were similar and how they were different and, common success factors, based on your
6 experience in those two industries.
7
8 A. Well, they're not that dissimilar. They were both retail franchisees and both selling retail
9 products. There was cost accounting, and the finance was common between both of them. The
10 Quick Lube franchises cost considerably more to develop than the sandwich shop franchises, but
11 the problems are still the same- And that's sourcing competitive financing for our franchisee's to
12 be able to purchase the franchise, and start up the business. And in any.franchise organization, I
13 think that's critical to the success of the company. A franchise company I don't think can even
14 expect to succeed without having good solid financing sources for its franchisees. It's like car
15 dealers today, you used to go to the bank to get your car loan and then go buy the car. Today
16 you stop on the way over to your aunt's house and buy a car and get it financed and still be on
17 time. The financing is right there, and it's done veiy, very quickly. Its the same with
18 franchising. You have to have those financing sources available to continue to grow,
19 irrespective of how good our product is. We have to have those financing sources available.
20 Probably the most common thing in my career has been dealing with the financing. Accounting
21 for franchising is the same, for every industry there some unique accounting rules, with respect
22 to revenue recognition. Franchisors were one ofthe first industries to abuse ceiiain recognition
23 standards in the accounting profession and as a result were the first to get whacked with very
24 definitive guidelines on how recognize revenue. And that's basically deferral of all revenue until
25 the related unit opens for business. That's not what the GAAP says, but that's what it says when
26 you get through interpreting the rules. This makes it a little more diffcult for us to get to the
27 positive financial results. Even though our cash flow is tremendous because of franchise sales,
28 that doesn't show up on the income statement until the unit opens. A banker will have to
29 understand that. They wil have to look more closely at our cash flow statement than our
30 income statement.
31
32 Q. Can you please clarify that? You have 700 or 800 outlets that have been sold but not yet
33 opened. Does that mean that they don't show up in your corporate financials?
34
35 A On the balance sheet, but not on the income statement. We collect about $20,000 per
36 franchise on the 700 that haven't been opened, and that's all sitting on our balance sheet in
37 an account called deferred franchise revenue; which is on the liability side of the balance
38 sheet. When we show the financial statements to bankers, we say this amount is not a
39 debt... we do not owe that money.. .it's a non-refundable franchise fee. But, it's also not
40 recognizable as income: it's there in limbo. And in doing your analysis, you need to move
41 that down into the equity category- its not debt. But we have to fight those battes with
42 lenders, although they're becoming more familiar with dealing with franchisors, an
43 understanding the accounting principles that are unique to franchise companies. The quick
44 lube, we were a smaller company, when I left we had 200 franchises opened, where here we
45 have 1300 and so it's getting much more rapid rise, and much more successful here-we're
46 doing a lot more here faster.
47
48 Q. SO, how you handle that? From a corporate standpoint, cash flow in growing companies
49 straps them.
50 A. The first years were diffcult. We've always had pretty good cash flow. But, we were very,
51 very earnings conscious-even though we had the cash, but we wanted to get positive eamings as
52 quickly as possible as we could after our IPO. For that reason, we pinched pennies, until we
53 started making money regularly and consistently, we pinched pennies. We doubled up hotel
54 rooms, we rented the cheapest cars, our people would stay with area directors or friends when
55 they would travel. We monitored office supplies, we used purchase orders for every single
56 purchase, we'd have our area directors meetings on co liege campuses in the summer if it were un
57 air-conditioned so we could get it cheap. A lot of penny pinching, to get to the financial results
58 that we wanted. And, we still pinch pennies, we still run this thing by the budget.
59 Not to jump ahead, but the budgeting process, the planning process, we do a thorough job of
60 that. Every fall, will have a group meeting where wil go off for three or four days, and wil
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61 identify opportunities and challenges coming up on the horizon, both internally and externally.
62 And then we'll identify what we need to do to deal with those throughout the next year. And
63 that will come back, and will put numbers to all of that, get our budget and will determine if
64 that's where we want to be. If it works for us, if not will go back and refine and modify. You
65 know, cut projects that we've put on the bottom of the priority heap. And then by the beginning
66 of December, we agree on the final firm budget for next year. And set line item by line item for
67 every single depaitment and profit center. Eveiy single employee in here has their own budget,
68 for the next year. And then we go off into the next year and we stick to that budget. We very
69 seldom vary. And it's reviewed every month with eveiy depaitment, with myself and the CEO
70 of the company, to look at performance against budget. And that's how we control it. We put a
71 lot of time into the budget, and we stait out the year we say" OK it's your department, your
72 budget here going to achieve these goals and we all agree that you need these resources to
73 achieve these goals"... and off you go. And we don't need to talk again, as long as your
74 achieving your goals, and you're not using any more resources. You can spend that money
75 according to the budget, within the timing of the budget. You don't have to go back to get things
76 approved again. And that works pretty well for us. Right now, I could show you our budget,
77 and it even amazes me how close we are seven months into the year, and how close we are on
78 the budget items both revenue and expenses. Its because we put a lot of time into it, and the
79 CEO SUppoitS it. These people can't go to the CEO and circumvent the process. He's behind it,
80 and he sticks with the budget, and he tells other people if it's in the budget, do it; if not, figure
81 out something else. We just don't have the money laying around to do other things.
82
83 Q. Do you think that one of the reasons why some younger franchisees get into trouble might be
84 because they don't have that kind of financial control?
85 A. Oh, yes. I think a lot of companies don't have the discipline to do that to make a budget and
86 stick to it. I also think a lot of companies don't have the passion that we have here. We're
87 fortunate in that we've got the founder involved, and he's well-educated, a good business person
88 and by the numbers person. He was also a franchisee of the company, prior to becoming the
89 owner of the company. So he knew from three or four years of owning one and then three
90 franchises, what it is like to be a franchisee, and what it takes to make money in this business.
91 And he's got the passion for it. So when we plan things and we do things, what always comes
92 first is the quality of the product to the customer, an(¡ the delivery of the product, the freshness
93 and a taste, and the environment, always comes first. Next, (is) the profitability of the94 franchisee. The franchisee has to be profitable- has to be making money in this business. Way
95 down the line comes the value of the stock, where it's trading at on the market, and our
96 profitability from day -to-day. We all know if we serve a good product, and our franchisee's are
97 profitable, everything else wil eventually work. We may make some mistakes, we may sign
98 some bad leases, we may make an acquisition that turns out to be He wrong thing to do-but
99 we'll always recover from that, just as long as our franchisees are making money. The CEO
ioo here, having been a franchisee, approaches it that way. As opposed to other franchise
101 companies whose tally of success is how many franchises they've sold. We like to have a
102 backlog, but that's not as important. When we get them open, we've got to make them
103 profitable.. . and that's when we know we're successfuL.
104
105 Q. You touched upon it being tough in the early days. Unlike some of the other concepts that
106 were bom into a market that was virtually wide open, you came into a market with established
107 competitors with significant market presence. Can you talk about how you build share and how
108 you were able to attract franchisees?
109
110 A. I don't think anybody would ever sit around and say" boy I think it would be a good idea to
111 get in the quick service restaurant business, and compete against Subway with 13,000 units,
112 Blimpie with 5,000 units, and eveiy other person in the world would tell us that that didn't make
113 any sense. It doesn't sound like a smart decision to make. But, it is a tough business, its
114 volatile. Successful restaurants can quickly become unsuccessful restaurants because suddenly
115 in three weeks' time two competitors pop up within walking distance, where there used to be no
116 competition. That's tough, it's tough to compete in this business. We do compete by keeping
117 our costs down, and our break-even points below, so that our franchisees can continue to make
118 money as long as possible, without having a high debt service from a large unit. When Rick
119 bought the chain, there were 19 units in Denver, and it did have a niche in Denver. It was
120 known as a specialty, high quality sub sandwich. So there was a culture built already. We've
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121 tried to continue that. Our prices are higher than Subway and Blimpie, higher than our
122 competition for the same size sandwich. But because our sandwiches, our meats and vegetables
123 and the rest of the ingredients are the highest quality you can get. Subway are generally just
124 more economic. Our decor is a little more upscale, and more conducive to the business eater.
125 So we've tried to maintain that image. And I think we've done that. I looked at the focus group
126 results that people looked at Quizno's in a lot of cases, as a place to go out to dinner. You
127 know, with their family. So we've got that niche above Subway and Blimpie. We're very
128 successful in downtown areas, and office buildings, in airpoiis, tech Centers, employment
129 centers-we're real success ful at these. Blimpie and Subway, our competitors, on the other hand,
130 are more out in the suburbs near the high schools, you'll always see one or two of them usually
131 right across the street from the high schooL. So, they're going for the more price conscious, and
132 we're in a niche above that.
133
134 Q. I spoke with Pat Meyers (Legal Counsel) about this. Quizno's makes an earnings claim
135 based on sales in its UFOC, which is unlike most of your competitors. Your same store sales are
136 above that of your competitors, which should make it very attractive to potential franchisees.
137 You find that to be the case? That potential franchisees wil look at that?
138
139 A. Yes. If the franchisee is doing their job, they wil do those kinds of comparisons. I'm not
140 sure that the majority of them actually do that much due diligence. But the ones that do, wil
141 choose Quizno's. And those are the ones that we want it anyway. In the absence of an earnings
142 claim, they're stil getting the information by talking to franchisees, which we encourage them to
143 do. Our startup costs are a little higher than Subway's -I think we are about 170,000 (dollars) to
144 200,000 (dollars), where theirs is i 10,000 (dollars) to 120,000 (dollars) in start-up costs. So,
145 somebody might decide that that is a good trade off- that for lower staiiup costs they can buy a
146 Subway, but their sales are going to be lower, but it doesn't take as much money to get into the
147 business.
148
149
150 Q. You've touched on profitability at the franchisee leveL. What do you think are the main
151 reasons for Iow franchisee profitability within a successful system?52
153 A. Cost control. Franchisees not controlling their costs properly. We emphasize ... We
154 recognize that that is a weakness of any franchisee-not just our franchisees in our chain... to be
155 able to control costs and manage their business from the checklist. In our training, and in every
156 meeting we have, we require our franchisee's to attend profitability seminars, cost seminars, to
157 detennine their break-even point etc.... and it has started to work. We had an interesting thing a
158 number of years ago. We were telling our franchisees that food cost should be 30%, labor
159 should be 20 (percent), discounts should be 5 (percent), right on down the line. And they
160 weren't believing us. And so we said, "well, here's our company stores, we do it in our
161 company stores,"and they still didn't believe us. They said, well, you keep the books in those
162 company stores, so you can do what ever you want. So, we started something that is unique to
163 the franchisee world, and we have a thing called blast fax-and this also helps us to collect our
164 royalty information- but, we didn't start it for that information. Every franchisee in our system is
165 required, everyday, to call in their sales from the previous my-both before discounts and after
166 discounts. At the end of each week, they call in their sales for the week, along with their food
167 costs percent, paper costs, and labor costs for the week. Eveiy day, we take all that information,
168 from all 1300 stores, we capture it, we split it by area, and we fax it back out to eveiyone of
169 them, and we put their name, their store number, and their location, what their sales were, and
170 what their costs were. We send it back out to all of their peers. Every franchisee inL.A.
171 Knows what the guy down the street is doing, who's doing better who's doing worse. And we
172 did that so that they can see what their fellow franchisee's are doing. They can say" well, that
173 guy's doing 30%, and 19% labor-that's what Quizno's told me-I know that guy, I'll call him up
174 and see what he's doing." And so that worked- that created peer pressure to improve your
175 results. It also created credibility of the numbers. And we continue to do that to this day. It's a
176 valuable tool. A franchisee... It's human nature the first day they open the store, they don't
177 know how much businesses is going to come in. So, you wind up being overstaffed- which is
178 probably a good business practice. You may be overstaffed your first week or two, until you get
179 a feel for how your business is going to go. And then, theoretically, you should be cutting back
180 to the modeL. At that point, you should know what your losses are going to run, when you pick
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181 up and when you drop-off, you know the pattems at that point. But its human nature for
182 franchisees to not let go of those people, to keep them around, because "I'm going to have a very
183 busy day." Or another problem is, if! don't keep Joe on the payroll, he's going to quit. So, even
184 though I've got nothing for him to do, I have to give him the hours today, so he doesn't quit.
185 And we try to get them past that-that's part of business-replacing people. You just can't keep
186 people on your payroll when you don't need them, just because they may go find another job.
187 To answer your question, controlling labor costs is the weak point in the franchise system if
188 they're not making the right amount of money.
189
190 Q. That was my next question...how important is labor management?
191
192 A. Labor management, from a cost standpoint and also from a resource standpoint, is the most193 important thing. '
194
195 Q. Because that's very visible to your customers as well, isn't it? If they can't get service...
1%
197 A. Its visible to our customers, its also the hardest thing to do-to find labor. I talked to our most
198 successful multi-unit franchisee, and asked him what the most impOliant thing he did. He said,
199 there's only one thing I do, and I do it everyday-and I'd do it 10 hours a day, and I'll continue to
200 do it seven days a week, 365 days a year-And that's recruit people. That's all I'm ever doing is
201 looking for people. He's said, I wake up every morning and I picture in my mind the weakest
202 link have in my stores right now. And even though eveiybody might be doing a good job, I
203 identify who the weakest pers on is, and I start trying to fix that. I identify where I don't have the
204 right kind of back-up-and so if I should lose somebody-always recruiting people. As opposed to
205 the franchisee who wil say "I finally got a good crew, and I can stop looking." That person will
206 ultimately fail-you've got to keep looking. If you're in the restaurant industry, or anything in the
207 service industry, you're dealing with minimum wage employees. You're in crisis mode. They're
208 talking about lifting the immigration laws for Mexico in order to get workers to come up here.
209
210 Q. I hear that from non-franchised businesses as welL. Now with a tighter labor market, they are
211 hiring people that have never worked before. They d.on't know what it's like to have to show up
212 for work. That's something where the system canno~ do eveiything. It's up to that individual
213 franchisee, to be looking for good people.
214
215 A. Right. That's their job-recruit and hire people. As much as we'd like to, we can't ultimately
216 do it. We can give them the tools are, and we do have pretty good hiring tools. We've got ...
217 we've just come out with a bunch of Spanish language recruiting radio ads to run on Spanish
218 radio stations that seem to be working. And referral fees to other employees.
219
220 Q. There is what I call the "official" environment of franchising-the UFOC and franchise
221 agreement and all the documentation- and then there's the informal environment -the labor
222 management. Looking at the offcial side, if! were to layout these documents from Subway,
223 Blimpie, your other competitors, and Quizno's, is there something in there that you can point out
224 to prospective franchisees that would make them choose Quizno's?
225
226 A. If I were a buyer, I would look first at the earnings. I would look at that, and if I had a
227 UFOC without an earnings claim, I'd go get infonnation. That would be one of primaiy things I
228 do. I'd look at the litigation, and then I'd tried to get a feel for why they're having a lot of
229 litigation. You know, it may not be that bad-but if it's a surge of litigation, that would tell me
230 that the system's in trouble. Maybe their sales are going down, maybe their food supplier is not
231 working or something is going wrong. Then I'd look at the people running the company, I'd
232 look into their background, because I want people who had been in the service business ... that
233 knew service... not just service to the customers but converts to service of the franchisees. I
234 looked at the franchise's financial statements, to see that they're well-capitalized- to make sure
235 they spend their time building a good system ... not all their time trying to raise money to pay
236 the bills. And I think we stack up pretty well in all of those areas with our offering circular.
237
238 Q. Quizno's went public in '94. Are you trying to buy the stock back now?
239
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240 A. Were buying it back right now. We did a tender offer last December and bought back about
241 half. The tender offer was voluntary, so we stil have about half out there that we wanted to get.
242 So now we're doing a merger, which requires all the shareholders ... the remaining public
243 shareholders to surrender their stock at about $8.50 per share, which is a pretty good premium.
244 And that should be completed within the next 30 days. Right now we're waiting for the last
245 round of comments from the SEC, which we should get any day. And at that time we'll be
246 ready to file our proxy, and schedule a shareholders meeting, and then we'll be private.
247
248 Q. And all of this has been going on in the midst of your exponential growth? Aachen
249
250 A. For the last year it has, right. And that was preceded by raising the money for the tender. I
251 spent last year it this time from the end of August through the middle of December, 6 and a half
252 days a week, Pat (Meyers) and I both getting the financing done to get the money to make the
253 deaL. But we've got that all done, it's just a matter of going through the mechanics of the SEC
254 approval, and we'll be private within the next two months. Ha
255
256 Q. Your thoughts on fees, royalties, transfer fees and the development of the UFOC, the
257 franchise agreement terms. What I've read is that franchisees see the value up -front, but once
258 they get in the system and see how it works, these fees and continued royalty payments tend to
259 be an aggravation. Can you just comment on how the fees are established?
260
261 A. Both the initial franchise fee and royalties are established by what the industry is charging.
262 We're at $20,000 for the initial franchise fee, which is about the average of every franchise, I
263 think it's about cIo se to McDonald's franchise fee if I'm not mistaken. And then the royalty is
264 the big nut, though. The royalty and the advertising fee. The mistake many franchisees make is
265 that they add them together. They say" a 7% royalty and a 4% ad fee means that that's 11
266 percent I'm paying the franchisor." The advertising fee, in our case and in most cases, goes
267 directly into a trust account that's accumulated among all franchisees and is spent right back out
268 on adveitising. That money is where you get the real t rue benefit and synergies of being a
269 franchisee, by combining your money with those others to buy adveitising. So, I think it's a
270 mistake, and I hate to see it when franchisees say that my royalties are 11 %. It's not. Its 7%,
271 plus, you're a participant in this trust account for adveitising, and you pay 4 percent into that.
272 The 7% in the 4 percent are ... two things ... it's looking at the competition, whatever other
273 franchisors are charging, and looking at our own unit models for our stores. You can't have
274 royalty that makes the unit unprofitable. By operating at 8% before royalties and we charge 7%
275 royalties, you know they can't make just one percent, it won't work. But we look at what the
276 unit economics will bear, we look at what we bring to the tab le, in terms of reduced cost for
277 insurance, the cost of food ... through our buying we think we can demonstrate that they are
278 buying at 4 or 5% less than if they were independent... and so you're paying 7% for royalties but
279 you're getting 5% off of your food. If you were independent, you'd be paying that. And so we
280 look good those things. But, the franchisees still have a hard time writing that check. When I
281 was with the quick lube, one half or better of my job was spent collecting royalties. The
282 franchise agreementwith that company required them to pay once a month. And they would
283 pay by check when I got over here, we said, we're going to make it once a week, and require it
284 by auto-debit. As a result, I spend maybe one half a day per month on receival:es. Because
285 they're all paid. We don't have any receivable problem ... is collected on the same day from
286 franchisees every week ... on Wednesday we pop into our bank a million dollars in royalties, and
287 it's great. It's great for cash flow. We don't have to wait until the end of the month for them to
288 write a check. It's also psychologically... when the franchisee has to write that check every
289 month, you're giving him an oppoitunity to sit and say" my month was real good, and here I am
290 writing a check for $3,000... what did I get for $3,0007" Prett soon, I put aside and say" I
291 don't think I got anything ... I'm not going to pay them for a while." Here, it comes out of their
292 bank account, the same day every week. And so, they don't miss it ... they're not thinking about
293 the money going out. That's one of best things we did in building the strength of this company.
294 Up front, saying this is how we're going to collect our royalties. And, it's been salable to our
295 franchisees. At first, there was a little push back, but they are a generation that used to paying
296 their health club dues or their child care and their loan payments by having their account
297 debited. They are a lot different from me, I think giving somebody the right to get into my bank
298 account and take money out is the worst possible thing I could never do. But that's been a
299 wonderful thing for us, it's really given us good cash flow and no receivable problems.
478
APPENDIXN
300
301 Q. I'm sure that those calls to collect royalty payments are not pleasant ones, to chase the royalty
302 payments.
303
304 A. That's right. You know, I don't like the ads that you guys ran on TV, so I'm not going to pay
305 my royalties. You opened a store 9 mi. away from me, and it's taking a lot of my business away.
306
307 Q. You touched on this before, about the need to get earnings going. As a publicly traded
308 company, those eaniings must be divided among all the stakeholders: the shareholders, the
309 corporation, and the franchisees. Is balancing the needs of the stakeholders more of an art or
310 science?
311
312 A. It's probably most difficult with franchisees. You know, balancing their interests. Making
313 sure were treating them fairly, and they're stil making money. Especially because we dictate a
314 lot to them. We tell them they can only buy from one food vendor, they can only buy one kind
315 offood, they have to buy eveiything that we tell them from the suppliers that we tell them. And
316 that's everything that goes in the store from the beginning, and all the food that goes in the store
317 from then on. Balancing the interests between shareholders of the companies and lenders, you
318 know, they have a common interest. They want to see the profitability of the company. 'They
319 want us to pay back their loans, #2 to create value. Our shareholders never bought the stock as
320 an income stock, they bought it as a growth stock. So, if our shareholders ... if we have to take a
321 dollar and pay down debt a dollar, they see that as the same benefit as giving them a dollar ...
322 we've grown by a dollar and created an additional dollars wOlih of net worth. But, that hasn't
323 been much of a problem. The question is, how much true service does a franchisee get. We
324 struggle all lot, because we like our franchisees ... you get to know them ... and you meet them at
325 gatherings. And sometimes we struggle ... one gets in trouble and they're losing money, then
326 they're out of money. It's human nature to all get together, have an emergency meeting and
327 decide what we're going to do the help this person, and get them out of trouble. Jarrod (Brooks,
328 Area Director of Quizno's in South Carolina) and I are dealing with one down there with Jimmy
329 Johnson. You know, we struggle... what do we do... what can we do to help this guy, to make
330 this thing work, to get his loan paid, to make the lender happy... and so, what we're doing, we're
331 taking our resources and focusing our resources on oomething that's one l300th of the company.
332 And that's where we have to really discipline ourselves, and we have to say... and Rick keeps
333 reminding us ... you have to look at the universe, you have to help everybody. And, hard as it is
334 to let this one unit fail, you got to let it faiL. Because you can't spend your time ... if we're going
335 to try to save eveiy unit, we're never going to grow... we're never going to be able to create
336 benefits for the whole. It's admitting that ... and letting those units fail... and going on and
337 putting our efforts into building the other 1299 stores, and doing something that would be good
338 for them. And recognizing why that person failed ... and if that was a mistake in the business
339 model, to correct that, so that we don't do it again.
340
341 Q. Can you talk a little bit about company stores. Some of the research suggests that these
342 stores are more profitable than franchisee own ed outlets.
343
344 A. I think that may be true in some situations, but I don't think it's true for us. Company stores
345 do create cash flow, good cash flow for us. But not necessarily profits after depreciation and
346 amortization. But they do generate cash flow, they give us a good place to tryout new ideas, a
347 place to train new employees to become new representatives for us. They give us places to do
348 shows, to have open houses. The serve a lot of purposes. With our business, though, because of
349 the low sales volume, $400,000 to $450,000 per year, and the relatively tight margins ... a
350 mistake in one of our company -owned stores has an exponential effect on our bottom line.
351 Whereas, you take a Ruby Tuesday (restaurant) doing $I.5 million to $1.8 milion per YEar in
352 sales, and operating on 12 percent margin ... they can make a few mistakes and recover. Are
353 they can also afford to have a fulltime, professional, general manager in that store to avoid those
354 mistakes. At our level of volume, its well-suited to an owner-operator. Company-store
355 ownership is diffcult because we can't afford to hire people to put them in there with
356 professional managers and get them motivated the same way a franchisee works. A franchisee
357 will work 12 hours a day, seven days a week and he'll love it. Our paid people would never do
358 that, no matter how hard we tlY. So we're drifting away from company-owned stores. We've
359 actually... in the last 90 days with taken our Denver company stores about 17 or 18 of them, and
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360 we formed four limited partnerships. And we put three four in each limited partnership. And
361 then we took company store supervisors, and we made each one of those ... offered them 5 i
362 percent of one of the partnerships. And now, you got four partnerships with a 51 % owner, being
363 one of our company store supervisors. And we took the other 49 percent. And we basically
364 gave them a franchise, we lease them the equipment. And it's 5 i percent yours 49 percent ours.
365 And you get to keep your salary and no bonuses, but at the end of each month we split up the
366 profits, 5 i percent to you, 49% to us. Was started that in April, and I think that any of them
367 believed, they thought that it was just a scheme. And then, at the end of May we handed them
368 some checks, and we did it again in June, and then again in July. Now, guess what. Those four
369 people are working 12 hours a day, seven days a week, they're tiying to figure out their food
370 costs, they're changing people, moving people, hiring people recruiting people. This shows you
371 the power of ownership.
372
373 Q. What do you think are the biggest challenges you've overcome in the past couple of years?
374
375 A. Being consistently profitable ... That was our first goal. We had to get this thing where it
376 was not only profitable, but where we were covering our G&A (general and administrative
377 expenses) with our royalty stream. That was my first goal. And we said if we can get this thing
378 where when the royalty comes in every Wednesday, cover the rent, the salaries, the taxes ... all
379 the G&A, then we can step back and relax a little bit. We know thei' that our other sources of
380 income will become our profit, like initial franchise fees, some of the other miscellaneous stuff
381 wil become our profit. So that was our first challenge. Other big challenges have been, even in
382 this company has been finding people. We've been very fOliunate getting staff, but we've had
383 some turnover even at the highest levels of the company. But getting the right people in the
384 right slots, especially in this environment it gets chaotic. And, when you find a weakness, it's
385 hard to discipline yourself to take the time to do what I believe is right to do. And that is to
386 write very thorough job descriptions, write down exactly what skills sets you need, write exactly
387 what you want this person to do, and then to find the person, to do that job with those skills,
388 rather than just say "well, I know a guy who's out of ajob."
389
390 i think the greatest risk we have going forward is credit for our franchisees for startup capitaL.
391 Startup financing loans, small business credit is prett tight right now. Regardless of what the
392 Fed (the D.S. Federal Reserve Bank) has been doing, our rates are going up. And they're getting
393 more picky about who they choose to finance, rates are going up, costs are going up. That's a
394 result of what's happened with defaults. Lenders have either gone out of business or are donnant
395 or have been acquired ... there's just not the pool of competition ... it's much smaller than it was
396 just two years ago. And they feel they can get these higher rates, and they can have stiffer
397 underwriting criteria, so they're just doing it. My greatest fear is that credit gets so tight that
398 people stop buying, like it was in the 1980's, when interest rates were in the high teens. At that
399 point, you couldn't sell franchises if your life depended on it. Because nobody was making any
40 kind of capital decisions for a long-temi. That's the fear on the horizon, the challenge. So we're
401 spending our time trying to figure out ways that we can lock up money, so if that happens, we've
402 got a free ride four or five months into it, until we exhaust our commitment. But we're trying to
403 see if we can find a way of convincing a lender to give us a commitment of $30 or $40 million
40 for our franchisees that will carry us through. So if the rest of the world goes nuts, we'll have
405 this, at least until we run out of it, enough until hopefully the problem goes away.
40
407 Q. Do you think a franchise company's business model changes over time, similar the product
408 life-cycle model of growth, maturity, and decline?
40
410 A. Yes, I think so. When you live around a lot of franchise companies, and you can see the
411 mistakes that they make. Dairy Queen is a good example. Back in the 1960's, Dairy Queen was
412 one of the biggest franchisors in the country... probably in the world. It was huge. But they lost
413 their system. I mean, they lost their niche. Its because they just did not have the mechanics in
414 place to upgrade and change their image, and keep up with the times. The franchisees were just
415 put in there, to run their business for i 5 or 20 years, suck all they could out of it, and then retire
416 to Florida. Because Daiiy Queen had no ability in their franchise agreements that required
417 upgrades or improvements. And, as a result, you just saw the chain kind of become dilapidated,
418 the stores getting diiiy, and unpainted. And I think that's the biggest mistake. Especially in the
419 restaurant business, where eveiybody expects that there is a new concept, a new theme every
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420 week. You've got to be able to require your franchisees to make upgrades ... new wall coverings,
421 new floors, all the aesthetic stuff ... to upgrade that and keep that image new all the time. I don't
422 think we need to change our food. I think a lot of franchisors, including us, made some
423 mistakes. We diversified, we tried pizza, home delivery pizza, gourmet pizza, we tried
424 smoothies, we tried everything; we always come back and wind up admitting to ourselves that
425 where we make money is on our core concept. I think a lot of franchisors, when they see their
426 system getting into trouble, think let's sell something else. I think that's when you get in trouble.
427 To save ourselves, rather than make our core concept work, we'll forget about that ... and we'll
428 do this. And they don't do it well, and the core concept fails, and then the whole thing fails.
429 And we've stuck... Rick (the CEOJ has stuck ... even though he's ventured into some things,
430 we've never ... we've ventured in, and ventured out... and stuck with the core concept. We make
431 the sandwich ... we have LTOs (Limited Time Offers), and that's how we tweak the menu. We
432 think up new sandwiches from a number of different sources. We have' a flavor consultant, we
433 have staff that come in trying these things... we'll do the LTO for 90 days, and we'll advertise
434 it. If it's not spectacular, then it's gone and the next LTO will come out, but if it's spectacular it
435 wil go on the menu, and then one comes off the bottom of the menu. And that's kind of how we
436 evolve our menu. But we just do it veiy, very slowly. There's never any big changes in our core
437 concept.
438
439 Q. Some franchises have grown through acquisition. Some have been successful, while others
44 have failed. If Quizno's was to make an acquisition, would be to diversify or to gain market
441 share?
442
443 A. Penetration. We've actually done a couple of acquisitions. We would never acquire another
44 franchise chain, with the thought that we could convert it to Quizno's. We know that that does
445 not work. We have acquired company-owned chains that we've conveiied to Quizno's. And
44 really, those are just real estate plays. What we're doing is we're getting good locations, and
447 that's it. We're not getting any goodwill from that chain, we're just creating Quizno's locations.
44 We've dabbled in it, what it boils down to is this. We're opening one a day. A 20-unit chain that
449 comes through the door might take us two months to negotiate, a month to do due diligence, and
450 then take a ton of money... in 20 days we wil have duplicated that. So why bother? Why not
451 just build more ourselves ... We know how to do it .1. find good locations, rather than go through
452 acquisitions. Acquisitions are pretty far down our scope. Although, we are looking at Wall
453 Street DeIi ... I think they're in Chapter i i (bankruptcy J ... but that's just again a real estate play
454 ... they've got great locations that we'd love to have. We put in an offer for about half of their
455 locations ...all the good ones.
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REQUIREMENTS FOR PREP ARA TION
OF A UNIFORM FRANCHISE OFFERING CIRCULAR
COVER PAGE: The state cover page of the offering circular must state:
1. The title in boldface type: FRANCHISE OFFERING CIRCULAR
2. The franchisor's name, type of business organization, principal business address and telephone
number.
3. A sample of the primary business trademark, logotype, trade name, or commercial label or symbol
under which the franchisee wil conduct its business. (Place in upper left-hand corner of the cover page.)
4. A brief description of the franchised business.
5. The total amounts in Items 5 and 7 of the offering circular: Franchisee's Initial Franchisee Fee or Other
Payment and Franchisee's Initial Investment.
6. The following statements:
Information comparing franchisors is available. Call the state administrators listed in Exhibit _ or
your public library for sources of information.
Registration of this franchise by a state does not mean that the state recommends it or has verified the
information in this offering circular. If you learn that anything in the offering circular is untrue, contact
the Federal Trade Commission and (State or Provincial authority).
7. Effective Date: (Leave blank until notified of effectiveness by state regulatory authority.)
Cover Page Instructions:
i. Present infol1nation in the required order. Except for risk factors or when instructed by the
examiner, do not capitalize or underline.
ii. The estimated cash investment should agree with the Item 7 total. Tliis total should represent
the franchisee's entire initial investment minus only exclusions allowed by Item 7. Do not state
what the total includes.
iii. Limit the cover page disclosure to one page unless risk factors require additional space.
Disclosure on the cover page should be brief. Limit the description of the business to the product
or service offered by the franchisor. Unless required by a state regulator, do not disclose
financing arrangements or the franchisee's right to use the trademark. Exclude non-required
infom1ation unless necessary as a risk factor or required by a state regulator.
iv. If applicable, disclose the following risk factors using the following language on the cover:
J. THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT PERMITS THE FRANCHISEE (TO SUE)
(TO ARBITRATE WITH) ONLY IN . OUT OF STATE
(ARBITRA TION) (LITIGATION) MAY FORCE YOU TO ACCEPT A LESS
FA VORABLE SETTLEMENT FOR DISPUTES. IT MAY ALSO COST MORE (TO
SUE) (TO ARBITRATE WITH) IN THAN IN YOU R
HOME STATE.
2. THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT STATES THAT LAW GOVERNS THE
AGREEMENT, AND THIS LAW MA Y NOT PROVIDE THE SAME
PROTECTIONS AND BENEFITS AS LOCAL LAW. YOU MAY WANT TO
COMPARE THESE LAWS.
3. THERE MAYBE OTHER RISKS CONCERNING THIS FRANCHISE.
v. In addition to the above language, disclose other risk factors required by a state regulator.
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vi. Use capital letters for risk factor disclosure.
vii. In multi state offerings in which the franchisor uses a single offering circular, refer to an
exhibit to the offering circular Jòr a list of State or Provincial authority.
Sample Cover Page:
(Logo)
Franchise Offering Circular
Belmont Muffers, Inc.
A Minnesota Corporation
First Street
Jackson, Minnesota 55000
(612) 266 -3430
The franchisee wil repair and install motor vehicle exhaust systems. The initial franchise fee is $ I 0,000.
The estimated initial investment required ranges from $132,700 to $160,200. This sum does not include
rent for the business location.
Risk Factors:
THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT REQUIRES THAT ALL DISAGREEMENTS BE
SETTLED BY ARBITRATION IN MINNESOTA. OUT OF STATE ARBITRATION MAY
FORCE YOU TO ACCEPT A LESS FA VORABLE SETTLEMENT FOR DISPUTES. IT
MA Y ALSO COST YOU MORE TO ARBITRATE WITH US IN MINNESOTA THAN IN
YOUR HOME STATE.
Information about comparisons of franchisors is available. Call the state administrators listed in Exhibit
_ or your public library for sources of infoffiation.
Registration of this franchise with the state does not mean that the state recommends it or has verified the
information in this offering circular. If you leam that anything in this offering circular is untrue, contact
the Federal Trade Commission and (S tate or Provincial authority).
Effective Date:
TABLE OF CONTENTS: INCLUDE A TABLE OF CONTENTS BASED ON THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THIS OFFERING CIRCULAR.
TABLE OF CONTENTS INSTRUCTION:
i. Refer to UFOC Items and state the page where each UFOC Item disclosure begins. List exhibits
by letter. Use the following format:
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T ABLE OF CONTENTS
ITEM
SAMPLE TABLE OF CONTENTS:
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Item 1
THE FRANCHISOR, ITS PREDECESSORS AND AFFILIATES
Item I Instructions:
i. Use the word "we," initials or one or two words to refer to the franchisor. Use different initials
or a different one or two words to refer to other persons contracting with the franchisee under
the franchise agreement. Except in the 23 Item titles, us e these initials or the word(s) to describe
these persons or entities throughout the offering circular. '
ii. Define the franchisee as "you" and use this description throughout the offering circular. If the
franchisee could be a corporation, partnership or other entity, disclose whether "you" includes
the franchisee's owners.
IlL. "Predecessor" in Item 1 means a person from whom the franchisor acquired directly or indirectly
the major portion of the franchisor's assets.
iv. The disclosure regarding predecessors need only cover the 10 year period immediately before
the close of the franchisor's most recent fiscal year.
v. Affiiate in Item I means a person (other than a natural person) controlled by, controlling or
under common control with the franchisor, which is offering franchises in any line of business
or is providing products or services to the franchisees of the franchisor.
DISCLOSE IN SUMMARY FORM:
A THE NAM OF THE FRANCHISOR, ITS PREDECESSORS AND AFFILIATES.
B. THE NAME UNDER WHICH THE FRANCHISOR DOES OR INTENDS TO DO BUSINESS.
Item IB Instruction:
If the franchisor does business under a name different from the name disclosed in Item lA, state that
other name. If not, state that the franchisor does not do business under another name.
C. THE PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ADDRESS OF THE FRANCHISOR, ITS PREDECESSORS AND
AFFILIATES, AND THE FRANCHISOR'S AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Item 1 C Instructions:
i. Piincipal business address means "home offce" in the United States, not in the state for which
the offering circular was prepared. If appropriate, also disclose the location of an international
"home offce." The business address can not be a post off ice box.
ii. In a mult~state offering in which the agent for service of process is required, the franchisor may
use an
exhibit or the acknowledgement of receipt to disclose this agent.
D. THE BUSINESS FORM OF THE FRANCHISOR
Item 1 D Instruction:
i. Disclosethe state of incorporation or business organization and the type of business
organization.
E. THE FRANCHISOR'S BUSINESS AND THE FRANCHISES TO BE OFFERED IN THIS STATE.
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Item lE Instructions:
Disclose the following:
1. That the franchisor sells or grants franchises;
11. Whether the franchisor operates businesses of the type being franchised;
iii. The franchisor's other business activities;
iv. The business to be conducted by the franchisees;
v. The general market for the product or service to be offered by the franchisee. (For example, is
the market developed or developing? Wil the goods be sold primarily to a certain group? Are
sales seasonal?)
vi. In general terms any regulations specific to the industry in which the franchise business
operates. It is not necessary to include laws or regulations that apply to businesses generally.
VB. A general description of the competition,
F. THE PRIOR BUSINESS EXPERIENCE OF THE FRANCHISOR, ITS PREDECESSORS AND
AFFILIATES INCLUDING:
(1) THE LENGTH OF TIME THE FRANCHISOR HAS CONDUCTED A BUSINESS OF THE TYPE
TO BE OPERATED BY THE FRANCHISEE.
(2) THE LENGTH OF TIME EACH PREDECESSOR AND AFFILIATE HAS CONDUCTED A
BUSINESS OF THE TYPE TO BE OPERATED BY THE FRANCHISEE.
(3) THE LENGTH OF TIME THE FRANCHISOR HAS OFFERED FRANCHISES FOR THE SAME
TYPE OF BUSINESS AS THAT TO BE OPERATED BY THE FRANCHISEE.
(4) THE LENGTH OF TIME EACH PREDECESSOR AND AFFILIATE OFFERED FRANCHISES
FOR THE SAME TYPE OF BUSINESS AS THAT TO BE OPERATED BY THE FRANCHISEE.
(5) WHETHER THE FRANCHISOR HAS OFFERED FRANCHISES IN OTHER LINES OF
BUSINESS, INCLUDING:
(A) A DESCRIPTION OF EACH OTHER LINE OF BUSINESS;
(B) THE NUMBER OF FRANCHISES SOLD IN EACH OTHER LINE OF BUSINESS; AND
(B) THE LENGTH OF TIME THE FRANCHISOR HAS OFFERED EACH OTHER FRANCHISE.
(6) WHETHER EACH PREDECESSOR AND AFFILIATE OFFERED FRANCHISES IN OTHER
LINES OF BUSINESS, INCLUDING:
(A) A DESCRIPTION OF EACH OTHER LINE OF BUSINESS;
(B) THE NUMBER OF FRANCHISES SOLD IN EACH OTHER LINE OF BUSINESS; AND
(B) THE LENGTH OF TIME EACH PREDECESSOR AND AFFILIATE OFFERED EACH OTHER
FRANCHISE.
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Item IF Instruction:
Limit disclosure about predecessors to the time before the franchisor acquired the predecessor's assets.
Thus, under the 10 year limitation, if a franchisor acquired the assets of a predecessor 8 years ago, the
disclosure about the predecessor should cove r only the 2 year period before the acquisition.
Sample Answer
To simplify the language in this offering circular "Belmont" means Belmont Muffers Inc., the franchisor.
"You" means the person who buys the franchise. Belmont is a Minnesota corporation that was
incorporated on September 3, 1963. Belmont does business a s Belmont Muffer Shops. Our principal
business address is 111 First Street, Jackson, Minnes ota 55555.
Belmonts agent for service of process is disclosed in Exhibit _'
Belmont cUlTently operates 12 Belmont Muffer Shops and sells pipe bending machines and muffers to
various muffer shops.
Belmont franchises tIre right to sell and install muffers for the public. You must honor our gnarantee to
replace muffers or exhaust pipes that wear out if the vehicle ownership has not changed. Belmont's
franchisees often operate their muffer shop fran chise with their service stations or tire center. Your
competitors include department store service departments, service stations and other national chains of
muffer shops. Exhibit is attached to this offering circular and contains a summary of the special
regulations for muffer installation in your state.
During the past 5 years Belmont has operated 7 muffer shops that are similar to the franchised shops
being offered. All these shops are located in urban areas, have approximately xxxxx square feet of floor
space and are located on busy streets. An additional 3 muffer shops were opened in 1990. From 1968 to
1973, Belmont offered franchises for "Repair- All Transmission Shops." "Repair-All" franchisees repaired
and replaced motor vehicle transmissions under a marketing p¡an similar to the franchise in this offering
circular. Belmont sold 40 of these franchises primarily in the states of Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin
and Ilinois. In 1973, Belmont sold this transmission repair company to CTF Inc.
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Item 2
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE
LIST BYNAME AND POSITION THE DIRECTORS, TRUSTEES AND/OR GENERAL PARTNERS,
THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS AND OTHER EXECUTIVES OR SUBFRANCHISORS WHO WILL
HAVE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO THE FRANCHISES OFFERED BY
THIS OFFERING CIRCULAR. LIST AL L FRANCHISE BROKERS. STATE EACH PERSON'S
PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS AND EMPLOYERS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.
Item 2 Instructions:
1. Principal officers include the chief executive and chief operating offcer, the president, financial,
franchise marketing, training and franchise operations officers.
11. First disclose the position and the name of the person holding it. Underline this information;
then skip one line.
iii. Disclose the beginning date and departure date for each job held in the five year period whether
or not this dat e is within the past five years. Disclose the location of the job.
IV. Do not disclose home addresses, home telephones, social security numbers or birth dates in this
Item.
v. Disclose the required information conceming the franchise broker's directors, pri ncipal offcers
and executives with management responsibility to market or service the franchises.
Vi. In a multi-state offering in which the franchisor uses a single offering circular and franchise
brokers and executives with direct management responsibility to the franchisees differs from
state to state, use an exhibit to refer to these personneI.
Sample Answer
President: Jane J. Doe
From June, 1978, until April, 1986, Ms. Doe was Vice-President of Atlas Inc., a Houston, Texas based
manufacturer of automobile wheels. In April, 1986, she joined Belmont as a Director and Vice President.
She was promoted topresident in June, 1987.
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Item 9 
FRANCHISEE'S OBLlGA nONS
DISCLOSE THE PRINCIPAL OBLlGA nONS OF THE FRANCHISEE UNDER THE FRANCHISE
AND OTHER AGREEMENTS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THESE AGREEMENTS.
Item 9 Instructions:
i. Disclose obligations in tabular form. Refer to the section of the agreement that contains the
obligation and any Item of the Offering Circular that further describes the obligation.
11. The table should contain a response to each category listed below. If the response to any
category is that no obligation is imposed, the table should state that. Do 'not change the names of
the categories. Fit all obligations within the listed categories. If other material obligations fall
outside the scope of all of the prescribed categories, add additional categories as needed. The
categories of franchisee obligations are:
a. Site selection and acquisition/lease
b. Pre-opening purchases/leases
c. Site develop ment and other pre,opening requirements
d. Initial and ongoing training
e. Opening
f. Fees
g. Compliance with standards and policies/Operating Manual
h. Trademarks and proprietary information
i. Restrictions on products/services offered
J. Warranty and customer service requirements
k. TelTitorial development and sales quotis
i. Ongoing product/service purchase
m. Maintenance, appearance and remodeling requirements
n. Insurance
o. Advertising
p. Indemnification
q. Owner's participation/management/staffing
r. Records and reports
s. Inspections and audits
t. Transfer
u. Renewal
v. Post-termination obligations
w. Non-competition covenants
x. Dispute resolution
y. Other (describe)
ll. Before the table, state the following:
THIS TABLE LISTS YOUR PRINCIPAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FRANCHISE AND
OTHER AGREEMENTS. IT WILL HELP YOU FIND MORE DETAILED INFORMATION
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ABOUT YOUR OBLIGATIONS IN THESE AGREEMENTS AND IN OTHER ITEMS OF THIS
OFFERING CIRCULAR.
Sample Answer 9
THIS TABLE LISTS YOUR PRINCIPAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FRANCHISE AND
OTHER AGREEMENTS. IT WILL HELP YOU FIND MORE DETAILED INFORMATION
ABOUT YOUR OBLIGATIONS IN THESE AGREEMENTS AND IN OTHER ITEMS OF THIS
OFFERING CIRCULAR.
Section Item inObligation in Agreement Offering Circular
a. Site selection Section 2A of Franchise
Items 6 an: I Iand acquisition/lease Agreement
b. Pre-opening
Section 3D of Franchisepurchases/
Agreement Item 8 leases
c. Site
development
Sections 3A andand other
3B of Franchise Agreement Items 6, 7 and 11pi-e-opening
requi remen ts
d. Initial and Section 5 of Franchiseongoing
Agreement Item i Itraining
e. Opening Section 4 of Franchise Item 11Agreement
f. Fees Section 6 of Franchise Agreement Items 5 and 6
g. Compliance
with standards
Section 8A of Franchiseand policies/ Agreement Item 11Operating
Manual
h. Trademarks and
Sections 7 and 11proprietary
of Franchise Agreement Items 13 and 14information
i. Restrictions
on products/ Section 12 of Franchise 
Item 16services Agreement
offered
j. Warranty and
customer Section 8B of Franchise
Item 11service Agreement
requirements
k. Territorial
development None
and sales
quota
1. Ongoing product/service Section 9 of Franchise
Item 8 purchases Agreement
m. Maintenance,
appearance Sections 8C and 10
Item 11and remodeling of Franchise Agreement
requirements
n. Insurance Section 13A of Franchise Items 6 and 8Agreement
o. Advertising Section 15 of Franchise Items 6 and I IAgreement
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p. Indemnification Section 13B of Franchise Item 6 Agreement
q. Owner's
participation/ Sections 4, 5and 14
Items 11 and I 5management/ of Franchise Agreement
staffing
r. Records/ Section 17 A of Franchise
Item 6 repoiis Agreement
s. Inspections/ Section 17B of Franchise
Items 6 and 11audits Agreement
t. Transfer Section 18 of Franchise Item 17Agreement
u. Renewal Section 20 of Franchise Item 17Agreement
v. Post-termination Section 22 of Franchise
Item 17obligations Agreement
w. Non-competition Sections 11, I 8 and 22e
Item 17covenants of Franchise Agreement
x. Dispute Section 24 of Franchise
Item 17resolution Agreement
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Item l7
RENEWAL, TERMINATION, TRANSFER
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SUMMARIZE THE PROVISIONS OF THE FRANCHISE AND OTHER AGREEMENTS DEALING
WITH TERMINATION, RENEWAL, TRANSFER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND OTHER
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP.
Item l7 Instructions:
1. Begin Item 17 disclosure with the following statement:
This table lists certain important provisions of the franchise and related agreements. You should
read these provisions in the agreements attached to this offering circular.
11. Respond in tabular form. Refer to the section of the agreement which covers each
subject.
Il. Use a separate table for any other significant franchise-relate agreements. If a provision
in any other agreement affects the provisions of the franchise or franchise- related
agreements disclosro in this Item (for example, the tenn of the franchise w il be equal
to the term of the lease), disclose that provision in the applicable category in the table.
iv. The table should contain a "summary" column to summarize briefly the disclosed
provision. The summary is intended to provide a concise overview of the provision in
no more than a few words or a sentence. Do not specify in detail all matters covered by
a provision.
v. The table should respond to each category listed below. Do not change the names of the
categories. List all contractual provisions relevant to each categOlY in the table. If the
response to any category is that the agreement does not contain the relevant provision,
the table should so state. If the agreement is silent conceming a category but the
franchisor unilaterally offers to provide certain benefits or protections to franchisees as
a matter of policy, a footnote should describe this policy and state whether the policy is
subject to change. The categories are:
a. Length of the term of the franchise
b. Renewal or extension of the term
c. Requirements for franchisee to renew or extend
d. Termination by franchisee
e. Termination by franchisor without cause
f. Termination by franchisor with "cause"
g. "Cause" defined - curable defaults
h. "Cause" defined - defaults which cannot be cured
1. Franchisee's obligations on termination/non-renewal
j. Assignment of contract by franchisor
k. "Transfer" by franchisee - defined
i. Franchisor approval of transfer by franchisee
m. Conditions for franchisor approval of transfer
n. Franchisor's right of first refusal to acquire
franchisee's business
o. Franchisor's option to purchase franchisee's business
p. Death or disability of franchisee
q. Non-competition covenants during the term of the
franchise
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r. Non-competition covenants after the franchise is
terniinated or expires
s. Modification of the agreement
t. Integration/merger clause
u. Dispute resolution by arbitration or mediation
v. Choice of forum
w. Choice of law
Sample Answer 17
This table lists important provisions of the franchise and related agreements. You should read
these provisions in the agreements attached to this offering circular.
Section in Franchise
Agreement
Section i,
(also Section i of
Lease, Exhibit F)
Provision
a. Term of the
franchise
b. Renewal or
extension of the
term
c. Requirements for
you to renew or
extend
d. Termination by
you
e. Termination by
Belmont without
cause
f. Termination by
Belmont with
cause
g.IICause"
defined -
defaults which
can be cured
h. "Cause"
defined -
defaults which
cannot be cured
i. Your obligations
on termination/
nonrenewal
j. Assignment of
contract by
Belmont
k. "Transfer" by
you - definition
L. Belmonts
approval of
transfer by
franchisee
Summary
Tenn is equal to lease terni - lO years
Section 20
If you are in good standing you can add
additional term equal to renewal tenn of lease (IO
years max.)
Sign new agreement, pay fee, remodel and
sign releaseSection 20
None
None
Section 21
Belinont can terminate only if
franchisee defaults
You have 30 days to cure: non-payment
of fees, sanitation problems, non-
submission of reports and any other default
not listed in Sec. 21A
Section 21B
Section 22
Non-curable defaults: conviction of felony,
repeated defaults even if cured, abandonment,
trademark misuse and unapproved transfers
Obligations include complete
deidentification and payment of amounts
due (also see 1', below)
No restriction on Belmonts right to
assign
Section 22
Section 18
Section 19A Includes transfer of contract or assets or
ownership change
Belmont has the right to approve all
transfers but will not unreasonably withhold
approval
Section 19B
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m. Conditions for
Belmont
approval of
transfer
n. Belmonts
right to first
refusal to
acquire
your business
o. Belmonts
option to
purchase your
business
p. Your death or
disability
q. Non - competition
covenants during
the term of the
franchise
r. Non-competition
covenants after
the franchise is
terminated or
expires
s. Modification of
the agreement
t. Integration!
merger clause
u. Dispute
resolution by
arbitration or
mediation
APPENDIX 0
Section 19C
New franchisee qualifies, transfer
fee paid, purchase agreement approved,
training arranged, release signed by
you and current agreement signed by
new franchisee (also see 1', below)
Section 19F
Belmont can match any offer for the
franchisee's business
None, but see policy
described in Note 1
Section 19D Franchise must be assigned by estate to
approved buyer in 6 months
Section 11
No involvement in competing business
anywhere in V.S
Sections 19C
and 22C
No competing business for 2 years within 20
miles of another Belmont franchise
(including after assignment)
Section 8A No modifications generally butOperating Manual subject to change
Only the terms of the franchise agreement
are binding (subject to state law). Any
other promises may not be enforceable
Section 29
Section 24
Except for certin
claims, all disputes
must be arbitrated in
w. Choice of law
v. Choice of forum Section 27
law
Section 28
Litigation must be in
applies
Note 1 - Franchisor is not obligated by the Agreement to do so, but, if the franchise is terminated,
franchisor's policy is to buy back inventory at fair market value. This policy is subject to change at any
time.
These states have statutes which may supersede the franchise agreement in your relationship with
the franchisor including the areas ofterl1ination and renewal of your franchise: ARKANSAS (Stat.
Section 70-807), CALIFORNIA (Bus. & Prof. Cod e Sections 20000 -20043), CONNECTICUT
(Gen. Stat. Section 42- 133e et seq.), DELAWARE (Code, tit.), HA WAIl (Rev. Stat. Section 482E-
1), ILLINOIS (Rev. Stat. Chapter 121 II2 par 1719-1720), INDIANA (Stat. Section 23-2-2.7),
IOWA (Code Sections 523H.I-523H.17), MICHIGAN (Stat. Section 19.854(27)), MINNESOTA
(Stat. Section 80C. 14), MISSISSIPPI (Code Section 75-24-51), MISSOURI (Stat. Section 407.400),
NEBRASKA (Rev. Stat. Section 87-40I), NEW JERSEY (Stat. Section 56: 10-1), SOUTH
DAKOTA (Codified Laws Section 37-5A-51), VIRGINIA (Code i 3.1-557-574-13.1-564),
WASHINGTON (Code Section 19.100.180), WISCONSIN (Stat. Section 135.03). These and other
states may have court decisions which may supersede the franchise agreement in your relationship
with the franchisor including the areas of termination and renewal of your franchise.
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